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Abstract 
 
  In their examination of party-voter linkages in twelve Latin American democracies, 
Kitschelt et al. (2010) find evidence of programmatic political competition in only two countries: 
Chile and Uruguay. However, while my own analysis of party-voter linkages in contemporary 
Latin America confirms the presence of programmatic political competition in Chile and 
Uruguay, it also reveals that programmatic party-voter linkages are stronger in El Salvador – one 
of the region’s poorest countries, and a country with scant democratic history – than they are in 
either Chile or Uruguay. The fact that El Salvador contradicts the standard “sociological” model 
of party system development, which identifies both a long democratic history and a relatively 
high level of socioeconomic development as prerequisites for the development of programmatic 
political competition, is the primary empirical puzzle that motivates this dissertation. 
 In response to the question of why programmatic political competition emerges in some 
countries but not in others, I argue that elite political agency, rather than the political and 
socioeconomic characteristics associated with the sociological model of party system 
development, determines the type of party-voter linkages that form in a given party system. More 
specifically, I contend that the presence of a unified Left that has achieved electoral success by 
actively promoting its ideological distinctiveness is the common link that explains the 
development of programmatic political competition in Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador. To 
support this argument, I combine the analysis of cross-country public opinion surveys with case 
studies that detail party system development in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala. 
Particularly instructive is the comparison between El Salvador, where programmatic party-voter 
linkages are much stronger than the standard sociological model would predict, and Costa Rica, 
where a relatively high level of socioeconomic development and a long democratic history have 
failed to generate programmatic political competition. Whereas my examination of the 
development of the Salvadoran party system demonstrates that the FMLN has played a crucial 
role in the development of programmatic political competition, my examination of party-voter 
linkages in Costa Rica shows how the weakness and disorganization of the Costa Rican Left has 
inhibited the development of programmatic political competition. 
 
  iv 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables ..........................................................................................................................     vi 
List of Figures .........................................................................................................................   viii 
List of Acronyms ....................................................................................................................     ix 
 
Chapter One: The Path to Programmatic Political Competition .............................................      1 
 1.1  Latin American Parties and Party Systems .............................................................      6 
 1.2  Party Elites and the Nature of Party-Voter Linkages .............................................    14 
 1.3  Guide to the Dissertation ........................................................................................    21 
Chapter Two: Programmatic Political Competition in Contemporary Latin America ...........    26 
 2.1  Predicting Programmatic Political Competition in Latin America .........................    28 
 2.2  Left-Right Self-Placement and Voting Behavior ...................................................    31 
 2.3  The Meaningfulness of Left-Right Self-Placement in Latin America ....................    44 
 2.4  Conclusions ............................................................................................................    51 
Chapter Three: Time, Party Elites, and the Nature of Party-Voter Linkages .........................    52 
 3.1  Political Capabilities, Opportunities, and Stakes ....................................................    54 
 3.2  Political Capabilities: Modernization Theory Redux .............................................    56 
 3.3  Political Opportunities: Political Learning and Party Identification .......................    58 
 3.4  Political Stakes: Social Cleavages and Critical Junctures ......................................    64 
 3.5  The Critical Role of the Latin American Left ........................................................    69 
Chapter Four: Introduction to Central American Case Studies  .............................................    73 
 4.1  Contemporary Variation in Party System Development ........................................    74 
 4.2  Three Branches off the Same Tree .........................................................................    87 
 4.3  Summary of Case Studies .......................................................................................    96 
Chapter Five: The Development of Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages in El Salvador ......  100 
 5.1  The Formation of ARENA and the FMLN .............................................................  104 
 5.2  Charting the Emergence of Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages ..........................  115 
 5.3  Conclusions ............................................................................................................  136 
  v 
Chapter Six: Guatemala: War is not the Answer ....................................................................  138 
 6.1  Party System, Party Non-System, or Non-Party Non-System? ..............................  141 
 6.2  The Persistence of Personalism ..............................................................................  147 
 6.3  After Árbenz: The Long Decline of the Guatemalan Left ......................................  150 
 6.4  Conclusions ............................................................................................................  162 
Chapter Seven: Costa Rica: Democratic Stability, Party System Disarray .............................  164 
 7.1  Costa Rican Elections: What, if anything, is at Stake? ...........................................  167 
 7.2  The Birth of Modern Costa Rica, 1929-48 .............................................................  173 
 7.3  The Long Fall of the Costa Rican Left ...................................................................  178 
 7.4  “Izquierda” is a Four-Letter Word .........................................................................  183 
 7.5  Musical Chairs to the Rhythm of Calypso: Opposition to the PLN .......................  192 
 7.6  Conclusions ............................................................................................................  196 
Chapter Eight: Beyond Central America ................................................................................  198 
 8.1 Elite Political Agency in Uruguay and Chile .........................................................  200 
 8.2 Programmatic Political Competition in Nicaragua and Bolivia?.............................  214 
 8.3 Argentina and Brazil: Impact of an Unclear Left ...................................................  224 
 8.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................  232 
Chapter Nine: Final Thoughts .................................................................................................  235 
 9.1 The Development of Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages ....................................  236 
 9.2 Latin America: Looking towards the Future ..........................................................  242 
 9.3 Future Research ......................................................................................................  249 
Bibliography ...........................................................................................................................  253 
Appendix .................................................................................................................................  272 
 
  vi 
List of Tables 
 
2.1 – GDP per Capita, 1929, at Purchasing Power Parity .......................................................    29 
2.2 – Democratic Experience: Years Democratic or Semi-Democratic, 1945-98 ..................    29 
2.3 – Social Security and Welfare Spending as a Percentage of GDP, 1970-2000 ................    29 
2.4 – Predicting the Relative Likelihood of Programmatic Political Competition .................    31 
2.5 – Programmatic Party Structuration (PPS) in Latin America, 1997/98 ............................    32 
2.6 – Predicted vs. Observed Programmatic Political Competition ........................................    34 
2.7 – Left-Right Self-Identification as a Prediction of Voting Behavior ................................    35 
2.8 – Comparing Measures of Programmatic Political Competition ......................................    38 
2.9 – Expanding the Sample ...................................................................................................    39 
2.10 – Predicted vs. Observed Programmatic Political Competition: Rankings .....................    41 
2.11 – The Impact of Outliers .................................................................................................    43 
2.12 – Average Standardized R2 Values, by Period ................................................................    50 
4.1 – Party System Institutionalization, 1994-2014 ................................................................    77 
4.2 – Ideological Polarization in Latin American Party Systems, 2006-10 ............................    80 
4.3 – Ideological Clarity in Latin American Party Systems, 2006-10 ....................................    80 
4.4 – Party Participation in Mayoral Elections .......................................................................    83 
4.5 – Development Indicators .................................................................................................    89 
8.1 – Support for Free Markets in Post-Pinochet Chile ..........................................................  213 
8.2 – PT: President versus Party, 1994-2014 ..........................................................................  231 
 
 
Tables in the Appendix 
 
2.13 – Population in Latin America, 2010 (in millions) .........................................................  275 
2.14 – GDP per Capita, 2000, at Purchasing Power Parity .....................................................  277 
2.15 – Estimates of GDP per Capita in 1928/29 .....................................................................  279 
2.16 – Measuring Political Stakes ...........................................................................................  281 
2.17 – Predictions of Programmatic Political Competition: Pearson’s R ...............................  282 
2.18 – Predicted PPC: Comparing Four Measures of Political Stakes ...................................  283 
2.19 – Predicting the Relative Likelihood of Programmatic Political Competition ...............  285 
  vii 
2.20 – Predicted vs. Observed Programmatic Political Competition ......................................  286 
2.21 – Left-Right Self-Identification as a Predictor of Voting Behavior ................................  287 
2.22 – Correlations between Independent Variables and Left-Right Self-Placement .............  293 
2.23 – Description of Independent Variables ..........................................................................  296 
2.24 – Independent Variables by Survey Year .......................................................................  297 
2.25 – Comparing Alternate Regression Models ....................................................................  298 
2.26 – Correlations between Alternate Regression Models ....................................................  299 
2.27 – Comparing Imputed Data and List-wise Deletion .......................................................  299 
2.28 – R2 Values for Country-Year Regression Models .........................................................  300 
2.29 – Standardized R2 Values for Country-Year Regression Models ...................................  301 
2.30 – Support for Democracy and Support for a Military Coup ...........................................  309 
2.31 – Educational Attainment by Country ............................................................................  315 
2.32 – Average Level of Political Interest ..............................................................................  315 
2.33 – Average Level of (Self-Reported) Political Knowledge ..............................................  316 
4.6 – Ideological Clarity in Latin American Party Systems ....................................................  319 
5.1 – March 1994 Election Results .........................................................................................  322 
5.2 – March 1997 Election Results .........................................................................................  322 
5.3 – March 2000 Election Results .........................................................................................  322 
5.4 – March 2003 Election Results .........................................................................................  323 
5.5 – March 2006 Election Results .........................................................................................  323 
5.6 – January 2009 Election Results .......................................................................................  323 
7.1 – Q-Statements Associated with the Right, Costa Rica, Factor 1 .....................................  336 
7.2 – Q-Statements Associated with the Left, Costa Rica, Factor 1 .......................................  336 
7.3 – Q-Statements Associated with the Right, El Salvador, Factor 1 ....................................  337 
7.4 – Q-Statements Associated with the Left, El Salvador, Factor 1 ......................................  337 
7.5 – Q-Statements Associated with the Right, Costa Rica, Factor 2 .....................................  338 
7.6 – Q-Statements Associated with the Left, Costa Rica, Factor 2 .......................................  338 
7.7 – Q-Statements Associated with the Right, El Salvador, Factor 2 ....................................  338 
7.8 – Q-Statements Associated with the Left, El Salvador, Factor 2 ......................................  339 
7.9 – Factor Scores ..................................................................................................................  339 
7.10 – Defining Sorts by Party Affiliation, Costa Rica ..........................................................  339 
7.11 – Defining Sorts by Party Affiliation, El Salvador .........................................................  339 
  viii 
List of Figures 
 
1.1 – Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages in Contemporary Latin America .........................      4 
1.2 – The Path to Programmatic Political Competition ..........................................................    20 
2.1 – Ideological Self-Placement and Presidential Vote Choice .............................................    36 
2.2 – Predicted vs. Observed Programmatic Political Competition ........................................    42 
2.3 – The Meaningfulness of Left and Right in Latin America ..............................................    48 
4.1 – Ideological Polarization in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, 2006-07 .............    82 
5.1 – Valid Votes Cast in National Elections, 1982-2014 ......................................................  132 
5.2 – Third Party Vote in Legislative Elections, 1994-2015 ...................................................  132 
6.1 – Electoral Weakness of the Guatemalan Left, 1995-2011 ...............................................  148 
7.1 – Relative Left-Right Placement, 1948 .............................................................................  178 
8.1 – Electoral Growth of the Frente Amplio, 1984-2014 ......................................................  206 
8.2 – Elections to Chile’s Chamber of Deputies, 1989-2013 ..................................................  209 
8.3 – The PT and the Rest of the Left .....................................................................................  230 
8.4 – Electoral Performance of the PT, 1989-2014 .................................................................  230 
9.1 – Predicted versus Observed Programmatic Political Competition ..................................  237 
 
 
Figures in the Appendix 
 
2.4 – Educational Attainment vs. Programmatic Political Competition .................................  316 
2.5 – Political Interest vs. Programmatic Political Competition .............................................  317 
2.6 – Political Knowledge vs. Programmatic Political Competition ......................................  317 
4.2 – GDP per Capita, 1929-2006 ...........................................................................................  318 
5.3 – The Decline of the PCN and the PDC ............................................................................  321 
6.2 – Genealogy of the Guatemalan Right ..............................................................................  324 
7.2 – Q-Sort Distribution ........................................................................................................  335 
 
  ix 
List of Acronyms 
 
ACS Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil (Civil Society Assembly), Guatemala 
ADN Acción Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Action), Bolivia 
ALN Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance) 
ANEP Asociación Nacional de Empresa Privada (National Association of Private 
Enterprise), El Salvador 
ANC Alianza Nacional Cristiana (National Christian Alliance), Costa Rica 
ANN Alianza Nueva Nación (New Nation Alliance), Guatemala 
ANSESAL Agencia Nacional de Servicios Especiales (National Special Services Agency), 
El Salvador 
ARDE Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática (Democratic Revolutionary Alliance), 
Nicaragua 
ARENA Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance), El Salvador 
ASI Alianza Social Indígena (Indigenous Social Alliance), Colombia 
ASP Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Assembly for the Sovereignty of the 
Peoples), Bolivia 
BOC Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos (Workers and Peasants Bloc), Costa Rica 
BRP Bloque Revolucionario Popular (Popular Revolutionary Bloc), El Salvador 
CACIF Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y 
Financieras (Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, 
and Financial Associations), Guatemala 
CCSS Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (Costa Rican Department of Social 
Security) 
CD Convergencia Democrática (Democratic Convergence) (1988-97); Cambio 
Democrático (Democratic Change) (2005-present), El Salvador 
CEPN Centro para el Estudio de los Problemas Nacionales (Center for the Study of 
National Problems), Costa Rica 
CN Coalición Nacional (National Coalition), El Salvador 
CNT Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (National Convention of Workers), 
Uruguay 
COENA Consejo Ejecutivo Nacional (ARENA’s National Executive Council), El 
Salvador 
COSEP Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada (Superior Council of Private 
Enterprise), Nicaragua 
CPU Coalición Pueblo Unido (People United Coalition), Costa Rica 
CREO Compromiso, Renovación y Orden (Compromise, Renewal, and Order), 
Guatemala 
CRM Coordinadora Revolucionaria de Masas (Mass Revolutionary Council), El 
Salvador 
DCG Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (Guatemalan Christian Democracy) 
  x 
DIA Desarrollo Integral Auténtico (Authentic Integral Development), Guatemala 
DRU Dirección Revolucionaria Unificada (Unified Revolutionary Directorate), El 
Salvador 
DSP Democracia Social Participativa (Social Participative Democracy), Guatemala 
EG Encuentro por Guatemala (Encounter for Guatemala) 
EGP Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (Guerrilla Army of the Poor), Guatemala 
ERP Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (People’s Revolutionary Army), El Salvador 
FA Frente Amplio (Broad Front), Costa Rica 
FA Frente Amplio (Broad Front), Uruguay 
FAL Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación (Armed Forces of Liberation), El Salvador 
FAPU Frente de Acción Popular Unificado (Unified Popular Action Front), El Salvador 
FAR Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (Rebel Armed Forces), Guatemala 
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia) 
FARN Fuerzas Armadas de la Resistencia Nacional (Armed Forces of the National 
Resistance), El Salvador 
FD Fuerza Democrática (Democratic Force), Costa Rica 
FDN Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (Nicaraguan Democratic Force) 
FDNG Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala (New Guatemala Democratica Front) 
FDR Frente Democrático Revolucionario (Democratic Revolutionary Front), El 
Salvador 
FECCAS Federación Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadoreños (Christian Federation of 
Salvadoran Peasants) 
FIDEL Frente Izquierda de Liberación (Leftist Liberation Front), Uruguay 
FMLN Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front), El Salvador 
FPL Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Martí (Farabundo Martí Popular 
Liberation Forces), El Salvador 
FREPASO Frente por un País Solidario (Front for a Country in Solidarity), Argentina 
FRG Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (Guatemalan Republican Front) 
FSLN Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation 
Front), Nicaragua 
FUNDESA Fundación para el Dessarrollo de Guatemala (Foundation for the Development 
of Guatemala) 
FUSADES Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (Salvadoran 
Foundation for Economic and Social Development) 
GANA Gran Alianza Nacional (Grand National Alliance), Guatemala 
GANA Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional (Grand Alliance for National Unity), El 
Salvador 
ICE Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (Costa Rican Institute of Energy) 
IPSP Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Political Instrument for 
the Sovereignty of the Peoples), Bolivia 
  xi 
JRN Juventud Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Youth), El Salvador 
LIDER Libertad Democrática Renovada (Renewed Democratic Liberty), Guatemala 
LP-28 Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero (February 28 Popular Leagues), El Salvador 
MAS Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Toward Socialism), Bolivia 
MIR Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left Movement), 
Bolivia 
ML Partido Movimiento Libertario (Libertarian Movement Party), Costa Rica 
MLN Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Movement), Uruguay 
MLP Movimiento de Liberación Popular (Popular Liberation Movement), El Salvador 
MNR Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (Revolutionary National Movement), El 
Salvador 
MNR Movimiento Nueva República (New Republic Movement), Guatemala 
MPP Movimiento de Participación Popular (Popular Participation Movement), 
Uruguay 
MR Partido Movimiento Renovador (Renewal Movement Party), El Salvador 
MR-13 Movimiento Revolucionario 13 Noviembre (November 13 Revolutionary 
Movement), Guatemala 
MRO Movimiento Revolucionario Oriental (Oriental Revolutionary Movement), 
Uruguay 
MRP Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (People’s Revolutionary Movement), 
Costa Rica 
ORDEN Organización Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Organization), 
El Salvador 
ORPA Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas (Revolutionary Organization 
of the People in Arms), Guatemala 
PAC Partido Acción Ciudadana (Citizens’ Action Party), Costa Rica 
PAC Patrulla de Autodefensa Civil (Civil Self-Defense Patrol), Guatemala 
PADP Partido Acción Democrática Popular (Popular Democratic Action Party), Costa 
Rica 
PAIS Partido Amplio de Izquierda Socialista (Broad Party of the Socialist Left), Chile 
PAN Partido Agrario Nacional (National Agrarian Party), Costa Rica 
PAN Partido de Avanzada Nacional (National Advancement Party), Guatemala 
PAR Partido de Acción Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Action Party), El Salvador 
PAR Partido de Acción Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Action Party), Guatemala 
PASE Partido Accesibilidad Sin Exclusión (Accessibility Without Exclusion Party), 
Costa Rica 
PASO Partido Acción Socialista (Socialist Action Party), Costa Rica 
PCB Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party) 
PCCh Partido Comunista de Chile (Communist Party of Chile) 
PCCR Partido Comunista de Costa Rica (Communist Party of Costa Rica) 
PCdoB Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil) 
  xii 
PCG Partido Comunista Guatemalteco (Guatemalan Communist Party) 
PCN Partido de Conciliación Nacional (National Conciliation Party) (1961-2011); 
Partido de Concertación Nacional (National Coalition Party) (2012-present), El 
Salvador 
PCO Partido da Causa Operária (Workers’ Cause Party), Brazil 
PCS Partido Comunista Salvadoreño (Salvadoran Communist Party) 
PCU Partido Comunista de Uruguay (Communist Party of Uruguay) 
PD Partido Demócrata (Democratic Party), Costa Rica 
PD Partido Demócrata (Democratic Party), El Salvador 
PDC Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party), Chile 
PDC Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party), Costa Rica 
PDC Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party), El Salvador 
PDT Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Democratic Labor Party), Brazil 
PFPC Partido Frente Popular Costarricense (Costa Rican Popular Front) 
PGT Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (Guatemalan Labor Party) 
PGP Partido por el Gobierno del Pueblo (Party for the Government of the People), 
Uruguay 
PIT-CNT Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores-Convención Nacional de Trabajadores 
(Intersyndical Plenary of Workers-National Convention of Workers), Uruguay 
PJ Partido Justicialista (Justicialist Party), Argentina 
PL Partido Liberal (Liberal Party), Brazil 
PLC Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (Constitutionalist Liberal Party), Nicaragua 
PLN Partido Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Party), Costa Rica 
PMDB Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement 
Party) 
POST Partido Organización Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Organization of 
Workers Party), Costa Rica 
PP Partido Patriota (Patriot Party), Guatemala 
PP Partido Progressista (Progressive Party), Brazil 
PPC Partido del Pueblo Costarricense (Costa Rican People’s Party) 
PPD Partido Por La Democracia (Party for Democracy), Chile 
PPL Partido Pátria Libre (Free Homeland Party), Brazil 
PPL Poderes Populares Locales (Local People's Power), El Salvador 
PPS Partido Popular Socialista (Popular Socialist Party), Brazil 
PR-9m Partido Revolucionario 9 de mayo (May 9th Revolutionary Party), El Salvador 
PRAM Partido Revolucionario Abril y Mayo (April and May Revolutionary Party), El 
Salvador 
PRB Partido Republicano Brasileiro (Brazilian Republican Party) 
PRC Partido Republicano Calderonista (Calderonista Republican Party), Costa Rica 
PRD Partido Renovación Democrática (Democratic Renovation Party), Costa Rica 
PRN Partido Republicano Nacional (National Republican Party), Costa Rica 
  xiii 
PRNI Partido Republicano Nacional Independiente (Independent National Republican 
Party), Costa Rica 
PRT Partido Revolucionario de las Trabajadoras y los Trabajadores (Workers 
Revolutionary Party), Costa Rica 
PRTC Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos (Revolutionary 
Party of Central American Workers), El Salvador 
PRUD Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Democrática (Revolutionary Party of 
Democratic Unification), El Salvador 
PS Partido Socialista (Socialist Party), Uruguay 
PS Partido Socialista de Chile (Chilean Socialist Party) 
PSB Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party) 
PSC Partido Socialista Costarricense (Costa Rican Socialist Party) 
PSD Partido Social Demócrata (Social Democratic Party), Costa Rica 
PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) 
PSOL Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (Socialist and Liberty Party), Brazil. 
PSTU Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado (United Socialist Workers’ 
Party), Brazil 
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party), Brazil 
PU Partido Unionista (Unionist Party), Guatemala 
PUD Partido de la Unión Democrática (Democratic Union Party), Costa Rica 
PUG Partido Unión General (General Union Party), Costa Rica 
PUN Partido Unión Nacional (National Union Party), Costa Rica 
PUP Partido Unión Popular (Popular Union Party), Costa Rica 
PUSC Partido de Unidad Socialcristiana (Social Christian Unity Party), Costa Rica 
PVP Partido Vanguardia Popular (Popular Vanguard Party), Costa Rica 
RN Fuerzas Armadas de la Resistencia Nacional (Armed Forces of the National 
Resistance), El Salvador 
RN Renovación Nacional (National Renewal), Chile 
TLC Tratado de Libre Comercio (Central American Free Trade Agreement) 
TSE Tribunal Supremo Electoral (Supreme Electoral Tribune), El Salvador 
UCN Unión del Cambio Nacional (National Change Union), Guatemala 
UCR Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union), Argentina 
UCR Unión Cívica Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Civic Union), Costa Rica 
UDI Unión Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union), Chile 
UDN Unión Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Union), El Salvador 
UfN Unificación Nacional (National Unification Party), Costa Rica 
UN Unión Nacional (National Union), Guatemala 
UNAG Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos de Nicaragua (National Union of 
Nicaraguan Farmers and Cattlemen) 
UNE Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (National Unity of Hope), Guatemala 
UNO Unión Nacional Opositora (National Opposition Union), El Salvador 
  xiv 
UP Unión Popular (Popular Union), Uruguay 
URD Unidad Revolucionaria Democrática (Democratic Revolutionary Unity), 
Guatemala 
URNG Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Unity) 
VDG Vanguardia Democrática Guatemalteca (Guatemalan Democratic Vanguard) 
VIVA Visión con Valores (Vision with Values), Guatemala 
 
 
  1 
Chapter One 
The Path to Programmatic Political Competition 
 
 When the first modern, representative democracies appeared in the late eighteenth 
century, political parties were described as a “dangerous vice” that constituted one of the 
“mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished” (Madison 
1787). Washington (1796) warned that the formation of political parties “serves always to 
distract the public councils, and enfeeble the public administration ... agitates the 
community ... foments occasionally riot and insurrection [and] opens the door to foreign 
influence and corruption.” However, by the early twentieth century, political scientists in 
the United States had adopted a drastically different opinion of the role that political 
parties play in a representative democracy. The “discipline and zest of parties” was 
praised for having “made it possible for [the US] to form and to carry out national 
programs” (Wilson 1908: 218, 221, cf. Cox and McCubbins 2005: 1). 
 This reappraisal of the relationship between political parties and representation is 
evidenced by the American Political Science Association’s much-cited call for 
“responsible partisan government,” which contends that “it is [only] in terms of party 
programs that political leaders can attempt to consolidate public attitudes toward the 
work plans of government” (APSA 1950: 1). No longer seen as a source of “instability, 
injustice, and confusion,” (Washington 1796) political parties are now praised for serving 
to “simplify the labyrinthine world of politics by supplying voters with relevant 
information in digestible form … [and to] facilitate electoral decision making by 
providing the informational shortcuts and standing choices that many citizens rely upon 
at the start of every campaign” (Baker et al. 2006: 382). Quite the opposite of 
Washington’s fear that “the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party” would 
extinguish representative democracy, we now exalt political parties as the “primary 
vehicles for integrating diverse social forces within democratic institutions, channeling 
and processing societal demands, regulating sociopolitical conflict, defining public policy 
alternatives, and holding government officials accountable to the citizenry” (Roberts and 
Wibbels 1999: 575). Indeed, Schattschneider’s (1942: 1) frequently cited claim that 
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“democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties” – or, at the very least, the modified 
version, which holds that “democracy is unworkable save in terms of parties” (Aldrich 
1995: 3) – can now be considered conventional wisdom.  
 However, in terms of holding government officials accountable to the electorate 
and providing voters with relevant information, not all political parties are created equal. 
At its core, the normative argument in favor of responsible partisan government identifies 
rational, deliberative programmatic linkages between the voting public and its agents 
(elected officials) as a vital foundation for the establishment of democratic accountability 
and enhanced democratic quality. Only stable, institutionalized, and ideologically 
cohesive parties that “develop coherent policy alternatives in their public appeals” and 
attempt to “build programmatic linkages to voters by assembling distinctive electoral 
coalitions such that each party’s voters are on average closer to that party’s programmatic 
appeals than to the rival appeals of any other party” (Kitschelt et al. 2010: 3) generate the 
rational, deliberative programmatic linkages that facilitate democratic accountability, 
which enhances the quality of democratic representation and, by extension, the quality of 
democracy itself. 
 Programmatic appeals are not, however, the only mechanisms that elite political 
actors employ as they seek election to public office. Rational, deliberative party-voter 
linkages can also be formed when electoral competition centers on voters’ evaluations of 
parties’ past performance in government (retrospective voting) and/or their perceived 
ability to effectively provide the electorate with certain valence goods such as economic 
prosperity and domestic security (prospective voting). Linkages formed through direct, 
targeted exchanges between parties and voters in the form of “monetary transfers or gifts, 
jobs in the public sector, preferential treatments in the allocation of social subsidies, 
regulatory favors, government contracts and honorary memberships and titles” (i.e. 
clientelism) (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 21) can also be an effective, and rational, means for 
parties and their candidates to gain support. Various mechanisms that generate non-
rational, affective party-voter linkages – including collective identification based on 
shared descriptive attributes (e.g., religion, race, ethnicity, language), the formation of 
attachments based on the personal charisma and/or perceived moral rectitude of 
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individual political leaders, and the use of vague appeals that “eschew dogmatic ideology 
in the interests of pragmatism and rhetorical appeals to ‘the people,’ ‘the nation,’ 
‘progress,’ ‘development,’ or the like” (Dix 1989: 26) – have also been shown to be 
electorally viable alternatives to the formation of programmatic party-voter linkages. 
 While the argument that privileges programmatic political competition over these 
other linkage mechanisms is virtually hegemonic within the realm of empirical political 
science research, programmatic political competition has proven to be an elusive quality 
in many democracies. As illustrated by the history of party system evolution in twentieth 
century Latin America, programmatic political competition is particularly uncommon in 
the newer democracies of the developing world, where weakly institutionalized party 
systems have emerged more frequently, and demonstrated greater resilience, than in long-
established democracies (O’Donnell 1994, Mainwaring 1998, Mainwaring and Torcal 
2005). In all democracies, the creation of programmatic linkages between citizens and 
their political agents is constrained by (1) the organizational costs that political elites 
must bear in order to create programmatically-cohesive parties capable of coordinated 
political action and (2) the capacity of citizens/voters (generally presumed to be cognitive 
misers) to process political information. This second obstacle may be especially acute in 
newer democracies, such as those found in Latin America, where “the tumult of electoral 
politics ... [combined with] the impact of dealigning forces such as mass media elections 
and candidate-centered politics ... is seen as eroding party learning” (Dalton and Weldon 
2007: 189). 
 Given these obstacles to the development of programmatic political competition, 
it is unsurprising that programmatic parties – parties that “organize constituencies in 
support of alternative policy programs offering contrasting visions of societal 
development, distributive justice, and associated democratic institutions” (Kitschelt et al. 
2010: 2) – have, in much of Latin America, been eclipsed at the ballot box by clientelistic 
parties that foster direct linkages with individual voters, catch-all parties that capture 
votes by making broad promises to deliver widely-held goals such as domestic security 
and economic development, and personalized parties built around “a single extraordinary 
personality in whose superior wisdom and capacity to arrive at beneficial collective 
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decisions his or her following has absolute trust” (Kitschelt 1994: 3). Yet, in spite of 
these obstacles, relatively strong programmatic party-voter linkages have been 
established in three Latin American democracies: Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador. 
 
Figure 1.1 – Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages in Contemporary Latin America 
 
 
 Figure 1.1 summarizes the evidence that I present in Chapter Two that 
demonstrates the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages in these three countries. 
The X-axis corresponds to an indicator of the extent to which survey respondents’ left-
right self-placement predicted their voting behavior in presidential elections held during 
the period 2001-09, while the Y-axis indicates the strength of the relationship between 
survey respondents’ left-right self-placement and their attitudes regarding a selection of 
economic, political, and social issues.1 As this figure illustrates, voters’ policy 
preferences are a better predictor of left-right self-placement, which is itself a better 
                                                 
1
  These two indicators are described more fully in Chapter Two; the indicator on the X-axis is measured from zero to 
one, while the indicator on the Y-axis is measured in terms of standard deviations from the mean. 
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predictor of voting behavior, in Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador than in any other Latin 
American democracy. 
 Following Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) still-classic account, much of the research 
on party system development in Latin America identifies a long democratic history and a 
high level of socioeconomic development as two prerequisites for the development of 
programmatic political competition. Chile and Uruguay, two of the most “modernized” 
countries in Latin America, certainly fulfill these requirements. It is the unexpected 
inclusion of El Salvador – a country whose low level of socioeconomic development and 
scant democratic history would presumably inhibit the emergence of programmatic 
political competition – in the group of three countries where programmatic party-voter 
linkages have developed that constitutes the key empirical puzzle that motivates this 
dissertation. Is the development of programmatic political competition in El Salvador 
simply an anomaly, or does evidence of strong programmatic party-voter linkages in this 
small, poor Central American republic force us to rethink the conventional wisdom 
concerning party system development in Latin America? 
 I contend that we cannot dismiss the development of programmatic political 
competition in El Salvador as “the exception that proves the rule.” Rather, I argue that the 
development of programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador necessitates a 
reexamination of the role that political elites play in determining the type of party-voter 
linkages that develop within a given party system. Through a detailed examination of 
party-voter linkages in three countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica) and a 
review of party system development in the rest of the region, I demonstrate that elite 
political agency – in particular, the unification, organization, and political activity of the 
Left – is the key variable that explains why programmatic party-voter linkages have 
developed in some Latin American democracies but not in others. More precisely, I argue 
that the presence of an organized and unified Left that achieved success at the ballot box 
by actively promoting its ideological distinctiveness served as the cornerstone for the 
construction of programmatic party-voter linkages in Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador. 
 The organization and political activity of the Left is particularly important 
because, historically in Latin America, leftist parties have often had the greatest incentive 
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to push for programmatic political competition because they have fewer financial 
resources than their right-wing and center-right opponents. However, although Latin 
America’s leftist parties have an incentive to invest in the development of programmatic 
party-voter linkages, the Left has only adopted this strategy in a relatively small number 
of countries. In countries where the Left remains fragmented (e.g., Brazil, Costa Rica), 
where the Left has not offered voters an ideologically coherent alternative to the neo-
liberal discourse that became virtually hegemonic following the “lost decade” of the 
1980s (e.g., Argentina, Peru, Mexico), or where the Left has not invested in the 
construction of solid party organizations either because its leaders have preferred the 
populist path (e.g., Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua) or because the Left has simply been 
unable to attract much support from the voting public (e.g., Guatemala), party-voter 
linkages tend to be based on patron-client ties, on voters’ evaluations of competing 
parties’ ability to provide prosperity and security, and on populist appeals. It is only 
where the Left has made a concerted effort to establish programmatic linkages with its 
supporters that programmatic political competition has developed. 
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section provides 
an overview of the literature on Latin American parties and party systems that has 
developed over the course of the past two decades. In the second section, I introduce my 
theoretical argument regarding the role that elite political agency plays in the 
development of programmatic political competition. The chapter then concludes with a 
guide to the remainder of the dissertation. 
 
1.1 Latin American Parties and Party Systems 
 From the 1940s through the 1980s, scholarship on democracy in Latin America 
focused on democratic transitions, democratic consolidation, and the breakdown of 
democratic regimes (Foweraker 1998). This preoccupation with democratization and 
democratic survival was consistent with the high degree of regime volatility that the 
region experienced during this period; although the “second wave” of democratization 
(Huntington 1991) had lifted the number of electoral democracies in the region to an 
unprecedented high of twelve in 1958, many of these early democratic experiments 
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would soon prove to be just that – experiments.2 By 1976, membership in the group of 
Latin American electoral democracies had fallen to three (Colombia, Costa Rica, and 
Venezuela). 
 The tide began to change again in 1978, when the “third wave” of 
democratization first reached Latin American shores with the restoration of democratic 
rule in the Dominican Republic. During the next twelve years, authoritarian regimes 
throughout the region fell like a series of dominoes; since 1990, when democracy was 
reestablished in Chile and Panama, Cuba has remained as Latin America’s only 
nondemocratic regime.3 While we cannot rule out the possibility of another reverse wave 
like the one that swept through the region during the 1960s and 1970s, it is important to 
note that, at present, the presence of civilian regimes led by the victors of relatively free 
and fair electoral competition has become the norm in Latin America for the first time in 
the region’s history. This historic change in Latin America’s political status quo has, 
appropriately, been accompanied by changes in the nature of scholarly work on 
democracy in the region. The earlier focus on democratization and the prospects for 
democratic survival has been largely supplanted by a focus on the quality of Latin 
America’s democratic institutions. 
 Within this new research tradition, Dix (1989) set the cornerstone for the 
development of a robust literature focused on Latin American party systems, a field of 
research that had been largely abandoned since the late 1960s, when interest in the 
region’s military regimes and revolutionary movements made “the study of political 
parties … a marginal pursuit among Latin Americanists” (Coppedge 1998b: 548). Based 
both on case studies of the party systems of individual countries (Keck 1986, Conaghan 
1988, Hartlyn 1988, Kinzo 1988, Gillespie 1991, González 1991, Graham 1992, Scully 
                                                 
2
 Throughout this manuscript, I employ a definition of “Latin America” that includes the nineteen independent states 
in the Americas that were formerly colonies of either Spain or Portugal, and use the term “electoral democracy” to 
include regimes that Mainwaring et al. (2001) code as either democratic or semi-democratic. 
3
  Although at least six Latin American countries have experienced interruptions to democratic rule since 1990 –
Fujimori’s autogolpe in Peru (1992), Serrano’s failed autogolpe and subsequent forced resignation in Guatemala 
(1993), the irregular impeachments of Ecuadorian presidents Bucaram (1997) and Gutiérrez (2005) and the forced 
resignation of president Mahuad (2000), the successful coup d’état that deposed Honduran president Zelaya (2009), 
failed coup attempts in Venezuela (1992, 2002) and Paraguay (1996), and the express impeachment of Paraguay’s 
president Lugo (2012) – these episodes were all met with various levels of regional condemnation and all were 
followed by a relatively prompt return to constitutional rule. 
  8 
1992, Mainwaring 1993, Coppedge 1994, Gibson 1996) and on investigations that 
utilized cross-national data (Remmer 1991, Mainwaring 1993, Jones 1994, Mainwaring 
and Scully 1995, Coppedge 1997), a new conventional wisdom soon emerged, arguing 
that Latin American party systems have failed to achieve the high degree of 
institutionalization and electoral stability exhibited by the party systems of the advanced 
industrialized democracies because of the weakness of the region’s class-based parties. In 
Western Europe, the expansion of suffrage in the early twentieth century had resulted in 
the rise to prominence of exclusivist, class-mass parties; in Latin America, however, 
inclusivist catch-all parties that are “excessively pragmatic, clientelistic, personalistic, 
volatile, uncohesive, and therefore weak” (Coppedge 1998b: 547) emerged as “the 
archetypical parties of the era of industrialization and mass mobilization” (Dix 1989: 31). 
 In a region long characterized by extraordinarily high levels of socioeconomic 
inequality, where the poor might be expected to soak the rich when afforded the 
opportunity to do so via relatively free and fair elections, the historical weakness of Latin 
America’s class-based parties is particularly surprising. Efforts to explain why party 
system development in Latin America has not followed the Western European model 
have tended to emphasize the manner in which Latin America’s social, economic, and 
political development during the early twentieth century differed from the experience of 
the advanced industrial democracies. In this regard, both modernization theory’s account 
of the relationship between industrialization and democracy (Lipset 1959) and the 
sociological model of party system development introduced by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
have loomed large over the literature on Latin American party systems. 
 Scholars who examined the relationship between industrialization and democracy 
in Latin America during the 1970s (e.g., O’Donnell 1973, Collier 1978) expressed a 
hearty skepticism of modernization theory that was fueled by unfolding events in the 
region’s five most highly industrialized nations – a series of military coups (1964-76) had 
exterminated democratic regimes in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina, while in 
Mexico, there were no signs that industrial development was having any impact on the 
PRI’s iron-clad grip on power. Interest in the relationship between industrialization and 
political development was soon revived when the third wave of democratization swept 
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through the region in the 1980s. In what can be considered the first systematic 
examination of party system formation and development in Latin America, Dix (1989) 
argues that the timing and nature of social mobilization and the expansion of suffrage 
explains why the region’s class-based parties have been so inconsequential in comparison 
to their European counterparts. The early expansion of suffrage in the region, enacted 
from above by elite groups who were motivated either by a desire to obtain new political 
allies in their competition with competing elites or by a desire to co-opt potential mass 
challenges to the social and economic privileges they enjoyed, precluded the “prolonged 
consciousness-raising struggle for political participation” that characterized the expansion 
of suffrage in Western Europe (Dix 1989: 33). 
 More importantly, in terms of explaining the relative weakness of Latin 
America’s class-based parties, the secondary sector (industry and related occupations) 
never supplanted agriculture and other primary sectors as the main source of employment 
in Latin America as it had in Western Europe and North America. Rather, in those Latin 
American countries where agriculture is no longer the main source of employment, the 
sector has been replaced not by industry, but by the service sector. Whereas Europeans 
and North Americans who abandoned the primary sector during the industrial revolution 
found work in the factory, an environment that fosters union organizing and the 
development of class consciousness, Latin Americans who leave the campo for the city 
struggle to find permanent, formal employment, and instead either find (often temporary) 
employment in the service sector or join the ever-expanding ranks of petty entrepreneurs. 
This pattern of insecure employment gives rise to a “migrant ethic” (Portes 1971) which 
leads service sector workers to “see their present and future in terms of individual, rather 
than class or group, mobility … not the kind of social situation in which class solidarity 
thrives” (Dix 1989: 32). In this environment, which stifles union organization and limits 
the formation of working class solidarity, political elites who attempt to create class-
based political parties find a limited audience for their (programmatic) message.  
 Like Dix (1989), Collier and Collier (1991) also identify industrialization as a 
necessary prerequisite for the formation of class-based political parties. Indeed, the eight 
countries they include in their analysis of political development in twentieth-century 
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Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela) are chosen precisely because they “have the longest history of urban 
commercial and manufacturing development in Latin America” (Collier and Collier 
1991: 12). Identifying the incorporation period, that moment when “state control of the 
working class ceased to be principally the responsibility of the police or the army but 
rather was achieved at least in part through the legalization and institutionalization of a 
labor movement sanctioned and regulated by the state,” as a critical juncture in the 
region’s political development, Collier and Collier (1991: 3, 498) argue that the manner 
in which nascent labor movements were incorporated into pre-existing party system 
structures during the early to mid-twentieth century “helped shape the type of political 
coalitions that crystallized … and the way these coalitions were institutionalized in 
different party systems.” Each country’s pattern of labor incorporation influenced future 
party system development in terms of party system fragmentation, political polarization, 
and the nature of the linkages that formed between political parties and organized labor. 
In turn, these characteristics shaped the nature of political competition, influenced the 
state’s ability to address opposition demands during the political and economic crises that 
swept across the region during the 1960s and 1970s, and, ultimately, affected the 
sustainability of electoral democracy in each country. 
 While Latin America’s late (and incomplete) industrialization unmistakably 
differed from the experience of the advanced industrial democracies, it is less clear why 
Latin American party systems have not followed the Western European example in terms 
of the relationship between social cleavages and party system development. According to 
Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) classic account, the reason why Western European party 
systems have exhibited a fairly remarkable degree of electoral stability is because they 
became “frozen” around the social cleavages – understood as “a form of closure of social 
relationships” that involves (1) an empirical (ascriptive) element which “identifies the 
empirical referent of the concept, and which we can define in social-structural terms,” (2) 
a normative (attitudinal) element consisting of “the set of values and beliefs which 
provides a sense of identity and role to the empirical element,” and (3) an organizational 
(behavioral) element, defined as “the set of individual interactions, institutions, and 
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organizations, such as political parties, which develop as part of the cleavage” (Bartolini 
and Mair 1990: 215-216) – that delineated political conflict at the time when suffrage was 
expanded to include the vast majority of male citizens. To determine why Latin American 
party systems did not follow this same path, one must examine the cleavage structure that 
characterized political conflict in Latin America prior to the era of mass politics. 
 To what extent did the cleavage structure that molded political conflict in Latin 
America prior to the era of mass politics resemble the social cleavages that existed in 
nineteenth-century Europe, where political conflict revolved around center-periphery, 
church-state, agriculture-industry/commerce, and worker-capitalist cleavages? According 
to Geddes (2004), the constellation of social cleavages found in mid-nineteenth century 
Latin America – when traditional landed interests allied with supporters of the church 
establishment and proponents of centralized government, generally under the 
“Conservative” label, to do battle (figuratively and, in a number of countries, also 
literally) with the anti-clerical, federalist, and commercial interests that formed the 
“Liberal” alliance – strongly resembled the configuration of social cleavages found in 
Catholic Southern Europe. Latin American party systems failed to follow the European 
model not because of differences in the initial cleavage structure, but rather, due to 
institutional features that differentiate Latin America’s presidential democracies from the 
parliamentary systems that predominate in Europe. 
 Dix (1989), on the other hand, argues that Latin America’s party systems have not 
followed the European model because Latin American societies do not exhibit the same 
set of divisive social cleavages as those found in Europe. While conceding that, “at first 
glance the historical cleavage lines of Latin American politics would appear roughly to 
parallel those of the European past, albeit with notable time lags: the center versus the 
periphery, the secularizing state versus the church, the landed elite versus commercial 
and industrial interests, and finally, in the wake of all the others, the class struggle of 
workers against their employers,” Dix (1989: 24-25) argues that religious homogeneity, 
the coincidence of industrial and landed interests, early political consolidation during the 
colonial era, and the absence of conflict between sub-national cultures defined by 
different languages and/or religions all inhibited the formation of durable social 
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cleavages in the region. Subsequent authors have tended to follow Dix (1989) by utilizing 
the social cleavage framework and the related concept of critical junctures in their 
examinations of political development in Latin America.  
 Before returning to the question at hand – why have programmatic party-voter 
linkages developed in some contemporary Latin American democracies but not in others? 
– it is important to recognize two shortcomings of early studies of Latin American party 
systems. First, as Coppedge (1998b: 549) notes, many of these studies tended to adopt a 
“purely institutional focus” on party system fragmentation and institutionalization, which 
produced “a dissection of party systems that have been drained, gutted, and picked clean 
of the flesh and blood of politics – ideology, personalities, interests, ideas, platforms, 
slogans, images, issues – in short, the substance of political competition.” Second, these 
studies also tended to overlook variation within the region. However, empirical research 
designed to measure party system institutionalization in the region (Dix 1992, 
Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Coppedge 1998a) demonstrates that, by characterizing the 
region’s party systems as fragmented and volatile, this conventional wisdom masks 
significant diversity within the region. 
 Indeed, Bornschier (2009: 8) contends that Latin America has drawn the attention 
of party system scholars precisely because “the amount of intra-regional variation in 
party system institutionalization and in the degree that party systems reflect social 
structure” makes the region a fruitful proving ground for theories of party system 
development. This variation is evident not only in terms of party system fragmentation 
and institutionalization, but also in terms of the nature of party-voter linkages that have 
formed in the region and the degree to which the region’s political parties contribute to 
the formation of relations of democratic accountability. 
 Although party system institutionalization may be a precondition of programmatic 
political competition – it is difficult to envision strong programmatic party-voter linkages 
emerging in a country where parties are poorly institutionalized – it does not follow that 
institutionalized party systems will necessarily develop programmatic party-voter 
linkages. Where political parties establish an organizational presence at the local level 
and where local-level party organizations maintain some degree of significance and 
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independence within the national-level party structure, these local party organizations 
create linkage mechanisms that allow supporters to hold party leaders accountable, 
regardless of the nature (programmatic, clientelistic, or affective) of the party’s appeal 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Therefore, targeted investigations of the nature of party-
voter linkages are needed in order to determine whether the relations of accountability 
formed by parties that are institutionalized in this manner constitute evidence of 
“promissory representation” (Mansbridge 2003) steeped in ideological differences 
between one party and another.  
 Bringing the examination of party system development in Latin America much 
closer to the substance of political competition (and to questions concerning the quality 
of representation afforded by the region’s political parties), Kitschelt et al. (2010) 
measure “programmatic party structuration” in twelve Latin American countries. 
Uruguay and Chile rank at or near the top of each of the four indicators they use to 
measure the extent to which political competition in these countries is organized around 
programmatic differences between competing political parties. To explain why the 
strength of programmatic party-voter linkages varies across the region, Kitschelt et al. 
(2010: 31, emphasis in original) argue that lasting programmatic party-voter linkages are 
the end product of long-term processes of political learning that only occur when each of 
three elements is in place: 
“political actors must have the capabilities – in terms of material and cognitive resources 
– to process the information and build the organizations that make possible programmatic 
linkages … [they must have ample] opportunities to engage in collective action and 
electoral competition to build programmatic linkages through an iteration of elections in 
which politicians and electoral constituencies can learn democratic accountability … [and 
they must] perceive political stakes – widely shared prospective material or cultural gains 
or losses imposed by authoritative policies and institutions locking in such policies – that 
motivate them to organize the political process around partisan alignments.” 
 
 This argument combines insights from modernization theory and from Lipset and 
Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage-based approach to the study of party system development with 
elements of the Michigan model of party identification (Campbell et al. 1954, 1960). 
From modernization theory, it appropriates the belief that a certain level of 
socioeconomic development is a prerequisite for the formation of a stable party system in 
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which political parties utilize programmatic appeals to win voters’ support. From social 
cleavage theory, it adopts the belief that strong party-voter linkages are likely to form 
only in the presence of a persistent, well-defined issue conflict that generates enduring 
political divisions. From the Michigan model, it borrows the notion that the development 
of programmatic party-voter linkages is a lengthy process made possible only by an 
iteration of democratic elections. In essence, Kitschelt et al. (2010) simply apply the 
conventional wisdom regarding party system development in Latin America to the 
question of programmatic party-voter linkages.  
 
1.2 Party Elites and the Nature of Party-Voter Linkages 
 In Chapter Two, I demonstrate that predictions based on measures of pre-WWII 
economic prosperity, post-WWII experience with democratic rule, and state social 
welfare expenditures (the three indicators that Kitschelt et al. (2010) use as proxy 
measures of economic and political modernization) cannot explain variation in the degree 
to which Latin America’s eighteen electoral democracies exhibit signs of programmatic 
political competition. Most spectacularly, the conventional wisdom cannot account for 
the surprising strength of programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador or for the 
non-programmatic nature of party-voter linkages in Argentina, Costa Rica, and Brazil, 
three relatively prosperous countries with comparatively long histories of democratic 
rule. 
 The poor performance of these predictions necessitates a re-examination of the 
speed with which programmatic party-voter linkages form, the resources needed to create 
organizations capable of fostering such linkages, and the role that political elites play in 
determining the nature of party-voter linkages. In accordance with the revisionist 
approach to the study of party identification (Markus and Converse 1979, Page and Jones 
1979, Fiorina 1981), I argue that the formation of programmatically meaningful party-
voter linkages does not necessarily require decades of stable democratic competition. 
Contra modernization theory and social cleavage theory, I argue that it is possible for 
political entrepreneurs to generate programmatic party-voter linkages even in societies 
characterized by a low level of socioeconomic development and/or the absence of a 
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stable pattern of social cleavages. In short, whereas the conventional wisdom focuses on 
the structural determinants of party system development, I emphasize elite political 
agency. 
 Echoing the Michigan model’s description of party identification as an “unmoved 
mover,” Kitschelt and his co-authors contend that the development of programmatic 
party-voter linkages “depends on long-term processes of political learning … [and that] 
short-term developments (e.g., economic performance, authoritarian interludes, and 
policy switching) tend to generate few improvements” which might facilitate the 
development of programmatic political competition (Hawkins et al. 2008: 2). However, 
empirical evidence (e.g., Inglehart and Hochstein 1972, Leithner 1997) which 
demonstrates that “crises can accelerate or erode the development of partisanship” 
(Niemi and Weisberg 2001: 329, emphasis added) suggests that political crises may 
facilitate the development of programmatic party-voter linkages. Indeed, I contend that 
political crises which result in the destruction of the previous partisan status quo may 
accelerate the political learning process that underlies the development of stable political 
identities and, subsequently, the formation of programmatic party-voter linkages. 
Specifically, I argue that, by creating an environment in which political conflict formed a 
central element of everyday life, the prolonged periods of pervasive political violence 
that preceded the most recent democratic transition in Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador 
served as a classroom for accelerated political learning.  
 Where widespread and persistent political violence – either in the form of the 
violent repression of civil society (the Southern Cone) or as all-out civil warfare (Central 
America) – preceded the establishment/restoration of electoral democracy, this violence 
held the potential to accelerate the process through which voters (1) learn to attach 
programmatic meaning to the ideological labels “left” and “right,” (2) begin to associate 
elite political actors with these labels, and (3) begin to use these labels to identify 
themselves. However, in arguing that pervasive political violence served to help educate 
the Chilean, Uruguayan, and Salvadoran masses regarding the ideological component of 
political competition by generating shared understandings of the meanings attached to the 
ideological terms “left” and “right” and of elite political actors’ placement on this 
  16 
ideological continuum, I do not contend that programmatic party-voter linkages can only 
form in the aftermath of such a dramatic episode, nor do I argue that political violence of 
the type experienced in these three societies necessarily results in the formation of 
programmatic party-voter linkages. Rather, I contend that the impact of political crises 
(broadly defined) on the development of programmatic political competition is largely 
dependent on decisions made by party elites regarding the manner in which political 
parties are organized and the manner in which they attempt to win the support of the 
voting public.  
 While our efforts to understand why programmatic political competition has 
developed in some democracies but not in others are motivated by the normative 
conviction that a voter who holds a certain set of policy preferences should vote for the 
party/candidate that shares the largest number of those preferences, this outcome only 
occurs if voters have (1) relatively well-defined policy preferences, (2) a desire to base 
their voting decisions upon ideological considerations, and (3) “a sense of the 
approximate relative positions of the available parties on the ideological spectrum” 
(Coppedge 1998b: 552). Voters’ ability to base their voting decisions on policy 
preferences and their desire to do so can only contribute to the development of 
programmatic political competition when political elites supply programmatically distinct 
options at the ballot box. While political crises may provide elites with a uniquely captive 
audience in terms of voters’ interest in national politics and their familiarity with the 
country’s main political actors, political entrepreneurs who wish to establish 
programmatic party-voter linkages must act decisively to establish “‘sufficiently 
ideological’ parties … that take clear, widely understood positions on a conventionally 
interrelated set of issues” (Coppedge 1998b: 552) in order to take advantage of this 
opportunity. 
 This argument, which privileges agency over structure, fits into a research 
tradition – established by Sartori (1968, 1969) and exemplified by examinations of party 
system development in post-Franco Spain (Chhibber and Torcal 1997), India (Chhibber 
1999), post-Pinochet Chile (Torcal and Mainwaring 2003), and Western Europe 
(Przeworski and Sprague 1986, Kalyvas 1996, Pakulski and Waters 1996) – that 
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challenges the Parsonian, structural-functionalist basis of the cleavage approach to the 
study of party system development. In contrast with modernization theory and the 
Michigan model of party identification, this agent-centered approach does not assign an 
overly important role to socioeconomic development or to the iteration of democratic 
elections. Rather, by emphasizing “the malleability of underlying conflicts in the hands of 
political parties and their leaders” (Deegan Krause 2006: 18-19), this approach suggests 
that, under certain circumstances, political elites can short-circuit the generally slow 
process through which political attachments form. 
 This is no easy task, however. Political elites who push for the establishment of 
programmatic political competition “must be capable of disrupting vertical links of 
authority and exchange that predominate in many less-developed countries” (Bornschier 
2009: 8). What circumstances would provide political elites with an opportunity to 
accelerate the development of programmatic party-voter linkages, and what sort of elites 
are likely to attempt to take advantage of this opportunity? Following Bornschier (2009: 
7), who contends that “the founding moment of a new democratic regime” is the ideal 
starting point for an agent-centered examination of party system development, and 
Zielinski (2002: 185), who notes that it is during the first few elections after the 
foundation of a new democratic regime when “political actors determine which cleavages 
to depoliticize and which to establish as the permanent axes of political competition,” I 
argue that the period surrounding the most recent wave of democratic transitions in Latin 
America constitutes precisely the type of political environment in which elite political 
actors might succeed in the construction of programmatic party-voter linkages. High 
levels of electoral volatility in much of the region, the demise of formerly prominent 
political parties in a number of countries, the electoral success of populist candidates who 
have run for office under the banner of highly personalized and minimally 
institutionalized parties, and the phenomenon of “policy switching,” which increases the 
programmatic ambiguity of ruling parties (Stokes 2001, Lupu 2011), can all be 
interpreted as signs that many Latin American party systems have indeed experienced 
important changes during the past two decades. 
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 Regarding the question of political supply (i.e. which elite actors are most likely 
to invest in the establishment of programmatic party-voter linkages?), the unity of the 
“externally mobilized party” (Shefter 1977, 1993), established by political actors who 
“come from outside the ruling circles of power … [and] push for programmatic 
competition ... because programs are all they [initially] have to offer” (Bornschier 2009: 
8), is particularly crucial. Unless confronted by “strong mobilization from below … 
established parties will have little incentive to rely on programs” (Bornschier 2009: 8). It 
is for this reason that Sartori (1994: 95, emphasis in original) contends that “the 
metamorphosis from an unstructured to a structured party system … made of strong, 
organization-based mass parties … has always been triggered by exogenous assault and 
contagion … the challenge of externally created (and largely anti-system) mass parties 
characterized by strong ideological ties and fervor.” 
 Following this line of research, I argue that where the Left achieved tangible 
success in its fight against government repression during the era preceding the return to 
democratic rule,4 succeeded in creating a broad coalition prior to the restoration of 
democratic rule, maintained its unity as an electoral force following the restoration of 
democratic elections, and employed programmatic appeals in its efforts to attract voters, 
it provided voters with a programmatically distinct option at one end of the ideological 
spectrum. I focus on the organization and political activity of the Left because, 
historically in Latin America, leftist parties have had the greatest incentive to push for 
programmatic political competition.5 Because center-right and right-wing parties 
generally controlled the state (and the considerable resources under the state’s command), 
and because these parties have enjoyed close relationships with economic elites (who 
often use their influence over national media outlets and their vast financial resources to 
support parties and candidates who have pledged to defend their economic interests from 
the threat of a leftist government), they have held a significant advantage over the Left in 
                                                 
4
  In this sense, success can take many forms: an outright military victory (the FSLN in Nicaragua), a military 
stalemate that forces the government to grant major concessions (the FMLN in El Salvador), or an electoral triumph 
that leads to the dismantling of the state’s repressive apparatus (the Concertación in Chile). 
5
  Indeed, in the political environment of 1980s Latin America, where democracy was still being reestablished 
following an era of right-wing dictatorships that often harshly repressed labor unions, student organizations, peasant 
associations, and left-leaning political organizations, the Left certainly constituted an externally mobilized party. 
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terms of their ability to finance the creation and maintenance of extensive patron-client 
networks. As long as the region’s right-of-center parties are able to convert this resource 
advantage into success at the ballot box, they have little need to promote their 
programmatic identity. 
 Echoing Duverger’s (1954) examination of the “contagion from the Left” – the 
process by which conservative cadre parties began to adopt the organizational features 
that characterized the nascent mass parties that emerged following industrialization in 
early twentieth century Western Europe – I argue that, in those countries where an 
unified Left that utilized programmatic appeals in its public discourse achieved success at 
the ballot box, that success has prompted political elites on the opposite end of the 
ideological spectrum to follow suit and take steps to promote their own parties’ policy 
platforms.6 As a result, a new pattern of party-voter linkages based on ideological 
position and programmatic preferences has formed.7 
 To summarize, in response to the question of how we can explain the 
development of programmatic party-voter linkages not only in Chile and Uruguay, but 
also in El Salvador, I contend that the role played by Leftist political elites during and 
after the most recent transition to democracy has been critically important. Figure 1.2 
illustrates this argument. In all three countries, pervasive political violence during the 
1970s and 1980s not only contributed to the formation of a broad Leftist coalition, but it 
also served to educate voters about the ideological differences between the Right and the 
Left. With the return to democratic rule, Leftist elites not only maintained the unity 
forged during the period of opposition to authoritarian rule, but they also created 
permanent party organizations that were used to actively promote their parties’ 
ideological distinctiveness. Faced with the electoral success of Leftist parties that utilized 
                                                 
6
  Though not explicitly concerned with the development of programmatic political competition, España-Nájera 
(2009: 8-9) makes a similar argument in her examination of post-conflict party system development in Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador, contending that “the left played a critical role, influencing the decisions of the other actors 
… the right decided on its electoral strategy in response to the earlier decisions of the left and its perception of how 
threatening the left was to its own position.” 
7
  I do not discount the possibility that the degree to which programmatically distinct political parties have appeared 
is also in part a product of a country’s electoral institutions. Federalism, high district magnitudes, and other institutional 
features that fail to provide elites with incentives to reduce the number of political parties may thwart the creation of 
programmatic party-voter linkages even where shared understandings of the meanings attached to the labels “right” and 
“left” have been established. I address the role of electoral institutions in Chapter Nine. 
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political programs (rather than patron-client exchanges) to win voters’ support, the main 
right-of-center parties in these three countries reacted by following the Left’s example 
and taking steps to define and publicize their own ideological identities. In Latin 
American countries where this series of events has not occurred – either because no 
broad, unified Leftist coalition has formed, because the Left has not attempted to attract 
voters by presenting and publicizing an ideologically distinct party platform, or simply 
because the Left has not achieved any meaningful electoral success – programmatic 
party-voter linkages remain weak. 
 
Figure 1.2 – The Path to Programmatic Political Competition 
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 While the widespread, persistent, and polarizing political violence that preceded 
the establishment/restoration of electoral democracy in many Latin American countries 
may have helped accelerate voters’ political education in terms of their familiarity with 
the meanings attached to the ideological labels “left” and “right,” programmatic party-
voter linkages only emerged in those countries where political elites provided voters with 
programmatically distinct options at the ballot box. While the violent repression of civil 
society during the 1970s and 1980s may have facilitated the efforts taken by Chile’s 
Concertación and Uruguay’s Frente Amplio to make voters aware of the programmatic 
differences between the main political parties in those two countries, it did not guarantee 
the future development of programmatic political competition, as evidenced by the 
weakness of programmatic party-voter linkages in their Southern Cone neighbors, 
Argentina and Brazil. Similarly, while the ideologically-charged civil war that dominated 
El Salvador’s political landscape from 1980 through 1992 may have facilitated the 
FMLN’s later efforts to make voters understand the ideological basis for their opposition 
to the status quo, programmatic political competition was not an inevitable outcome, as 
demonstrated by the weakness of programmatic party-voter linkages in neighboring 
Guatemala. Again, programmatic political competition only developed in those countries 
where political elites (beginning with the Left) sought to take advantage of the enhanced 
political interest and awareness these political crises generated by actively promoting the 
programmatic differences between the country’s main political parties. 
 
1.3 Guide to the Dissertation 
 In Chapter Two, I use public opinion data to address a number of questions 
regarding the nature of party-voter linkages in contemporary Latin America. Using data 
from the 2004-10 Americas Barometer surveys and the 1996-2007 Latinobarómetro 
surveys to measure (1) the extent to which voters’ left-right self-identification predicts 
voting behavior and (2) the extent to which citizens’ preferences on a number of 
economic, political, and social issues predict their left-right self-placements, I examine 
the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages in each of Latin America’s eighteen 
electoral democracies. This analysis, which reveals stronger-than-predicted relationships 
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between left-right self-identification and voting behavior in El Salvador and (to a lesser 
degree) Nicaragua, as well as weaker-than-predicted relationships in Argentina, Brazil, 
and Costa Rica, calls into question any argument that uses socioeconomic and political 
characteristics associated with modernization theory to explain the development of 
programmatic party-voter linkages. Evidence that the relationship between issue 
preferences and left-right self-identification is strongest in precisely those same three 
countries (Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador) where left-right self-identification best 
predicts voting behavior further buttresses my argument that the conventional wisdom 
regarding party system development in contemporary Latin America cannot account for 
variation in the degree to which programmatic political competition has developed in the 
region. 
 Chapter Three provides a closer examination of my answer to the question of how 
we can account for the development of programmatic political competition in Chile, 
Uruguay, and El Salvador, and for the weakness of programmatic party-voter linkages in 
the rest of Latin America. Specifically, I examine the manner in which the theory I 
propose, which emphasizes the importance of elite political agency, contrasts with a 
conventional wisdom that draws from modernization theory, the Michigan model of party 
identification, and social cleavage theory. 
 In Chapters Four through Seven, I present case studies of the development of 
party-voter linkages in three countries – El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. 
Inasmuch as the unexpected strength of programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador 
constitutes the main empirical puzzle that stands at the center of this dissertation, El 
Salvador presents itself as an obvious candidate for further examination. By selecting 
Guatemala and Costa Rica to complement my examination of the development of 
surprisingly strong programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador, I shine a welcome 
light on party system development in Central America, an understudied region that 
exhibits substantial variation in terms of party system development and, in particular, the 
development of programmatic party-voter linkages. At a minimum, these three case 
studies improve our understanding of party system development in Central America. 
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 My case selection also serves another, perhaps more important purpose: by 
selecting three countries that exhibit substantial variation on the dependent variable (the 
strength of programmatic party-voter linkages) but are very similar in terms of the 
historical development of their economies and their social and political institutions, I 
enhance the validity and reliability of the structured, focused comparisons that I make 
between the three cases. In a general sense, the rationale for focusing on Latin American 
party systems (rather than studying all party systems) is derived from the presumed 
importance of the various social, cultural, economic, and political characteristics that the 
region’s countries share; social, economic, and political characteristics that would be 
variables in a global examination of party system development can be treated as 
constants when the scope of our investigation is limited to Latin America. Since El 
Salvador has even more in common (in terms of its political, social, and economic 
history) with its Central American neighbors than with the relatively far-flung nations of 
South America, the selection of Guatemala and Costa Rica as companion cases serves to 
further facilitate the process of isolating the factors that have influenced party system 
development in the region. 
 Chapter Five examines the development of programmatic party-voter linkages in 
El Salvador since the end of that country’s civil war in 1992. As noted above, El Salvador 
stands out as a case where strong programmatic party-voter linkages have formed in spite 
of various factors – a low level of socioeconomic development, meager state spending on 
social welfare programs, and extremely limited prior experience with democratic 
elections – that would seemingly present formidable obstacles to the formation of 
programmatic relations of democratic accountability. My examination of the 
development of the Salvadoran party system demonstrates that the FMLN’s monopoly 
over the Salvadoran Left, its institutional presence at the municipal level, and its use of 
programmatic political discourse during the past decade played an important role in the 
creation of a party system now characterized by a high degree of programmatic political 
competition. 
 Chapter Six examines party-voter linkages in the “party non-system” (Sánchez 
2009) that has developed in Guatemala since that country’s return to civilian rule in 1985. 
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Guatemalan political actors’ failure to create political parties capable of persisting for 
more than two election cycles, let alone parties capable of generating programmatic 
party-voter ties, not only provides a stark contrast to the experience in neighboring El 
Salvador, but it also helps debunk the theory that the development of strong 
programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador can be explained simply as the political 
inheritance left by more than a decade of armed conflict. The Guatemalan Left’s 
weakness in 1996 (when a peace agreement put an end to thirty-six years of civil war), 
the absence of strong ties between the guerrilla movement and civil society during that 
conflict, and the continued fractionalization of the Left during the post-war era are 
identified as key factors that explain the extreme discontinuity and non-ideological nature 
of party politics in Guatemala. 
 Chapter Seven narrates the development of the party system, and of party-voter 
linkages, in Costa Rica, a country where we might expect to find evidence of 
programmatic party-voter linkages, but do not. Elite political actors in Costa Rica have 
failed to achieve programmatic relations of democratic accountability in spite of the 
country’s extensive experience with electoral democracy, its early establishment of a 
relatively inclusive social welfare state, and its relative affluence (particularly in 
comparison to its Central American neighbors). This examination of party-voter linkages 
in contemporary Costa Rica identifies the legal proscription of Leftist parties following 
the 1948 Civil War and the continuing electoral weakness of the Left in the decades since 
that proscription was lifted in 1970 as crucially important parts of the explanation of why 
programmatic party-voter linkages remain weak in Costa Rica. 
 In Chapter Eight, I apply my theoretical argument beyond these three case studies, 
and beyond the Central American isthmus, to the full realm of Latin America’s electoral 
democracies. Special attention is paid to Chile and Uruguay (the two countries that, along 
with El Salvador, exhibit the strongest evidence of programmatic party-voter linkages in 
the region), to Nicaragua and Bolivia (countries that, like El Salvador, exhibit higher 
levels of programmatic party competition than their economic and political history would 
lead one to predict), and to Argentina and Brazil (countries that, like Costa Rica, exhibit 
lower-than-expected levels of programmatic party competition). Through this 
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examination, I demonstrate that the higher-than-predicted strength of programmatic 
party-voter linkages in El Salvador is not simply an anomaly. Rather, I argue that the 
development of programmatic political competition in El Salvador demonstrates the need 
to question long-held notions regarding the pace of party system development and the 
relative importance of political agency (vis-à-vis socioeconomic cleavages) for the 
formation of party-voter linkages. 
 In the final chapter, Chapter Nine, I provide a summary of the arguments and 
evidence presented in my examination of party system development in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Costa Rica – highlighting the contributions made to our understanding of 
party system development in these three countries – and in my abbreviated examinations 
of the development (or non-development) of programmatic party-voter linkages 
elsewhere in Latin America. I also discuss the likelihood that programmatic party 
competition will endure in those Latin American countries where it has been established, 
and that it might be established in those countries where programmatic party-voter 
linkages remain weak. This final chapter concludes by making some suggestions for 
future research that might build upon the research I present here by focusing greater 
attention on the elite decision-making process that determines party organization and 
strategy, by examining the relationship between electoral institutions and the 
development of programmatic political competition, by expanding this research project 
beyond the confines of Latin America, and by exploring the impact that programmatic 
party-voter linkages have on democratic quality.  
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Chapter Two 
Programmatic Political Competition in Contemporary Latin America 
 
 In their examination of party system development in Latin America, Kitschelt et 
al. (2010) identify Uruguay and Chile – countries with relatively long histories of 
prosperity and democratic rule that are also home to the region’s most generous social 
security and welfare programs – as the two countries that score highest on multiple 
indicators of “programmatic party structuration.” Yet, although their work represents an 
important step forward in terms of measuring programmatic political competition in the 
region, in this chapter I demonstrate that the conclusion that they draw from this exercise 
– namely, that “only those Latin American polities which experienced a relatively high 
level of economic development already before World War II, longer periods of 
democratic competition after 1945, and the implementation of comparatively broad 
policies of social protection for at least the urban population in that time period were able 
to lock in patterns of programmatic party competition that still persist into the late 1990s” 
(Kitschelt et al. 2010: 8-9)  – is largely an artifact of their case selection.  
 While providing a largely pragmatic explanation for their decision to exclude six 
of the region’s eighteen democratic regimes from their analysis,1 Kitschelt et al. (2010: 
343) contend that their sample is representative of Latin America. However, as detailed 
in Appendix 2.A, their twelve-country sample under-represents the region’s low-income 
countries, and it also under-represents those countries that have relatively limited 
experience with democratic rule. As I demonstrate in this chapter, indicators used to 
measure economic and political modernization are poor predictors of the strength of 
programmatic party-voter linkages in Latin America when all eighteen of the region’s 
electoral democracies are taken into consideration. 
 My examination of the strength of programmatic political competition in the 
region focuses on both the relationship between left-right self-placement and voting 
                                                 
1
  Guatemala, Panama, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua are omitted from their analysis due to missing data on 
various indicators. Paraguay is excluded not due to any data constraints, but rather because it had “little or no exposure 
to any sort of moderately open electoral contestation over the course of [the] twentieth century … until the mid-1990s” 
(Kitschelt et al. 2010: 342). 
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behavior (explored in the first two sections of the chapter) and the relationship between 
policy preferences and left-right self-placement (examined in the final section of the 
chapter). In the first section, I create alternatives to the proxy measures that Kitschelt et 
al. (2010) employ to measure the political capabilities, opportunities, and stakes that 
purportedly facilitate the development of programmatic political competition. Because 
these alternative indicators of economic and political modernization are based on data 
that are available for all eighteen Latin American democracies, I am able to use these 
indicators to generate predictions of the relative likelihood (according to the theory that 
economic prosperity and prior experience with democratic elections are prerequisites for 
the development of programmatic party-voter linkages) that programmatic party 
competition would have developed in each of Latin America’s eighteen electoral 
democracies, overcoming the data constraints to which Kitschelt et al. (2010) allude.  
 In the second section of the chapter, I use an indicator introduced by Mainwaring 
and Torcal (2005) to measure the strength of the relationship between left-right self-
placement and voting behavior in each country. I then compare these observations of 
programmatic political competition to the predictions generated in the first section. The 
results of this analysis demonstrate that measures of pre-WWII economic prosperity, 
post-WWII democratic experience, and the extent to which governments introduced 
social protection for the urban working class during the ISI era are poor predictors of the 
degree to which left-right self-placement predicts voting behavior in the region’s eighteen 
electoral democracies. Most strikingly, this analysis reveals that left-right self-placement 
is a better predictor of voting behavior in El Salvador than in any other Latin American 
country, a finding that calls the presumed importance of economic and political 
modernization into question. 
 Yet, it would be rash to conclude that the standard “sociological” model fails to 
explain party system development in contemporary Latin America solely based on this 
evidence, for it is only if/when the labels Left and Right are used to communicate 
programmatic (rather than merely symbolic or affective) meaning that the degree to 
which left-right self-placement predicts voting behavior can be accepted as an indicator 
of the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages. Therefore, in the third section of 
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this chapter, I examine the relationship between voters’ policy preferences and their left-
right self-placement. Finding that this relationship is strongest in the same three countries 
– Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador – where left-right self-placement best predicts voting 
behavior, I argue that there is indeed a programmatic basis to citizens’ use of the 
ideological labels Left and Right in these countries. Consequently, I argue that the results 
of the analysis described in the first two sections of this chapter do indeed cast important 
doubts over the broader applicability of the results that Kitschelt et al. (2010) present. 
When their sample of countries is expanded to include all eighteen Latin American 
democracies, the evidence that they find linking the development of programmatic 
political competition to economic prosperity, democratic experience, and welfare 
provision weakens considerably. 
 
2.1 Predicting Programmatic Political Competition in Latin America 
 Kitschelt et al. (2010) use GDP per capita data for the year 1928, taken from 
Bulmer-Thomas (1994), to measure pre-WWII economic prosperity, their proxy measure 
for the material and cognitive capabilities that political actors presumably require in order 
to be able to process political information and to create the political organizations that 
foster the development of programmatic party-voter linkages. To calculate experience 
with democratic competition during the post-WWII era, their proxy for the political 
opportunities that political elites and voters alike have had to build programmatic 
linkages through repeated electoral contests, they utilize data taken from Mainwaring et 
al.’s (2001) classification of Latin American regime types.2 To measure the degree to 
which governments introduced social protection for the urban working class during the 
ISI era, their proxy for the perceived political stakes that motivate elite actors to organize 
                                                 
2
  For any given year, Mainwaring et al. (2001) code a regime as democratic only if each of the following four 
conditions is fully met: (1) the national government was elected by means of free and fair elections, (2) the majority of 
the adult population was eligible to vote, (3) civil liberties received adequate protection, and (4) the powers of elected 
officials were not encroached upon by the military or by other non-elected actors. A regime is coded as a semi-
democracy if one (or more) of these conditions is partially compromised. Only when one (or more) of these conditions 
is completely absent is a regime coded as authoritarian. Kitschelt et al. (2010) assign a value of 1 to country-years 
classified as democratic, 0.5 to country-years coded as semi-democratic, and 0 to country-years coded as authoritarian. 
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political competition around programmatic partisan alignments, Kitschelt et al. utilize an 
indicator of social policy expenditure as a percent of GDP in the year 1973. 
 
Table 2.1 – GDP per Capita, 1929, at Purchasing Power Parity (2007 Dollars) 
 
Argentina $6,416   Guatemala $2,527   Panama $2,042  
Uruguay $5,652   Peru $2,379   Ecuador $1,986  
Chile $5,619   Costa Rica $2,324   Paraguay $1,688  
Venezuela $5,033   Colombia $2,211   Brazil $1,670  
Mexico $2,581   Honduras $2,202   El Salvador $1,529  
Nicaragua $2,571   Bolivia $2,045   Dominican Rep. $1,095  
 
Table 2.2 – Democratic Experience: Years Democratic or Semi-Democratic, 1945-98 
 
Costa Rica 52 
 
Colombia 30.5 
 
Panama 14.5 
Venezuela 42.5 
 
Argentina 24.5 
 
El Salvador 11 
Uruguay 42 
 
Dominican Rep. 24 
 
Guatemala 11 
Chile 37 
 
Bolivia 21 
 
Nicaragua 7.5 
Ecuador 35 
 
Peru 20.5 
 
Mexico 5.5 
Brazil 32 
 
Honduras 17.5 
 
Paraguay 5 
 
Table 2.3 – Social Security and Welfare Spending as a Percentage of GDP, 1970-
2000 
 
Uruguay 13.7 
 
Nicaragua 3.0 
 
Dominican Rep. 0.9 
Chile 8.7 
 
Bolivia 2.9 
 
Peru 0.9 
Brazil 7.4 
 
Mexico 2.9 
 
Honduras 0.7 
Argentina 5.5 
 
Paraguay 2.2 
 
Guatemala 0.6 
Panama 4.5 
 
Colombia 1.8 
 
El Salvador 0.5 
Costa Rica 3.7 
 
Venezuela 1.8 
 
Ecuador 0.2 
 
 Because some of the indicators that Kitschelt et al. (2010) use are not available 
for all eighteen of the region’s democratic regimes, I must first identify alternate 
measures that capture the same theoretical concepts before moving on to the task of 
quantifying the conventional wisdom on party system development in Latin America 
with regards to the development of programmatic political competition. To measure pre-
WWII economic prosperity, I replace the Bulmer-Thomas (1994) data that Kitschelt et al. 
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use with data from Avakov (2010), who provides GDP per capita estimates for the year 
1929 for all eighteen Latin American democracies.3  To calculate experience with 
democratic competition during the post-WWII era, I follow Kitschelt et al. and use data 
taken from Mainwaring et al.’s (2001) classification of Latin American regime types.4 To 
measure the degree to which governments introduced social protection for the urban 
working class during the ISI era, I use data on social security and welfare spending as a 
percentage of GDP during the period 1970-2000.5 These three indicators of the political 
capabilities, opportunities, and stakes that (according to Kitschelt et al.’s reformulation of 
the conventional wisdom on party system development in Latin America) facilitate the 
formation of programmatic party-voter linkages are reported in Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. 
 Using these proxy measures of political capabilities, opportunities, and stakes, I 
generate a prediction of the relative likelihood that a given country would have developed 
programmatic political competition through a relatively simple three-step process. First, 
the proxy measures of political capabilities, opportunities, and stakes are all standardized 
by taking the difference between the country’s value on each indicator and the mean 
value for that indicator, and dividing this result by the standard deviation of the values for 
that indicator. Second, a raw measure of the predicted likelihood of programmatic 
political competition is calculated by taking the sum of the standardized measures of 
political capabilities, opportunities, and stakes.6 Lastly, this raw measure itself is then 
standardized, with a mean of 0.00 and a standard deviation of 1.00, following the same 
                                                 
3
  I prefer Avakov’s (2010) estimates – which are all either taken from Maddison (1995, 2001, 2003, and 2007) or 
extrapolated from the data that Maddison provides – for two reasons. First, Avakov provides “pure” (i.e. not 
extrapolated) estimates for thirteen countries, compared to only nine pure estimates in the data that Kitschelt et al. 
(2010) use. Second, Avakov uses more temporally proximate data as the basis for creating extrapolated estimates for 
those countries where pure estimates are not available than do Kitschelt et al; whereas Avakov uses pure estimates for 
the year 1950 to create extrapolated estimates of GDP per capita in 1929 in five countries, Kitschelt et al. use data from 
the years 1960 and 1980 to generate extrapolated estimates when pure estimates are not available. 
4
  Scores for the six countries Kitschelt et al. (2010) exclude from their analysis are calculated using the original data 
from Mainwaring et al. (2001). Scores for Mexico and Peru are recalculated because the scores Kitschelt et al. report 
for these two countries differ from the scores derived from the data that Mainwaring et al. provide. 
5
  Appendix 2.B, which provides a discussion of the differences between the indicators I use and the indicators that 
Kitschelt et al. (2010) employ, demonstrates that the indicators I use do indeed capture the same theoretical concepts as 
the proxy measures that Kitschelt et al. employ. 
6
  This calculation assumes that political capabilities, opportunities, and stakes should be weighted equally. This 
appears to be a safe assumption to make, inasmuch as Kitschelt et al. (2010) do not state that any one precondition for 
the development of programmatic political competition is more or less important than the other two. 
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process used to create the standardized measures of political capabilities, opportunities, 
and stakes. 
 The predictions reported in Table 2.4 suggest that Uruguay and Chile are the two 
Latin American countries where programmatic political competition is most likely to be 
found. Argentina, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Brazil are also predicted to have a better-
than-average likelihood of developing programmatic political competition. The 
remaining twelve countries are all revealed to be rather poor candidates for the formation 
of programmatic party-voter linkages. Within this group of twelve, El Salvador deserves 
special attention; its position at the bottom of this table signifies that, according to the 
indicators of political and economic modernization that Kitschelt et al. (2010) employ, El 
Salvador is the Latin American country that is least likely to display evidence of 
programmatic political competition. The following section utilizes data on the extent to 
which voters’ left-right self-identification predicts voting behavior to examine just how 
well these predictions perform. 
 
Table 2.4 – Predicting the Relative Likelihood of Programmatic Political 
Competition 
 
Uruguay 2.44 
 
Colombia -0.17 
 
Mexico -0.68 
Chile 1.70 
 
Ecuador -0.28 
 
Honduras -0.68 
Argentina 1.16 
 
Bolivia -0.36 
 
Dominican Rep. -0.75 
Venezuela 0.90 
 
Panama -0.37 
 
Guatemala -0.80 
Costa Rica 0.72 
 
Peru -0.53 
 
Paraguay -1.01 
Brazil 0.39 
 
Nicaragua -0.61 
 
El Salvador -1.07 
 
2.2 Left-Right Self-Placement and Voting Behavior 
 Whereas the previous section focused on generating predictions based on proxy 
measures of the political capabilities, opportunities, and stakes that Kitschelt et al. (2010) 
identify as preconditions for the development of programmatic political competition – the 
right side of the equation, so to speak – in this section, I turn my attention to the left side 
of the equation, and the measurement of programmatic political competition. 
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 To measure “programmatic party structuration” (PPS), Kitschelt et al. (2010) use 
data from the 1997 Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) survey of Latin 
American legislators and the 1998 Latinobarómetro public opinion survey. They measure 
four distinct components of PPS: “[1] a low dimensionality issue space on to which 
parties map in predictable ways; [2] meaningful left-right semantics offering cognitive 
short-cuts to [elite] political actors within this space; [3] ideological cohesion within 
parties on key issues of the day, so that citizens can have greater comprehension of and 
confidence in parties’ proposed programs; and [4] linkages between voters and parties 
that are grounded in the issue positions taken by actors at both levels” (Hawkins et al. 
2008: 1-2). Table 2.5 reproduces their four indicators of PPS. 
 
Table 2.5 – Programmatic Party Structuration (PPS) in Latin America, 1997/98 
 
Low-Dimensionality  Left-Right Semantics: 
 
Partisan Divide    [PPS1] 
 
Strength of Ideological Divide    [PPS2] 
 
Chile 1.3   Bolivia .57  
 
Uruguay 3.0   Chile .54  
 
Mexico 3.7   Uruguay .53  
 
Argentina 5.3   Mexico .28  
 
Venezuela 5.3   Costa Rica .28  
 
Ecuador 7.0   Colombia .21  
 
Colombia 7.3   Argentina .20  
 
Costa Rica 7.7   Brazil .18  
 
Peru 7.7   Venezuela .17  
 
Bolivia 9.3   Dominican Rep. .14  
 
Brazil 10.0   Ecuador .12  
 
Dominican Rep. 10.3   Peru .12  
 
 [scores are average rank orders]    [scores are regression coefficients] 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
 
Ideological Cohesion  Voter-Party Linkages 
 
of Political Parties    [PPS3]  Grounded in Issue Positions    [PPS4] 
 
Chile .40   Chile 6.9  
 
Bolivia .41   Uruguay 6.5  
 
Uruguay .41   Argentina 4.5  
 
Venezuela .45   Colombia 2.3  
 
Argentina .51   Brazil 1.5  
 
Costa Rica .52   Bolivia 1.5  
 
Dominican Rep. .52   Mexico 0.0  
 
Colombia .55   Costa Rica -0.1  
 
Ecuador .60   Ecuador -0.1  
 
Mexico .62    [scale ranges from -10 to 10] 
 
Peru .63  
  
  
 
Brazil .67  
  
  
 
 [scale ranges from 0 (perfect cohesion) to 1 (no cohesion)]   
 
 Uruguay and Chile – the two Latin American countries where, based on their 
degree of political and economic development, we would most expect to find evidence of 
programmatic political competition – rank at or near the top of all four of the indicators 
that Kitschelt et al. (2010) use to measure PPS. This finding appears to support the 
conventional wisdom regarding the role that economic development and democratic 
experience play in party system development, as does further analysis of the relationship 
between the predictions presented in Table 2.4 and the four measures of PPS shown in 
Table 2.5. As shown in Table 2.6, the correlations between predicted and observed PPS 
for the twelve countries that Kitschelt et al. include in their analysis are all at least 
moderately strong. The question I will address in the rest of this section is: how well do 
these relationships hold up when this analysis is extended to include all eighteen of Latin 
America’s electoral democracies? Does variation in pre-WWII economic prosperity, 
post-WWII experience with democracy, and the inclusiveness of social welfare coverage 
established during the ISI era explain variation in the strength of the relationship between 
left-right self-identification and voting behavior, or do the apparent relationships shown 
in Table 2.6 vanish when the six countries that Kitschelt et al. omit are included in the 
analysis? 
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Table 2.6 – Predicted vs. Observed Programmatic Political Competition7 
 
  PPS1 PPS2 PPS3 PPS4 
 Predicted PPS  .58  .51  .62  .85 
 
 Before these questions can be addressed, however, a suitable measure of 
programmatic party-voter linkages that can be applied to all eighteen of the region’s 
electoral democracies must be identified. Using a simple metric employed by 
Mainwaring and Torcal (2005), I use data from Americas Barometer public opinion 
surveys to create a summary measure of the strength of programmatic party-voter 
linkages in each country. My decision to focus on party-voter linkages, rather than elite-
level measures of programmatic political competition, is rooted in a belief that only the 
presence of relatively strong programmatic party-voter linkages can be considered a 
necessary (though not sufficient) element of programmatic party competition and of the 
type of responsible partisan government envisioned by political scientists as the vital 
foundation for the establishment of democratic accountability. If voters make no use of 
the cognitive short-cuts provided by left-right semantics, then it is of little consequence to 
the quality of democratic representation and accountability if the labels left and right 
carry any substantive meaning at the elite level, if political parties “map in predictable 
ways” onto a “low dimensionality issue space,” or if these parties exhibit “ideological 
cohesion … on key issues of the day.” 
 To create this measure of the degree to which left-right self-identification predicts 
voting behavior, I take data from the Americas Barometer survey conducted most 
immediately following each of thirty-two presidential elections held in Latin America’s 
eighteen electoral democracies during the years 2001-2009 and run logistic regressions 
on each of the three pairs formed by the three leading vote-getters in each election, using 
survey respondents’ left-right self-identification (as measured on a 10-point scale) as the 
sole independent variable and their reported vote choice as the dependent variable. The 
summary measure of the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages is then created by 
                                                 
7
  To calculate these correlation coefficients, the values reported for the measures of “Low-Dimensionality Partisan 
Divide” (PPS1) and the “Ideological Cohesion of Political Parties” (PPS3) are re-scaled, by taking the obverse of the 
values reported in Table 2.5, so that higher scores signify a higher level of PPS on all four measures. 
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calculating the average of the Nagelkerke R2 values from each of these three logistic 
regressions, with .00 entered rather than the reported Nagelkerke R2 value if the logistic 
regression coefficient is not significant at the .95 confidence level.8 
 
Table 2.7 – Left-Right Self-Identification as a Predictor of Voting Behavior 
 
El Salvador, 2009 .277  Mexico, 2006 .033 
 
Uruguay, 2004 .259  Costa Rica, 2002 .020 
 
Chile, 2009 .152  Argentina, 2007 .019 
 
Venezuela, 2006 .121  Ecuador, 2006 .018 
 
Bolivia, 2009 .108  Panama, 2009 .014 
 
Nicaragua, 2006 .077  Guatemala, 2007 .007 
 
Colombia, 2007 .054  Dominican Rep., 2008 .005 
 
Honduras, 2001 .051  Paraguay, 2008 .004 
 
Peru, 2006 .039  Brazil, 2006 .000 
 
 Table 2.7, which presents the resulting measure of the strength of left-right self-
identification as a predictor of voting behavior for each of the region’s eighteen electoral 
democracies, shows that, although left-right self-placement may be a rather poor 
predictor of voting behavior in most of Latin America when compared to the long-
established Western democracies or even to the newer democratic regimes found in post-
Soviet Eastern Europe,9 the extent to which respondents’ left-right self-placement 
predicts their voting behavior varies greatly across the region.10 To demonstrate the 
substantive significance of the values presented in Table 2.7, the six charts included in 
Figure 2.1 provide a visual illustration of the degree to which the relationship between 
                                                 
8
  Appendix 2.B provides an example of the manner in which this measure is calculated. 
9
 Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) present their summary measure of the strength of left-right self-identification as a 
predictor of voting behavior for a total of thirty electoral democracies, including seven Latin American countries – 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. As a group, the mean score for these seven Latin 
American countries is lower than the mean scores both for twelve Western democracies and for eight post-Soviet states. 
Of the seven Latin American countries included in this analysis, only Uruguay and Chile present higher-than-average 
scores; both are ranked below Sweden, Italy, France, and Spain but above Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, 
the UK, Norway, Switzerland, the US, and Australia. 
10
 For countries with multiple observations included in the set of thirty-two elections I examine, I report each 
country’s maximum value. Empirically, it makes very little difference whether I use each country’s maximum value or 
the value from its most recent election, both because the most recent value is the maximum value for fourteen of the 
eighteen countries and because the correlation between the maximum values and the most recent values is nearly 
perfect (Pearson’s R = .99). Table 2.20 provides data for all thirty-two elections; these data show that left-right self-
identification is consistently a better predictor of voting behavior in El Salvador, Uruguay, and Chile than it is in the 
rest of Latin America. 
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left-right self-identification and voting behavior varies as this summary measure takes on 
different values. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Ideological Self-Placement and Presidential Vote Choice 
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 Included for comparative purposes, the first chart in Figure 2.1 uses data from the 
2004 NES Survey to plot the likelihood that a voter reported having voted for either 
George W. Bush or John Kerry in the 2004 US presidential election, according to that 
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voter’s self-placement on a 7-point liberal-conservative scale. The X-pattern that appears 
in this chart is what we would expect to find in a country where (1) the major political 
parties occupy distinct locations on the left-right scale, (2) voters are in broad agreement 
regarding these parties’ ideological positions, (3) voters are also able to place their own 
political beliefs/preferences on this same left-right scale, and (4) voters vote for the 
party/candidate whose ideological position most closely resembles their own preferences. 
The second chart shows survey respondents’ reported vote choice, at each point on the 
ten-point scale of ideological self-placement, in El Salvador’s 2009 presidential election 
(mean Nagelkerke R2 = .277), the election that tops the ranking provided in Table 2.7. 
Like the chart for the 2004 US election, this chart demonstrates that the vast majority of 
voters who identify themselves with the Left voted for the party that is universally 
associated with the Left in El Salvador (the FMLN), while the majority of voters who 
identify themselves with the Right voted for the country’s most prominent right-wing 
party (ARENA).  
 The next two charts, which correspond to the Uruguayan presidential election of 
2004 (.259) and the Chilean presidential election of 2009 (.152), illustrate the existence 
of a similarly strong relationship between ideological self-placement and voting behavior 
in the two countries that follow El Salvador in the ranking shown in Table 2.7. The final 
two charts, which correspond to the Honduran presidential election of 2001 (.051) and 
the Peruvian presidential election of 2006 (.039), illustrate just how weak this 
relationship is in most of Latin America’s electoral democracies. To say that ideological 
self-identification appears to have had a marginal impact on voting behavior in these two 
presidential elections would hardly be an exaggeration. Considered as a group, the charts 
presented in Figure 2.1 demonstrate the degree to which the values reported in Table 2.7 
do indeed represent meaningful differences in the extent to which evidence of 
programmatic party-voter linkages can be found in the region. 
 Having demonstrated that the values reported in Table 2.7 are indeed indicative of 
significant real-world differences between one country and another, I turn to two 
additional questions that must be addressed. First, how well do the values reported in 
Table 2.7 correspond to the measures of programmatic political competition given in 
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Table 2.5; does the indicator I borrow from Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) measure the 
same concept as the indicators Kitschelt et al. (2010) use? Second, how well do the 
values reported in Table 2.7 correspond to the predictions presented in Table 2.4 – do the 
conclusions that Kitschelt et al. draw hold up when the six countries they exclude from 
their analysis are taken into consideration? 
 To address this first question, I examine the correlation coefficients that 
summarize the relationship between the indicator of programmatic party-voter linkages I 
create and the four indicators of PPS that Kitschelt et al. use for the nine countries for 
which predictions can be generated using the data that Kitschelt et al. provide.11 These 
correlation coefficients, reported in Table 2.8, show that the indicator I use is just as 
strongly correlated to Kitschelt et al.’s four indicators as those indicators are to one 
another. This evidence, combined with the fact that Chile and Uruguay follow El 
Salvador atop the rankings of the indicator I use just as they top the rankings on Kitschelt 
et al.’s four indicators of PPS, reassure us that the data reported in Table 2.7 represent an 
indicator of programmatic political competition that is indeed compatible with the 
indicators that Kitschelt et al. use. Confident that the data reported in Table 2.7 are valid 
in this sense, I move on to examine the role that economic and political development play 
in fostering the development of programmatic political competition. 
 
Table 2.8 – Comparing Measures of Programmatic Political Competition 
    PPS1   PPS2   PPS3   PPS4 
 PPS1 ---- 
 PPS2 .59 ---- 
 PPS3 .54 .81 ---- 
 PPS4 .71 .57 .71 ---- 
 Lucas .57 .76 .81 .73 
 
 To determine how well economic and political modernization predict the 
development of programmatic party-voter linkages, I begin with a targeted examination 
of the correlations between the figures reported in Table 2.4 (the predicted likelihood that 
programmatic political competition would have emerged, based on each country’s level 
                                                 
11
  Predictions cannot be generated for Bolivia, Ecuador, or the Dominican Republic because Kitschelt et al. (2010) do 
not provide GDP per capita estimates for those three countries. 
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of economic and political development) and those presented in Table 2.7 (which measure 
the extent to which left-right self-identification predicts voting behavior). Table 2.9 
provides the correlation coefficients for these relationships between predicted and 
observed levels of programmatic political competition; this simple correlation analysis is 
produced for two groupings of countries: (1) the twelve countries that Kitschelt et al. 
(2010) include in their analysis, and (2) the full set of Latin American democracies, 
including El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Paraguay. This 
table also provides the correlations between my measure of programmatic party-voter 
linkages and each of the three individual components of Kitschelt et al.’s capabilities-
opportunities-stakes framework.  
 
Table 2.9 – Expanding the Sample 
  Correlation Coefficient (Pearson’s R) 
 Predictor  n=12   n=18 
 Predicted PPC (Table 2.4)  .71   .37 
 
 GDP per capita 1929  .59   .35 
 Democratic Experience  .35   .17 
 Social Spending  .69   .39 
 
 The differences between the correlation coefficients reported in the first column, 
which refer to the incomplete samples that Kitschelt et al. analyze, and those reported in 
the second column, which correspond to data that include all eighteen of Latin America’s 
democratic regimes, are noteworthy. The correlation between predicted and observed 
programmatic political competition for the sample that includes all eighteen countries is 
roughly half as strong as it is for the restricted sample that Kitschelt et al. employ.12 This 
trend holds true for each of the three proxy measures of political capabilities, 
opportunities, and stakes. 
 Towards the beginning of this section, I asked if the relationships between 
predicted and observed levels of programmatic party competition displayed in Table 2.6 
                                                 
12
  Table 2.19 demonstrates that this drop-off would be even more drastic if I would have employed either Mesa-
Lago’s (1989) data on the percentage of the economically active population that was covered by social security 
schemes in the year 1980 or Huber et al.’s (2008) data on average total social spending during the period from 1970-
2000 as my proxy measure of political stakes. 
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would disappear once we include the six countries that Kitschelt et al. (2010) exclude 
from their analysis. The data in Table 2.9 provide our first answer to this question; while 
these relationships might not wholly vanish, they do fade considerably. This finding begs 
a new set of questions. What explains the drastic impact that the inclusion of the six 
countries that Kitschelt et al. omit has on the predictive power of their indicators of 
economic and political development? Is one of the six countries that they exclude a 
statistical outlier that obscures evidence of what is in fact a relatively strong relationship 
between the predictions generated based on this theoretical framework and the degree of 
programmatic party-voter linkages that can be found in Latin America’s electoral 
democracies? Or, is it one of the countries that Kitschelt et al. include that is the 
statistical outlier, generating evidence of a strong relationship where none actually exists? 
To address these questions, I embark on a country-by-country examination of the rank 
ordering of the predictions presented in Table 2.4 and the rank ordering of the observed 
values of programmatic party-voter linkages reported in Table 2.7. To facilitate 
comparisons between these two rankings, I reproduce them both in Table 2.10. 
 An examination of these two sets of rankings uncovers evidence that appears to 
lend support to Kitschelt et al.’s claims and evidence that calls the theoretical framework 
that underlies those claims into question. Three of the four countries that top the ranking 
of the predicted likelihood that programmatic political competition would develop – 
Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela – also occupy three of the top four spots in the ranking of 
the observed strength of programmatic party-voter linkages. Similarly, the Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, and Paraguay occupy three of the final four spots in both rankings. 
Colombia and Peru complete the group of eight countries whose place in the rank 
orderings differs little (two positions or less) between these two measures. For these eight 
countries, the predictions presented in Table 2.4 are certainly on target. Another four 
countries – Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Panama – fall into an intermediate group; the 
predictions derived from indicators of economic and political development perform fairly 
well, although each of these countries does move three to four spots in the rankings. 
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Table 2.10 – Predicted vs. Observed Programmatic Political Competition: Rankings 
 
Predicted Likelihood of  Strength of Left-Right Self-Identification 
 
Programmatic Political Competition  as a Predictor of Voting Behavior 
 
Uruguay   El Salvador  
 
Chile   Uruguay  
 
Argentina   Chile  
 
Venezuela   Venezuela  
 
Costa Rica   Bolivia  
 
Brazil   Nicaragua  
 
Colombia   Colombia  
 
Ecuador   Honduras 
 
 
Bolivia   Mexico 
 
 
Panama   Peru 
 
 
Peru   Costa Rica 
 
 
Nicaragua   Ecuador 
 
 
Mexico   Panama 
 
 
Honduras   Argentina 
 
 
Dominican Republic   Dominican Republic 
 
 
Guatemala   Paraguay 
 
 
Paraguay   Guatemala 
 
 
El Salvador   Brazil 
 
 
 The remaining six countries, however, tell a different story. Most remarkably, El 
Salvador, the country that is predicted to be the least likely to develop programmatic 
political competition, exhibits the strongest programmatic party-voter linkages in the 
entire region, stronger even than those found in Chile and Uruguay, the two Latin 
American countries that both Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) and Kitschelt et al. (2010) 
identify as the region’s foremost examples of programmatic political competition. 
Nicaragua and Honduras also exhibit stronger than predicted programmatic party-voter 
linkages, although we should not make too much of this finding in the case of Honduras, 
since the chart included in Figure 2.1 that corresponds to that country’s 2001 presidential 
election is hardly indicative of strong programmatic party-voter linkages. Moving in the 
other direction, programmatic party-voter linkages in Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica – 
countries that join Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela in the list of the six countries with the 
highest predicted likelihoods of programmatic political competition – are significantly 
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weaker than expected. The fact that three of the six countries that exhibit the greatest 
disparity between predicted and observed levels of programmatic party-voter linkages are 
countries that Kitschelt et al. exclude from their analysis helps explain the sizeable 
impact that these countries’ inclusion has on the correlation coefficients reported in Table 
2.9. 
 Now, what are we to make of this analysis? Should the conventional wisdom 
regarding party system development in Latin America be praised for predicting the 
relative strength of programmatic party-voter linkages in eight countries, or should it be 
damned for generating a number of erroneous predictions, particularly in the extreme 
case of El Salvador? To address this question, I return to the notion of statistical outliers. 
 
Figure 2.2 – Predicted vs. Observed Programmatic Political Competition 
 
 
 Figure 2.2 plots predicted versus observed levels of programmatic political 
competition for all eighteen of Latin America’s electoral democracies. The linear 
regression line included in this chart suggests a positive relationship between the 
predictions based on Kitschelt et al.’s (2010) account and the evidence of programmatic 
party-voter linkages drawn from survey data on the 
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identification and voting behavior. However, this chart also suggests that both El 
Salvador and Uruguay could be labeled statistical outliers.  
 To examine the impact that these two outliers have on the relationship between 
predicted and observed levels of programmatic political competition, I return to 
correlation analysis. Table 2.11 provides correlation coefficients that summarize the 
strength of the relationships between the predicted levels of programmatic political 
competition reported in Table 2.4 (row 1), each of the three indicators of economic and 
political modernization used to create those predictions (rows 2-4), and the observed 
level of programmatic political competition reported in Table 2.7. The first column 
includes all eighteen Latin American democracies, the second refers to a 17-country 
sample that excludes only El Salvador, and the third corresponds to a 17-country sample 
that omits only Uruguay. 
 
Table 2.11 – The Impact of Outliers 
  n=18 no ELS no URU 
 Predicted PPC .37   .71   .05 
 
 GDP per capita 1929 .35   .61   .14 
 Democratic Experience .17   .41  -.01 
 Social Spending .39   .67  -.02 
 
 A quick comparison between the first and second columns suggests that El 
Salvador is a statistical outlier, and that its inclusion obscures evidence of what is in fact 
a relatively strong relationship between Kitschelt et al.’s indicators of economic and 
political modernization and the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages. However, 
this finding, which in isolation would be interpreted as evidence in support of the 
conventional wisdom regarding party system development in Latin America, is 
immediately countered by the figures presented in the final column, which suggest a 
completely different interpretation. These correlation coefficients suggest that Uruguay is 
a statistical outlier, and that its inclusion generates evidence of a strong relationship 
between pre-WWII economic prosperity, post-war experience with democracy, and the 
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inclusiveness of State welfare programs, on the one hand, and programmatic political 
competition, on the other, where no such relationship actually exists. 
 Taking all three sets of correlation coefficients into account, this evidence 
suggests that, when we reincorporate the six countries that Kitschelt et al. (2010) exclude 
from their analysis, pre-WWII economic prosperity, post-war experience with 
democracy, and the inclusiveness of State welfare programs are (individually and in 
tandem) rather poor predictors of the strength of the relationship between left-right self-
placement and voting behavior. However, before concluding that political and economic 
modernization is therefore a poor predictor of the development of programmatic party-
voter linkages, I must address the question of whether the indicator that I have borrowed 
from Mainwaring and Torcal (2005), which measures the strength of the relationship 
between left-right self-identification and voting behavior, is an appropriate proxy 
measure of the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages. 
 
2.3 The Meaningfulness of Left-Right Self-Placement in Latin America 
 Earlier in this chapter, I justified my decision to focus on programmatic party-
voter linkages by arguing that, in their absence, evidence of PPS at the elite level would 
not constitute programmatic party competition in the sense that parties utilize their 
programmatic identities to compete for votes. However, to conclude that the evidence I 
presented in the previous section discredits the conventional wisdom regarding the 
development of programmatic political competition in the region would be to assume that 
the extent to which left-right self-identification predicts voting behavior is a valid 
measure of the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages. While the responsible 
party government model of democratic accountability would argue that political parties 
should employ left-right semantics as cognitive shortcuts designed to communicate their 
issue positions to the voting public, whether political actors actually use the terms Left 
and Right in this manner is an empirical question. It is only if parties and voters do 
indeed use the terms Left and Right to express programmatic positions that the indicator 
of the degree to which left-right self-identification predicts voting behavior that I borrow 
from Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) can be accepted as an indicator of the strength of 
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programmatic party-voter linkages. Therefore, I now examine the extent to which the 
terms Left and Right convey programmatic (rather than merely symbolic or affective) 
meaning in contemporary Latin America. 
 As summarized by Zechmeister (2006: 151-154), existing studies of ideological 
labels suggest that the meanings associated with the terms Left and Right may possess 
one or more of the following four different components: symbolic (when an ideological 
label is employed simply as an alternative to the name of a particular political party or of 
a group of political actors), affective/emotive (in which citizens associate an ideological 
label with a certain political actor because they feel a shared positive or negative affect 
towards both symbols), valence (when ideological labels identify issue priorities and/or 
issue ownership), and policy (in which ideological labels fulfill the role ascribed to them 
by the responsible party government model of democratic accountability and serve as 
cognitive shortcuts used to communicate distinct issue positions and policy preferences). 
The evidence that I present in the previous section can only be accepted as evidence that 
relatively high levels of economic and political development are neither necessary 
preconditions for nor sufficient causes of the development of programmatic political 
competition if I can demonstrate that left-right self-placement is itself grounded in 
programmatic meaning. 
 While research in the long-established, advanced democracies of Western Europe 
and North America has found that voters’ left-right self-placements are powerful 
predictors of voting behavior (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, Huber 1989, Fleury and 
Lewis-Beck 1993, Evans et al. 1996, Knutsen 1997, Erikson and Tedin 2003), various 
studies have also found that, in the minds of many voters in these countries, the labels 
Left and Right are often not strongly linked to policy stances (Converse 1964, Inglehart 
and Klingemann 1976, Klingemann 1979, Conover and Feldman 1981, Kinder 1983, 
Converse and Pierce 1986, Evans and Whitefield 1998). It follows that, in the Latin 
American context – where democracy is still something of a novelty in many countries, 
where political competition is often anchored by strong personalities rather than stable, 
institutionalized political parties (Roberts 2002), and where political campaigns 
frequently focus more on references to valence issues than on competing policy stances 
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(Magaloni and Poiré 2004) – we cannot expect that mass understandings of the terms Left 
and Right will be associated exclusively with substantive, programmatic content. Rather, 
the appropriate empirical question is whether these labels convey any programmatic 
meaning in the region. 
 To determine whether voters in Latin America’s eighteen electoral democracies 
attach programmatic meanings to the terms Left and Right, I utilize data from the 
Latinobarómetro public opinion surveys conducted throughout the region in the years 
1996-2007 to run a series of regression models that examine the relationship between 
respondents’ left-right self-placement and their attitudes regarding a selection of 
economic, political, and social issues. Although multiple regression analysis is most 
frequently used to test hypotheses which state that variation in one or more explanatory 
variables causes variation in the response variable (hence the use of the terms 
“independent” and “dependent” variables), the oft-repeated warning that “correlation 
does not imply causation” reminds us that the coefficients generated by these models are 
indeed correlation coefficients, and that regression models provide direct evidence of 
correlation, not of causation. It follows that multiple regression analysis can also be used 
to analyze the relationships that exist between a set of variables even when the researcher 
takes an agnostic stance with regards to the presumed direction of causality. Indeed, I 
neither offer nor test any hypothesis regarding the direction of causality in the 
relationship between the variables that are employed as independent variables and 
respondents’ left-right self-placement. 
 The independent variables included in these regression models are drawn from a 
pool of sixteen variables: one variable that measures respondents’ attitudes towards 
regional economic integration, five variables that measure preferences regarding the 
economic role of the State, an indicator of respondents’ attitudes towards economic 
inequality, three variables that measure respondents’ support for democracy, three 
variables related to issues regarding the rule of law, and three variables that gauge 
respondents’ attitudes towards abortion, homosexuality, and women’s role in society.13 
                                                 
13
  Appendix 2.D explains how these sixteen variables were chosen from an initial set of sixty-two attitudinal 
variables, Table 2.22 provides a full description of each of these sixteen variables, and Table 2.23 displays which 
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Using these sixteen variables, I follow a three-step process to measure the extent to which 
respondents’ policy preferences predict their left-right self-placement in each of Latin 
America’s eighteen electoral democracies. 
 First, I ran separate OLS regression models using respondents’ left-right self-
identification as the dependent variable and the 5-12 policy preference variables included 
in the corresponding year’s surveys as the independent variables for each single-country, 
single-survey sample. Because I am more concerned with the overall predictability of the 
dependent variable than with the relationships between specific independent variables 
and left-right self-identification, the statistic of interest that I take from these regression 
models is the R2 value.14 Since the number of variables included in these regression 
models varies from one survey year to another, the R2 values obtained from the single-
country, single-survey regression models cannot be used to make comparisons across 
years. Therefore, to facilitate comparisons between models from different survey years, I 
standardized the R2 value obtained from each regression model by transforming the 
reported R2 value into an indicator of the number of standard deviations that it is either 
greater or less than the mean R2 value for the corresponding survey year. Then, to create 
a single summary measure of the programmatic meaningfulness of the labels Left and 
Right for each of Latin America’s eighteen electoral democracies, I calculate the average 
of these standardized values for each country. 
  These average standardized values (illustrated in Figure 2.3) demonstrate that the 
relationship between citizens’ left-right self-placement and their preferences on a 
selection of economic, political, and social issues is strongest in the same three countries 
where left-right self-identification best predicts voting behavior.15 On average, during the 
                                                                                                                                                 
independent variables are included in each survey year. Appendix 2.D also provides evidence of the robustness of the 
analysis presented in this chapter; neither the inclusion of additional policy-related variables, the inclusion of 
demographic variables, nor the inclusion of indicators of respondents’ attitudes towards the United States and select 
foreign leaders has a significant impact on the results described below. 
14
 While the practice of comparing R2 values is not generally recommended as a means of evaluating different 
regression models (Granger and Newbold 1976), R2 values can be a useful measure of the relative strength of the 
relationship between a set of independent variables and a given dependent variable within different samples when the 
same regression model is applied to each sample.  
15
  Appendix 2.F demonstrates that the extraordinary strength of the relationship between political preferences and 
left-right self-placement in Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador cannot be attributed to higher levels of education, a greater 
degree of political knowledge, and/or higher levels of political interest among the survey respondents from these three 
countries. 
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period from 1996-2007, the citizens of El Salvador, Uruguay, and Chile attached 
substantive, programmatic meanings (rather than merely symbolic or affective 
attachments) to the terms Left and Right to a greater degree than did their counterparts in 
the rest of Latin America. Aside from these three countries, only Argentina – a country 
where left-right self-placement is a very poor predictor of voting behavior – exhibits a 
(slightly) stronger-than-average relationship between policy preferences and left-right 
self-placement. 
 
Figure 2.3 – The Meaningfulness of Left and Right in Latin America 
 
Note: For each country, the X-axis reports the strength of the relationship between left-right self-placement and voting 
behavior (taken from Table 2.7) while the Y-axis reports the mean difference (in standard deviations) between the 
strength of the relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-placement in that country and the average 
strength of this relationship across Latin America. 
 
 An examination of the standardized R2 values for each of the 191 individual 
country-year regression models (which are reported in Table 2.29) provides further 
confirmation that there is something unique about the relationship between policy 
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preferences and left-right self-placement in Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador. The 
strength of the relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-placement is 
stronger than the regional average in Chile and Uruguay in each of the eleven survey 
years. El Salvador and Argentina both exceed the regional average in seven of the eleven 
regression models. No other country exhibits a stronger-than-average score on this 
measure more than twice. Moreover, Chile (10), Uruguay (8), and El Salvador (4) 
account for twenty-two of the twenty-three instances in which the R2 value that 
summarizes the strength of the relationship between the policy preferences included in 
the corresponding year’s regression models and left-right self-placement is at least one 
standard deviation greater than the average R2 value for that survey year. 
 These findings, as well as the fact that my indicators of (1) the strength of the 
relationship between left-right self-placement and voting behavior and (2) the strength of 
the relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-placement are rather 
strongly correlated (Pearson’s R is .73), suggest that the values reported in Table 2.7 can 
indeed be interpreted as evidence of the presence of relatively strong programmatic party-
voter linkages in El Salvador, Uruguay, and Chile. Consequently, these findings also 
suggest that the values reported in Table 2.7 do indeed demonstrate that the conventional 
wisdom regarding party system development in Latin America cannot account for 
variation in the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages in the region. 
 Finally, my analysis of the Latinobarómetro survey data also uncovered evidence 
(illustrated in Appendix 2.D, Table 2.29) of two noteworthy longitudinal trends. While it 
is important to be cautious about drawing any firm conclusions from these regression 
models due to the fact that the independent variables vary from one survey year to 
another, it is interesting to note that the standardized R2 values corresponding to the 2006 
and 2007 regression models for Bolivia, Ecuador, and, to an even greater degree, 
Venezuela hint that the relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-
placement may have started to strengthen in those three countries during the latter half of 
the first decade of the twenty-first century. If verified, the emergence of a programmatic 
basis to the use of the terms Left and Right in the those countries that experienced the rise 
to power of the three most prominent proponents of the new, Bolivarian Left would add 
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ammunition to my argument that actions taken by a unified Left to promote its 
ideological distinctiveness play a vitally important role in the establishment of 
programmatic political competition. 
 The second longitudinal trend that warrants discussion concerns the relationship 
between policy preferences and left-right self-placement in El Salvador. This relationship 
was sometimes stronger than average during the years 1996-2003, but it was never much 
stronger than average during that period. From 2004-07, however, this relationship was 
consistently much stronger than the regional average. Table 2.12, which presents separate 
average standardized R2 values for the pre- and post-2004 time periods for the four 
countries where policy preferences best predict left-right self-placement, demonstrates 
that the relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-placement in El 
Salvador was unremarkable prior to 2004, when it then became extraordinarily strong. 
 
Table 2.12 – Average Standardized R2 Values, by Period 
 1996-2003 2004-2007 
 Country Mean R2 Country Mean R2 
 Chile 2.62 El Salvador 2.18 
 Uruguay 2.28 Chile 1.73 
 Argentina 0.12 Uruguay 1.17 
 El Salvador -0.04 Argentina 0.50 
 
 The timing of this sudden, yet enduring, emergence of a strong relationship 
between policy preferences and left-right self-placement in El Salvador is neither 
coincidental nor irrelevant. Rather, as I argue in Chapter Five, the fact that the strength of 
programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador increased substantially in 2004, the 
same year that long-time Salvadoran Communist Party leader Schafik Hándal ran as the 
FMLN candidate in a presidential election that saw the total number of valid votes cast 
exceed the number of votes cast in the previous presidential election by 86.3%, further 
supports my argument that actions taken by the FMLN to make voters cognizant of the 
party’s ideological distinctiveness played an important role in generating the high level of 
programmatic political competition seen in contemporary El Salvador. 
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2.4 Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I have tested Kitschelt et al.’s (2010) conclusions by incorporating 
data from the six Latin American democracies they exclude from their analysis in order 
to (1) generate predictions of the likelihood that programmatic party-voter linkages 
would have formed in each of the region’s eighteen electoral democracies, and (2) 
examine how well these predictions perform. The results of the analysis described in this 
chapter cast important doubts over the broader applicability of a theoretical framework 
that associates the development of programmatic political competition with economic and 
political development. At the very least, we must conclude that this framework cannot 
explain the development of programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador. 
 The fact that El Salvador exhibits stronger programmatic party-voter linkages 
than any other Latin American country demonstrates that neither economic prosperity, 
extensive experience with democracy, nor the establishment of a relatively inclusive 
social safety net can be considered a necessary precondition for the formation of 
programmatic political competition. Similarly, the weaker-than-predicted programmatic 
party-voter linkages found in Argentina, Costa Rica, and Brazil provide convincing 
evidence that not one of these three attributes can be labeled a sufficient cause of 
programmatic political competition. 
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Chapter Three 
Time, Party Elites, and the Nature of Party-Voter Linkages 
 
 As noted in Chapter One, I contend that the development of programmatic 
political competition in El Salvador, a poor country with little history of democratic 
elections that also has one of Latin America’s stingiest social security systems, cannot be 
dismissed as an anomaly. Rather, I argue that the unexpected strength of programmatic 
party-voter linkages in El Salvador forces us to reexamine the theoretical framework that 
has guided much of the study of party system development in contemporary Latin 
America. Specifically, in arguing that the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages 
not only in El Salvador but also in Chile and Uruguay is best explained by the presence in 
all three countries of an organized and unified Left that has achieved electoral success by 
actively promoting its ideological distinctiveness, I challenge a theory of party system 
development in the region (Kitschelt et al. 2010) which contends (1) that the material and 
cognitive resources needed to create the organizations that foster the formation of 
programmatic party-voter linkages can only be found in those Latin American countries 
that had already achieved a certain degree of economic prosperity prior to World War II, 
(2) that only those countries that exhibited long periods of democratic competition in the 
post-WWII era provided both political elites and the masses with the necessary 
opportunities to build programmatic linkages, and (3) that the protracted political 
struggles over the appropriate economic role of the state that motivate elite actors to 
organize political parties around programmatic platforms only developed in those 
countries that established relatively inclusive social safety nets during that same era. 
 In the first section of this chapter, I provide a brief overview of the capability-
opportunity-stakes framework that Kitschelt et al. (2010) employ to explain the 
development of programmatic political competition in Chile and Uruguay, a framework 
that represents something of an amalgamation of three long-standing research traditions: 
modernization theory, the Michigan model of party identification, and the cleavage-based 
approach to the study of party system formation and evolution. From modernization 
theory, Kitschelt et al. appropriate the belief that a certain level of socioeconomic 
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development is a prerequisite for the formation of a stable party system in which political 
parties utilize programmatic appeals to win voters’ support; from the Michigan model of 
party identification, they adopt the notion that the development of programmatic party-
voter linkages is a lengthy process made possible only by an iteration of democratic 
elections; and from social cleavage theory, they adopt the belief that strong party-voter 
linkages are likely to form only in the presence of a persistent, well-defined issue conflict 
that generates enduring political divisions. 
 In the three sections that follow, I examine this capabilities-opportunities-stakes 
framework as it relates to political science literatures on party system formation and 
development, partisan identification, and the formation of political cleavages. In doing 
so, I demonstrate how my own argument regarding the resources needed to create 
organizations capable of fostering programmatic party-voter linkages, the speed with 
which such linkages form, and the role that political elites play in determining the nature 
of party-voter linkages is also rooted in well-established literatures – namely, a 
revisionist approach to the study of party identification that argues that meaningful party-
voter linkages can form in a relatively short period of time and a Sartori-inspired line of 
research on party system development that privileges agency over structure. 
 In the final section of this chapter, I address two important questions – (1) who is 
likely to invest in the development of programmatic political competition and (2) how do 
they promote the formation of programmatic party-voter linkages? As noted in Chapter 
One, I argue that, throughout most of Latin America, political elites on the Left have the 
greatest incentive to attempt to convince voters to base their voting decisions on 
programmatic concerns because they do not possess the financial resources necessary to 
compete with established conservative parties in terms of their spending on mass media 
campaigns and the establishment and maintenance of patron-client ties. With regards to 
the question of how Leftist political elites can accomplish this task (generating 
programmatic linkages with a significant number of voters), I argue that the emergence of 
programmatic party-voter linkages in Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador is largely the 
result of the unity of the Left in all three countries, the creation of permanent party 
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organizations representing a broad leftist coalition, and conscious efforts designed to 
educate voters and promote the distinctiveness of the Left’s political program. 
 
3.1 Political Capabilities, Opportunities, and Stakes 
 While many early examinations of party system development in Latin America 
(Remmer 1991, Mainwaring 1993, Jones 1994, Coppedge 1997) focused on comparing 
these party systems to their counterparts in advanced industrial democracies – a 
comparison that led to the characterization (generalization) of Latin American parties and 
party systems as being poorly institutionalized – other works (Dix 1992, Mainwaring and 
Scully 1995, Coppedge 1998a) have demonstrated that this conventional wisdom 
regarding the fragmentation and volatility of Latin American parties and party systems 
overlooks a significant degree of diversity within the region. As I demonstrate in Chapter 
Two, Latin American party systems also display a significant degree of diversity with 
regards to the development of programmatic party-voter linkages, enough to demonstrate 
that not all of the region’s democracies adhere to a conventional wisdom that equates 
party competition in Latin America with clientelism and catch-all parties. Addressing the 
question of why programmatic political competition has emerged in some Latin 
American democracies but not in others, Kitschelt et al. (2010) argue that programmatic 
party-voter linkages are the result of a long-term process of political learning that can 
only occur in societies where three characteristics are present: 
 First, for programmatic party-voter linkages to emerge, a country must exhibit a 
relatively high level of socioeconomic development. Higher levels of socioeconomic 
development coincide with improved access to political information (as voters gain 
improved access to local and international media via cable television and the Internet) 
and with a greater capacity to understand and process that information (due to the higher 
levels of educational attainment that generally accompany socioeconomic development). 
The material resources associated with higher levels of socioeconomic development 
combine with these cognitive resources to reduce voters’ demand for the selective 
incentives that form the basis of clientelistic party-voter linkages and to increase their 
demand for collective goods. This, in turn, prompts elite actors to stop pursuing party-
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voter linkages based on clientelistic exchanges and to start making programmatic appeals 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). 
 Socioeconomic development also decreases the allure of selective incentives; the 
greater material wealth of the voting public decreases the demand for selective 
incentives, while the increased mobility associated with economic growth impinges upon 
politicians’ ability to maintain patron-client networks. Similarly, the widespread adoption 
of Washington Consensus policies – particularly the privatization of state enterprises, 
reductions in the number of public employees, and a general reduction in state spending – 
in the aftermath of the economic crises of the 1980s decreased the amount of resources 
available to politicians for the maintenance of patron-client relationships (i.e. the supply 
of selective incentives). 
 Second, the long-term process of political learning necessary for the development 
of programmatic party-voter linkages requires a relatively long and continuous history of 
democratic elections. Repeated cycles of competitive elections held within a political 
environment that provides reasonable guarantees of civil rights and civil liberties allow 
parties and voters alike to experience a cumulative learning effect. While parties are 
afforded the opportunity to learn to address the collective action problems that may be 
most acute during the first post-transition elections, voters benefit (learn) by being 
exposed to the party reputations that are established through electoral campaigns and 
through winning parties’ performance in government. 
 Third, political actors must be motivated to create permanent, ideologically 
coherent political parties because they believe that government policies and institutions 
influence the distribution of certain cultural and/or material gains and losses. Quite 
simply, if neither voters nor party elites believe that election results have a real impact on 
future economic, social, or cultural development, elites will not invest in creating stable, 
institutionalized parties, while the parties that do form will have no incentive to employ 
programmatic appeals. While noting that these perceived political stakes could, in theory, 
be centered on various types of political, social, or cultural conflict, Kitschelt et al. (2010: 
38) focus on “questions of political economic regime form” because empirical evidence 
demonstrates that competing positions regarding the “authoritative rules that (re)assign 
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property rights and regulate people’s market behavior” form the central component of the 
programmatic appeals made by Latin American political parties. 
 Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I use this capability-opportunity-stakes 
framework as a point of reference in order to highlight the extent to which my own 
argument regarding the development of programmatic political competition also parallels 
long-standing research traditions in political science. 
 
3.2 Political Capabilities: Modernization Theory Redux 
 In his classic exploration of the relationship between economic development and 
democracy, Lipset (1959) contends that the concurrent processes of industrialization and 
urbanization that characterize economic modernization generate important changes to 
social values and attitudes that are necessary for the creation of a democratic society. 
Urbanization and poverty reduction combine to increase the production and diffusion of 
news media (resulting in improved access to information) and to generate higher levels of 
education (improving the cognitive resources necessary to process political information). 
Industrialization and wealth creation combine to spur the growth of the middle class and 
to reduce the size and importance of isolated industries (such as mining, logging, fishing, 
and rural agriculture) that often serve as breeding grounds for lower-class support for 
extremist ideologies. These changes facilitate the widespread adoption of democratic 
norms of tolerance, which, in turn, leads to the moderation of political conflict. By 
creating an environment in which tolerance and political moderation become social 
norms, economic development reduces the costs of defeat at the ballot box – because 
party elites have little reason to believe that losing an election will result in their 
permanent exclusion from political competition or in the implementation of radical policy 
changes, they are unlikely to respond to unfavorable election results with an immediate 
call for regime change.  
 Dix (1989) and Collier and Collier (1991) both adopt Lipset’s focus on the social 
and political changes associated with industrialization in their examinations of party 
system development in Latin America, examinations that focus on the relative weakness 
of class-based parties in the region (as compared to the important role played by labor 
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parties in Western Europe). Dix argues that the weakness of class-based parties in Latin 
America – and, consequently, the weakness of programmatic party-voter linkages – can 
be attributed to the region’s relatively low level of industrial development. Collier and 
Collier argue that the manner in which nascent labor movements were incorporated into 
pre-existing party system structures during the early to mid-twentieth century had a 
tremendous impact on party system development in the mid to late-twentieth century, 
particularly with regards to party system fragmentation, polarization, and political 
parties’ relationship with organized labor. 
 Kitschelt et al.’s (2010) argument that the early achievement of a relatively high 
level of economic prosperity is necessary for the formation of programmatic party-voter 
linkages is firmly in line with this line of political science research, which identifies 
economic modernization as a prerequisite for democratic stability and the formation of 
class-based parties. Their focus on the material and cognitive resources that facilitate 
voters’ access to political information and also increase their ability to process that 
information clearly parallels the importance that Lipset (1959) places on the expansion of 
education and news media that accompanies industrialization. Similarly, their focus on 
the importance of party organization recalls arguments made by Dix (1989) and Collier 
and Collier (1991) regarding the relationship between industrialization, the formation of 
class-based parties, and the development of formal linkages between labor unions and 
political parties in twentieth-century Latin America. 
 I contend, however, that the presence of strong programmatic party-voter linkages 
in El Salvador casts serious doubts on any theory that identifies economic modernization 
as a prerequisite for the development of programmatic political competition. Moreover, 
while it is reasonable to assume that the social and political changes associated with 
economic modernization may well have facilitated the process through which Chilean 
and Uruguayan voters learned to utilize political information in such a way that they 
would vote “correctly,” the weakness of programmatic party-voter linkages in a number 
of Latin America’s most “modern” countries (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Costa 
Rica) demonstrates that economic modernization does not guarantee the emergence of 
programmatic political competition. In short, I argue that, although economic 
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modernization may contribute material and cognitive resources that facilitate the 
formation of programmatic party-voter linkages, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
the development of programmatic political competition. 
 
3.3 Political Opportunities: Political Learning and Party Identification 
 The argument that programmatic party-voter linkages will only form in countries 
that have enjoyed long periods of democratic rule, because repeated cycles of competitive 
elections afford political parties the opportunity to establish well-defined programmatic 
reputations while also giving voters the opportunity to learn how to vote “correctly” and 
to use their vote to hold elected officials accountable for their policymaking decisions, 
finds its parallel in the extensive literature on party identification. First defined more than 
a half-century ago as “the sense of personal attachment with which the individual feels 
toward the [partisan] group of his choice” (Campbell et al. 1954: 89), party identification 
has been described as “the central factor in explaining not just how people vote, but also 
how they see the political world” (Achen 2002: 151). 
 The classical view of party identification, generally referred to as the “Michigan 
model,” argues that party identification is “something of an unmoved mover, a 
psychological attachment that remains highly stable over time” (Green and Palmquist 
1994: 437). In addition to being the primary determinant of vote choice, party 
identification is also said to influence both “how individuals see the hurly burly world of 
everyday politics” and “some of their most abstract and enduring beliefs about society 
and public affairs” (Goren 2005: 894). The important role that partisan attachment plays 
in influencing political behavior is a result of the extent to which party identification 
serves as a psychological construct that provides the “simple cues” that voters need “to 
help order a complex reality” (Converse and Pierce 1992: 240). 
 The key conceptual attributes of party identification, as defined by Campbell et al. 
(1960: 121-122), are social identification and partisan affect: 
“In characterizing the relation of individual to party as a psychological identification we 
invoke a concept that has played an important if somewhat varied role in psychological 
theories of the relation of individual to individual or of individual to group. We use the 
concept here to characterize the individual’s affective orientation to an important group-
object in his environment. Both reference group theory and small-group studies of 
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influence have converged upon the attracting or repelling quality of the group as the 
generalized dimension most critical in defining the individual-group relationship, and it is 
this dimension that we will call identification.” 
 
As Niemi and Weisberg (2001: 323) note, this view of party identification, which is 
firmly rooted in social psychology, suggests that “people identify with groups such as 
parties just as they identify with religions or social classes.” Green et al. (2002: 204) 
expand upon the degree to which party identification resembles other forms of social 
identification; like class identification, partisan identification “reflects an awareness that 
one belongs to a social group,” like ethnic identification, it is a group label that the 
individual must choose to apply as part of his/her self-identity, and like religious 
identification, party identification “may develop for reasons that have to do with a 
person’s social location ... rather than the draw of the doctrine associated with the group.” 
 Franklin and Jackson (1983: 957) summarize the process through which party 
identification, defined as a type of social identity, informs political behavior according to 
the Michigan model: 
“Parties were viewed as the major group objects on the political horizon. Once imbued 
with positive or negative associations by an individual, these groups acted as powerful 
organizing mechanisms for the person’s political cognitions, which would otherwise rest 
on only the most rudimentary stores of information. Party identification allowed 
individuals to ‘know’ more about persons and policies associated with the parties than 
was possible on the basis of their direct contact with issue positions and candidate 
characteristics.” 
 
Although reference group theory, the psychological theory upon which the authors of The 
American Voter based their concept of social identification, has been supplanted by social 
identity theory, which defines social identity as “that part of an individual’s self concept 
which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a group (or groups) together 
with the value and emotional significance attached to the membership” (Tajfel 1978: 63), 
the psychological basis for the classical view of party identification has not been 
undermined by this evolution in psychological theory. Following Tajfel’s definition of 
social identity, the “identification” part of the term “party identification” contains two 
meanings, one associated with empathy (corresponding to The American Voter’s concept 
of partisan affect) and another synonymous with self-conception (i.e. social 
identification) (Green et al. 2002). 
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 With regards to the formation of party identification, the Michigan model argues 
that “true partisan identifications take extended periods of time to develop” (Converse 
and Pierce 1992: 241) and that partisanship is necessarily an attachment “that forms early 
in life through a process of political socialization” (Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996: 
567). Indeed, Converse (1969) argues that the development of partisanship follows a 
three-generation pattern, with party identification being (1) uncommon amongst people 
who had already reached adulthood (and had therefore already established their personal 
and group identities) prior to the creation of a new party system, (2) more common 
amongst members of the second generation, those who were in the process of establishing 
their identities when the new party system emerged, and (3) most common (but weaker) 
amongst members of the third generation, those who will have inherited partisan 
attachments from their parents. 
 While Kitschelt et al. (2010) do not focus on party identification per se – indeed, 
the normative justification for focusing on programmatic party-voter linkages 
conscientiously discounts the value of the social and affective components of party 
identification – their contention that long periods of democratic competition are 
necessary for the development of programmatic party-voter linkages obviously shares 
with the Michigan model an emphasis on gradual, long-term processes of political 
learning. 
 Of course, the Michigan model is hardly the only extant perspective on the 
formation and evolution of party-voter linkages. In an account of the history of 
scholarship on party identification that is still quite useful three decades after its 
publication, Franklin and Jackson (1983) identify three distinct schools of thought: (1) 
the Michigan model (2) the rational choice approach, and (3) a revisionist line of research 
(e.g., Markus and Converse 1979, Page and Jones 1979, Fiorina 1981) which suggests 
that “partisanship is not accurately described by either of these dominant models” 
(Franklin and Jackson 1983: 957-958). Box-Steffensmeier and Smith (1996) formalize 
the distinctions between classical, rational choice, and revisionist accounts of party 
identification by specifying the individual voter’s decision mechanism as 
xi(t) = θ0 + αxi(t-1) + δzi(t) + εi(t) 
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where xi(t) is person i’s current party identification, xi(t-1) is her party ID in the last period, 
and zi(t) includes all other systematic predictors of party identification, which might 
include retrospective evaluations of the incumbent president, comparative assessments of 
political parties’ and candidates’ positions on salient issues, and evaluations of 
contemporary economic conditions. Viewed within this framework, we can distinguish 
between these three approaches to the study of party identification in the following 
manner: (1) the Michigan model contends that the value of δ is nearly negligible, (2) 
rational choice theorists argue that it is the value of α
 
that is negligible, while (3) 
revisionists claim that the values of both δ and α
 
are substantively important. 
 The claim that the value of δ is roughly zero (i.e. that the best predictor of current 
party identification is past party identification) is reflected in the one phrase that is most 
frequently associated with the Michigan model’s view of partisanship – that of the 
“unmoved mover.” This conception of party identification as an unmoved mover 
emphasizes both the belief that “party identification is a pervasive dynamic force shaping 
citizens’ perceptions of, and reactions to, the political world” (Bartels 2002: 117) and the 
conviction that party identification, once formed, is highly stable.  
 Whereas the Michigan model emphasizes “the persistence and robustness of 
voters’ party loyalties,” the rational choice approach to the study of party identification 
“emphasizes the strong correlation between party identification and left/right ideological 
self-placement” (Bowler and Lanoue 1996: 340-341). According to rational choice 
theory, party preferences are simply “a function of voters’ issue positions and the 
positions of the parties” (Franklin and Jackson 1983: 958). Current party identification is 
best predicted by voters’ evaluations of the incumbent president, their assessments of 
political parties’ and candidates’ positions on salient issues, and their evaluations of 
contemporary economic conditions. 
 Achen (2002: 153) summarizes the non-psychological nature of rational choice 
theory’s explanation of party identification: 
“When the voters expect that a party will favor them in the future, they will be said to 
‘identify’ with that party. Of course, none of the emotional or affective content 
sometimes associated with identification is treated here. Those feelings are obviously 
quite real, but this model sets them aside in the same way and for the same reason that 
economics sets aside the consumer’s joy at finding a perfect apple in the grocery store.” 
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What might appear to be party loyalty or partisan identification results not from any 
psychological identification with a political party, but rather from the relative stability of 
individuals’ policy preferences and of political parties’ policy platforms. So, from the 
point of view of rational choice theory, although “the cost of information might lead 
voters to adopt methods of evaluating party positions which could lag behind actual party 
policies” and thus generate the illusion of party loyalty, voters are expected to 
immediately update their party preferences when provided with accurate, up-to-date 
information about competing parties’ policy platforms (Franklin and Jackson 1983: 958).  
 As noted above, the revisionist account of party identification, which contends 
that the values of both δ and α
 
are substantively important, suggests that neither the 
Michigan model nor the rational choice approach provides an accurate description of 
partisan attachments. Rather, the revisionist approach “attempts to meld the issue voter of 
traditional democratic theory, the partisan voter of the Michigan studies, and the 
retrospective voter” (Fiorina 1981: 65). Based on the belief that “an individual’s party 
identification is not necessarily permanent but is both a cause of and can be caused by 
political factors” (Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996: 567), the revisionist approach 
argues that current party identification is best predicted by taking into consideration both 
past party identification and contemporary political evaluations. Voters exhibit partisan 
loyalties not simply because they form a psychological attachment with a certain political 
party (as per the Michigan model), nor because voters’ policy preferences and parties’ 
policy platforms tend to be stable (as per rational choice theory), but rather because party 
leadership tends to be stable.  
 Returning to the topic at hand – the development of programmatic political 
competition in contemporary Latin America – it is important to be mindful of certain 
differences between party identification and the notion of programmatic party-voter 
linkages, especially in relation to the study of political behavior. The study of party 
identification is predicated on the assumption that a voter who identifies herself with a 
certain political party will be more likely to vote for that party’s candidates than for the 
candidates of political parties towards which she does not feel any psychological 
attachment. The examination of the development of programmatic party-voter linkages, 
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on the other hand, is motivated by the belief that a voter who holds a certain set of policy 
preferences should be more likely to vote for the party/candidate that shares a large 
number of those preferences than for any party/candidate whose preferences have less in 
common with those of the voter.  
 For programmatic party-voter linkages to form, voters must have relatively well-
defined policy preferences, they must choose to base their voting decisions upon 
ideological considerations, and they must possess “a sense of the approximate relative 
positions of the available parties on the ideological spectrum,” something that requires 
the presence of “‘sufficiently ideological’ parties … that take clear, widely understood 
positions on a conventionally interrelated set of issues” (Coppedge 1998b: 552). Whereas 
Kitschelt and his co-authors argue that programmatic party-voter linkages require a long-
term process of political learning, and that “negative short-term experiences can have 
harsh consequences” for the development of programmatic political competition 
(Hawkins et al. 2008: 2), Niemi and Weisberg (2001) contend that economic or political 
crises may in some cases accelerate the development of partisan identification. 
 Inasmuch as programmatic party-voter linkages lack the psychological component 
associated with party identification, it seems fair to conclude that political crises could 
have a substantial impact on the development of programmatic party-voter linkages. 
Indeed, I argue that political crises – namely, the violent repression of civil society 
associated with military rule in Uruguay, with the Pinochet regime in Chile, and with the 
civil war in El Salvador – played an important role in accelerating the development of 
programmatic political competition in the three Latin American countries where strong 
programmatic party-voter linkages are found. Continuous, direct exposure to political 
violence provided voters with an education in the ideological disagreements that 
generated violent conflict between competing groups of political elites, an education that 
provided voters with ample opportunities to attach programmatic meanings to the labels 
“left” and “right” and to begin to use those terms to identify their own political 
preferences, long before democratic elections were re-established in these three countries.  
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3.4 Political Stakes: Social Cleavages and Critical Junctures 
 Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) classic account of party system development, which 
argues that Western European party systems exhibit a high degree of stability because 
they became frozen around center-periphery, church-state, land-industry, and capitalist-
worker cleavages (themselves the products of the issue conflicts that generated critical 
junctures in European history) that existed at the time when suffrage was expanded to 
include most male citizens, continues to loom large over the literature on Latin American 
party systems. Although Lipset and Rokkan introduced the concept of social cleavages as 
a determinant of party system development, they did not provide any explicit definition 
of the term. Drawing upon a typology developed by Rae and Taylor (1970), Bartolini and 
Mair (1990: 215-216) argue that social cleavages should be understood “primarily as a 
form of closure of social relationships” involving (1) an empirical (ascriptive) element 
which “identifies the empirical referent of the concept, and which we can define in 
social-structural terms,” (2) a normative (attitudinal) element consisting of “the set of 
values and beliefs which provides a sense of identity and role to the empirical element,” 
and (3) an organizational (behavioral) element, defined as “the set of individual 
interactions, institutions, and organizations, such as political parties, which develop as 
part of the cleavage.”  
 As noted in Chapter One, students of party system development in Latin America 
offer conflicting answers to the question of why Latin American party systems did not 
become frozen around the social cleavages that organized political conflict when 
universal male suffrage was introduced during the mid-to-late nineteenth. Although 
Geddes (2004) argues that mid-nineteenth century Latin America exhibited a 
configuration of social cleavages that is strikingly similar to the set of social cleavages 
found in Spain, Portugal, and Italy,1 most work on party system development in the 
                                                 
1
  In arguing that the reasons why Latin American party systems are less stable than their Western European 
counterparts are connected to various institutional features that are unique to presidential democracies, Geddes (2004) 
taps into the main alternative to social cleavage theory: institutionalism. Because examinations of the impact that 
various electoral institutions have on party system development provide few predictions regarding the impact that these 
institutions have on the nature (programmatic or non-programmatic) of party-voter linkages that are likely to form, and 
also because because institutional differences between the Central American case studies that I examine are minimal, I 
do not examine institutionalism in great detail in this chapter. I do, however, briefly discuss the potential influence of 
electoral institutions in Chapter Nine. 
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region has drawn inspiration from Dix (1989), who contends that Latin American party 
systems have not followed the European model because Latin American societies do not 
exhibit the same type of divisive social cleavages that presumably contribute to party 
system stability in Western Europe. 
 The notion of critical junctures, one of the core components of social cleavage 
theory, has been particularly influential in the study of party system development in Latin 
America. In a work described by Bornschier (2009: 8) as the “most ambitious and 
theoretically elaborate application of the concept of critical junctures,” Collier and Collier 
(1991: 3) identify the incorporation period, that moment when “state control of the 
working class ceased to be principally the responsibility of the police or the army but 
rather was achieved at least in part through the legalization and institutionalization of a 
labor movement sanctioned and regulated by the state,” as the critical juncture that 
influenced political competition for a number of decades. Other authors have identified 
various different historical moments as critical junctures in Latin America’s political 
development. For instance, Thorp (1998) contends that the radical transformation of 
Latin American economies caused by the adoption of import substitution industrialization 
(ISI) beginning in the 1940s amounted to nothing less than a political and social 
revolution in many countries. Domínguez (1998: 72) refers to the economic downturn 
that swept through the region during the early 1980s as a critical juncture that “did 
wonders for the prospects of democracy and markets” in Latin America. España-Nájera 
(2009) argues that the democratic transitions of the 1980s and 1990s constituted a critical 
juncture for party system formation in the region. Yashar (2005) suggests that the 
adoption of neoliberal citizenship regimes in the 1980s and 1990s constitutes a critical 
juncture that resulted in the politicization of ethnic cleavages and the subsequent 
emergence and mobilization of indigenous movements in a number of Latin American 
countries. 
 While Kitschelt et al. (2010) do not explicitly adopt the language of critical 
junctures, their contention that protracted political struggles over the appropriate 
economic role of the state only led party elites to employ programmatic platforms in 
those countries that had established relatively inclusive social safety nets during the 
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1950s and 1960s can be interpreted as an argument identifying this period as a critical 
juncture for the development of party-voter linkages in the region. However, the period 
during which these social safety nets were established is certainly not the only (or even 
the most recent) period of widespread social, economic, and political change to have 
swept through Latin America during the post-WWII era. As noted above, scholars have 
put together a fairly long list of potential critical junctures for party system development 
in Latin America.  
 Even Collier and Collier (1991), the most celebrated proponents of the use of 
cleavage theory to explain party system development in Latin America, express a certain 
degree of uncertainty regarding which period of time should be identified as a critical 
juncture vis-à-vis the current status of the region’s party systems. While they identified 
the initial incorporation of the working class into electoral politics early in the twentieth 
century as the critical juncture that set the stage for party system development for a 
number of decades, they also speculated that the “significant changes in the parameters of 
politics” that had occurred during the 1980s might represent the initial stages of a new 
critical juncture in the development of the region’s party systems (Collier and Collier 
1991: 9). A decade later, in the preface to the 2002 edition of their groundbreaking study, 
Collier and Collier (2002: xiii-xv) argued that: 
“Latin American politics is, indeed, experiencing the new critical juncture we 
discussed.… The class coalitions, party systems, and resulting regime dynamics that were 
our central focus have in important respects been destabilized. In some countries, they 
have been superseded entirely…. [W]ith the rise of neoliberalism in national economic 
politics, the partial eclipse of union power, and the uncertain emergence of alternative 
popular sector actors, among many other transformations, Latin America is in the midst 
of fundamental political change. As was the case with the previous critical juncture, this 
new episode involves a basic alteration of the relationships among class structure, party 
systems, and regime dynamics.” 
 
 What, then, of the social cleavage approach and, specifically, the notion of critical 
junctures? Should we identify the period of democratization during the 1970s and 1980s 
as a critical juncture, one that has given rise to a new set of social cleavages, or should we 
abandon the cleavage approach altogether in our examination of the development of 
party-voter linkages in contemporary Latin America? To answer this question, it is useful 
to borrow Deegan Krause’s (2006) alternative typology for categorizing societies based 
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on the ascriptive, attitudinal, and behavioral divisions they exhibit. This typology 
includes three types of “divides,” described as “something more than mere difference but 
something less than cleavage” – (1) position divides, which combine ascriptive and 
attitudinal differences, are by definition not politicized and are therefore unlikely to 
generate serious political conflict, (2) census divides, which combine ascriptive and 
behavioral differences, may become politicized, but their political significance can be 
minimized if political elites choose to emphasize attitudinal factors that cut across these 
group and party ties, and (3) issue divides, which combine attitudinal and behavioral 
differences, are politicized by definition, although their impact may erode over time 
because they lack strong roots in society (Deegan Krause 2006: 16-17). 
 At the mass level, programmatic political competition is virtually synonymous 
with the presence of political conflict organized around issue divides, inasmuch as both 
programmatic political competition and issue divides are defined by a linkage between 
attitudes (policy preferences) and political behavior (vote choice). While Deegan Krause 
(2006) suggests that the impact of issue divides might not endure from one election to the 
next because issue divides lack ascriptive roots, he does not claim that issue divides 
cannot endure. Following Torcal and Mainwaring (2003: 55), who contend that political 
agency “can even (re)create social identities,” I argue that, just as political elites can 
minimize the political significance of census divides by emphasizing attitudinal 
differences that cut across ascriptive and organizational ties, they can also enhance the 
durability of issue divides by emphasizing the ideological differences between political 
parties. Indeed, I contend that the evidence presented in Chapter Two, which shows that 
the relationships between policy preferences, left-right self-placement, and voting 
behavior are strong in Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador than in any other country in Latin 
America, demonstrates that elite political actors in these three countries have succeeded 
in generating new issue divides. 
 Just as Bornschier (2009) hints that it may be too early to determine whether the 
value-based divides that have recently emerged in many post-industrial democracies 
(Inglehart 1984) should be identified as social cleavages, it may also be too early to 
determine whether the issue divides that have emerged in Chile, Uruguay, and El 
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Salvador are accompanied by the sort of ascriptive ties that are characteristic of a social 
cleavage. Perhaps ascriptive divides between the supporters of the Chile’s Concertación, 
Uruguay’s Frente Amplio, and El Salvador’s FMLN and the supporters of their 
opponents will form (or are in formation), perhaps they will not. Ultimately, in terms of 
the impact these divides have on voting behavior, and particularly on the relationship 
between policy preferences and vote choice, in the near term, I contend that the 
difference between a social cleavage and an issue divide may be of little consequence. 
Similarly, I argue that it is of little consequence whether or not we choose to identify the 
transitions to democracy during the 1970s and 1980s as a critical juncture in the 
development of Latin American party systems as long as we remain cognizant of the role 
that political elites must play for any period of significant socio-political change to result 
in the establishment of programmatic political competition. 
 By focusing on the role that elites play in the creation of issue divides and/or 
social cleavages, I follow Sartori (1968) in privileging agency over structure. Although 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 26) had explicitly warned, in their seminal account of the 
relationship between social cleavages and party system development, that “cleavages do 
not translate themselves into party oppositions as a matter of course,” much of the 
research that has followed in their footsteps “has suffered from an unwarranted degree of 
social determinism” (Bornschier 2009: 2). As a result, the cleavage framework has been 
criticized for “underplay[ing] the role of agency in creating links between social 
cleavages and political parties” (Chhibber and Torcal 1997: 28; also see Sartori 1968, 
Zuckerman 1975). This critique may be particularly relevant for work on party system 
development in Latin America, where “political elites are especially able to play a more 
active role in defining the social basis of party support” due to the “marked absence of 
secondary organizations and party structures” (Chhibber and Torcal 1997: 28). 
 It is against this backdrop, in which “the largest contingent of researchers has 
focused on the role of socioeconomic and cultural roots,” that “a small but increasingly 
influential group of scholars” who emphasize “the malleability of underlying conflicts in 
the hands of political parties and their leaders” has emerged (Deegan Krause 2006: 18-
19). For instance, in their examination of the evolution of the Spanish party system 
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during the first two decades of the post-Franco era, Chhibber and Torcal (1997: 36) argue 
that “the emergence of social status as a salient factor [was] largely due to the strategies 
pursued by party elites and the economic and fiscal policies adopted by the PSOE 
government.” By influencing which issues become politicized, political elites “form the 
basis for more enduring social cleavages that link political parties with specific sectors 
within society” (Chhibber and Torcal 1997: 31). Similarly, Torcal and Mainwaring 
(2003: 59) emphasize the political construction of social identities in their examination of 
party system formation during Chile’s transition to democracy following the Pinochet 
era, arguing that: 
“The interaction of competing political parties, their political discourses, electoral 
platforms and policy making can change voters’ political and cultural preferences. These 
factors are primarily responsible for the creation or disappearance of social identities that 
can reflect or defuse existing social differences. Politics is responsible for creating, 
transforming, deepening or diffusing specific social and economic conflicts.” 
 
 In contrast with modernization theory and the Michigan model of party 
identification, this approach to the study of party system evolution does not assign an 
overly important role to socioeconomic development or to the iteration of democratic 
elections. On the contrary, I argue that under certain circumstances – for instance, when a 
political crisis has resulted in the dissolution of the previous partisan status quo – 
political elites can accelerate the frequently slow process through which political 
attachments form. Two important questions, which I address in the following section, 
remain: (1) which political elites are most likely to invest in the development of 
programmatic political competition, and (2) how do these actors promote the creation of 
programmatic party-voter linkages. 
 
3.5 The Critical Role of the Latin American Left 
 Voters’ ability to understand and utilize ideological labels cannot in and of itself 
create programmatic political competition. For programmatic political competition to 
emerge, political elites must supply programmatically distinct options at the ballot box. 
While political crises may provide elite actors with a uniquely captive audience in terms 
of the attention voters pay to national politics and in terms of their familiarity with the 
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country’s main political actors, political entrepreneurs who wish to establish 
programmatic party-voter linkages must act decisively in order to take advantage of this 
opportunity. Who are these political entrepreneurs; which political elites have an 
incentive to foster programmatic party-voter linkages? 
 In answering this question, I follow Shefter (1977, 1993) and Sartori (1994) and 
argue that political outsiders, elites who lack access to the many resources that are 
available to governing parties, have the greatest incentive to invest in the formation of 
programmatic ties with their supporters because they are at a distinct disadvantage in 
terms of their ability to fund expensive political campaigns or to provide their supporters 
with selective benefits. In the political environment of contemporary Latin America, 
where the consolidation of democratic rule following an era dominated by right-wing 
dictatorships that harshly repressed labor unions and left-wing political organizations is 
in many countries still an unfinished process, the Left fits the description of political 
outsiders, and as such emerges as the leading suspect in response to the question of which 
elite actors in post-Third Wave Latin America would be most likely to attempt to initiate 
the process through which programmatic party-voter linkages are formed. 
 Of course, simply having an incentive to push for the establishment of 
programmatic political competition does not mean that Latin America’s leftist political 
parties will necessarily succeed in doing so; as Bornschier (2009: 8) notes, “their task is 
not an easy one … [because they] must be capable of disrupting vertical links of authority 
and exchange that predominate in many less-developed countries.” The Left’s ability to 
achieve this goal is affected by a number of factors. 
 The formation and maintenance of a broad leftist coalition – either within a single 
party (as in El Salvador) or as a permanent coalition of individual parties (as in Chile and 
Uruguay) – that is capable of providing voters with a programmatically distinct option at 
one end of the ideological spectrum increases the likelihood that the Left will be able to 
serve as the protagonist in the development of programmatic political competition. Where 
the Left is represented by a single party (or durable coalition), or where one Leftist party 
is clearly the only viable option even though additional Leftist parties are also present, 
voters are better able to quickly associate the ideological commitments and programmatic 
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preferences of the Left with that party. In other words, the unity of the Left is important 
for the creation of an easily-identified party brand, which in turn makes it easier for 
voters to vote “correctly.” 
 Similarly, the creation and maintenance of permanent party organizations, not 
only at the national level, but also at the local level, contributes to the establishment of a 
programmatically meaningful party brand while also playing an important role in helping 
to accelerate the process through which voters learn to identify which programmatic 
preferences, and which political party, is associated with the Left. By maintaining regular 
contact with the voting public outside of campaign season, active local party 
organizations, particularly those that make explicit efforts to educate actual and potential 
supporters about the party’s ideological commitments and its programmatic platform, 
provide a substitute for (or, at least, a complement to) the iteration of elections (and 
election campaigns) that is generally presumed to play an important role in the 
development of political identities and programmatic party-voter linkages. 
 Complementing the unification of the Left, the creation of permanent party 
organizations, and concerted effort to educate voters about the Left’s programmatic 
distinctiveness, the campaign rhetoric used by Leftist parties has the potential to 
accelerate the development of programmatic political competition by conveying the 
Left’s political message to a larger audience. Leftist parties that openly embrace their 
ideological identity and use their campaign advertising and appearances to emphasize the 
manner in which their political program differs from the policies advocated by their 
opponents help provide voters with a meaningful choice as they enter the ballot box. 
 Where the Left reaps the benefits of all these efforts – the investments in time and 
resources that are required to create a unified and well-organized political party that 
reaches out to voters to educate them about the differences between the right and the left 
– and achieves a significant degree of electoral success, conservative political elites take 
note and respond to this “contagion from the Left” (Duverger 1954) by emulating the 
Left’s approach to party-building. With both the Left and, now, the Right investing 
resources in the creation of permanent party organizations and in efforts to ensure that 
voters are familiar with the programmatic differences that separate the country’s main 
  72 
political parties, programmatic party-voter linkages are more likely to form as voters find 
it easier to vote “correctly.” 
 This process requires neither a particularly high level of socioeconomic 
development nor a long history of democratic elections. What it does require, however, is 
the presence of a unified and ideologically coherent group of political elites who exhibit 
the desire and the organizational capacity to place programmatic concerns at the center of 
political competition. On the flip side, where opposition elites are content with a status 
quo in which voters struggle to identify the ideological and/or programmatic differences 
that separate the country’s main political parties, or where elites who wish to foment the 
development of programmatic political competition are unable (due to a lack of 
ideological coherence, a lack of organizational capacity, or an inability to connect with 
likeminded voters) to build an ideologically coherent political party that achieves success 
by emphasizing its programmatic distinctiveness, neither a high degree of economic 
modernization nor the iteration of democratic elections will foster the development of 
programmatic political competition. The development of programmatic party-voter 
linkages and of programmatic relations of democratic accountability requires an 
environment in which voters are faced with a meaningful choice between 
programmatically distinct options; only party elites can provide these options. 
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Chapter Four 
Introduction to Central American Case Studies 
 
 In Chapter Two, I provided evidence that Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador exhibit 
significantly stronger programmatic party-voter linkages than any other Latin American 
democracy, and I also demonstrated that the inclusion of El Salvador in this list of Latin 
American democracies where programmatic political competition has been established 
cannot be explained by prevailing accounts of party system development in the region. 
While evidence of strong programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador demonstrates 
that neither a high level of socioeconomic development, extensive past experience with 
democratic elections, nor the creation of a relatively robust social welfare system can be 
considered a necessary condition for the development of programmatic party-voter 
linkages, more evidence is required to evaluate my hypothesis that it is the unification, 
organization, and political activity of the Left that is largely responsible for the creation 
of programmatic party-voter linkages in Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador. 
 In the three chapters that follow, I examine party and party system development in 
three Central American republics: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. This selection 
of cases brings with it three distinct advantages. First, I take a small step towards 
remedying the fact that research on Latin American party systems has tended to neglect 
Central America. Their exclusion is problematic because any examination of party 
system development in Latin America that omits Central America systematically under-
represents Latin America’s poorest countries and those that have limited experience with 
democratic elections. A second advantage of selecting three Central American cases 
became evident while I was conducting interviews in the three countries. Since major 
political developments in one Central American country often help form a frame of 
reference for political actors throughout the region, party officials are frequently attuned 
to party politics in neighboring republics and are therefore often able to make informed 
comparisons between their own party’s historical development, internal organization, 
ideological commitments, and campaign strategies and those of political parties in 
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neighboring countries. In many instances, these comparisons contributed to my 
comparative historical analysis of party system development in the region. 
 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the nature of party-voter linkages in these 
three countries varies significantly in spite of the fact that El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Costa Rica long experienced very similar patterns of social, economic, and political 
development. Consequently, the close examination of party system development in each 
country allows us to identify the causal mechanisms that explain this divergence in 
outcomes. The three case study chapters that follow demonstrate how the presence of an 
organized and unified Left that has achieved success at the ballot box by actively 
promoting its ideological distinctiveness is responsible for the development of 
programmatic political competition (in the case of El Salvador) and how the absence of a 
successful, ideologically distinct Left inhibits the formation of programmatic party-voter 
linkages (in the cases of Guatemala and Costa Rica).  
 In this chapter, I provide a brief introduction to the case studies that follow. In the 
first section of the chapter, I examine the extent to which the Salvadoran, Guatemalan, 
and Costa Rican party systems differ from one another. In the second section, I examine 
both (1) the various historical, economic, and social characteristics that these three 
countries share and (2) the manner in which their political trajectories began to diverge 
from one another beginning in the early 1930s. The chapter concludes with a preview of 
the conclusions that I draw from these three case studies. 
 
4.1 Contemporary Variation in Party System Development 
 As demonstrated in Chapter Two, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica vary 
significantly in terms of how well survey respondents’ issue preferences predict their left-
right self-placement and how well left-right self-placement predicts voting behavior. Of 
the three countries, only Guatemala – where programmatic party-voter linkages are 
expected to be, and are, very weak – conforms to predictions derived from a conventional 
wisdom that identifies a relatively high degree of economic and political modernization 
as a prerequisite for the development of programmatic political competition. In El 
Salvador, the Latin American democracy that this conventional wisdom identifies as the 
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most unlikely candidate for the development of strong programmatic party-voter 
linkages, the relationships between issue preferences, left-right self-placement, and 
voting behavior are much stronger than predicted. In Costa Rica, these relationships are 
considerably weaker than the country’s long democratic history and relatively high level 
of socioeconomic development lead to us expect. 
 In this section, I put the Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Costa Rican party systems 
under the microscope. I begin my examination of the differences between these three 
party systems by examining how they compare to one another on selected measures of 
party system institutionalization (understood as the degree to which party systems exhibit 
stable patterns of electoral competition between parties that have strong roots in society). 
Although indicators of party institutionalization such as the number of political parties 
and the degree of electoral volatility (the extent to which each party’s share of the vote 
varies from one election to the next) provide a somewhat limited description of a given 
party system, these characteristics are unquestionably relevant to our examination of the 
development of programmatic political competition, for we can assume that it will be 
easier for the average voter (presumably a cognitive miser who invests a limited amount 
of time seeking out political information) to correctly identify each major party’s issue 
preferences, determine which party’s platform most closely aligns with his/her own 
political preferences, and then vote accordingly in a country with few relevant political 
parties and a low degree of electoral volatility than in a country with many parties and/or 
a high degree of electoral volatility. 
 Just as we can assume that voters should find it easier to vote “correctly” when 
confronted with a relatively small number of relevant political parties and a low level of 
electoral volatility, we can also assume that the average voter will better be able to make 
an informed vote choice if there are clear ideological differences between the country’s 
main political parties. Indeed, in a country where all political parties espouse the same 
ideology and campaign on identical policy platforms, programmatic political competition 
is inconceivable. For this reason, the degree of ideological polarization present within a 
country’s party system likely has an impact on the development of programmatic party-
voter linkages. However, if elite-level ideological polarization is to have an influence on 
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voting behavior, the ideological distance between the main political parties must be 
readily discernable (i.e. voters must be able to identify the main political parties’ relative 
placement on a left-right continuum). Indeed, in terms of the relationship between 
ideological polarization and the development of programmatic party-voter linkages, how 
easily voters can identify political parties’ left-right placement is likely just as 
consequential as the magnitude of the ideological distance between parties.1 Therefore, to 
complement my examination of ideological polarization in El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Costa Rica, I provide data on the ideological clarity of each country’s main political 
parties. 
 Then, after exploring how El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica compare to 
one another with regards to these system-level characteristics, I turn my focus to the 
organization of the individual political parties that constitute each party system. 
Specifically, I examine two party characteristics that likely have an impact on voters’ 
ability to identify a party’s issue preferences and, subsequently, to use this information to 
vote “correctly” – the degree to which the party maintains a permanent organizational 
presence at the local level (the “intensiveness” of party organization) and the extent to 
which the party maintains institutionalized ties with certain sectors of society and/or 
demographic groups (the “pervasiveness” of party organization). 
 
Party System Institutionalization 
 Table 4.1 provides various indicators of party system institutionalization based on 
data from every legislative election held in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica 
between 1994 and 2014. Quite clearly, El Salvador exhibits a higher level of party system 
institutionalization than the other two countries. During the past two decades, El Salvador 
has seen fewer political parties participate in its legislative elections and fewer parties 
win seats in the legislature than either Guatemala or Costa Rica, and it has also had fewer 
                                                 
1
  Pairwise correlations between the indicators I use in this chapter to measure ideological polarization and 
ideological clarity and the two indicators used in Chapter Two to measure the strength of programmatic party-voter 
linkages support this statement. If we focus on the strength of the relationship between left-right self-identification and 
voting behavior, ideological polarization (Pearson’s R = .62) is a better predictor of programmatic party-voter linkages 
than ideological clarity (.52). However, if we instead focus on the strength of the relationship between policy 
preferences and left-right self-identification, ideological clarity (.42) appears to be a better predictor of programmatic 
party-voter linkages than ideological polarization (.36). 
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relevant parties and lower levels of electoral volatility than the other two countries. On 
average, political parties that had not participated in the previous election combine to win 
only 5.5% of the vote in Salvadoran legislative elections – half the percentage won by 
newly-formed parties in Costa Rican elections and less than one-fifth the vote percentage 
won by new parties in Guatemala. The cumulative impact of the relatively high levels of 
electoral volatility in Costa Rica and Guatemala is sizeable; whereas political parties 
established prior to the 1994 election combined to win 88.6% of the vote in the 2012 
legislative election in El Salvador, the comparable figures for Guatemala and Costa Rica 
are 15.4% and 35.6%, respectively. 
 
Table 4.1 – Party System Institutionalization, 1994-2014 
 El Salvador Guatemala Costa Rica 
Total Political Parties 26 [8] 45 [14] 56 [21] 
Total Legislative Parties 10 [6] 21 [11] 16 [9] 
ENEP 3.49 [3.24] 6.28 [7.63] 4.36 [6.20] 
Mean Electoral Volatility 12.4% 42.6% 23.6% 
Mean Vote %, New Parties 5.5% 30.9% 11.5% 
Vote %, Established Parties (2011-14) 88.6% 15.4% 35.6% 
 
Notes: The number of political parties excludes four Guatemalan parties that formed part of electoral coalitions but did 
not present any legislative candidates under their own party banners during this time period and five independent 
candidates who participated in the 2012 Salvadoran election. Two Guatemalan parties that formed a coalition in the 
1995 election and then both dissolved are treated as a single party, as are four Costa Rican parties that formed a 
succession of electoral coalitions in the 1994-2006 elections but never presented individual slates of candidates. The 
Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) is calculated for each election using the formula introduced by Laakso 
and Taagepera (1979): ENEP = 1/Ʃpi2, where pi is the proportion of total votes received by party i for each party that 
received at least one vote. Electoral volatility is calculated by computing the sum of the net change in the percentage of 
votes gained or lost by each political party from one election to the next, and then dividing this sum by two. For this 
calculation, the five independent candidates who participated in El Salvador’s 2012 election are each treated as 
individual political parties. Votes won by electoral coalitions were reallocated to the various coalition partners in the 
following manner: for national coalitions formed by previously independent political parties, votes were reallocated 
based on the proportion of the vote that each party had won in the previous election; for coalitions formed at the sub-
national level, votes were reallocated based on the proportion of the vote that each party received in electoral districts 
where they presented separate slates of candidates. Figures in brackets refer to the 2011 Guatemalan election, the 2012 
Salvadoran election, and the 2014 Costa Rican election. 
 
 Whereas El Salvador provides an example of a party system in which a high level 
of institutionalization developed rather rapidly, Costa Rica currently finds itself in the 
midst of a prolonged transition from a highly stable party system towards a still-uncertain 
future. For three decades, beginning in 1976, when the non-Leftist opposition to the 
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ruling National Liberation Party (PLN) first joined forces as the Unity Coalition (which 
became the Social Christian Unity Party, PUSC, in 1983), Costa Rica possessed what was 
essentially a two-party system. For reasons that are examined in Chapter Seven, Costa 
Rican bipartism started to unravel following the 1998 general election. The abrupt 
decline of the PUSC, the less dramatic decline of the PLN, and the inability of newer 
parties such as the Citizens’ Action Party (PAC) and the Libertarian Movement (ML) to 
achieve the high levels of support previously enjoyed by the PLN and the PUSC has left 
Costa Rica with a poorly institutionalized party system; in the most recent legislative 
election (2014), a record nine parties won seats in the 57-seat legislative assembly, no 
party received more than 26% of the vote, and the effective number of parties rose to 
6.20. 
 While the Salvadoran party system stands out due to its high level of 
institutionalization and the Costa Rican party system merits attention because of its 
ongoing transition away from stable two-party competition, the Guatemalan party system 
is noteworthy for its enduring, extremely low level of institutionalization. Indeed, the 
level of electoral volatility that has plagued Guatemala since the reestablishment of 
democratic rule in 1986 is so high that it leads one to question whether the term “party 
system” can accurately be utilized to describe political competition in the country. Data 
from nearly three decades of national elections provide a wealth of evidence (summarized 
in Chapter Six) to support the argument that Guatemala’s party universe should perhaps 
be described as a “party non-system,” since the country currently lacks “a set of political 
organizations with an identifiable or organized pattern of interactions” – one of the 
defining characteristics of a party system (Sánchez 2009: 488). 
 It should come as no surprise that El Salvador, the country with the strongest 
programmatic party-voter linkages, is also the country that exhibits the highest level of 
party system institutionalization, as it is difficult to imagine how programmatic political 
competition might develop in a party system characterized by a large number of relevant 
political parties and a high degree of electoral volatility. However, while a certain degree 
of party system stability might reasonably be considered a necessary condition for the 
development and maintenance of programmatic party-voter linkages, countries such as 
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Honduras – where programmatic party-voter linkages remained exceedingly weak in 
spite of the fact that, prior to the 2009 coup d'état, the party system long counted a low 
number of relevant political parties and a high level of electoral stability2 – demonstrate 
that a high level of party system institutionalization is not sufficient for the emergence of 
programmatic political competition. This is why we must examine not only the number of 
parties, but also those parties’ ideological positions and their internal organization. 
 
Ideological Polarization and Clarity 
 To measure ideological polarization, I utilize data provided by Wiesehomeier and 
Benoit (2009), who used expert surveys conducted in all eighteen Latin American 
democracies during the years 2006-07 to estimate the left-right placement (on a scale 
from 1 to 20) of 145 of the region’s political parties. To calculate each country’s level of 
ideological polarization, I measure the ideological distance between the two parties that 
received the greatest number of votes in the legislative elections held closest to, but not 
before, 2006. While this is an admittedly rough (and also, unfortunately, static) measure, 
it does provide some indication of the extent to which Latin American party systems 
differ in terms of their degree of ideological polarization. 
 As shown in Table 4.2, the perceived ideological distance between ARENA and 
the FMLN is greater than the distance between the two largest parties in any other Latin 
American democracy.3 The ideological distance between the top two parties in Costa 
Rica’s 2006 legislative election, the PLN and the PAC, is only one-third as great as the 
distance between ARENA and the FMLN. The ideological distance between the top two 
parties in Guatemala’s 2007 legislative election is slightly greater than the regional 
average, but this finding must be regarded as something of an anomaly since the two 
parties in question, the National Unity of Hope (UNE) and the Grand National Alliance 
                                                 
2
  From 1971 through 2009, Honduras’s ENEP never exceeded 2.58; from 1981 (when data are first available) 
through 2009, electoral volatility averaged 8.9%. 
3
  Where multiple parties included in Wiesehomeier and Benoit’s (2009) study formed national coalitions in the 
legislative election, the average left-right placement of the coalition partners is used to calculate ideological 
polarization. Where the number of votes received by each coalition partner is available (Chile), the average left-right 
placement is weighted by the vote percentage received by each party; where these data are not available (Mexico, Peru, 
and Venezuela), the simple average is used. This indicator could not calculated for Argentina or Ecuador because 
neither Argentina’s Frente para la Victoria nor Ecuador’s Alianza País – the winners of the 2007 legislative elections 
in their respective countries – were included in Wiesehomeier and Benoit’s (2009) expert surveys. 
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(GANA), went on to form an electoral alliance in the 2011 legislative election. Using 
data from surveys of legislators in the region, Fortín (2010) finds that Guatemala’s 
political parties exhibit the lowest level of ideological cohesion in all of Central America.  
 
Table 4.2 – Ideological Polarization in Latin American Party Systems, 2006-10 
Country    Country    Country   
El Salvador 16.50  Uruguay 8.29  Dominican Rep. 2.71 
Bolivia 13.12  Guatemala 8.12  Honduras 2.33 
Mexico 11.43  Venezuela 7.32  Peru 1.72 
Nicaragua 10.34  Panama 7.25  Paraguay 1.40 
Chile 9.62  Costa Rica 5.81    
Colombia 8.60  Brazil 5.13            Mean 7.64 
 
Table 4.3 – Ideological Clarity in Latin American Party Systems, 2006-10 
Country    Country    Country   
El Salvador 1.12  Colombia 2.24  Nicaragua 3.29 
Mexico 1.72  Brazil 2.36  Paraguay 3.16 
Bolivia 1.59  Peru 2.55  Costa Rica 3.24 
Dominican Rep. 1.69  Honduras 2.69  Venezuela 3.22 
Uruguay 1.87  Guatemala 2.96    
Chile 2.08  Panama 3.04    
 
 As I noted earlier, these estimates of ideological polarization are only relevant to 
our examination of the development of programmatic political competition if voters can 
identify the ideological distance between their country’s main parties. Therefore, I use the 
standard deviations of the point estimates generated by Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) 
to indicate how difficult it is to ascertain each party’s ideological location. Because 
voters’ ability to observe ideological polarization is a function of their ability to identify 
each major party’s ideological placement, I use the weighted average4 of the standard 
deviations of the estimated ideological position for all parties that received at least 10% 
of the vote in the 2006-10 legislative elections (a total of 47 parties) to create an indicator 
                                                 
4
  This average is weighted by vote percentage so that the figure for each country reflects the relative importance of 
each party. 
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(reported in Table 4.3) that measures how easy (or difficult) it is to perceive ideological 
differences between the main political parties in each Latin American democracy. 
 This indicator of “ideological clarity” demonstrates once again the extraordinary 
character of the Salvadoran party system. Country experts demonstrated a greater degree 
of agreement regarding the left-right placement of ARENA and the FMLN than they did 
for any other Latin American political party that received at least 10% of the vote in 
legislative elections held during 2006-10.5 The placements of the main political parties in 
Costa Rica and Guatemala were considerably less uniform. Indeed, Guatemala’s UNE 
generated the third-highest level of expert disagreement regarding its position on the left-
right continuum, while Costa Rica’s PLN was the fifth most difficult party for country 
experts to place. 
 Figure 4.1 illustrates the extent to which the Salvadoran, Costa Rican, and 
Guatemalan party systems differ from one another in terms of the perceived ideological 
distinctiveness of the main political parties by combining the data on ideological 
polarization used to create Table 4.2 with the data on ideological clarity used to create 
Table 4.3. The large and readily-discernable ideological gap between ARENA and the 
FMLN surely helps explain why the relationship between left-right self-identification and 
voting behavior is stronger in El Salvador than in any other Latin American democracy. 
while uncertainty regarding the relative ideological placements of the main political 
parties in Costa Rica and Guatemala contributes to the weakness of programmatic party-
voter linkages in those two countries, If “country experts” find it difficult to identify clear 
distinctions between these two countries’ main political parties, it is not surprising that 
the average voter is also apparently unable to do so. 
                                                 
5
  The ideological clarity of all 47 political parties that received at least 10% of the vote in Latin American legislative 
elections held during 2006-10, country experts’ average left-right placement of these parties, and the percentage of total 
votes they received are provided in Appendix 4.B.   
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Figure 4.1 – Ideological Polarization in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, 
2006-07 
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Party Organization 
 As described in Chapter One, my explanation for variation in the degree to which 
programmatic political competition has emerged in Latin America assigns a central role 
to the unification and organization of the Left. In this sense, my argument echoes 
Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) analysis of party system institutionalization, which not 
only asserts that “party organizations matter,” but also emphasizes political parties’ 
“organizational presence” at the local level (the municipio in El Salvador and Guatemala, 
the cantón in Costa Rica). Of course, the simple assertion that “party organizations 
matter” is of somewhat limited value – to demonstrate that party organizations matter, we 
must have some way to measure and compare relevant aspects of political parties’ 
organizational presence. Towards this end, I examine the “intensiveness” and 
  83 
“pervasiveness” of party organization demonstrated by the main political parties in El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica.6 
 Following Deegan Krause (2000), I take two distinct approaches to examine the 
“intensiveness” of party organization (i.e. the degree to which each country’s main 
political parties maintain an organizational presence at the local level). First, I count the 
number of candidates that each party fielded in the most recent mayoral elections. This 
indicator, which implicitly assumes that, by sponsoring a candidate in a sub-national 
election, a party is signaling a desire to build stronger ties with local voters, counts as its 
main advantage the fact that election results published by all three countries’ national 
electoral commissions allow for a precise count of the number of mayoral candidates 
presented by each party. The main disadvantage of this approach, however, comes from 
the fact that merely sponsoring a candidate in a local election must be considered a 
relatively weak form of organizational presence. Therefore, I complement this indirect 
measure of a party’s organizational presence at the local level by examining the number 
of local/regional party offices maintained by each party, an indicator that helps provide a 
clearer picture of political parties’ permanent organizational presence. 
 
Table 4.4 – Party Participation in Mayoral Elections 
El Salvador (2012)  Costa Rica (2010)  Guatemala (2011) 
ARENA 100%  PLN 100%  PP 100% 
FMLN 100%  PAC 63.0%  UNE–GANA 97.6% 
GANA 94.3%  ML 66.7%  LIDER 75.1% 
PCN 84.4%  PUSC 65.4%  UCN 74.5% 
   PASE 21.0%  CREO 60.1% 
Mean Non-Participation Rate      
 5.3%   36.8%   18.6% 
 
Notes: Figures for El Salvador include candidates backed by local-level electoral coalitions. By party, the number of 
coalition candidates was: ARENA, 5; FMLN, 19; GANA, 1; and PCN, 31. The figure for Guatemala’s UNE-GANA 
coalition includes 261 municipios where candidates ran for office under the UNE-GANA banner, 16 municipios where 
                                                 
6
  The main political parties in these three countries exhibit little variation on a third potentially important 
characteristic: the “extensiveness” of party organization (i.e. whether the party is national or regional/local in nature). 
Only in Costa Rica have local/regional parties had any success in national elections. Since 1990, six different regional 
parties (including three that later became national parties) won a total of seven seats in the Costa Rican legislature. 
However, the total percentage of valid votes received by Costa Rica’s regional parties has never exceeded 7.2% – 
evidence that, even in Costa Rica, national elections are dominated by national parties. 
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the two parties each entered candidates, and 48 municipios where only one of the two parties sponsored a mayoral 
candidate. 
 
 Table 4.4 provides the percentage of municipalities in which each of the three 
countries’ main political parties (those that won at least 5% of the seats in the legislative 
election) sponsored candidates in recent mayoral elections, along with the average non-
participation rate for each country. Again, El Salvador stands out on this indicator of the 
“intensiveness” of party organization. Although Costa Rica’s PLN and Guatemala’s PP 
match the 100% participation rate achieved by ARENA and the FMLN, the other relevant 
parties in these two countries (with the exception of Guatemala’s UNE-GANA coalition) 
exhibit a considerably lower degree of organizational presence at the local level than do 
El Salvador’s secondary parties, the Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA) and the 
National Coalition Party (PCN).7 
 Variation in the “intensiveness” of party organization becomes more apparent 
when we examine the number of permanent local party offices that these parties maintain. 
To get a sense of how the main political parties in these three countries compare to one 
another on this measure of their organizational presence at the local level, I visited (or, in 
some instances, attempted to visit) the national headquarters (and, in some cases, 
regional/local party offices) of thirteen parties to interview party officials with first-hand 
knowledge of their party’s internal organization. These interviews, as well as the 
examination of party websites and party statutes, uncovered sizeable differences in the 
degree to which political parties in the three countries actively seek to maintain a 
permanent organizational presence at the local level.  
 At one end of the spectrum, all of El Salvador’s main political parties (ARENA, 
FMLN, GANA, PCN, and PDC) not only maintain party offices in San Salvador that are 
well-staffed and open to the public, but they also operate numerous departmental and 
municipal offices. Although exact figures are not available, ARENA likely maintains 
                                                 
7
  El Salvador’s historic National Conciliation Party (PCN) was de-registered in April 2011, only to be re-registered 
five months later as the National Coalition (CN). After the 2012 election, the party regained its traditional acronym as 
the National Coalition Party. 
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upwards of 200 permanent party offices,8 while the FMLN maintains offices in all 
fourteen departmental capitals and in many (if not most) of the country’s largest 
municipalities. Even the smaller parties maintain numerous party offices, including 
offices in most (if not all) departmental capitals. 
 Like their Salvadoran counterparts, Costa Rica’s main political parties (PLN, 
PAC, ML, and PUSC) all include provisions in their party statutes that call for the 
establishment of local party organizations. Also like their Salvadoran counterparts, these 
four parties all maintain permanently-staffed national headquarters that are regularly open 
to the public. However, for the most part, these parties’ permanent organizational 
presence does not extend beyond the capital; while the PAC maintains three regional 
offices and the ML has one, neither the PLN nor the PUSC maintain any permanent party 
offices outside the San José metropolitan area. Indeed, Gómez Campos et al. (2013: 14) 
appear to be correct when they conclude that “political parties in Costa Rica are generally 
poorly institutionalized organizations with low levels of coordination between their 
different levels of administration.” 
 The permanent organizational presence of Guatemala’s main political parties (PP, 
GANA, UNE, and LIDER) is even more limited. In early 2012, when I was conducting 
fieldwork in Guatemala City, only LIDER maintained a fully-staffed party office open to 
the public; other parties’ national headquarters were either closed to the public (GANA), 
staffed by only a receptionist and a janitor (PP), or seemingly abandoned (UNE). Unlike 
nearly all of the main political parties in El Salvador and Costa Rica, no Guatemalan 
party makes its statutes available online, so it is difficult to determine whether these 
parties even so much as express a desire to establish a permanent presence at the local 
level. Of course, the fact that only one party even maintains a functional party office in 
the capital strongly suggests that Guatemalan parties’ efforts to maintain a permanent 
organizational presence at the local level are minimal at best.9 
                                                 
8
  Koivumaeki (2010: 90) cites one ARENA official who estimates that the party has 220-250 offices open year-
round. Party officials I spoke with in the party’s headquarters in San Salvador and in local offices in La Libertad and 
Chalatenango all stated that ARENA has offices in the majority of the country’s 262 municipalities. 
9
  This conclusion is supported by other authors’ examinations of party organization in contemporary Guatemala. 
Sonnleitner (2009) reports that, with the exception of the now-defunct Guatemalan Christian Democracy (DCG), no 
party had any degree of party organization established in even half of the country’s municipalities, while España-
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 As for the “pervasiveness” of party organization, variation between the three 
countries regarding the extent to which political parties (1) maintain institutional ties with 
sector-specific groups and/or (2) have established party-affiliated organizations for 
members of specific demographic groups parallels variation on the “intensiveness” of 
party organization: El Salvador’s main political parties outperform their Costa Rican 
counterparts, while Guatemala’s political parties make minimal (if any) efforts to expand 
their organizational presence. The FMLN has long cultivated formal ties with a variety of 
labor unions, student organizations, peasant associations, and other civil society actors. 
ARENA maintains its ties with the business and agro-business sectors through close 
organizational linkages to the National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP) and the 
Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES), while the 
Nationalist Republican Youth (JRN) and party-affiliated women’s groups actively court 
those two demographics.  
 In Costa Rica, the PLN’s statutes call for the creation of organizations for 
educators, businessmen, professionals, youths, women, workers, and members of 
agricultural co-ops. The PAC’s statutes make explicit mention only of the creation of a 
party-affiliated youth organization while the ML’s statutes call for separate youth and 
women’s assemblies (but not permanent organizations). The PUSC’s statutes make no 
explicit mention of any sector-specific or demographic-based organizations. In practice, 
the PLN and the PAC do both maintain small but active youth organizations, but neither 
party exhibits the type of strong, institutionalized ties to sector-specific organizations that 
characterize the relationships that ARENA and the FMLN cultivate with their respective 
bases. While the PLN once boasted strong organizational linkages with labor and the 
middle class, these ties started to weaken once the party embraced structural adjustment 
in the early 1980s, and they have continued to deteriorate over the course of the past 
decade as the party has increased its reliance on mass media campaigns (Gómez Campos 
et al. 2013). Now, the PLN (like the ML) maintains organizational linkages primarily 
with the country’s various business associations. Although the origins of the PAC are 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nájera (2009) found that only the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), now a minor party (it received only 2.7% of 
the vote in the 2011 legislative election), maintained party offices outside of Guatemala City. 
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linked to the unprecedented wave of social protests that swept across Costa Rica in 2000 
in opposition to the “Combo ICE” (legislation backed by the PLN and the PUSC, and 
ultimately declared unconstitutional, that would have privatized the country’s energy and 
telecommunications sectors), and the party has at times (particularly in 2007, as part of a 
broad coalition that unsuccessfully sought to block ratification of the Central American 
Free Trade Agreement) fostered close relationships with labor unions and middle-class 
organizations, it has not made any effort to institutionalize these relationships. 
 Finally, little need be said about the “pervasiveness” of party organization in 
Guatemala. Neither interviews conducted with party officials nor the revision of party 
documents and party websites uncovered evidence that any of Guatemala’s main political 
parties maintain affiliated organizations for youths, women, or any other group. Similarly 
(and unsurprisingly, given the extremely short lifespan of most Guatemalan political 
parties), the relationships between political parties and civil society organizations tend to 
be both weak and ephemeral.  
 In conclusion, this examination of the “intensiveness” and “pervasiveness” of 
party organization in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica demonstrates that ARENA 
and the FMLN have established a permanent presence in the Salvadoran landscape in a 
way that is unparalleled by political parties in Costa Rica and Guatemala. Of course, I 
contend that it is by no means a coincidence that the country whose principal political 
parties maintain the most “intensive” and “pervasive” organizational presence is the same 
country that exhibits the highest level of party system institutionalization, the greatest 
degree of ideological clarity, and the strongest programmatic party-voter linkages. 
Rather, I argue that the degree to which ARENA and the FMLN maintain a permanent 
organizational presence at the local level helps explain the fact that El Salvador exhibits 
an institutionalized party system characterized by a high degree of programmatic political 
competition. 
 
4.2 Three Branches off the Same Tree 
 Whereas the previous section focused on the differences between the Salvadoran, 
Guatemalan, and Costa Rican party systems, this section provides an overview of the 
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political history of these three countries that emphasizes the many economic, political, 
and historical similarities that provide the rationale for seeking to make comparisons 
between these three cases. My examination of the political development of these three 
countries demonstrates that El Salvador in 1932 (when the military government 
responded to a peasant uprising by launching a series of indiscriminate attacks on 
peasants, indigenous communities, and anyone else suspected of being a Leftist that left 
as many as 30,000 dead), Costa Rica in 1948 (when the government’s decision to annul 
presidential election results ignited a 44-day civil war), and Guatemala in 1954 (when the 
CIA helped overthrow the country’s progressive, democratically-elected government) 
found themselves in very similar positions with regards to the future development of each 
country’s party system. In the case study chapters that follow, I argue that the distinct 
trajectories that each country’s Left followed in the aftermath of these episodes of 
political violence had an important impact on party system development and on the 
development of party-voter linkages in these three countries. 
 
Early Political Development 
 Latin America’s eighteen electoral democracies all share a number of 
characteristics that would presumably influence party system development. In terms of 
their political development, these commonalities include a common historical experience 
with Iberian colonialism, struggles to consolidate state authority upon gaining 
independence in the early nineteenth century, and experience with oligarchic rule during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In terms of their economic development, 
they are united by their incorporation into the global economy as a source of raw 
materials during the late nineteenth century, their less-than-successful efforts to use the 
state to spearhead industrialization during the middle of the twentieth century, and their 
adoption of neoliberal reforms following the debt crisis of the 1980s. These shared 
characteristics provide the rationale for examining party system development on a 
regional basis, because they allow researchers to treat as constants various social, 
cultural, economic, and political characteristics that would be variables in a broader, 
global context 
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 In addition to the economic and political developments that have influenced the 
entire region, the five Central American republics share an additional set of experiences, 
including their brief incorporation into Iturbide’s Mexican Empire (1822-23), their 
experience as member states of the Federal Republic of Central America (1823-39), their 
historic reliance on a limited number of agricultural commodities (particularly coffee) as 
the main source of trade revenues, and their proximity to the United States (with all the 
economic and political pressures that entails). Within the small universe of Central 
American republics, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica share an additional 
important characteristic, as they were the three countries that went the furthest in 
implementing liberal reform (understood as using the state to promote economic 
development the commercialization of agriculture while simultaneously bolstering 
private property rights and removing trade barriers) during the nineteenth century 
(Mahoney 2001). All these similarities further enhance our ability to isolate the factors 
that have influenced party system development in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa 
Rica because they reduce the number of plausible explanations for the observed variation 
in party system development in these three countries. 
 
Table 4.5 – Development Indicators 
 Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala 
Human Development Index (2012) .773 [7] .680 [14] .581 [19] 
GNI per Capita (2012) $10,863 [7] $5,915 [13] $4,235 [17] 
Secondary Education (2010) 53.6% [6] 37.5% [15] 14.8% [19] 
Life Expectancy at Birth (2010) 79.4 [1] 72.4 [17] 71.4 [18] 
Maternal Mortality Ratio (2010) 40 [3] 81 [9] 120 [17] 
Homicide Rate (2012) 8.5 [5] 41.2 [17] 39.9 [16] 
Gender Inequality Index (2012) .346 [1] .441 [8] .539 [19] 
    
Human Development Index (1980) .621 [7] .471 [16] .432 [19] 
 
Notes: GNI per Capita is measured in 2005 international dollars. Secondary Education reports the percentage of the 
population aged twenty-five and older that has completed secondary education. Maternal Mortality Ratio is measured 
as deaths per 100,000 live births. Homicide Rate is measured as homicides per 100,000 residents. Numbers in brackets 
refer to the country’s ranking amongst Latin America’s nineteen independent states. 
 
Sources: UNODC (2014) for homicide rate, UNDP (2013) for all other data. 
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 Of course, to those who are only casually familiar with Central America, the 
suggestion that Costa Rica shares much in common with its northern neighbors may seem 
odd, as it contradicts the oft-repeated narrative that paints Costa Rica as the Switzerland 
of Central America. Under uninterrupted democratic rule since 1953, and having 
abolished its armed forces in 1948, Costa Rica avoided the military dictatorships and 
internal armed struggles that plagued the rest of Central America throughout much of the 
second half of the twentieth century. On the socioeconomic front, the data presented in 
the first seven rows of Table 4.5 demonstrate that Costa Rica does indeed stand at a 
different level of development than the rest of Central America, as the country scores 
much higher than El Salvador and Guatemala on a series of indicators of economic 
development, education, health care, violent crime, and gender inequality. Moreover, the 
final row of Table 4.5, which reports how the three countries scored on the UNDP’s 
Human Development Index in 1980, demonstrates that the contemporary development 
gap between Costa Rica and its northern neighbors is not a particularly recent 
development; indeed, the human development gap between Costa Rica, on the one hand, 
and El Salvador and Guatemala, on the other, was larger in 1980 than in 2012. 
 However, Costa Rican exceptionalism, though real in many aspects, should not be 
exaggerated. Although its geographic location as the southern-most Central American 
republic helped minimize the country’s involvement in the series of internal and 
international wars between Liberal and Conservative forces that dominated nineteenth 
century politics in the rest of the region, Costa Rica experienced enough home-grown 
political instability to call any comparisons with Switzerland into question. Between 1838 
(when Costa Rica declared its independence from the Federal Republic of Central 
America) and 1871, the country adopted six different constitutions and saw power change 
hands sixteen times. During this period, “elections were part of the political process, but 
they were not the principal means for changing governments” (Nohlen 2005: 148). 
Control of the Costa Rican state instead depended on the results of competition between 
the country’s coffee-growing oligarchs (and their private armies). Although a series of 
reforms introduced during the 1880s made elections more consequential, Costa Rica did 
not introduce universal male suffrage until 1913. Moreover, successful coups in 1917 and 
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1919 demonstrated that not even the establishment of mass democracy had persuaded the 
country’s economic elites to abandon force as a means to obtain political power. 
 The depth of Costa Rican exceptionalism on the socioeconomic front must also be 
called into question. Time-series data on GDP per capita in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala (illustrated in Appendix 4.A) strongly suggest that the sizable development 
gap that now distinguishes Costa Rica from its Central American neighbors did not begin 
to take shape until the mid-1950s, after Costa Rica began implementing a broad range of 
social security and welfare programs. Similarly, while social spending (as a percentage of 
GDP) is much greater in Costa Rica than in El Salvador and Guatemala, this, too, is a 
fairly recent phenomenon. Data on government spending in the three countries in the 
early 1930s demonstrate that, prior to the 1941 establishment of the Caja Costarricense 
de Seguro Social (the main pillar of Costa Rica’s social security system), the Costa Rican 
state was no more generous than the Guatemalan or Salvadoran states. Also, although 
Costa Rica had a much lower percentage of smallholders (families whose landholdings 
are not large enough for subsistence farming) than any other Central American republic 
(Brockett 1992) and its agricultural export sector was therefore far more reliant on market 
mechanisms (rather than coercion) to ensure the supply of labor, available evidence from 
the early 1960s suggests that income inequality was only marginally lower in Costa Rica 
than in the other two countries (Deininger and Squire 1998, UTIP 2008). 
 Ultimately, whether we choose to focus on Costa Rica’s history of democratic 
stability, its enviable economic performance, or its relatively expansive social security 
apparatus, it is apparent that the characteristics that make Costa Rica stand out amongst 
its Central American peers are all of fairly recent origin. From the arrival of the Spanish 
in the sixteenth century through to the first decades of the twentieth century, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador followed a very similar path of political development. Not 
until the repercussions of the 1929 stock market crash made themselves felt in Central 
America did these three countries begin to diverge in ways that would later have an 
impact on party system development and the development of programmatic party-voter 
linkages. 
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Divergent Paths 
 Heavily dependent on revenues from coffee exports, all three countries suffered 
greatly as decreased global demand caused coffee prices to plummet by nearly 65% 
between 1929 and 1931 (Fridell 2007: 120). Between 1930 and 1932, GDP per capita fell 
by 12.6% in Costa Rica, 21.2% in El Salvador, and 22.3% in Guatemala (Maddison 
2007). El Salvador’s GDP per capita did not consistently exceed pre-crash figures until 
1940; the Costa Rican and Guatemalan economies did not fully recover until 1946. This 
economic collapse, which effectively served as the final nail in the coffin of the Liberal 
regimes that had been established in all three countries during the nineteenth century, 
could hardly have come at a more inopportune time, as it coincided with important 
domestic political developments in all three countries.  
 In Costa Rica, the introduction of universal male suffrage (1913) and the 
subsequent introduction of the secret ballot (1925) had contributed to the normalization 
of political competition; presidential elections held in 1919, 1923, and 1928 are 
considered to have been relatively free and fair. El Salvador and (to a lesser degree) 
Guatemala were also engaged in processes of political liberalization when the global 
depression hit. In El Salvador, President Pío Romero Bosque (1927-31) not only 
introduced a series of reforms that granted workers new rights and protections, but he 
also broke with tradition by refusing to name a successor, which meant that the January 
1931 presidential election would be the country’s first competitive election since 1886, 
and its first ever attempt at mass democracy (since workers had not been granted the right 
to vote until 1915). In Guatemala, President Lázaro Chacón (1926-30) was more tolerant 
of political expression and labor organization than his predecessors had been.10 
 Since plantation workers and landless peasants in all three countries bore the 
brunt of the economic hardships caused by the rapid decline in coffee prices, the global 
depression exacerbated poverty and inequality in a region that already exhibited high 
                                                 
10
  It is important to note that a certain degree of political turmoil was already evident before the global depression hit; 
Chacón, whose government was widely regarded as corrupt, had survived a failed coup attempt in January 1929. He 
was ultimately forced to resign the presidency on December 12, 1931, after having suffered a stroke. Over the course of 
the next three months, Guatemala experienced the resignation of Chacón’s first designated successor, a military coup 
that resulted in the death of acting president Baudilio Palma, the appointment of a third interim president, and, 
ultimately, the unopposed election of General Jorge Ubico, who would remain in power until 1944. 
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levels of both. It was in this context that the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS, founded 
March 30, 1930) and the Communist Party of Costa Rica (PCCR, founded June 16, 1931) 
quickly became relevant political actors. Faced with this new opposition inspired by the 
Russian revolution and fearful that the political participation of the masses would result 
in the dismantling of the Liberal state and the agro-export economy it had fostered, 
political elites in the three countries scrambled to find an answer to Central America’s 
version of “the social question.” Ultimately, the emergence of the Marxist Left 
precipitated political violence in all three countries; after these episodes of political 
violence, each country’s Left followed its own unique trajectory. 
 In El Salvador, a series of armed clashes between the PCS and government forces 
helped provoke the December 7, 1931 military coup that put a premature end to the 
country’s first democratic experiment. A month later, after the acting president, General 
Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, had suspended legislative and municipal elections in 
many Communist strongholds and refused to certify election results in those 
municipalities where PCS candidates claimed victory, PCS founder Augustín Farabundo 
Martí participated in the organization of an uprising11 that saw peasants attack a number 
of coffee estates and government offices in western El Salvador. Although the number of 
civilian victims of this rebellion likely did not exceed three dozen (Anderson 1971), 
Martínez responded by launching a series of indiscriminate attacks on peasants, 
indigenous communities, and anyone else suspected of being a Leftist. This wave of 
attacks, known simply as La Matanza (the massacre), left as many as 30,000 dead and 
paved the way for a half-century of military rule.  
 La Matanza also obliged what remained of the Left to retreat to the shadows of 
the Salvadoran political landscape; nearly annihilated, the Salvadoran Left had but one 
option for survival – la clandestinidad. The PCS spent the next four decades cultivating 
the grassroots relationships with workers, students, and peasants that would eventually 
lead to the emergence of the country’s first guerrilla organizations, to those groups’ 
                                                 
11
  To this day, disagreement exists regarding the nature of the January 1932 uprising. While many sources refer to it 
as a “Communist” uprising, others – including Guenther (1941: 127, cf. Webre 1979: 8), who colorfully contended that 
the majority of the peasants who participated in the revolt were “no more Communists that Martínez [was] an eskimo” 
– downplay the role that the PCS or its ideology played in motivating the rebellion. 
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subsequent consolidation under the FMLN banner, and, ultimately, to the January 10, 
1981, “Final Offensive” that launched the country’s eleven-year civil war. 
 In Costa Rica, the Left initially made its presence felt both through its 
involvement in the country’s labor union movement (most spectacularly, by organizing 
the wave of strikes that swept across the banana plantations on the country’s Caribbean 
coast in 1934) and through its participation in the electoral process. By 1938, the 
communists had established themselves as the principal opposition to the ruling National 
Republican Party (PRN). Four years later, shortly after the 1942 legislative election, 
Communist leader Manuel Mora negotiated an unexpected alliance with President Rafael 
Ángel Calderón Guardia (who had introduced a series of social reforms, including the 
establishment of Costa Rica’s social security program) and pro-reform Catholic 
archbishop Víctor Manuel Sanabria (Molina 2004: 164). Amidst heightened political 
tensions caused by opposition claims that the Communist-Calderonista alliance had used 
fraudulent means to achieve victory in the 1944 and 1946 elections, the pro-Calderón 
legislature’s decision to annul the 1948 presidential election (won by opposition 
candidate Otilio Ulate) prompted José Figueres Ferrer to launch the March 12, 1948, 
uprising that kicked off Costa Rica’s 44-day civil war. 
 After the war, the Costa Rican Left not only found itself banned from 
participating in electoral politics (a prohibition that would remain in effect until 1975), 
but it also found it difficult to establish a clear ideological identity. By allying with 
Calderón and Sanabria, the Left had signaled a preference for reform rather than 
revolution. Consequently, when Figueres (as president) not only preserved the social 
reforms that Calderón had introduced in 1941-43 but also expanded upon them by 
nationalizing the banking sector, guaranteeing public education to all citizens, and 
establishing a modern civil service, it became exceedingly difficult to recognize any clear 
ideological distinction between Figueres and his followers (who established the PLN) and 
the remnants of the Costa Rican Left gathered within the Popular Vanguard Party. 
 Although the Guatemalan Left enjoyed less political freedom, and far less 
political influence, in the early 1930s than its Salvadoran and Costa Rican counterparts, it 
would enjoy much greater (though ultimately short-lived) success in the 1940s. On July 
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1, 1944, mass protests inspired by the general strike that had prompted El Salvador’s 
General Martínez to resign the presidency (and, ironically, to seek exile in Guatemala) 
two months earlier forced Ubico to give up power. Three months later, on October 19, 
opposition forces led by Captain Jacobo Árbenz and Major Francisco Arana stormed the 
National Palace, forced Ubico’s successor (General Federico Ponce) into exile, and 
established the Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno. The Junta repealed many of the laws 
that formed the legal basis for Guatemala’s system of “labor-repressive agriculture” 
(Moore 1968), halted the political repression that had characterized the Ubico and Ponce 
governments, purged the armed forces of many pro-Ubico officers, and introduced a new 
constitution before presiding over the December 1944 presidential election that was won 
(with 86% of the vote) by previously exiled philosophy professor Juan José Arévalo. 
 As president, Arévalo implemented a series of social reforms, including the 
establishment of Guatemala’s social security system (1946) and the introduction of a new 
Labor Code (1947) that increased protections for workers. While these reforms consisted 
of “moderate legislation … that had for many years been in effect in capitalist countries,” 
their implementation in a political environment where “ideological backwardness 
resulted in any reform measure being identified as communism” generated considerable 
reactionary backlash – Arévalo’s government survived more than thirty coup attempts 
(Luján Muñoz 2004: 252-253, 259). 
 Elected president in November 1950, Árbenz enjoyed a closer relationship with 
the radical Left than his predecessor. Although he had campaigned under the banner of 
the moderate National Integrity Party, Árbenz also enjoyed the endorsements and support 
of the reformist National Renovation Party, the Socialist Party, and the increasingly 
radical Revolutionary Action Party. Having made land reform one of the central pillars of 
his campaign platform, Árbenz introduced an Agrarian Reform Law in June 1952 that 
called for the redistribution of uncultivated land on estates larger than 222 acres (some 
60% of private landholdings in the country). This land reform measure, which ultimately 
resulted in the redistribution of more than 1.44 million acres of previously underutilized 
land, infuriated and emboldened Guatemala’s landed aristocracy; the president’s 
relationship with the communist Guatemalan Labor Party disquieted a number of military 
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officials. With the help of the Catholic Church, the United Fruit Company, and 
sympathetic dictators Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic) and Anastasio Somoza 
García (Nicaragua), Árbenz’s domestic opponents succeeded in convincing the US 
government that the Guatemalan president and the reforms he had introduced posed a 
threat to political stability in the hemisphere. After Árbenz was ousted by a CIA-
sponsored coup in June 1954, the social, economic, and political reforms introduced 
during the previous ten years were overturned, and labor unions and Leftist political 
parties were banned. 
 The trajectory of the post-1954 Guatemalan Left differed from that of the post-
1932 Salvadoran Left in two important ways. First, whereas the Salvadoran Left spent 
four decades regrouping before it returned to the path of armed insurrection, the 
Guatemalan Left launched an armed insurgency on November 13, 1960, only six years 
after the coup that deposed Árbenz. Second, whereas the formation of the guerrilla 
organizations that eventually merged to form the FMLN took place after the 
establishment of a broad network of ties between the PCS and various worker, student, 
and peasant groups, Guatemala’s first guerrilla groups took up arms against the state 
before attempting to foster ties with civil society. A half-century later, the Guatemalan 
Left’s ties to civil society remain tenuous. 
 
4.3 Summary of Case Studies 
 The three case studies that follow draw on data gathered during six months of 
fieldwork in Central America, where I conducted interviews with national and regional 
party officials, with current and former elected officials and candidates to elected office 
(i.e. persons with an intimate knowledge of their party’s internal organization and, in 
many cases, persons who have been actively involved in designing their party’s campaign 
strategies and other outreach activities), with local party activists (i.e. those persons who 
are responsible for implementing those party strategies and for fomenting party-voter 
linkages at the grassroots level), and with academics and non-partisan government 
officials in the region. The information gathered from these interviews is supplemented 
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with data from a Q-method study12 I conducted in El Salvador and Costa Rica, previous 
case studies, official party documents (e.g., party platforms, campaign materials, and 
party websites), published interviews with party officials, and the writings of party 
leaders. These primary and secondary sources are used to identify the factors that explain 
the unexpected development of programmatic political competition in El Salvador, the 
surprising weakness of programmatic party-voter linkages in Costa Rica, and the 
instability and non-ideological nature of the Guatemalan party system. 
 In Chapter Five, I examine the unexpected development of programmatic political 
competition in El Salvador. Clearly, the country does not enjoy the advantages of a long 
history of democratic elections, a high level of socioeconomic development, or an 
established tradition of social welfare spending, factors that purportedly help explain the 
emergence of programmatic political competition in Chile and Uruguay. In this chapter, I 
contend that the rapid development of a highly-institutionalized party system 
characterized by strong programmatic party-voter linkages was made possible by the 
FMLN’s efforts to provide Salvadoran voters with a clear indication of the party’s 
ideological distinctiveness. By building a permanent party organization that fomented 
grassroots linkages with voters, reactivating relationships with progressive elements of 
civil society that had eroded during the civil war, achieving ideological discipline within 
the party, and using campaign materials and ideological training centers to disseminate 
the party’s political program, the FMLN fostered the development of programmatic ties 
with its supporters. The success of the FMLN’s efforts (as measured in vote totals) 
provided ARENA with a powerful incentive to initiate its own efforts to promote its 
ideological identity and to forge programmatic ties with its supporters. 
 The development of Guatemala’s “party non-system,” which I examine in 
Chapter Six, provides an important counterpoint to the development of strong 
programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador. The fact that Guatemala is the Central 
American country whose recent political history most closely parallels that of El Salvador 
– in both countries, decades of authoritarian violence committed by the state in order to 
prop up a system of labor-repressive agriculture that had been established in the 
                                                 
12
  Q-method itself, as well as the details of the Q-method study that I conducted, are described in Chapter Seven. 
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nineteenth century eventually led to prolonged civil wars that did not conclude until the 
1990s – makes the vast differences between these two countries in terms of how well 
policy preferences predict left-right self-identification and how well left-right self-
identification predicts voting behavior particularly striking. 
 “The war” is often the first response offered by Salvadoran political actors when 
they are asked to explain the surprising strength of programmatic party-voter linkages in 
the country. Certainly, it would be an error to completely dismiss the notion that events 
immediately prior to and during the civil war played an important role in facilitating the 
formation of programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador. However, the acutely 
non-programmatic nature of political competition in contemporary Guatemala, a county 
that suffered through a civil war which lasted three times as long and claimed three times 
as many lives as the civil war in neighboring El Salvador, demonstrates quite clearly that 
“the war” is at best an incomplete answer to the question of why El Salvador exhibits 
stronger programmatic party-voter linkages than any other Latin American democracy. In 
Chapter Six, I demonstrate how the Guatemalan Left’s inability to achieve any measure 
of success at the ballot box has contributed to the development of a poorly-
institutionalized party system populated by an ever-changing array of ideologically 
indistinct political parties that rely on patron-client ties and increasingly costly mass 
media campaigns (presumably funded, at least in part, by Mexican drug cartels and their 
Guatemalan allies) to win voters’ support. 
 In Chapter Seven, I turn my sights to Costa Rica, the one Central American 
country where, according to the conventional wisdom, we might expect to find evidence 
of programmatic political competition. Costa Rica not only claims the title of Latin 
America’s oldest democracy, but it also boasts of a higher level of socioeconomic 
development than any other Central American republic and a level of social spending 
that, while lower than the high standard set by Uruguay and Chile, is higher than the 
Latin American average and roughly six times greater than that of Honduras, Guatemala, 
and El Salvador. Nonetheless, both my own analysis (Chapter Two) and that of Kitschelt 
et al. (2010) fail to uncover evidence of strong programmatic party-voter linkages in 
Costa Rica. I argue that the reason why the Costa Rican party system more closely 
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resembles the Guatemalan party system than the Salvadoran party system is because 
Costa Rica, like Guatemala, has long suffered from the absence of an electorally-viable 
Left. 
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Chapter Five 
The Development of Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages in El 
Salvador 
 
 In Chapter Two, I demonstrated (1) that left-right self-placement was a better 
predictor of voting behavior in El Salvador than in any other Latin American democracy 
during the first decade of the twenty-first century, (2) that, since 2004, the relationship 
between voters’ policy preferences and their left-right self-placement has been stronger in 
El Salvador than anywhere else in Latin America, and (3) that the standard sociological 
approach to the study of party system development cannot explain the development of 
programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador. Quite simply, in terms of its low level 
of socioeconomic development, the narrow scope of its social safety net, and its limited 
experience with democratic elections, El Salvador can only be described as a case of 
programmatic political competition where we least expect it. 
 Moreover, an examination of the country’s political history provides no indication 
that the development of programmatic political competition should have been considered 
a likely outcome in 1984, when El Salvador held its first legitimately free and fair 
presidential election since 1931. With the country firmly entrenched in a civil war pitting 
the US-backed armed forces against a Leftist insurgency that had gained control of wide 
swaths of territory in northern and eastern El Salvador, there was little if any reason to be 
optimistic about the future of Salvadoran democracy, let alone the prospects for the 
creation of a stable party system characterized by strong programmatic party-voter 
linkages, when Christian Democrat leader Napoleón Duarte assumed the presidency on 
June 1, 1984.1 
 Although the January 16, 1992, Chapúltepec Accords, which put a definitive end 
to eleven years of civil war, may have generated increased optimism about El Salvador’s 
                                                 
1
  Rueschemeyer et al. (1992: 41, 247) aptly summarize the pessimism that reigned during the late 1980s regarding 
the future of Salvadoran democracy: “the distribution of land in El Salvador creates insolvable problems for democracy 
in that country…. A democratic solution is impossible without concessions of the oligarchy on land reform … 
negotiations between an elected government and the guerrillas, no matter how well intentioned on both sides, remain 
incapable of bringing about a transition to full democracy.” Of course, this statement was proven to be incorrect the 
very same year that it was published, as the peace agreement that ended the Salvadoran civil war contains no promise 
of comprehensive land reform. 
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democratic future, the formation of a modern party system characterized by a high degree 
of programmatic political competition must still have been considered an unlikely 
development at the time of the March 20, 1994, general election, the first election held 
after the war’s end. Popular support for the two political parties that had dominated 
Salvadoran politics from the early 1960s through the mid-1980s – the Christian 
Democratic Party (PDC, founded in 1960) and the National Conciliation Party (PCN, 
founded in 1961) – was clearly on the decline.2 The centrist PDC, winner of the 1984 
presidential election, had seen its support fall in response to the Duarte government’s 
(1984-89) inability to negotiate an end to the civil war. The right-wing, military-aligned 
PCN, which had ruled the country from 1962-79, experienced an even more abrupt 
decline following the reintroduction of competitive elections in 1982. Indeed, at the time 
of the 1994 election, El Salvador’s party system appeared to be on the verge of 
disintegration, not on the verge of becoming the poster child for programmatic political 
competition in Latin America. How can we explain the seemingly unlikely emergence of 
programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador? 
 During the final three months of 2011, I conducted interviews with a total of 
twenty-seven party leaders, activists, elected officials, and candidates for elected office 
from El Salvador’s six main political parties – the Nationalist Republican Alliance 
(ARENA), the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), the PCN, the PDC, 
the Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA), and Democratic Change (CD). When 
presented with evidence that programmatic party-voter linkages are stronger in El 
Salvador than in any other Latin American democracy and asked to explain how these 
relationships have formed in spite of the fact that El Salvador does not exhibit any of the 
characteristics identified by Kitschelt et al. (2010) as the foundation of programmatic 
political competition in Chile and Uruguay, a large number of my interview subjects – 
people who enjoy privileged access to the inner workings of the Salvadoran party system 
– suggested that the country’s decade-long civil war was responsible for the generation of 
programmatic party-voter linkages. 
                                                 
2
  See Appendix 5.A for an illustration of the electoral decline experienced by these two parties. 
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 On its face, this appears to be a perfectly reasonable explanation. Politics plays a 
more-significant-than-usual role in citizens’ day-to-day lives when those lives are directly 
affected by an armed conflict that extends throughout much of the country’s territory. 
Presumably, the experience of such a prolonged and intense encounter with violent 
political conflict would serve to drastically reduce the amount of time required for 
citizens to become aware of the identities of, and differences between, the principal 
parties to the conflict (Laufer 1989). However, if the strength of programmatic party-
voter linkages in contemporary El Salvador is simply an inheritance left behind by a 
prolonged period of violent domestic conflict, we would expect to find similarly strong 
programmatic party-voter linkages in countries such as Guatemala, Nicaragua, and 
Colombia, and we would also expect to find evidence that programmatic political 
competition in El Salvador was already in place at the time of the first post-war elections 
in 1994. 
 Empirical examinations of the strength of the relationships between policy 
preferences, left-right self-placement, and voting behavior demonstrate that this first 
expectation is not met.3 In Guatemala, the relationship between left-right self-
identification and voting behavior is very weak; in Nicaragua and Colombia, the strength 
of this relationship approximates the Latin American average. The relationship between 
policy preferences and left-right self-identification is weak in all three countries. 
Although this finding alone does not completely debunk the theory that programmatic 
political competition in contemporary El Salvador is a result of the country’s civil war, it 
does at least suggest that such a theory would require the addition of important qualifiers. 
 As for the second expectation, that we would see evidence of programmatic 
political competition as early as the 1994 elections if the strong programmatic party-voter 
linkages we observe in El Salvador now are indeed a heritage of the country’s civil war, 
available evidence concerning the development of the relationship between policy 
preferences and left-right self-placement suggests that programmatic party-voter linkages 
in El Salvador were not yet particularly strong in the period immediately following the 
civil war. Although Azpuru (2010) finds that left-right self-placement was a statistically 
                                                 
3
  In this paragraph and the next, I refer to the data presented in Tables 2.7, 2.12, and 2.29. 
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significant predictor of voting behavior in the 1994 presidential election, data from the 
earliest Latinobarómetro survey (1996) demonstrates that the relationship between policy 
preferences and left-right self-placement was, at that time, still quite weak. Indeed, 
survey data strongly suggest that programmatic political competition did not emerge until 
2004, when the FMLN selected long-time Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS) leader 
Schafik Hándal as its presidential candidate. 
 While it would be foolish to neglect the role that a decade of civil war, as well as 
the political developments that paved the way for that war, played in “shaping the 
political arena,” evidence that programmatic party-voter linkages remain weak in other 
Latin American countries that experienced similar episodes of prolonged domestic 
conflict and evidence that strong programmatic party-voter linkages did not emerge in El 
Salvador until 2004 allows us to be more confident in the conclusion that the strong 
programmatic party-voter linkages observed in contemporary El Salvador are not simply 
part of the heritage of the civil war. Nonetheless, we are still faced with the same 
question: how can we explain the seemingly unlikely development of programmatic 
political competition in El Salvador? 
 In this chapter, I demonstrate that, by creating extensive networks of local party 
organizations that maintain their visibility throughout the entirety of the electoral cycle, 
establishing political institutes designed to educate/indoctrinate party supporters, and 
emphasizing their ideological distinctiveness in their public discourse, the FMLN and 
ARENA have, in a relatively short period of time, created a political environment in 
which voters can, with little effort, correctly identify the programmatic preferences and 
ideological commitments associated with each party. I also present evidence that the 
FMLN served as the first mover in all of these regards, with ARENA only taking the 
deliberate strategic decision to mimic many of the FMLN’s ideological outreach 
activities after ARENA suffered a surprising (and for the party leadership, unsettling) 
setback in the 2003 legislative and municipal elections. 
 In the first section of this chapter, I trace the development of the two political 
parties that have dominated electoral competition in the post-war era. This brief political 
history begins in the 1960s, when many of the organizations that served as precursors to 
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the FMLN and ARENA came to life during a period of rapid economic growth and 
diversification that was accompanied by a significant degree of political liberalization. 
This historical overview continues through to the early 1980s, when the FMLN and 
ARENA both came to life just as a decade of escalating guerrilla activity and government 
repression reached the breaking point that converted the long-simmering conflict into 
full-blown civil war, and it also covers the various transformations that both groups 
experienced during the eleven-year war. 
 In the second section of the chapter, I examine the post-war evolution of the 
FMLN and explain how difficulties associated with the FMLN’s transition from guerrilla 
organization to political party, ideological conflicts within the party, and the party’s 
electoral triumphs have influenced the nature of political competition in contemporary El 
Salvador. Crucially, this examination demonstrates that the dramatic strengthening of the 
relationship between voters’ policy preferences and their left-right self-placement that 
became apparent in 2004 was precipitated by the FMLN’s adoption (in 2002) of an 
intensive plan designed to revitalize the party’s previously-strong relationships with 
Salvadoran civil society and to educate voters by emphasizing the party’s ideological and 
programmatic distinctiveness. Ultimately, the analysis contained in this chapter supports 
my contention that the unity and organization of the Salvadoran Left and the political 
strategies that the FMLN employed after completing its difficult transition from a loose 
confederation of guerrilla forces into a cohesive and ideologically coherent political party 
are the crucial elements that explain the emergence of programmatic political competition 
in El Salvador. In more general terms, my analysis of the important role played by the 
FMLN lends support to arguments that emphasize elite political agency, and particularly 
the critical role played by externally mobilized parties, as a crucial element in the 
development of programmatic political competition. 
 
5.1 The Formation of ARENA and the FMLN 
 Both the military-aligned PCN and the centrist PDC had been reduced to 
secondary status by 1994, when the first post-war elections were held. ARENA and the 
FMLN, the two parties that have come to dominate Salvadoran politics in the post-war 
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era, were both of fairly recent origin. Moreover, both were seemingly unlikely candidates 
to become the cornerstone of a stable, modern party system. The FMLN was created in 
October 1980 to coordinate the activities of five Leftist guerrilla groups as they waged 
war against the Salvadoran state. ARENA, formed in May 1981, was the political project 
of Roberto d’Aubuisson, the death squad leader who was presumably the intellectual -
author of the March 1980 assassination of San Salvador Archbishop Óscar Arnulfo 
Romero. How did these two relatively young parties, both born of political violence, 
become the centerpiece of Latin America’s most programmatic party system? To answer 
this question, it is useful to briefly trace the origins of these two parties. 
 
The FMLN: Fifty Years in the Making 
 Although the FMLN can trace its lineage back to the March 1930 formation of the 
Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS), the true roots of the guerrilla organizations that 
joined forces to create the FMLN did not begin to emerge until the early 1960s, when 
Col. Julio Rivera (the first of four PCN presidents who ruled the country from 1962 
through 1979) introduced a series of limited but significant political reforms that not only 
allowed for a series of meaningful (if not completely free and fair) elections,4 but also 
(briefly) allowed Salvadoran civil society an unprecedented degree of freedom. While 
rapid economic growth and increasing diversification contributed to the growth of urban 
labor unions, the state’s failure to take effective measures to reduce poverty and 
inequality created a receptive audience for rural organizers, whose efforts led to the 1964 
formation of the Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants (FECCAS), and for parish 
priests influenced by liberation theology who established Christian base communities in 
many rural areas. Throughout the 1960s, PCS activists embarked upon what future 
FMLN leader Schafik Hándal would later describe as “an intense period of agitation and 
mass mobilization” (Harnecker 1988: 5) as they used their involvement in labor unions, 
                                                 
4
  Like a number of military regimes in the region, El Salvador held elections on a fairly regular basis. In most cases, 
the military regime’s candidates either ran unopposed (1935, 1939, 1944, 1952, 1954, and 1958) or they achieved 
victory with impossibly high vote percentages (99.7% in 1945, 95.2% in 1956, and 87.7% in 1960). Prior to the 1964 
legislative election, only the 1950 election won by General Óscar Osorio and his Revolutionary Party of Democratic 
Unification (PRUD) and the 1961 Constitutional Assembly election, which the PCN won with 60.1% of the vote, could 
be considered competitive elections. 
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student organizations, peasant associations, and Christian base communities to educate 
members about the party’s ideology and its political aspirations. For many members, 
these organizations would serve as a gateway to the guerrilla movement when the 
political liberalization of the 1960s was replaced by wholesale repression in the 1970s. 
 While most of the opposition (including the leadership of the PCS) remained 
committed to electoral competition even after the PCN had resorted to massive fraud in 
order to “win” the March 1970 legislative election, the same could not be said after the 
February 20, 1972, presidential election, when the government hastily ordered a halt to 
election coverage after early results showed an advantage for PDC leader Napoleón 
Duarte.5 PCN candidate Arturo Molina was later declared the victor, while Duarte was 
forced into exile in Venezuela. Wade (2003: 39) aptly summarizes the lesson that the 
opposition drew from this episode: the 1972 presidential election demonstrated “that 
reform through elections was unattainable. The electoral option was essentially removed 
from the bargaining table.” On March 2, four members of the People’s Revolutionary 
Army (ERP)6 attacked a National Guard post outside San Salvador’s Benjamin Bloom 
children’s hospital. According to ERP commander Eduardo Sancho, this attack 
represented “a change in direction in the war” (Cienfuegos 1993: 16). By the end of the 
month, both the ERP and the Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)7 had 
created urban commando groups that frequently carried out small-scale attacks. 
 El Salvador’s increasingly tense political environment was brought to a boil in 
1977, after the PCN once again resorted to widespread fraud in order to “win” the 
presidential election held on February 20. Three years earlier, both the ERP and 
especially the FPL had begun to emphasize the organization and mobilization of the 
masses. By 1977, the armed Left had not only strengthened pre-existing ties to urban 
                                                 
5
  Duarte ran as the candidate of the National Opposition Union (UNO), which also included the Nationalist 
Democratic Union (UDN), which had been created by the PCS in 1969 to serve as its electoral front, and the 
Revolutionary National Movement (MNR). 
6
  El Salvador’s first de facto guerrilla organization, the ERP had been established – as El Grupo – in January 1970 
by former PCS general secretary Cayetano Carpio, who had abandoned the PCS after failing to convince other 
members of the party’s Central Committee that they could convert the 1969 war with Honduras into a popular war, just 
as the Bolsheviks had done during World War I. El Grupo was the author of the first armed action taken by any of the 
groups that would eventually form the FMLN, the February 11, 1971, kidnapping and subsequent murder of Ernesto 
Regalado Dueñas, a prominent member of the Salvadoran oligarchy. 
7
  The FPL was founded in April 1971 by a group of PCS dissidents. 
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labor unions and radical student groups, but it had also developed close relationships with 
many of the peasant organizations and Christian base communities that had been 
established during the 1960s (Kincaid 1987, Cienfuegos 1993, Álvarez 2010).8 Two 
incidents that occurred in the weeks following the election – the February 28 massacre of 
dozens of protesters who had gathered in San Salvador’s Plaza Libertad and the March 
10 assassination of Rutilio Grande, one of El Salvador’s most prominent proponents of 
liberation theology9 – set in motion a wave of violent repression that only intensified after 
Gen. Carlos Humberto Romero assumed the presidency on July 1 and immediately 
declared a state of siege. In the face of increasingly violent and indiscriminate repression, 
the armed Left conducted a series of high-profile kidnappings of government officials 
and prominent businessmen, while civil society groups – both independent groups and 
groups affiliated with the guerrilla movement – continued to organize protests, strikes, 
and other demonstrations. 
 Although the October 15, 1979, military coup that ousted Gen. Romero provided 
a momentary glimmer of hope that civil war could be averted, the inability of the various 
joint military-civilian juntas that governed the country following the coup to establish 
control over conservative elements of the state’s security forces resulted in an 
unprecedented escalation of political violence; according to Booth and Walker (1993: 
103), there were more than 13,000 political assassinations in the year 1980.10 Amidst 
                                                 
8
  The National Resistance (RN), formed by ERP dissidents in May 1975, established close ties to the Unified 
Popular Action Front (FAPU), a coalition of Christian base communities, labor unions, and professional organizations 
formed in 1974. The FPL was closely linked to the more radical Revolutionary Popular Bloc (BPR), a civil society 
coalition that sponsored a series of demonstrations, strikes, and land invasions after its foundation in 1975. The ERP 
formed its own civil society affiliate, the February 28 Popular Leagues (LP-28), shortly after the 1977 election. A 
fourth guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC), which was formed by another 
group of ERP dissidents in January 1976, also created its own unarmed branch, the Popular Liberation Movement 
(MLP), in 1979. 
9
  The assassination of Rutilio Grande took on an added significance because of the profound impact it had on 
Grande’s close personal friend, Óscar Arnulfo Romero, who had been named Archbishop of San Salvador just sixteen 
days before Grande’s murder. Later in 1977, Archbishop Romero, who had previously supported the Catholic Church’s 
traditional anti-communist stance, initiated a campaign calling for the government to respect the human rights of its 
citizens, and he began using his weekly sermons (which were broadcast throughout the country via radio) to denounce 
crimes perpetrated by ORDEN (the rural intelligence network cum paramilitary force formed in 1966) and by the 
state’s security forces. 
10
  Amongst the more spectacular incidents of the wave of violence that swept across El Salvador in 1980 were: (1) the 
January 22 sniper attacks on demonstrators gathered to commemorate the anniversary of the 1932 peasant uprising, (2) 
the assassination of Archbishop Romero on March 24, one day after he had used his Sunday sermon to urge Salvadoran 
soldiers to lay down their arms, exhorting them that “Thou shalt not kill! No soldier is obliged to obey an order against 
the law of God,” (3) the attack that occurred six days later, during Romero’s funeral, that left at least 30 dead, (4) the 
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levels of repression not seen since 1932,11 the guerrilla organizations were forced to 
relocate from San Salvador to the countryside, while many members of the non-violent 
opposition joined the guerrilla organizations out of a concern for self-preservation. 
 This wave of violence also motivated the guerrilla groups and their civil society 
affiliates to suspend their ideological debates, downplay their tactical differences, and 
begin to coordinate their actions. On January 11, 1980, the BPR, FAPU, UDN, LP-28, 
and MLP joined forces to create the Mass Revolutionary Council (CRM), which 
immediately emitted a call for unity and armed insurrection. In May, the ERP, FPL, RN, 
and the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL)12 formed the Unified Revolutionary 
Directorate (DRU), a body tasked with the formation of a shared set of political and 
military objectives. On October 10, 1980, these four guerrilla organizations formed the 
FMLN13 and begin planning the ambitiously-named “Final Offensive,” the series of 
simultaneous assaults on the country’s principal army bases launched on January 10, 
1981, that was intended to provoke a revolt by sympathetic junior officers as well as a 
massive popular insurrection. 
 
ARENA: The Merger of Two Rights 
 ARENA’s origins can be traced to the 1966 creation of two organizations, the 
Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN) and the National Association of Private 
Enterprise (ANEP), whose objectives differed greatly. In accordance with its acronym 
(“order”) and with little regard for anything “democratic,” ORDEN – which grew to have 
approximately 100,000 members before it was formally dissolved in November 1979, 
largely because a variety of selective benefits such as health care, education, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sumpul River massacre (May 14), in which roughly 600 civilians were killed by members of the armed forces, the 
National Guard, and ORDEN operating in coordination with the Honduran army, (5) the November 27 capture and 
murder of all six members of the executive committee of the moderate-left Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), and 
(6) the December 2 rape and murder (at the hands of members of the National Guard) of three American nuns and an 
American laywomen who were participating in a Catholic relief mission. 
11
  In January 1932, PCS founder Augustín Farabundo Martí participated in the organization of an uprising that saw 
peasants attack a number of coffee estates and government offices in western El Salvador. The government of Gen. 
Maximiliano Martínez responded to this uprising by launching a series of indiscriminate attacks on peasants, 
indigenous communities, and anyone else suspected of being a leftist. This episode, referred to simply as La Matanza 
(the massacre), left as many as 30,000 dead. 
12
  The armed wing of the PCS, the FAL was created in March 1980. 
13
  The PRTC joined the FMLN on December 5, 1980. 
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preferential access to agricultural inputs were made available only to peasants holding an 
ORDEN identification card – was created by Gen. José Alberto Medrano “to provide a 
rural intelligence network for detecting signs of popular unrest or mobilization and to 
serve as a paramilitary force for attacking and dismantling such subversive activities” 
(Kincaid 1987: 485).  
 ANEP, on the other hand, was formed to represent the interests of the emerging 
urban industrial and commercial sectors that were the main beneficiaries of a period of 
rapid economic growth and increasing diversification ushered in by the 1960 creation of 
the Central American Common Market (CACM). Though hardly keen to witness the 
growth and politicization of El Salvador’s union movement, the capitalist class 
represented by ANEP was less reliant on coercive measures to minimize labor costs than 
was the traditional landed oligarchy, and it had little reason to adopt the violent 
opposition to land reform that had long been characteristic of the agrarian elite. Whereas 
ORDEN joined the state’s various security forces – the armed forces, the National Police, 
the Treasury Police, the National Guard, and the National Special Services Agency 
(ANSESAL) – as one more weapon in the vast arsenal that Salvadoran landowners used 
to ensure the continuing survival of the coercive labor practices that guaranteed the 
profitability of the agro-export sector, the creation of ANEP provided the first hints of the 
emergence of a democratic Right. 
 While the traditional, agrarian, authoritarian Right had demonstrated its strength 
when it succeeded in blocking legislation introduced in 1976 that called for the 
expropriation and redistribution of 59,000 hectares of land (less than 4% of the country’s 
agricultural land), its influence over the state declined substantially in the aftermath of the 
October 1979 coup. In one of its first acts, the Primera Junta Revolucionaria de 
Gobierno decreed an immediate halt to the sale, transfer, or division of properties larger 
than 100 hectares – a measure designed to prevent landowners from evading the three-
stage land reform program14 that the junta introduced on March 5, 1980. Opposition to 
the junta and its socioeconomic reforms soon found its poster child in “a man who began 
                                                 
14
  The first phase of this land reform measure – the only phase that was fully implemented – consisted of the 
expropriation of all landholdings in excess of 500 hectares, a measure that affected 244 landowners who controlled a 
total of 224,083 hectares, roughly 25% of El Salvador’s agricultural land (Castro Morán 2005). 
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to appear on television in January 1980, unknown but with the characteristics of a leader” 
(de Rosa Ferreira 2011: 24): Roberto d’Aubuisson. 
 d’Aubuisson served as an effective bridge between the traditional authoritarian 
Right and the emerging democratic Right because he stood with one foot firmly planted 
in each camp. A former army major and head of ANSESAL, he had earned his 
authoritarian credentials both with his penchant for using a blowtorch while interrogating 
political prisoners (which earned him the nickname “Blowtorch Bob”) and with his 
involvement in the formation of right-wing death squads during the late 1970s. Yet, in 
spite of his extremely unsavory past – US Ambassador Robert White labeled 
d’Aubuisson a pathological killer – there is some reason why d’Aubuisson is to this day 
revered by the Salvadoran Right as a champion of democracy. Frequently repeating the 
refrain that “a free man’s most powerful weapon is his vote,” d’Aubuisson was quick to 
recognize that the civil war would likely result in an eventual transition to democratic 
rule, and that the Right would have to create an independent (i.e. not formally aligned 
with the armed forces) electoral vehicle supported both by the agrarian Right and the 
industrial-commercial Right if it hoped to successfully compete for political power in a 
democratic El Salvador. Thus, months before the governing junta announced, in early 
1981, that elections to form a Constitutional Assembly and an interim government would 
be held on March 28, 1982, d’Aubuisson was already laying the foundation for a new 
political project. That new political project, ARENA, came to life on May 2, 1981, at a 
meeting held in Guatemala City. 
 
Wartime Transformations: ARENA and the FMLN during the Civil War 
 Both ARENA and the FMLN underwent a series of important changes during El 
Salvador’s eleven-year civil war. ARENA experienced a meteoric rise to national 
prominence that was made possible by d’Aubuisson’s close relationships with Medrano 
(which helped the new party establish an extensive network of patron-client relationships 
that included many of the tens of thousands of conservative peasants who had been 
members of ORDEN) and with the conservative landowners who funded the death squads 
that had emerged during the 1970s. With 29.5% of the vote, ARENA finished second to 
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the PDC in the March 1982 Constitutional Assembly election, and d’Aubuisson was 
elected president of that body on May 2, exactly one year after the party had formed.15 
 However, although ARENA had in less than a year grown from a group of thirty-
nine self-exiled conservatives gathered in a Guatemala City hotel into a political party 
that received 402,000 votes in its first electoral contest, the results of subsequent 
elections suggested that support for ARENA had peaked just as fast as it had grown. In 
the first round of the 1984 presidential election, d’Aubuisson received 29.8% of the vote, 
virtually identical to the vote percentage that ARENA had received two years earlier. In 
the following year’s legislative elections, ARENA received 29.7% of the vote, again 
virtually identical to the party’s performance in 1982. The fact that ARENA’s vote share 
had once again remained stagnant prompted important changes within the party. After the 
1985 election, d’Aubuisson selected Alfredo Cristiani, a moderate US-educated 
businessman with no previous political experience, to replace him as president of 
ARENA’s National Executive Council (COENA). 
 This change, which also put Cristiani in line to become the party’s candidate in 
the 1989 presidential election, signaled a changing of the guard within ARENA. From its 
birth through 1985, ARENA had been firmly in the control of “the radically anti-
communist landowning sector … [and it was] characterized by a belligerent style, by the 
use of confrontational rhetoric and by resorting to violent tactics and ways of struggle” 
(Álvarez 2010: 26). With Cristiani as the president of COENA, “the modernizing sector 
of the economic elite” (Álvarez 2010: 26) replaced the landowning oligarchy as the 
dominant group within the party. By installing Cristiani as his successor, d’Aubuisson 
effectively redefined the party’s political goals; rather than represent the interests of the 
traditional landed oligarchy, ARENA would heretofore represent the interests of the 
rising industrial and commercial elites. Whereas the ARENA of 1981-85 was “a 
parochial, ideologically driven (even emotionally driven) political party” defined by its 
rabid anti-communism, its passionate defense of private property, and its goal of 
achieving a military victory over the FMLN, the post-1985 ARENA became “a more 
                                                 
15
  ARENA’s nineteen seats, combined with the fourteen seats won by the PCN, gave the Right a voting majority in 
the 60-seat Constitutional Assembly; this explains how d’Aubuisson became president of the Constitutional Assembly. 
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moderate and institutionalized party” (Colburn 2009: 145) dedicated to neoliberal reform 
and more interested in ending the war (even if doing so meant entering into negotiations 
with the FMLN) than in continuing to rely on the armed forces to help defend its interests 
(Álvarez 2010, González 2011).  
 Three years later, this “new” ARENA passed its first test in impressive fashion as 
the party received 48.0% of the vote in the 1988 legislative election, enough to give the 
party a majority in the 60-seat Legislative Assembly.16 This resounding electoral triumph 
repeated itself in 1989, when Cristiani won the presidency with 53.8% of the vote, and 
again in 1991, when ARENA received 44.3% of the votes cast in the legislative election, 
enough to earn thirty-nine seats in an expanded 84-seat Legislative Assembly. With these 
electoral triumphs, ARENA had clearly established itself as El Salvador’s preeminent 
political party by the time the January 16, 1992, Chapúltepec Accords put a definitive end 
to El Salvador’s eleven-year civil war. 
 Transformations within the FMLN and in the nature of its relationship with civil 
society ran parallel to military developments as the civil war passed through three distinct 
stages following the failure of the FMLN’s “Final Offensive.” During the initial stage of 
the war (1981-83), the FMLN was obligated to change its military strategy from one of 
popular insurrection (the preferred strategy of the RN) to one of prolonged popular war 
(favored by the FPL and the ERP) (Wade 2003, González 2011). This period saw the 
FMLN incorporate large numbers of new recruits, establish its rearguard,17 and then 
launch a sustained offensive during which the guerrilla forces “operated like a regular 
army, attacking in large units” (Stanley 1996: 227). 
 Although the five guerrilla organizations all considered the development and 
maintenance of strong ties with civil society to be a key component of their overall 
strategy for defeating the military regime, their political organizing efforts were largely 
abandoned during this period as the FMLN, still confident in its chances of achieving a 
                                                 
16
  ARENA won thirty seats in the 1988 election. That total rose to thirty-one shortly after the election, when one PCN 
legislator switched parties. 
17
  At its peak in 1982-83, the FMLN counted 10-12,000 troops – which made it “Latin America’s most powerful 
guerrilla movement” in terms of its size relative to the national population; with one combatant for every 500 
Salvadorans, the relative size of the FMLN was six times greater than that of Colombia’s guerrilla forces (Álvarez 
2010: 7) – and it controlled roughly 25% of the country’s territory, including wide swaths in the north and northeast 
that would remain under FMLN control throughout the war (Álvarez 1988, Cienfuegos 1993). 
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military victory over the Salvadoran armed forces, devoted most of its resources to the 
ongoing armed struggle.18 This neglect, combined with the state’s response to the “Final 
Offensive” – what little restraint the state’s security forces had shown during the 
preceding wave of repression was immediately abandoned; in 1981 alone, government 
forces were responsible for more than 18,000 deaths (Álvarez 2010: 24) – had a profound 
impact on the relationship between the FMLN and civil society. With many of their rank-
and-file members either killed, forced to flee the country, or incorporated into the ranks 
of the growing guerrilla armies, many of the peasant associations, student groups, labor 
unions, and religious organizations that had been so vibrant during the 1960s and 1970s 
disappeared during the early 1980s (Foley 1996). 
 The civil war entered its second stage early in 1984, when the Salvadoran armed 
forces, now awash with funds and equipment provided by the Reagan administration, 
adopted an aggressive counterinsurgency strategy based on air strikes and frequent 
incursions into FMLN-controlled territories. This new strategy “forced the guerrillas to 
abandon their all-out offensive and adopt a more traditional guerrilla strategy based on 
small units, mobility, geographic dispersion, emphasis on political work, and, above all, 
economic sabotage” (Stanley 1996: 227). 
 During this period, the FMLN once again emphasized the organization and 
mobilization of labor unions, peasant associations, and student organizations. Efforts to 
reestablish ties with civil society bore the most fruit in metropolitan San Salvador, where 
labor unions and organizations associated with the Catholic Church were able to renew 
their activities due to the significant reduction in urban death squad activity that 
accompanied the June 1984 transition to democratic rule. Various new organizations 
dedicated to serving the interests of persons displaced by the war, of political prisoners, 
and of the families of persons killed or disappeared by the state’s security forces, as well 
                                                 
18
  During this period, the FMLN’s political outreach activities were limited to: (1) the establishment of military 
schools in certain areas – particularly the ERP-controlled areas of the northeastern department of Morazán – where the 
FMLN had set up its base camps, (2) the creation of local administrative bodies (Local People’s Power, PPL) in FPL-
controlled areas in the northern department of Chalatenango that emphasized social organization and popular 
participation, and (3) the use of clandestine radio stations Radio Venceremos (which began transmitting on the day of 
the “Final Offensive”) and Radio Farabundo Martí (which began its transmissions on January 22, 1982) to broadcast 
news reports and political commentaries (Álvarez 1988, Binford 1997, Gutiérrez Castro 2010). 
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as a growing movement that organized demonstrations in favor of a negotiated end to the 
war, also emerged during this period (Villalobos 1989, Harnecker 1991-a, Foley 1996). 
 Beginning in 1984, the FMLN also redoubled its political education efforts. The 
military training schools created during the first phase of the war were refashioned into 
comprehensive political-military schools designed to provide each FMLN combatant 
with a thorough political education. From 1984 through 1989, combatants who passed 
through the FMLN’s field schools not only received military training and general 
education courses (including literacy training), but they also completed a course that 
included training in political theory/analysis and in methods of community organizing, 
including instructions for explaining the FMLN’s political goals and raising workers’ and 
peasants’ political consciousness. By way of Radio Venceremos and Radio Farabundo 
Martí, the general education courses created by the FMLN spread beyond the confines of 
the guerrilla camps, and even beyond the confines of the guerrilla-controlled territories, 
to reach a much broader audience (López Vigil 2006, Gutiérrez Castro 2010). 
 The FMLN’s relationship with civil society began transitioning towards a third 
phase in 1986. With the FMLN’s leadership convinced that it needed to take the war back 
to San Salvador in order to legitimize its continuing armed struggle (González 2011), 
labor organization took a back seat to the establishment of urban guerrilla groups as the 
FMLN began preparing a massive offensive, launched on November 11, 1989, that saw 
more than 5,000 FMLN combatants invade dozens of areas in metropolitan San Salvador, 
prompting nineteen days of fighting in the capital during which the armed forces 
responded with heavy artillery fire and with aerial bombings of working-class residential 
neighborhoods under FMLN control. The inconclusive result of the guerrilla offensive 
convinced all involved, including extreme right-wing proponents of a “Guatemala 
solution” (i.e. the unrestrained use of military force to annihilate the armed insurgents 
and their supporters), that neither the FMLN nor the Salvadoran armed forces were likely 
to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield. Five months later, negotiations between 
the FMLN and the Salvadoran government began in earnest.19 During this period, the 
                                                 
19
  The FMLN had held talks with the Duarte government on four separate occasions between October 1984 and 
October 1987, and it had held talks with the Cristiani government in September and October 1989, but these meetings 
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FMLN scaled back on its political education efforts while its leaders focused on these 
negotiations. 
 
5.2 Charting the Emergence of Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages 
 As noted in the introduction to this chapter, survey evidence suggests that strong 
programmatic party-voter linkages did not develop in El Salvador until a decade after the 
war’s end – after the FMLN had completed its difficult transition from guerrilla group to 
political party, after it had resumed the ideological outreach activities that had 
characterized the guerrilla movement during the 1970s, and after the FMLN’s victory in 
the 2003 legislative and mayoral elections had prompted ARENA to reevaluate and 
redesign its own outreach efforts. This section, which illustrates the role that ARENA 
and, more crucially, the FMLN have played in constructing programmatic political 
competition, is divided into three parts, corresponding to the three phases in the FMLN’s 
post-war development as a political party: (1) the transition period between the signing of 
the Chapúltepec Accords and the first post-war elections (March 20, 1994), (2) a 
subsequent period (1994-2002) characterized by internal conflict within the FMLN 
between ortodoxos and renovadores, and (3) the contemporary period, in which the 
ortodoxos (mainly leaders of the PCS, along with some leaders of the FPL) have 
maintained control over the party. 
 
The Transition from War to Democracy, 1992-94 
 At the time of the 1994 elections, neither ARENA nor the FMLN appeared likely 
to spearhead the creation of a party system characterized by strong programmatic party-
voter linkages. Although the dramatic uptick in electoral support that ARENA 
experienced in 1988 had followed on the heels of a change in party leadership that 
brought the democratic, modernizing right to the fore, there is no evidence to indicate that 
the party’s ideological moderation was the cause of ARENA’s electoral success during 
the final years of the war. During this period, ARENA used its considerable campaign 
                                                                                                                                                 
were “merely tactical in nature for both parties and yielded no substantial results” because both the FMLN and the 
Salvadoran armed forces were still convinced that they could achieve a military victory (Álvarez 2010: 31). 
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funds to fan public perceptions of PDC corruption (particularly in relation to the 
mismanagement of state-owned enterprises) and ineptitude (with regards to the Duarte 
government’s inability to secure an end to the civil war) (Castro Morán 2005, de Rosa 
Ferreira 2011). Ideological/programmatic pleas were deemed surplus to requirements; 
indeed, current ARENA officials note that the party made little if any effort to educate 
voters about its ideology during this period because ARENA was able to “win easy” 
simply by outspending its rivals, mobilizing voters through patron-client relationships, 
and preying on its opponents’ political weaknesses.20 
 At the other end of the political spectrum, the FMLN was perhaps more likely to 
become the focal point of a programmatic party system, not only because its rise to 
prominence had been due in large part to the relationships that had developed between 
the guerrilla movement and various sectors of Salvadoran civil society during the 1960s 
and 1970s, but also because political education played a central role in the FMLN’s 
strategy for fomenting a massive popular insurrection. Indeed, had the guerrilla groups 
been political parties, the relationships they cultivated with labor unions, professional 
organizations, peasant associations, student groups, and religious organizations during the 
period between 1974 and 1979 could have been described as the ideal avenue for a new 
political party to build strong programmatic linkages with its supporters. However, the 
brutal repression unleashed by the state’s security forces and their paramilitary allies 
following the 1979 coup had a profound impact on the FMLN’s relationship with civil 
society. Although the FMLN had worked to reestablish ties with civil society and to 
revitalize its political education efforts during the middle phase of the war, it again 
deemphasized these activities in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 Once the war had ended, the FMLN faced the task of transforming itself from a 
guerrilla organization to a political party. The many difficulties that the FMLN faced as it 
underwent this transformation provide the best explanation for why the incorporation of 
the fervently ideological FMLN into El Salvador’s party system did not immediately 
                                                 
20
  Interviews with Orlando Cocar Romano, manager of ARENA’s center for political and ideological training, the 
Instituto de Formación Politica “Mayor Roberto d’Aubuisson,” (San Salvador, November 3, 2011) and with a party 
official who was involved in designing ARENA’s campaign strategy for the 2004 presidential election (La Libertad, 
November 28, 2011). 
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result in the development of programmatic party-voter linkages. During this transition 
period, which did not reach its conclusion until 2002, political education and the union 
movement were further marginalized as other priorities superseded the party’s efforts to 
form ideological linkages with its supporters. First, as stipulated by the Chapúltepec 
Accords, the FMLN had to demobilize and subsequently disarm its 8,600 combatants, a 
task that drew considerable attention from the FMLN’s leaders, who were well aware that 
at least 2,000 members of the Unión Patriótica, the political party formed by Colombia’s 
FARC in 1985, were assassinated in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Merino 2011: 119). 
 Once the process of demobilization and disarmament had been completed, the 
FMLN was confronted with a second challenge: reinserting its combatants, including 
some who had lived “underground” since the mid-1970s, into civilian life. Although the 
peace agreement designated roughly 10% of the country’s agricultural land for 
redistribution to ex-combatants and to those who had farmed plots that were abandoned 
by their owners during the war, and it also contained provisions designed to provide ex-
combatants with preferential access to small business and farm loans, the Cristiani 
government (and subsequent ARENA governments) provided limited funding for these 
programs. As a result, the FMLN as an institution took on the responsibility of helping its 
former combatants to reestablish family and community ties and to prepare themselves 
for productive lives, another task that diverted the party’s attention away from engaging 
in ideological education and solidifying its relationship with its social base. 
 Indeed, in a general sense, the FMLN devoted much of its activity during the 
initial post-war period to ensure the government’s compliance with various provisions of 
the peace agreement. Although the Chapúltepec Accords did little to address the 
socioeconomic inequalities that had prompted the growth of the opposition movement 
during the 1960s and the subsequent formation of the guerrilla groups in the 1970s, the 
peace agreement did represent a significant change in terms of dismantling the state’s 
repressive security forces and establishing the foundation for meaningful democratic 
competition. Eager to ensure that the agreed changes were indeed implemented, the 
FMLN took up the task of monitoring the Cristiani government as it restructured and 
downsized the armed forces, eliminated the National Guard and the Treasury Police, 
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replaced the National Police with a civilian police force, released political prisoners and 
allowed the return of persons who had been forced into exile, created a national office 
dedicated to monitoring human rights violations, and implemented a host of judicial and 
electoral reforms designed to strengthen the country’s nascent democracy. Again, 
performing these important tasks left the FMLN with little time to repair its deteriorating 
relationship with the labor movement or to redouble its efforts to educate the public about 
the party’s ideological commitments.21 
 The FMLN also faced an important organizational hurdle that demanded the 
attention of the party’s leaders: how would the five guerrilla groups, who had maintained 
their separate command structures and separate identities throughout the war, merge to 
create a coherent political party? During the war, the five groups within the FMLN had 
been united by a shared military objective: defeat the state’s repressive security forces. 
However, once peace was established, the animated ideological debates within the Left 
that had led to divisions between these five groups during the 1970s were reactivated, 
demonstrating that the formation of the FMLN had to a certain extent been a marriage of 
convenience necessitated by the violent repression of the late 1970s. Thus, the 
organizational challenges associated with the process of converting five guerrilla 
organizations into one political party rapidly morphed into ideological disagreements 
and, ultimately, disagreements about the future identity of the FMLN as a political party.  
 Since its creation, the FMLN had defined itself as a socialist organization. 
However, when pressed to specify what “socialism” meant, its leaders could not reach 
any clear agreement beyond a commitment to reject oligarchic rule and North American 
imperialism (Alcántara and Freidenberg 2003, Zamora 2003). As these ideological 
debates progressed, three distinct factions soon developed within the party. One faction, 
the ortodoxos, led by long-time PCS leader Schafik Hándal, sought to retain the FMLN’s 
revolutionary identity. From their perspective, electoral democracy was simply one of the 
many tools that the FMLN would have to employ as it continued to push for the creation 
                                                 
21
  Former FPL commander and current Salvadoran president Salvador Sánchez Cerén (2009: 232, 242) recalls that, 
during the first years after the war’s end, “the peace agreement became [the FMLN’s] programmatic platform … the 
entire command structure was oriented towards guaranteeing the implementation of the agreement, and the majority of 
the party’s leaders participated in various commissions” designed to carry out the agreed-upon reforms. 
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of a socialist state. While not dismissing the importance of electoral competition, the 
ortodoxos believed that “it would be impossible to attain the party’s democratic 
objectives without the active participation of the masses in the streets, without acts of 
civil disobedience” (Zamora 2003: 71). A second faction, the renovadores, led by FPL 
commander Facundo Guardado, wanted to see the FMLN evolve into a moderate and 
pragmatic social democratic party. From their point of view, mass protests only served to 
destabilize El Salvador’s fragile democracy, which in turn reduced the FMLN’s chances 
of obtaining political power. A third faction, led by ERP commander Joaquín Villalobos, 
argued that the FMLN should form a permanent alliance with the PDC. 
 Not only was the FMLN divided internally along these ideological fault lines, but 
it was also suffering from growing pains that further diluted the party’s ideological 
identification. During the first six months after the war’s end, the FMLN’s membership 
had grown from roughly 15,000 to more than 100,000. While becoming a member of the 
FMLN before or during the war involved both an initiation process and a continuing 
process of political education, joining the party after the war was a much simpler matter. 
However, as PCS/FAL commander José Luis Merino notes, although the FMLN 
benefited from adding these new affiliates who were “ready to work” and “to pledge their 
allegiance to the FMLN’s red flag,” their incorporation significantly lowered the level of 
ideological coherence within the party because these new recruits “had not developed the 
principles and values” that the party’s ex-combatants had assimilated during years of 
armed struggle (Regalado 2011: 121-122). 
 Given that the FMLN’s leadership was divided by ideological debates and that the 
level of ideological coherence amongst the party’s rank-and-file membership had 
decreased significantly, it is not surprising that the FMLN’s platform for the 1994 
elections used “relatively vague or ambiguous ideological language in order to 
accommodate the diverse lines of thought” that coexisted within the party (Zamora 2003: 
66). This platform focused on political reform and guaranteeing the implementation of 
the peace agreement; it made little reference to the guerrilla movement’s original raison 
d’etre of combating socioeconomic inequality. Even current Salvadoran president 
Salvador Sánchez Cerén (2009: 156) concedes that, in its 1994 platform, “the FMLN did 
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not propose any solutions to the economic problems” that continued to affect the majority 
of Salvadorans. Indeed, in economic terms, this platform was remarkably similar to 
ARENA’s platform; both parties called for the establishment of a social market economy 
and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. Although “the content of the proposals 
to achieve those goals was rather different … whether or not the electorate fully 
perceived those differences in approach remains unclear, since in their campaigns, both 
parties advocated the need for social development” (Azpuru 2010: 111). 
 While the FMLN formed an electoral alliance with the Democratic Convergence 
Party (CD) and the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) to support the CD’s Rubén 
Zamora Rivas in the 1994 presidential election, the party did run its own slate of 
candidates in the legislative election. Given ARENA’s considerable advantages in 
funding22 and campaign experience, as well as the political capital that the Cristiani 
government had earned by negotiating an end to the civil war, the FMLN’s performance 
in its first election was encouraging. Although ARENA’s Armando Calderón Sol 
defeated Zamora Rivas by a 36.6% margin in the presidential run-off election, the FMLN 
did surpass the PDC as the country’s second-largest electoral force, receiving 21.4% of 
the vote in the legislative election.23 
 
The Battle over the FMLN’s Ideological Soul, 1994-2002 
 Any celebrations triggered by the FMLN’s performance in the March 1994 
elections were short-lived, however, as the aforementioned ideological tensions that 
lingered within the party soon became public. On May 1, 1994, during the first session of 
the newly-formed legislature, seven FMLN legislators affiliated with the ERP and the RN 
broke party discipline and brokered a deal with ARENA. Nine days later, the FMLN’s 
General Coordinator, longtime PCS leader Schafik Hándal, suspended ERP leader 
Joaquín Villalobos and the seven rebellious deputies from the party. Amidst a hostile 
environment – “accusations of being neoliberal or Stalinist … would come to frame the 
                                                 
22
  Stahler-Sholk (1994: 24) notes that, while ARENA spent $12 million on its campaign, the FMLN-CD-MNR 
coalition could only raise a paltry $270,000 for its campaign efforts. 
23
  Data from the 1994-2009 legislative and municipal elections are reported in Appendix 5.B. 
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debate within the FMLN” (Wade 2003: 96) – the ERP and the RN withdrew from the 
FMLN in December 1994 to form the Democratic Party (PD). 
 According to Nidia Díaz, the FMLN’s candidate for the vice-presidency in the 
1999 election, the conflict that ultimately led the RN and the ERP to abandon the FMLN 
boiled down to a disagreement over the concept of revolution. While Villalobos and 
Sancho believed that “a democratic revolution had already occurred,” the leaders of the 
FPL, the PRTC, and the PCS argued that “the defeat of the dictatorship had initiated a 
process of democratization … [but] there had not yet been a democratic revolution … the 
peace agreement had created a better situation to continue the political fight for a 
democratic revolution” (Regalado 2011: 131). 
 After the faction led by Villalobos abandoned the party, the FMLN enjoyed a 
brief period of unity as it prepared for the 1997 legislative elections. In June 1995, the 
FMLN national council amended the description of the party’s ideology; while the 
party’s original statutes had described the FMLN as a “pluralist, democratic, and 
revolutionary” party, the 1995 revision added a fourth descriptor, “socialist” – the first 
time that any reference to socialism was used in an official document emitted by the 
FMLN as political party (Zamora 2003). That same month, the FMLN initiated the 
process of dissolving the independent organizational structures of the PCS, FPL, and 
PRTC in order to create a single party structure, although the FMLN would still 
recognize distinct ideological “tendencies” within the party. Introduced the following 
March, the FMLN’s platform for the 1997 legislative and municipal elections committed 
the party to two objectives: “defeat neoliberalism in El Salvador and make progress 
towards an alternative social project” (Sánchez Cerén 2009: 244). 
 Although the FMLN’s leadership exhibited a higher degree of ideological 
coherence in the run up to the 1997 elections than it had prior to the 1994 elections, and 
although some of the transitional issues that drew their attention away from party-
building activities prior to the 1994 elections had been resolved, the party still faced 
various important challenges as it sought to improve upon its previous performance. One 
obstacle was the declining strength of the party’s traditional social bases. The Christian 
base communities that played a fundamental role in the growth of the guerrilla movement 
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during the 1970s lost much of their influence as the Catholic Church in El Salvador 
became increasingly conservative following the November 1994 death of Archbishop 
Arturo Rivera y Damas (Wade 2003: 22-23). Peasant associations were slow to recover 
from the effects of the repression they were subjected to during the war. Leftist labor 
unions experienced a precipitous decline; while total union membership increased by 
103% from 1992 to 1994, membership in Leftist unions declined by 62% as workers 
turned their focus from broad political goals to parochial bread and butter issues 
(Fitzsimmons and Anner 1999). 
 Moreover, the relationship between the party’s leadership and its social bases had 
become strained; workers and peasants “criticized [the FMLN] because the peace 
agreement did not resolve anything substantively in terms of employment, salaries, land 
redistribution, or public security” (Sánchez Cerén 2009: 244). Also, a social gap opened 
up between party leaders and rank-and-file militants; whereas leaders and combatants 
maintained close contact and shared the same difficult lifestyle during the war, after the 
war “the leadership established itself in the capital, [where] their lifestyles, clothing, and 
modes of transportation differed from those of their rank-and-file companions” (Gutiérrez 
Castro 2010: 85-86). With the FMLN now focused on electoral competition rather than 
social mobilization, many ex-combatants and members of the groups that had formed the 
FMLN’s social base before and during the war felt as though they had been abandoned 
by the party (Luciak 2001, Zamora 2003). 
 As described in the party’s own official history, ARENA was at once the winner 
and (along with the PDC) one of the two biggest losers of the 1997 elections (de Rosa 
Ferreira 2011: 103). Although ARENA retained its position as the largest party in the 
Salvadoran legislature, the party’s vote percentage dropped from 45.0% to 35.4%. This 
vote swing had an important impact on the composition of the Salvadoran legislature. 
Since 1988, ARENA had been able to form a voting majority in the Legislative Assembly 
by partnering with the PCN; after the 1997 election, which left this right-wing coalition 
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four seats short of a simple majority, ARENA would have to cast a wider net as it sought 
legislative support for additional neoliberal reforms.24 
 The FMLN, on the other hand, saw its share of the vote in the legislative election 
increase by half, and the number of FMLN mayors more than tripled. The “nature” of the 
municipalities where the FMLN gained control of city hall was also significant. With one 
exception (the working-class San Salvador suburb of Mejicanos), all of the municipalities 
where the FMLN had won mayoral elections in 1994 were located in areas that had been 
under guerrilla control during much of the war. Three years later, FMLN candidates won 
mayoral elections in six of the country’s fourteen departmental capitals (including San 
Salvador), and in ten of the country’s twelve largest municipalities. Consequently, after 
the 1997 election, the percentage of Salvadoran voters who lived in an FMLN-governed 
municipality (48.0%) exceeded the percentage of voters who had ARENA mayors 
(41.6%). With electoral support for the FMLN and ARENA trending in different 
directions, and with Salvadoran voters growing less concerned about “the viability of the 
democratic process” and more focused on “issues such as education, poverty alleviation, 
and unemployment” (Wantchekon 1999: 830), an FMLN triumph in the 1999 presidential 
election seemed a real possibility. 
 However, ideological tensions within the FMLN boiled over within months of the 
1997 election, just as they had following the 1994 elections. This second wave of internal 
conflict first became public in September, at the party’s national convention, when 
Facundo Guardado defeated Salvador Sánchez Cerén in internal elections to become the 
FMLN’s General Coordinator. While Guardado and Sánchez Cerén had both been 
commanders in the FPL during the war, they now represented the two competing 
ideological factions that remained within the FMLN; whereas Guardado had emerged as 
the leader of the renovadores, Sánchez Cerén stood alongside PCS leader Schafik Hándal 
as one of the leaders of the ortodoxos. The mutual recriminations that followed paralleled 
the series of accusations and counter-accusations that had led the ERP and the RN to exit 
                                                 
24
  Under Cristiani, ARENA introduced an ambitious series of neoliberal reforms, including (1) the privatization of the 
financial sector, the energy and telecommunications industries, and the coffee and sugar industries, (2) the reduction of 
tariffs and the elimination of export duties, (3) the elimination of price controls on most consumer goods, and (4) the 
implementation of regressive tax reforms including the elimination of property taxes, a 50% reduction in taxes on 
incomes greater than ¢75,000 ($8,571.43), and the introduction of a value-added tax. 
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the FMLN in 1994. While the ortodoxos accused Guardado of abandoning socialism and 
adopting neoliberalism, Guardado publicly claimed that “he feared for his life because 
‘some of the FMLN’s leaders accused him of being a CIA agent’” (Zamora 2003: 109).25 
Although the ortodoxos vowed not to permit the FMLN to deviate from its revolutionary 
background, this is precisely the path that Guardado followed when he declared, in 
December 1997, that the FMLN should redefine itself as a social democratic party. 
 The following year, “the process of selecting a presidential ticket became a public 
debacle that highlighted the FMLN’s inability to contain, much less overcome” the 
ideological and tactical disagreements that existed between the ortodoxos and the 
renovadores (Wade 2003: 99-100). Three party conventions were needed to eventually 
select Guardado as the FMLN’s candidate in the 1999 presidential election. For its part, 
ARENA reacted to the setback it had suffered in the 1997 elections by naming Francisco 
Flores, a young, Harvard-educated career public servant who was then serving his second 
term in the Legislative Assembly, as its candidate for the presidency. ARENA’s leaders 
were convinced that making Flores, who was not in any way connected to the party’s 
ultra-conservative authoritarian wing, the new face of ARENA would allow the party to 
recover the ground it had lost in 1997. 
 In the March 1999 presidential election, Flores defeated Guardado by a sizeable 
22.9% margin. Whereas ARENA had picked up an additional 217,000 votes in 
comparison to the 1997 legislative election, Guardado actually received 26,000 fewer 
votes than the FMLN’s candidates had received in 1997. Following the election, 
Guardado resigned his post as the FMLN’s General Coordinator while blaming the 
ortodoxos’ half-hearted support of his campaign and their unwillingness to work to 
mobilize the FMLN’s social bases for his crushing defeat. Even the ARENA leadership, 
while celebrating the wisdom of having selected Flores and Quintanilla to represent the 
party in the 1999 election, conceded that the FMLN had “only worked at half-speed” in 
support of Guardado’s candidacy, and that the FMLN’s internal conflicts had facilitated 
Flores’s triumph (de Rose Ferreira 2011: 106). Schafik, however, countered these claims 
                                                 
25
  Guardado had reason to consider this accusation a death threat; in 1975, noted author and ERP militant Roque 
Dalton was assassinated by fellow ERP militants because of his suspected ties to the CIA. It was this event that led the 
RN to split from the ERP. 
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by arguing that the FMLN had lost the election (and the support of the party’s traditional 
social base) because Guardado had abandoned socialism. 
 Just as it had briefly achieved a semblance of internal harmony after the ERP and 
the RN abandoned the party in December 1994, the FMLN once again temporarily 
established a greater degree of unity as the party prepared for the 2000 legislative and 
municipal elections. However, although the party’s reins were now in the hands of a 
member of the ortodoxo faction (Fabio Castillo, who was elected to replace Guardado as 
the FMLN’s General Coordinator in July 1999), the FMLN’s 2000 platform was no less 
ideologically vague than previous platforms had been. As described by Wade (2003: 
103), the FMLN in 2000 “offered little in the way of any economic program” while its 
platform “with a few exceptions … could have been offered by any of El Salvador’s 
competing interests. It was, in a sense, generic.” Nonetheless, the FMLN recovered from 
its poor performance in the previous year’s presidential election; although the party 
received 9,880 fewer votes than ARENA, it emerged from the 2000 election as the largest 
party in the Legislative Assembly. 
 Again, however, harmony within the FMLN would prove to be short-lived as the 
conflict between ortodoxos and renovadores was soon reignited. Following a three-
month trial conducted by the FMLN’s Honor Tribunal, Guardado was expelled from the 
FMLN on October 1, 2001; amongst Guardado’s sins were his support of the 
dollarization plan unveiled by President Flores, his absence from the party’s national 
convention, and his encouragement of other party members to boycott that meeting. 
Three days later, seven renovadores in the Legislative Assembly crossed party lines and 
voted to ratify a free trade agreement with Chile. In April 2002, after another five 
renovadores had been formally expelled from the party, Guardado announced the 
formation of a new political party, the Renewal Movement (MR). Five months later, 
PRTC leader Francisco Jovel was also expelled from the party, leaving control of the 
FMLN solely in the hands of the ortodoxos. 
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The FMLN under Ortodoxo Control 
 Writing before the 2003 legislative elections, Wade (2003: 110-111) argued that 
the FMLN “only seems interested in courting the base during elections.” Indeed, with the 
party’s leadership almost constantly preoccupied by the ideological and tactical 
disagreements that led the ERP, the RN, the PRTC, and a faction within the FPL to either 
abandon the FMLN or be expelled from it, the relationship between the FMLN and its 
traditional social bases was as weak in 2002 as it had been at any time since the guerrilla 
movement first emerged in the 1970s. Moreover, the FMLN had renounced the 
ideological outreach activities that were largely responsible for the party’s ties with El 
Salvador’s workers and peasants. José Luis Merino (2011: 127-128), one of the leaders of 
the ortodoxo faction, provides a telling first-hand account: 
“[After the Chapúltepec Accords] we abandoned the political schools, we abandoned the 
political preparation of our leaders and our members. During the 1970s, when we were 
deep underground, when a little pamphlet sometimes meant death, there was an enormous 
trade in political materials, books and pamphlets that we would study in the corners of 
eateries, in the corners of factories, in the coffee plantations, in the fields. In those 
difficult, risky conditions we studied, we prepared ourselves, we organized study 
circles…. [After the war] we fell into a trap and for a number of years the FMLN 
suspended all its political education efforts. We had education and political formation 
while we were underground, we had education and political formation during the war. 
When our legs bent due to the weight in our backpacks, we were carrying books in our 
backpacks, there were study circles in the guerrilla camps, and after signing the peace 
agreement we practically buried our instruments of education and formation. We gave up 
this tool. And we became a party without ideology, claiming to be a party of the Left but 
without the ideological basis to be one.” 
 
 On the other side of the proverbial aisle, ARENA did not perceive any reason to 
mobilize its base except during election time, or to invest party resources in educating the 
voting public about the party’s ideological commitments. During this era of “winning 
easy,” ARENA was able to use its material advantages and its status as the governing 
party to gain voters’ sympathies both by using extensive mass media campaigns that 
painted the FMLN as unprepared and unfit to govern and by using its control of 
municipal governments to maintain patron-client relationships with rural voters. 
However, although neither the FMLN nor ARENA made any concerted effort during the 
first ten years after the Chapúltepec Accords to indoctrinate voters, they did establish the 
organizational groundwork that would later make such efforts possible: both parties 
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established local party offices throughout most of the country, developed a clear 
organizational hierarchy that defines the roles assigned to party officials at the national 
and local levels and governs the relationships between them, and established mechanisms 
designed to ensure party discipline in the Legislative Assembly. 
 Even though their political campaigns and other activities during 1992-2002 had 
not emphasized ideology, the FMLN and ARENA had already, in the words of one 
ARENA activist, established themselves “as trademarks, like Coke and Pepsi … some 
people try out other parties, like they try a new soda, but these parties forget the promises 
that they make, and the people return to the established brands.”26 Azpuru (2010) 
demonstrates that the ARENA and FMLN party labels had already become largely 
synonymous with the terms Right and the Left, respectively, as early as 1994, even 
though Salvadoran voters did not yet demonstrate a clear understanding of the meanings 
associated with those two ideological labels. The uniformly poor electoral performance of 
political parties formed by groups that had either separated from or been expelled by 
ARENA or the FMLN, and of other new parties that tried to usurp their position as the 
flag bearer of either the Right or the Left, underscores the degree to which the brand 
names ARENA and FMLN already resonated with voters.27 
 The relatively non-ideological nature of political competition in El Salvador 
changed, quite dramatically, shortly after the ortodoxos began consolidating their control 
of the FMLN in 2002. Under the leadership of Schafik Hándal, the FMLN almost 
immediately increased its involvement with the labor union movement and with other 
progressive elements of Salvadoran civil society; the party’s participation in the wave of 
protests that greeted the Flores government’s attempts to privatize elements of the 
national health care system symbolized the FMLN’s new commitment to strengthening 
the relationship between the party and its social bases (Artiga González 2008). 
                                                 
26
  Interview with the manager of one of ARENA’s municipal headquarters in the department of La Libertad (La 
Libertad, November 28, 2011). 
27
  Between 1988 and 2003, two parties separated from ARENA (the Liberation Party in 1988 and the Republican 
Popular Party in 2003), two separated from the FMLN (the Democratic Party in 1994 and the Renovating Movement in 
2002), three independent right-wing parties emerged (the National Action Party in 2000, and the Popular Action and 
Christian Force parties in 2003), and three independent leftist parties were formed (the Unity Movement and the 
National Revolutionary Movement in 1994 and the Social Democratic Party in 2003). Not one of these ten parties ever 
received more than 3.7% of the vote in any legislative election, none survived for more than two election cycles, and 
only two (the Unity Movement and the National Action Party) ever won representation in the Legislative Assembly. 
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 With Hándal at the helm, the FMLN also took steps “to reactivate and strengthen 
the political-ideological education of its members and to reactivate its work in providing 
political education to the public at large” (Gutiérrez Castro 2010: 87). Towards this end, 
in 2003, the FMLN established the Heroes of 1932 National School for Political Leaders, 
intended, according to the FMLN’s General Youth Coordinator, María José Menéndez, to 
“make youths familiar with the texts that facilitate an understanding of [the FMLN’s] 
ideology and the principal analytical tools needed to understand the country’s reality … 
so that they can observe that reality in a critical manner and take action against it” 
(Gutiérrez Castro 2010: 86). The following year, the FMLN established five more 
schools for political education, created a National Secretariat for Education within the 
party, and initiated the formation of local base committees designed to “organize, 
educate, and mobilize the population and to produce and distribute propaganda in favor 
of the party’s [new] strategic line” at the municipal level (Gutiérrez Castro 2010: 80). 
While these various educational efforts might be criticized on the grounds that they are 
geared towards training students in Marxist thought, as opposed to focusing on public 
policy or other more practical matters,28 the unapologetically ideological nature of these 
outreach activities certainly deepened participants’ understanding of the FMLN’s 
ideological commitments, and of how the party differs from ARENA.  
 The March 2003 elections, held in the midst of the FMLN’s internal 
transformation, provided ARENA with a surprise result that forced the party to 
reexamine the nature of its own relationship with the voting public. For the first time, the 
FMLN won a plurality of votes in a national election. ARENA’s vote percentage in the 
legislative election and the number of municipalities under its control both dropped to 
their lowest figures since 1985. Whereas ARENA had reacted to previous electoral 
setbacks in 1997 (when the party received 35% fewer votes in the legislative election 
than it had three years earlier) and 2000 (when the party’s candidate lost the election for 
mayor of San Salvador by an 18% margin) simply by changing the party’s executive – in 
1997, COENA president Gloria Salguero Gross resigned and was replaced by Cristiani, 
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  Interview with Evelin Patricia Gutiérrez Castro, professor at the Universidad Pedagógica and author of a 
comparative study of the FMLN and the FSLN (San Salvador, November 16, 2011). 
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who in turn resigned the post after the 2000 elections – the party responded to its defeat 
at the polls in 2003 by finally implementing Article 25 of the party’s statutes, which 
assigns the party’s Vice-President of Ideology (one of only three vice-presidencies within 
COENA) the task of creating and operating an institute for political formation (ARENA 
2002, Wade 2003, de Rosa Ferreira 2011). That Article 25 was implemented in 2003, just 
as the FMLN was recommitting itself to strengthening its own ideological identity, and 
not in 1981, when ARENA first envisioned taking such a step, was no coincidence.29 
 When ARENA did follow the FMLN’s lead and initiate its own project to provide 
political education to the party’s officials, its candidates for public office, and members 
of the public at large, it did so with gusto; during the twelve months that passed between 
the March 2003 legislative and municipal elections and the March 2004 presidential 
election, ARENA’s Major Roberto d’Aubuisson Institute for Political Formation 
provided ideological instruction to approximately 60,000 party sympathizers. Although 
no firm estimate is available regarding the number of people who received training at the 
FMLN’s various political education centers prior to the 2004 election, the manager of 
ARENA’s Institute for Political Formation contends that the extent of ARENA’s 
ideological outreach efforts did and still do pale in comparison to the FMLN’s political 
training initiatives. Even if we assume that the FMLN only educated/indocrinated the 
same number of people as ARENA, this would mean that 120,000 people – equivalent to 
one out of every twelve voters who cast a ballot in the 2003 legislative election –  
participated in one of these two parties’ ideological training programs during the months 
preceding the 2004 presidential election. 
 To fully appreciate the magnitude of the efforts that ARENA and the FMLN 
made to educate voters in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election, it is useful to 
compare those efforts to the political training project initiated by Costa Rica’s Citizens’ 
Action Party in 2011. That year, the PAC introduced three-day leadership training 
workshops that included a focus on the party’s ethical principles and values, its statutes, 
its history, and its ideology. It was with no small sense of pride that one of the party 
                                                 
29
  Information presented in this paragraph and the next are taken from a series of conversations with Orlando Cocar 
Romano, manager of the Instituto de Formación Política Mayor Roberto d’Aubuisson and author of a book examining 
ARENA’s ideological foundations (San Salvador, October 28 – November 3, 2011). 
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officials responsible for organizing this project informed me of the number of people who 
participated in these workshops during their first year: 226.30 A far cry from 120,000! 
 Also contributing to the heightened role that ideology played in the 2004 election 
was the FMLN’s choice of Schafik Hándal as its presidential candidate. The irascible 
Schafik became something of an easy target for ARENA on the campaign trail not only 
because of his sometimes abrasive personality, but also because of his lifelong affiliation 
with the Salvadoran Communist Party. A member of the PCS since the early 1950s, and 
its Secretary General from 1973 until the party was dissolved in 1994, Schafik had been 
intimately involved in the PCS’s various attempts to participate in the electoral arena 
either by attempting to create legal political parties31 or by infiltrating existing parties,32 
and he also served as the FAL’s top commander during the civil war. Schafik drew upon 
his political experiences to outmaneuver internal rivals as he led the PCS, which was the 
smallest of the five organizations that made up the FMLN in terms of the number of 
armed combatants it fielded during the civil war and the last of the five to take up arms 
against the state, to prominence after the civil war. It was his experience as a guerrilla 
commander that ARENA would use to its advantage on the campaign trail. 
 In 1994, ARENA made the party’s experience in government (including its 
success in bringing the civil war to an end) the central pillar of its presidential campaign. 
Five years later, ARENA emphasized its leadership of El Salvador’s post-war economic 
recovery. For the 2004 election, neither of these strategies seemed particularly viable; 
economic growth had stagnated, and the FMLN had demonstrated its capacity to govern 
as it presided over nearly all of the country’s most-populous municipalities. In need of a 
new campaign theme, ARENA not only emphasized the iron-fist (mano dura) approach 
introduced by President Flores in 2003 to combat the country’s growing problem with 
violent crime perpetrated by the MS-13 and Mara Dieciocho street gangs, but it also 
invested heavily in a mass media campaign that focused on Schafik’s communist ties and 
                                                 
30
  Interview with a staff member at the PAC’s national office (San José, January 24, 2012). 
31
  The PCS sought to register the April and May Revolutionary Party (PRAM) in 1959, and the May 9th 
Revolutionary Party (PR-9m) in 1970. The national election council rejected both of these parties on the grounds that 
they espoused a foreign ideology (communism). 
32
  Beginning in 1966, the PCS exerted influence over the Revolutionary Action Party (PAR). During the 1970s, the 
PCS influenced the three-party National Opposition Union (UNO) through its control of the Nationalist Democratic 
Union (UDN). 
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“warned” Salvadoran voters that Schafik would turn El Salvador into another Cuba if 
elected. According to ARENA’s ubiquitous campaign propaganda, an FMLN 
government led by Schafik would eliminate civil liberties, destroy private enterprise, and 
jeopardize the country’s relationship with the United States (which would, in turn, put the 
estimated two million Salvadorans resident in the US, and the remittances that they send 
to family members in El Salvador, at risk). 
 For its part, the FMLN used its campaign to emphasize (1) the party’s opposition 
to the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), (2) its plan to reintroduce the 
colón, and (3) its opposition to the Flores government’s decision to send Salvadoran 
troops to fight in Iraq. Although Schafik tried to reassure centrist voters by promising that 
he would not nationalize any business or confiscate any private property and vowing to 
cultivate friendly relations with the US in order to ensure that the flow of remittances 
would not be adversely affected (Hándal 2008: 145-146), he simultaneously reminded 
FMLN activists and supporters that “everyone knows me – I am and continue to be a 
communist.” 
 The results of the 2004 presidential election allow for various interpretations. The 
fact that ARENA candidate Tony Saca’s 22.0% margin of victory was nearly identical to 
the 22.9% margin by which Francisco Flores had defeated Facundo Guardado five years 
earlier suggests that the FMLN’s “stance on issues like CAFTA and dollarization did not 
seem to resonate with moderate voters” (Azpuru 2010: 129). However, this virtually 
unchanged margin of victory obscures two important changes. First, Salvadoran voters 
participated in the 2004 election in record numbers; the number of valid votes cast in 
2004 was 62.8% greater than in the previous year’s legislative election, and 92.6% 
greater than in the 1999 presidential election. As demonstrated in Figure 5.1, this spike in 
voter participation endured throughout the following decade. Second, as illustrated by 
Figure 5.2, the 2004 presidential election initiated a noticeable decline in the electoral 
significance of El Salvador’s third parties. 
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Figure 5.1 – Valid Votes Cast in National Elections, 1982-2014 
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Figure 5.2 – Third Party Vote in Legislative Elections, 1994-2015 
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 It does not require too heroic an assumption to conclude that the dramatic increase 
in voter participation that began in 2004 was at least to some degree the result of the 
aggressive measures that the FMLN and then ARENA took to actively promote their 
ideological distinctiveness. By educating the voting public about the policies that each 
party would attempt to enact if victorious, the FMLN and ARENA gave Salvadoran 
voters a reason to care who their next president would be and, consequently, a reason to 
vote. Similarly, it does not seem to be a coincidence that the extent to which Salvadoran 
politics resembles a two-party system increased substantially at precisely the same time 
that the FMLN and ARENA began investing in political education/indoctrination. To the 
extent that each party partly defined its ideology in terms of opposition to that of its main 
rival – i.e., ARENA clearly advertised itself as an anti-communist party, while the FMLN 
emphasized its opposition to neoliberalism – and succeeded in delivering that message to 
the voting public, ARENA and the FMLN also sent voters the message that the country’s 
other political parties are largely irrelevant. Both of these changes are consistent with my 
argument that the intentional efforts made by the FMLN and ARENA to educate voters 
about their ideological commitments best explain why the relationship between 
Salvadoran voters’ policy preferences and their ideological self-placement first became 
strong in 2004, even though ideological self-placement had been a strong predictor of 
voting behavior since 1994. 
 Had the evidence of strong programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador that 
emerged in 2004 disappeared shortly thereafter, one might have been tempted to argue 
that survey data from 2004 are merely a statistical anomaly, or that the inordinately 
inflammatory nature of the 2004 presidential campaign caused a very temporary 
strengthening of the relationships between individual policy preferences, ideological self-
placement, and voting behavior. However, this was not the case. As demonstrated in 
Tables 2.21 and 2.28, the relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-
placement remained strong at least through 2007, and left-right self-placement was an 
even better predictor of voting behavior in 2009, when television journalist Mauricio 
Funes was the FMLN’s presidential candidate, than it had been in 2004, when PCS boss 
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Schafik Hándal headed the party ticket. Even as Salvadoran politics appeared to become 
less polarized, these programmatic party-voter linkages have endured. How? 
 Although Schafik, in the message to the nation that he delivered immediately after 
the election, publicly attributed ARENA’s victory in the 2004 election to “lies, fraud, and 
bribery … vote-buying, the falsification of voter IDs … and bringing thousands of 
Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Nicaraguans to vote … which all occurred with the 
complicity of the Supreme Electoral Tribune” (Hándal 2008: 161), the FMLN as a party 
responded to his defeat with an internal discussion of the party’s goals. In the twelve 
years since its rebirth as a political party, the FMLN had not yet resolved an important 
lingering question regarding the main objective of the party’s participation in the 
electoral process – what was more important, maintaining the FMLN’s identity as a 
socialist organization, or improving its ability to compete for power in national elections? 
The FMLN’s choice of Mauricio Funes, a popular television journalist who played no 
part in the civil war and who was not even formally affiliated with the FMLN, as its 
presidential candidate in the 2009 election demonstrated the result of the post-2004 
internal debates: the FMLN had decided to compete for power by embracing moderation 
and reformism.33  
 Significantly, the process of reaching that decision did not result in any highly-
publicized ideological divisions similar to those that emerged following the 1994 and 
1999 electoral defeats. Although four of the party’s elected officials withdrew from the 
FMLN and another five were expelled from the party during 2004-06,34 and although 
some of these ex-FMLN politicians banded together to form the Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (FDR), which competed (with little success) in the 2009 legislative and 
municipal elections, these episodes did not generate ideological divisions within the 
FMLN leadership. 
                                                 
33
  As Colburn (2009) notes, this redefinition of the FMLN’s electoral objectives was facilitated by Schafik Hándal’s 
sudden death on January 24, 2006. 
34
  In November 2004, one FMLN deputy was expelled from the party for voting in favor of a fiscal reform bill 
opposed by the FMLN leadership. In March 2005, two more deputies were expelled from the party for voting in favor 
of a bond issue to finance the national budget. In June 2005, two FMLN mayors and two deputies resigned from the 
party due to disagreements over the candidate selection process for the 2006 elections. In 2006, the party expelled two 
mayors for violating the FMLN’s policy that no person should serve more than three consecutive terms in the same 
elected office and for criticizing FMLN leadership (Artiga González 2006). 
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 Although the post-Schafik FMLN remained under ortodoxo control and it retained 
the ortodoxos’ methods – the party continued its efforts to rebuild its formerly close 
relationships with peasant and labor organizations, and it further expanded its political 
education efforts with the 2007 introduction of “Plan 140,” a 3-4 month program 
designed to train new party leaders (Gutiérrez Castro 2010) – it backed away from some 
(though not all) of the statist economic policies contained in the party’s 2004 campaign 
platform. In essence, once they had gained full control over the party, the same ortodoxos 
who had spent ten years consolidating power within the FMLN – and who had forced 
first Villalobos (ERP) and Sancho (RN), and later Guardado (FPL) and Jovel (PRTC) 
from the party for attempting to redefine it as a social democratic party – turned around 
and moved the party away from revolutionary socialism and towards reformism as they 
adopted a platform that focused on poverty reduction without proposing a fundamental 
alteration of the state’s role in the Salvadoran economy. 
 Salvadoran voters appeared to reward the FMLN for its moderation in the 2006 
and 2009 elections. In the 2006 legislative elections, the FMLN edged out ARENA as the 
top vote-getter (by the tiniest of margins) with a then party-best 39.3% of the vote. In 
January 2009, the FMLN’s vote percentage rose once again, to 42.6%, and the party also 
won an unprecedented number of mayoral contests. Two months later, the post-Schafik 
FMLN’s electoral pragmatism earned its greatest reward when Funes defeated Rodrigo 
Ávila by a 2.6% margin to put an end to twenty years of ARENA rule.  
 During the campaign preceding the 2009 presidential election, ARENA and the 
FMLN had each sent voters the exact same message regarding the relationship between 
Funes and the FMLN, although the way the two parties delivered this message differed 
greatly. ARENA publicly warned Salvadoran voters that the moderate Funes was simply 
a puppet being used by the FMLN, that ortodoxo leaders such as Medardo González, José 
Luis Merino, and Salvador Sánchez Cerén would call the shots in a Funes government, 
and that the ortodoxos’ recent embrace of reformism lacked sincerity. The FMLN quietly 
reassured its core supporters that the party would maintain firm control over Funes and 
that the party’s recent moderation (including its campaign pledge to maintain the US 
dollar as the national currency and to abide by the free trade agreements signed by 
  136 
previous governments) had not diluted its commitment to revolutionary social change. 
Once in office, Funes demonstrated (to the delight of some and to the dismay of others) 
that he was not a puppet after all. However, although Funes adopted a centrist approach 
that often put him at odds with the FMLN party leadership, his moderation seems not to 
have undermined the programmatic party-voter linkages that have been evident since 
2004 or weakened the electoral position of the FMLN, which retained the presidency in 
2014 when Sánchez Cerén defeated the ARENA candidate, former San Salvador mayor 
Norman Quijano, by a razor-thin 0.2% margin in the presidential run-off election. 
 
5.3 Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I have argued that the unexpected strength of programmatic party-
voter linkages in El Salvador – and the timing with which evidence of strong 
programmatic party-voter linkages first appeared – can be traced to specific, purposeful 
actions taken by the country’s two main political parties, the FMLN and ARENA. As 
described by Merino (2011: 130): 
“For a number of years, it took a lot of work for the leaders of the FMLN to understand 
that our principal mission consists in explaining, in a clear and convincing manner, not 
only to our militants but also to the general public, the reason why we want to control 
municipal governments, why we want to have deputies in the Legislative Assembly, why 
we want to have an FMLN government; explaining to them where we are going, what 
power is, how we currently interpret the construction of power, and what social 
transformations we need power to implement.” 
 
 It was not until 2002, after the FMLN had completed a difficult, decade-long 
transition from guerrilla organization to political party, that the party rediscovered the 
tool that had been responsible for its growth during the 1970s, when the guerrilla 
movement that eventually coalesced into the FMLN was unquestionably an “externally 
mobilized party” (Shefter 1977, 1993) established by political actors who “come from 
outside the ruling circles of power” (Bornschier 2009: 8) – its ideology. By 
reemphasizing the ties to labor unions and peasant associations that had propelled the 
guerrilla movement forward during the 1970s, by establishing a network of ideological 
training centers that recalled the political-military schools that the FMLN organized in 
1984-89, and by using its campaign materials to familiarize the broader public with the 
  137 
party’s ideological commitments just as it had used Radio Venceremos and Radio 
Farabundo Martí during the war, the FMLN took the lead in educating Salvadoran voters 
about the programmatic differences that distinguished the FMLN from the ruling party, 
ARENA. 
 The fact that the FMLN’s implementation of an aggressive ideological outreach 
program coincided with the party’s first victory in a national election (the 2003 
legislative election) prompted ARENA to initiate its own political education efforts. In 
essence, ARENA “changed [its] ways in response to the challenge of [an] externally 
created (and largely anti-system) mass [party] characterized by strong ideological ties and 
fervor” (Sartori 1994: 95). Although ARENA had contemplated the creation of an 
institute for political education as early as 1981, it only put that plan into action once it 
became apparent that relying on its network of patron-client ties with rural voters and on 
trumpeting its experience in government might no longer be sufficient. 
 That the FMLN’s renewed commitment to forging strong ties to labor unions and 
peasant associations and its move to emphasize the party’s ideological distinctiveness had 
such an immediate impact on the nature of political competition in El Salvador results 
from the party’s high degree of “intensive” and “extensive” organization (which made 
such an effort possible) and from the fact that the FMLN was quite clearly the country’s 
only viable Leftist party (as demonstrated by the abysmal election returns of the PD, the 
PSD, the MR, and the FDR). With ARENA and the FMLN both actively promoting their 
ideological commitments, Salvadoran elections became, to an even greater degree than 
before, a contest between these two parties. Even as the FMLN moderated its ideology 
following Schafik’s defeat in the 2004 presidential election, and even as ARENA 
experienced its own bout of internal strife after losing the presidency in 2009,35 these two 
parties have remained synonymous with the Left and the Right, respectively. 
 
                                                 
35
  In October 2009, fourteen ARENA legislators (many of them loyal to former president Tony Saca) abandoned the 
party to form GANA. Saca was subsequently expelled from ARENA in December 2009; in 2014, he attempted to 
regain the presidency as the candidate of the Unity coalition formed by GANA, the PCN, and the PDC, but finished a 
distant third, with 11.4% of the vote. 
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Chapter Six 
Guatemala: War is not the Answer 
 
 Beyond the many relevant social, economic, and political characteristics shared 
by all five Central American republics, Guatemala and El Salvador have much in 
common. As the two Central American countries that adopted “radical liberalism” during 
the 1870s1 (Mahoney 2001), Guatemala and El Salvador share a long history of labor-
repressive agriculture. Because the agricultural export sector in both countries relied on 
coercion, rather than market mechanisms, to ensure the supply of labor, the emergence of 
the “communist threat” in the 1920s and 1930s prompted the landed oligarchy to ally 
itself with the armed forces in order to “maintain highly exclusive, labor-repressive, and 
antireformist governments that episodically murdered, tortured, and imprisoned many of 
their own citizens … with greater intensity and persistence than other authoritarian 
regimes” in the region (Stanley 1996: 23). 
 In both countries, this “reactionary despotism” (Baloyra 1983) paved the way for 
prolonged, extremely violent civil wars that pitted a Leftist insurgent movement that 
utilized guerrilla tactics to challenge the state’s control of the countryside against a 
heavily militarized state that responded to popular mobilization and the reformist 
demands made by labor, campesino, and religious groups “by rejecting ameliorative 
policies and intensifying repression” (Booth 2000: 68). Adopting a scorched earth policy 
that targeted civilians in rural areas thought to provide moral and/or material support for 
the insurgents, the armed forces committed numerous massacres of civilian populations 
in both El Salvador2 and Guatemala.3 
                                                 
1
  This “radical liberalism,” characterized by the aggressive dismantling of traditional communal landowning 
arrangements and the encouragement of capitalist expansion in the agricultural sector, contrasts with the “reformist 
liberalism” adopted in Costa Rica, where the commercialization of the agricultural sector was enacted without the 
elimination of the small, independent farms that characterized pre-capitalist agrarian society throughout the region. 
2
  Based on its examination of massacres committed at Las Aradas (May 1980; 300-600 victims), El Mozote 
(December 1981; more than 800 victims), and El Calabozo (August 1982; more than 200 victims), as well as testimony 
regarding other mass executions, the United Nations Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (1993) concluded that, 
during the years 1980-82, the Salvadoran armed forces implemented “a deliberate strategy of eliminating or terrifying 
the peasant population in areas where the guerrillas were active.”  
3
  In its report on human rights violations committed during Guatemala’s civil war, the UN-backed Comisión para el 
Esclarecimiento Histórico (1999: 41) concluded that “agents of the State of Guatemala, within the framework of 
counterinsurgency operations carried out between 1981 and 1983, committed acts of genocide against groups of Mayan 
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 Partly as a result of these tactics, Leftist insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala 
were unsuccessful in their attempts to overthrow military regimes that governed in 
alliance with a narrow class of wealthy landowners who vehemently and violently 
opposed any calls for land reform. In both countries, the transition to democratic rule was 
initiated in the mid-1980s, before the conclusion of the armed conflict. Lastly, in both 
countries, the end of the Cold War and the resultant decline in foreign support for both 
pro- and anti-government forces played an important role in facilitating the negotiated 
settlements that ultimately paved the way for peace. 
 These similarities, combined with the fact that El Salvador and Guatemala post 
nearly identical scores on indicators of past democratic experience and state social 
spending that correspond to two of the three pillars of the capabilities-opportunities-
stakes framework that Kitschelt et al. (2010) employ, make the vast differences between 
these two countries in terms of the strength of the relationships between policy 
preferences, left-right self-identification, and voting behavior quite striking. In particular, 
given the fact that “the war” is often the first response offered by Salvadoran political 
actors when asked to explain the surprising strength of programmatic party-voter linkages 
in that country, Guatemala’s “party non-system” (Sánchez 2009), which is characterized 
by “high electoral volatility, severe party instability, weak links to society, organizational 
fragility, ideological vagueness, limited territorial presence, lack of legitimacy and 
opaque financing mechanisms” (ASIES 2009: 9), provides an important counterpoint to 
the highly-institutionalized party system characterized by strong programmatic party-
voter linkages that has developed in El Salvador. 
 As my examination of the post-war development of El Salvador’s party system 
(Chapter Five) demonstrates, it would be an error to completely dismiss this notion that 
events immediately prior to and during the civil war played an important role in 
facilitating the formation of programmatic party-voter linkages in that country. However, 
the acutely non-programmatic nature of political competition in contemporary 
Guatemala, a county that suffered through a civil war that lasted three times as long and 
                                                                                                                                                 
people” in Huehuetenango, El Quiché, and Baja Verapaz departments. This report counts a total of 669 civilian 
massacres, and identifies the Guatemalan state as the actor responsible for 626 of those incidents. 
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claimed three times as many lives as the civil war in neighboring El Salvador, 
demonstrates quite clearly that “the war” is at best an incomplete answer to the question 
of why El Salvador exhibits stronger programmatic party-voter linkages than any other 
Latin American democracy. Accordingly, in this chapter, I address the question of why 
Guatemala’s civil war did not give birth to a stable, institutionalized party system 
inhabited by ideologically coherent political parties that maintain a permanent 
organizational presence within Guatemalan society and that actively promote the 
development of programmatic party-voter linkages. 
 In the first section of the chapter, I examine political competition in contemporary 
Guatemala and ponder whether the universe of Guatemalan political parties might be best 
described not as a “party system,” or even as a “party non-system” (Sánchez 2008, 2009), 
but rather as a “non-party non-system.” Not only is the party system poorly 
institutionalized, but the constituent parties themselves exhibit uniformly weak party 
organizations, and they fail to fulfill many of the roles that we generally expect political 
parties to play in a modern representative democracy. 
 In the second section of the chapter, I argue that low levels of party and party 
system institutionalization, as well as the virtual absence of programmatic party-voter 
linkages, can be attributed largely to the weakness of the Left in post-war Guatemala. In 
El Salvador, the FMLN’s electoral triumphs led ARENA to follow its rival’s example 
and take steps to actively promote the party’s ideological distinctiveness and to invest in 
the formation of programmatic linkages with its supporters, actions that have contributed 
greatly not only to the stability of the Salvadoran party system but also to the 
development of programmatic political competition. In Guatemala, however, since 
neither the ex-guerrilla Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) nor any other 
grouping of the Left has succeeded in establishing itself as a relevant actor in the 
country’s electoral politics, the Right has not been presented with any incentive to 
consolidate its forces under a single party banner or to invest resources in promoting its 
ideological identity. 
 In the final section of the chapter, I address the question of why, unlike El 
Salvador’s FMLN and Nicaragua’s Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), the 
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URNG was unable to complete a successful transition from guerrilla group to political 
party. Whereas Allison (2006a, 2006b) points to insurgent groups’ wartime strength as a 
critical determinant of post-war electoral success and España-Nájera (2009) emphasizes 
the importance of the negotiating strategies that these groups employed during each 
country’s transition to democracy, I argue that the poor electoral performance of the 
URNG is best explained by its weak ties to civil society, which in turn prevented the 
URNG from establishing itself as the standard-bearer of an organized, unified, and 
ideologically coherent Left.4 
 
6.1 Party System, Party Non-System, or Non-Party Non-System? 
 As noted in Chapter Four, Sánchez (2008, 2009) suggests that it may be 
inappropriate to utilize the term “party system” when describing political competition in 
contemporary Guatemala. The only “identifiable or organized pattern of interactions” 
(Sanchez 2009: 488) that clearly exists in Guatemalan electoral politics concerns the 
country’s presidential run-off elections: the last four presidential elections were all won 
by the runner-up from the previous election.5 The following details underscore the low 
level of institutionalization that has characterized party politics in Guatemala since the 
transition to democratic rule began in 1984: 
• Not one of the seventeen political parties that participated in either the 1984 
Constitutional Assembly election or the 1985 presidential election survives today. Only 
one of those parties, Guatemalan Christian Democracy (DCG) survived into the new 
millennium. The DCG’s registration was cancelled after the party received less than 1% 
of the vote in the 2007 legislative and presidential elections. 
• The seven presidential elections held since the restoration of democratic rule have been 
won by seven different political parties. Of the six parties that had won the presidency in 
                                                 
4
  Both Allison and España-Nájera do identify the URNG’s weak ties with civil society as one factor in the party’s 
poor electoral performance, but neither author argues that this is the principle cause of the poor performance of the 
URNG as political party. 
5
  The winner of the 2011 presidential election, Otto Pérez Molina, was defeated in the 2007 presidential run-off 
election by Álvaro Colom, who in 2003 lost to Óscar Berger, who in 1999 lost to Alfonso Portillo, who in 1995 lost to 
Álvaro Arzú. This pattern has become so ingrained in the Guatemalan political landscape that, when I conducted 
interviews with party officials and activists in early 2012, I was repeatedly assured that Manuel Baldizón, head of the 
Renewed Democratic Liberty (LIDER) party and runner-up to Pérez Molina in the 2011 election, would win the 2015 
presidential election simply “porque le toca” (because it is his turn). However, although Baldizón topped pre-election 
polls throughout much of 2015, he ultimately finished third in the first round of the 2005 presidential election, and 
therefore failed to qualify for the run-off eletction (by a scant 0.09% of the vote). 
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previous occasions, only the National Advancement Party (PAN) participated in the 2011 
presidential election. Its candidate received less than 3% of the vote. 
• Only three of the eighteen parties that participated in the 2011 legislative election were 
even ten years old. These three “established” parties – the PAN, the Guatemalan 
Republican Front (FRG), and the URNG – combined to win only six seats in the 158-seat 
national assembly. The average age of the other fifteen parties was 4.3 years. 
 
 Not only does the Guatemalan party system exhibit an extremely low level of 
institutionalization, but Guatemala’s individual political parties are also poorly 
institutionalized. Parties make little effort to maintain a permanent organizational 
presence or to establish institutional linkages with specific sectors or demographic 
groups. Yet, weak party organization is far from the only shortcoming that is 
characteristic of Guatemala’s political parties. Taking into account the various functions 
that are commonly attributed to political parties in a representative democracy – the 
recruitment of candidates for elected office, the management of political campaigns, the 
organization of government (achieved in part by ensuring party discipline), the 
aggregation and articulation of interests (i.e. combining a set of political demands into a 
coherent policy program), and the representation of supporters’ interests – one could 
argue that the groupings that contest Guatemala’s elections hardly merit being labeled 
political parties. 
 Various characteristics of electoral competition in Guatemala reveal that central 
party organizations play a secondary role in the recruitment of candidates for elected 
office and the management of campaigns. It is a poorly guarded secret that spots on 
parties’ lists of candidates for legislative elections are up for sale; Briscoe and Rodríguez 
Pellecer (2010) estimate the price of the top spot on a party’s departmental list as roughly 
US$125,000, while Guatemalan journalist Héctor Cordero reports that the price can run 
as high as $250,000 (Harlow 2011) – this in a country where nominal GDP per capita 
stands at roughly $3,700. A GANA official confirms that this system, by which “it is the 
candidates who choose their parties, rather than the parties that choose their candidates,” 
extends to local elections as well, particularly in those municipalities (the majority) 
where parties do not maintain any permanent party organization; consequently, “parties 
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postulate the candidate who brings in the most money, rather than the person who is most 
closely identified with the party and its ideals.”6 
 In terms of campaign management, the high price of political participation has 
been accompanied in recent years by increasingly lavish mass media campaigns, with the 
2007 election identified as something of a tipping point in terms of the amount of money 
candidates and their backers spend on publicity and advertising (Benítez 2007). Laws 
designed to reel in campaign spending have been entirely ineffective;7 one party official 
with privileged access to campaign finance data estimates that Guatemala’s political 
parties spent a total of Q600-750 million (US$77-96 million) in the run-up to the 2011 
general elections,8 while another source describes Guatemala’s electoral campaigns as the 
most expensive (in per capita terms) in all of Latin America (International Crisis Group 
2011). With the responsibility for funding these campaigns resting largely on the 
candidates themselves, politicians are obliged to establish strong ties to local business 
leaders – regardless of whether their businesses are legal or illegal.  
 Since the late 1990s, when US drug enforcement efforts in the Caribbean led 
South American drug smugglers to increase the amount of product sent overland via 
Central America, Guatemala has experienced an unprecedented degree of elite 
fragmentation as the emerging narco elite has sought greater political influence at the 
expense of the traditional oligarchy. For obvious reasons, reliable data on the role that 
drug traffickers and other criminal organizations play in financing political campaigns is 
not available. However, it is widely alleged that recently deposed president Otto Pérez 
Molina (PP), his predecessor Álvaro Colom (UNE), and the runner-up in the 2011 
election, Manuel Baldizón (LIDER), all received significant sums9 from local and 
international criminal organizations (Goodman 2007, Benítez 2007, Briscoe and 
Rodríguez Pellecer 2010, Isaacs 2010, Stone 2011, Arsenault 2011). Such is the 
                                                 
6
  Interview conducted in Guatemala City, March 28, 2012. 
7
  Four parties (the PP, UNE, GANA, and the PAN) surpassed the campaign spending limit (which is set at roughly 
US$6 million) in 2007, while the PP, LIDER, and the UNE-GANA coalition all did so in 2011 (Solórzano Castillo 
2008, Stone 2011, Gamazo 2011, Arsenault 2011, “Campaña electoral”). The fact that the fine for campaigning after 
being explicitly prohibited from doing so is only $125 certainly helps explain why parties have disregarded laws 
designed to limit campaign spending. 
8
  Interview conducted in Guatemala City, March 28, 2012. 
9
  For instance, Stone (2011) cites local reports which state that, in 2007, Álvaro Colom received Q16 million from 
local criminal organizations and an additional Q20 million from the Zetas (a prominent Mexican drug cartel). 
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presumed influence of these groups that the US Ambassador classified the ideology of 
one party (the UCN) simply as “narco” (US Embassy 2009), Amnesty International has 
described Guatemala as a “corporate mafia state” (Peacock and Beltrán 2003), and a 2011 
editorial published in neighboring El Salvador argued that Guatemala resembles Somalia 
inasmuch as the state “no longer has the capacity to govern and to protect its population 
in large portions of its territory” due to the power exercised by Mexican drug cartels in 
the northern third of the country (“No es guerra”). 
 In such an environment, where “real community leaders generally do not 
participate in politics because the costs are too high” (Harlow 2011), where legislators 
“perceive their main allegiance to be not the party, nor even the constituents, but the local 
financial network” (Briscoe and Rodríguez Pellecer 2010: 29), and where even the vice 
president (Eduardo Stein, 2004-08) warned that “organized crime is increasingly 
penetrating state institutions [to such an extent that] if Guatemala does not make some 
dramatic changes, we are likely to become a narco-republic” (Rosemberg 2007), it is no 
surprise that Guatemala’s political parties contribute little to the aggregation, articulation, 
and representation of citizens’ interests. With political parties serving solely as electoral 
vehicles, campaigns rely almost exclusively on marketing techniques and on the 
distribution of patronage to win voters’ support.10 
 Guatemalan political parties’ failure to fulfill many of the functions that are 
commonly attributed to political parties in a modern representative democracy is further 
highlighted by the alarming frequency with which elected officials switch parties. During 
the 2000-04 and 2004-08 legislative periods, 121 legislators changed parties a total of 
211 times (Fortin 2010). In the current legislature, at least twenty-nine legislators had 
already changed parties as of January 17, 2012 – just three days after their inauguration 
(“El transfuguismo”). As of July 26, 2015, at least ninety-three of the 158 legislators who 
were inaugurated in 2012 are no longer affiliated with the political party whose banner 
they utilized during their campaign.  
                                                 
10
  On the final day of campaigning prior to the 2011 election, Guatemala City newspaper Prensa Libre lamented that, 
while “the electoral campaign culminates today with huge celebrations, concerts by local and international artists, and 
gifts that range from t-shirts to calves … during more than 130 days of propaganda there was not any room for concrete 
proposals regarding problems that the country faces, such as health care, education, security, and the reduction of social 
inequalities” (“Campaña electoral”). 
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 This epidemic transfuguismo (“the tendency to defect”) demonstrates that, for 
many legislators, “there is no relationship of identification with the party that brought 
them to public office.”11 Indeed, the frequency with which politicians change parties 
suggests that the conclusion offered by one former UNE activist – that “politicians in 
Guatemala align themselves with whichever party or candidate best suits their personal 
interests, lending their support to the highest bidder”12 – is quite accurate. Comments 
made by two serial party-switchers underscore the degree to which legislators consider 
themselves free agents. First elected to the Guatemalan Congress in 1999 as a member of 
PAN, Gladys Anabella de León Ruiz had already passed through the PU, UNE, the PP 
(twice), and GANA (twice) before she joined the PP for a third time in January 2006. In a 
2005 interview, de León Ruiz explained her fickle partisan loyalty in the following terms: 
“I comply with Article 161 of the Constitution, which states that legislators are 
representatives of the people, not some party” (Fortin 2010: 161). Similarly, upon joining 
LIDER in April 2014, Juan Manuel Giordano (who switched parties five times during his 
first twenty-eight months in office) explained that “if Cristiano Ronaldo decides to 
change teams today, he is not going to be a better or worse player. He is only looking for 
the team that he can win trophies with, and that is what we are looking for, the winning 
team” (“El Transfuguismo”). 
 Unsurprisingly, Guatemalan political parties’ inability to keep their own house in 
order has severely undermined their ability to organize the government. With parties-in-
government weakened by repeated waves of defections, business interests represented by 
the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial 
Associations (CACIF) and the Foundation for the Development of Guatemala 
(FUNDESA) exercise outsized influence over government policymaking. As Briscoe and 
Rodríguez Pellecer (2010: 9) note, “Guatemala stands out for the way in which 
institutional penetration by the central nucleus of business power is so ubiquitous and 
                                                 
11
  Interview with a GANA official conducted in Guatemala City, March 28, 2012. 
12
  Interview conducted in Guatemala City, March 19, 2012. With regards to his reference to “the highest bidder,” 
payments to legislators who switch parties are commonplace and legal. For instance, it is widely reported that Manuel 
Baldizón has offered US$61,000 to legislators who switch to his party, LIDER (US Embassy 2009, Arsenault 2011). 
The effectiveness of this strategy is illustrated by the post-election growth of LIDER’s legislative bench; although the 
party won only fourteen seats in the 2011 election, the number of LIDER legislators now (as of July 26, 2015) stands at 
fifty-six. 
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uncontested.” In terms of their ability to guide public policy, Guatemala’s political parties 
are also overshadowed by “the hidden powers,” a loose network of military and civilian 
officials13 who were involved in designing and implementing the counter-insurgency 
strategy that the Guatemalan armed forces introduced during the early 1980s, and who 
continue to influence policymakers and terrorize citizens who seek justice for the victims 
of past human rights abuses, protest against racial inequality and discrimination, and/or 
denounce rampant government corruption (Peacock and Beltrán 2003). 
 To summarize, elections in contemporary Guatemala are contested by political 
parties that are best described as electoral machines designed to support the party leader’s 
presidential ambitions, parties that do not fully control the selection of candidates or the 
development of their expensive mass media campaigns (which are financed by third 
parties, presumably including local and international criminal organizations), and that, 
amidst the destabilizing impact of epidemic transfuguismo, are poorly equipped to 
counter-balance the influence that business associations and groups linked to the armed 
forces exert over the formation and implementation of public policy. Regardless of the 
term we use to describe Guatemala’s dysfunctional universe of under-institutionalized 
electoral machines – party system, party non-system, or non-party non-system – it is clear 
that this high degree of instability constitutes a formidable obstacle to the development of 
programmatic party-voter linkages. The question remains, why is it that, three decades 
after Guatemala initiated its transition to democratic rule, political elites continue to focus 
their “energy and resources on building personal ties with the electorate, creating a 
mobile base of support that can travel with individual politicians across party lines” 
(España-Nájera 2009: 181) rather than investing in the creation of consolidated, 
permanent political parties? 
 
                                                 
13
  Peacock and Beltrán (2003) identify four distinct groups that comprise “the hidden powers.” They are: (1) “La 
Cofradía,” a group formed by current and retired military intelligence officers who, during the civil war, advocated a 
policy of social control through brutal violence, (2) “El Sindicato,” members of the Guatemalan Military Academy’s 
“Promotion 73” who advocated the pacification and reconciliation strategy referred to as “frijoles y fusiles” (beans and 
rifles), which advocated providing development for 70% of the population and killing the remaining 30%, (3) the 
Presidential General Staff, a security force that carried out various intelligence and counter-insurgency operations, 
often disguising political executions as common crimes, and (4) the leaders of the Civil Self-Defense Patrols (PACs), 
the ostensibly voluntary security forces that incorporated as many as one million civilians between 1982 and 1995. 
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6.2 The Persistence of Personalism 
 The short answer to the question of why Guatemala’s political elites continue to 
create ephemeral political parties that “are founded not with the goal of creating an 
institution based on any particular current of political, economic, or social thought, but 
rather, with the objective of carrying one person to the presidency” (Sandoval 2012) is 
that these parties continue to find success in Guatemalan elections. I contend that the 
Guatemalan Left’s inability to achieve electoral relevance is the principal reason why 
political entrepreneurs have found investments in political parties that maintain a 
permanent organizational presence and cultivate a clear and distinct programmatic 
identity to be unnecessary. Facing no real threat from the Left, conservative political 
elites have no strong incentive to build a permanent political party or even to advertise 
their programmatic/ideological preferences. 
 I am hardly the first person to identify the disunity and electoral weakness of the 
Left as the source of various shortcomings exhibited by Guatemala’s democracy. For 
instance, Sonnleitner (2009: 533) argues that the lack of a consolidated Left capable of 
“providing the country with alternative ideas and projects, or even with an ideological 
debate between competing viewpoints,” constitutes one of the primary structural 
obstacles that diminishes the quality of Guatemalan democracy. Isaacs (2010: 118) points 
to the weakness and disorganization of the Left as the reason why patron-client 
relationships continue to play such an important role; the country’s “current political 
landscape, devoid of a credible Left, leaves … substantial segments of the marginalized 
poor … [with] little alternative … [but to] take what they can get” from political elites 
who offer cash transfers and other benefits in exchange for electoral support. My own 
argument echoes that of España-Nájera (2009: 166), who explicitly links Guatemala’s 
low level of party system institutionalization to the absence of “an electorally viable 
leftist party [that would give] the right … a powerful incentive to unify and cooperate.” 
 Demonstrating the electoral weakness of the Guatemalan Left is a fairly simple 
task; Figure 6.1 reports the total vote percentage won by leftist and center-left parties and 
coalitions in the 1984 Constitutional Assembly election and the 1985-2011 legislative 
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elections.14 It is worth noting that even the best electoral performance of the Guatemalan 
Left pales in comparison to the success obtained by the FMLN in neighboring El 
Salvador – in the 1999 election, to date its greatest electoral performance, the Left (then 
consisting of the FDNG and the URNG-DIA coalition) captured only nine of the 113 
seats (8%) in the legislature; the FMLN, on the other hand, has never won fewer than 
25% of the seats in the Salvadoran legislature. 
 
Figure 6.1 – Electoral Weakness of the Guatemalan Left, 1995-2011 
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 With the electoral weakness of the Left giving them no incentive to unite their 
forces and invest in the construction of permanent party organizations, non-leftist 
                                                 
14
  Based on works by Sichar Moreno (2003, nd), Álvarez (2011), and Allison (2012), I identify two active parties – 
the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) and the New Nation Alliance (ANN) – and the defunct New 
Guatemala Democratic Front (FDNG), as well as the coalitions formed by these parties, as leftist parties. Another four 
parties – the Encounter for Guatemala (EG), Authentic Integral Development (DIA), Social Participative Democracy 
(DSP), and the National Union (UN) – are identified as center-left parties, but the 2011 coalition formed by the EG and 
Vision with Values (VIVA) is not counted as a center-left coalition. The election results reported in Figure 6.1 refer to 
the national list vote. 
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political elites have presided over a seemingly endless process of party splintering. An 
examination of the genealogy of the nine non-Left parties that received at least 5% of the 
vote in one of the last three legislative elections (2003-11) – a group of parties that 
combined to win 82% of the vote in those three elections – finds that all of these parties 
can trace their lineage to the neoliberal National Advancement Party (PAN) and/or the 
extreme right Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG).15 In nearly all of these cases, party 
divisions were immediately followed by the presidential campaign of the new party’s 
leader; this clearly suggests that individual politicians’ presidential aspirations, rather 
than any ideological disagreements between party elites, have been responsible for this 
series of party divisions. 
 Only in 2007, when Álvaro Colom (UNE) and Otto Pérez Molina (PP) advanced 
to the presidential runoff election, were Guatemalan voters provided with a choice 
between two clearly distinct programmatic options. Yet, even in this case, differences 
between the two candidates’ policy platforms were largely limited to their proposals for 
addressing the country’s extraordinarily high rate of violent crime.16 Generally speaking, 
to the extent that they exhibit any ideological preferences at all (something that many 
parties intentionally avoid in order to forestall possible criticisms),17 Guatemala’s 
political parties espouse the same conservative ideology, one that favors maintaining the 
status quo: an extremely weak state that, because Guatemala has the lowest level of 
government expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) in all of Latin America,18 is incapable 
of remedying the socioeconomic and racial inequalities that plague the country. 
 Indeed, a number of the party officials I interviewed in Guatemala commented on 
the lack of ideological distinctions between the country’s main political parties; for 
example, one GANA official stated that “there are minimal, minimal, minimal 
                                                 
15
  See Appendix 6 for an overview of the genealogy of the Guatemalan Right. 
16
  Pérez Molina called for an iron fist approach that emphasized increased spending on law enforcement, Colom 
called for greater investments in social development programs and in the rehabilitation and reintegration of criminal 
offenders. Yet, inasmuch as Colom joined Pérez Molina in calling for the expansion of the domestic security role of the 
armed forces, even this programmatic difference between the two candidates was limited in scope (Isaacs 2010) 
17
  Interview with LIDER official conducted in Guatemala City, March 19, 2012. 
18
  Miller and Kim (2015) provide data on government expenditures as a percentage of GDP for the year 2014 for 183 
countries. Only two countries – Madagascar and Sudan – spent less than Guatemala, where government expenditures 
totaled 14.1% of GDP. 
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differences between parties.”19 The comments made by another GANA official, one who 
had been a candidate in the 2011 legislative election, demonstrate the extent to which 
Guatemala’s political parties de-emphasize questions of ideology; when asked to describe 
the ideological differences between GANA and other political parties, she replied that: “It 
is difficult to say … let us see how … I do not know how to say it … I do not know what 
the party’s ideology is … I do not remember.”20 Certainly, parties whose ideological 
identities are so poorly established cannot contribute to the development of programmatic 
party-voter linkages; if candidates for national office are unable to identify their own 
party’s ideological stance, voters cannot be expected to vote “correctly.” 
 If the extremely low level of institutionalization exhibited by the Guatemalan 
party system and by its constituent political parties explains why relationships between 
policy preferences, left-right self-identification, and voting behavior are notably weak, 
and if the inability of the Left to achieve any meaningful success at the ballot box 
explains why conservative political elites have not invested in the creation of well-
organized, permanent, ideologically coherent political parties, we must ask, why, two 
decades after its first participation in national elections, is the Guatemalan Left so weak? 
It is to this question that I now turn. 
 
6.3 After Árbenz: The Long Decline of the Guatemalan Left  
 In examining the post-war performance of the URNG, El Salvador’s FMLN, and 
Nicaragua’s FSLN, Allison (2006a, 2006b) emphasizes the small number of URNG 
combatants and the group’s inability to control any significant territory during the war as 
critical factors that prevented the URNG from becoming a successful political party. 
Addressing this same question of why the URNG’s transition from guerrilla organization 
to political party has been significantly less successful than that of the FMLN and FSLN, 
España-Nájera (2009: 9) emphasizes the importance of the strategies that these three 
guerrilla groups adopted during each country’s transition to democracy and argues that, 
                                                 
19
  Interview conducted in Guatemala City, March 28, 2012. 
20
  In the original Spanish: “es difícil de decir … vamos a ver en que … no sé cómo decir … no sé que es la ideología 
del partido … no me recuerdo.” Interview conducted in Guatemala City, March 28, 2012. 
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whereas the FMLN and FSLN both improved their ability to compete in post-transition 
elections by adopting a “procedural strategy” that allowed each group “to secure changes 
in the political arena during negotiations [while] strengthening the party’s national 
organization and its ties with civil society throughout the transition,” the URNG has been 
less successful because it instead opted for a “substantive strategy” designed to “secure 
system-wide changes that address socio-economic problems during the negotiations 
[while] leaving the organizational restructuring and strengthening of the left’s 
organization and its ties with civil society until after the negotiations have been 
concluded.” 
 I contend that both of these explanations are only partially correct, and argue that 
it is the weakness of the URNG’s ties to civil society that best explains why the 
Guatemalan Left has failed to create the type of unified, ideologically coherent, and 
successful political party that is capable of promoting the development of programmatic 
political competition. 
 As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the many similarities between El 
Salvador and Guatemala make comparisons between the two countries particularly 
fruitful. However, in turning to the question of why the Guatemalan Left has failed to 
achieve any significant degree of electoral success, it is useful to take some of the more 
important differences between these two neighboring republics into consideration. 
Particularly relevant are differences between the two countries with regards to the nature 
of their civil wars and their ethno-linguistic profiles. After providing a brief overview of 
the organizational discontinuity that has plagued the Guatemalan Left throughout the 
post-war era, I spend the remainder of this section demonstrating how (1) various actions 
taken by the URNG and its predecessors during Guatemala’s 36-year civil war and (2) 
the country’s high level of ethnic heterogeneity have both contributed to the inability of 
the Guatemalan Left to develop strong institutional linkages with civil society. 
 
The URNG as Political Party 
 The weakness and disunity of the Guatemalan Left is made apparent not only by 
the rather meager election results displayed in Figure 6.1, but also by the organizational 
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discontinuity that has plagued the Left throughout the past two decades. Sensing the 
impending end of the country’s civil war – UN-sponsored meetings between the URNG 
and the Guatemalan government held in Mexico City in January 1995 had breathed new 
life into the on-again off-again process of peace negotiations that had begun in Madrid in 
November 1987 (Armon et al. 1997) – the URNG created an electoral wing, the New 
Guatemala Democratic Front (FDNG), to compete in the November 1995 election. With 
the December 29, 1996, Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace putting a definitive end 
to thirty-six years of civil war and paving the way for the legalization of the URNG, it 
was assumed that the FDNG and the URNG would merge. Yet, while the URNG, FDNG, 
and the center-left Authentic Integral Development party (DIA) did indeed join forces in 
February 1999 to create the New Nation Alliance coalition (ANN) in support of Álvaro 
Colom’s presidential candidacy, the FDNG was forced out of the coalition prior to the 
November 1999 election “in part due to differences between the leaders of [the URNG 
and the FDNG] … regarding the distribution of party positions and candidacies,” (Fortín 
2010: 157). The URNG-DIA coalition went on to receive 11.0% of the vote in the 1999 
legislative election, enough to place third behind the FRG and the PAN. 
 Although this result was at least somewhat promising, the fracturing of the 
Guatemalan Left accelerated after the 1999 election, as the URNG suffered a number of 
high-profile defections. In August 2001, ORPA leader Rodrigo Asturias (nom de guerre 
Gaspar Ilom) replaced FAR leader Jorge Ismael Soto (nom de guerre Pablo Monsanto) as 
the Secretary General of the URNG. Nine months later, Monsanto and roughly two 
hundred of his followers abandoned the URNG to form a new party, also named the New 
Nation Alliance (ANN). Colom also abandoned the Left in 2002 in order to create his 
own electoral vehicle, the centrist National Unity of Hope (UNE). As a result of these 
“internal divisions and rivalries that thwarted the consolidation of a durable and 
consistent party capable of attracting voters from beyond [the Left’s] small group of core 
supporters” (Sonnleitner 2009: 534), five different parties – the URNG, DIA, ANN, 
Social Participative Democracy (DSP), and the National Union (UN) – all claimed to 
represent the Left in the 2003 election. Consequently, the URNG finished a disappointing 
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sixth in the 2003 legislative election, receiving 59.8% fewer votes than it had four years 
earlier. 
 The fragmentation of the Left and the electoral weakness of the URNG were 
again on display in 2007, when Álvaro Colom, the Left’s one-time standard-bearer, won 
the presidency. That year, Rigoberta Menchú’s Encounter for Guatemala (EG) joined the 
URNG, DIA, and ANN on the roll call of Guatemala’s leftist parties as the URNG 
finished tenth in the legislative election with only 3.6% of the vote. 
 In terms of the organization of the Left, it appeared that the 2011 election might 
represent something of a turning point. Guatemalan political scientist Jorge Alvarado 
suggested that, by joining forces to form the Broad Front, the URNG, ANN, and Winaq 
demonstrated that “it is possible for the Guatemalan Left to reach a consensus and create 
a definitive agenda that will in the future increase the Left’s credibility and improve its 
electoral results” (Álvarez 2011). Subsequent developments, however, suggest that it is 
unlikely that the organizational unity exhibited during the 2011 election will usher in a 
new era for the Guatemalan Left. Although the URNG and Winaq remain united, the 
Broad Front’s vice-presidential candidate (Aníbal García) is now seeking the presidency 
under the banner of the New Republic Movement (MNR), while the center-left EG has 
also named its own presidential candidate (José Ángel López).  
 Moreover, the poor results obtained by the URNG-ANN-Winaq alliance in 2011 
suggest that, in terms of the Left’s ability to shape public policy, Sichar Moreno (nd) may 
be correct when he contends that “the current situation of the Guatemalan Left might be 
even worse than when the Left was illegal.” Although the total number of valid votes cast 
in the 2011 election was 107.8% greater than the number of votes emitted in 1999, the 
Broad Front’s legislative candidates actually received 39.3% fewer votes than the 
URNG-DIA alliance had received twelve years earlier, its presidential candidate 
(Menchú) received only 3.3% of the vote, and its mayoral candidates were successful in 
only three of the country’s 332 municipalities. Pointing to “the divorce that exists 
between base organizations and the political Left,” Guatemalan political analyst Edgar 
Gutiérrez argues that, even if the Left were to do a better job of incorporating “social 
organizations’ demands for the nationalization of natural resources and for profound 
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agrarian, social, and fiscal reforms” into its platform, it is unlikely that the Left would 
garner more than 12% of the vote (Álvarez 2011). 
 It is quite clear that, by any standard, the URNG has been unable to duplicate the 
successful transition from guerrilla organization to political party completed by El 
Salvador’s FMLN and Nicaragua’s FSLN. Why is this so? 
 
All Guerrillas Are Not Created Equally 
 Sichar Moreno (nd) traces the URNG’s lineage back to the early years of the 
“Guatemalan Revolution,” the ten-year period of social democratic rule that began when 
the 1944 popular uprising put an end to the Ubico dictatorship and lasted until the US-
backed coup that ousted president Árbenz in 1954. In 1947, a group of radical activists 
lead by José Manuel Fortuny created the Guatemalan Democratic Vanguard (VDG). 
Initially a faction within the Revolutionary Action Party (PAR), the VDG separated from 
the PAR in 1949 to create the Guatemalan Communist Party (PCG), which was in 1952 
rechristened as the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT). Although the first decree issued by 
the military government that assumed power after the 1954 coup explicitly banned the 
PGT, the party’s leaders (many of whom were forced into exile in Mexico) continued to 
play an important role in organizing opposition to the military regime. 
 Significantly, however, the initial spark that led to the formation of Guatemala’s 
first guerrilla organizations came not from the PGT, but from within the armed forces. On 
November 13, 1960, a group of leftist junior officers led by Marco Antonio Yon Sosa and 
Luis Turcios Lima, launched a revolt designed to topple the government of General 
Ydígoras Fuentes. After that effort failed, the rebellious officers who survived the coup 
attempt fled to the Sierra de las Minas mountain range in eastern Guatemala, where they 
eventually regrouped and formed the November 13 Revolutionary Movement (MR-13). 
In December 1962, the MR-13 joined forces with the armed branch of the PGT to create 
the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), Guatemala’s first de facto guerrilla organization. Under 
Yon Sosa’s leadership, the FAR established three separate fronts – two in the largely-
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ladino21 eastern departments of Zacapa and Izabal, and a third in the capital – each under 
the command of former military officers who had participated in the 1960 revolt. 
 When we compare the early development of Guatemala’s leftist insurgency to the 
development of the groups that eventually united to form the FMLN, various important 
differences are evident: 
• Whereas the leaders of the five organizations that joined forces in 1980 to create the 
FMLN were all civilians whose path to taking up arms against the state began with their 
involvement in the Salvadoran Communist Party, the FAR’s leaders all came from a 
military background. 
• Whereas the armed groups that eventually formed the FMLN devoted considerable 
resources throughout the second half of the 1970s to the cultivation of close relationships 
with labor unions, student groups, peasant organizations, and Christian base 
communities, the leaders of the MR-13 first made contact with the leading organization 
of the civilian Left, the Democratic Revolutionary Unity (URD), in early 1962. 
• Whereas El Salvador’s guerrilla organizations spent nearly ten years committing various 
small-scale attacks (and recruiting militants) before launching the January 1981 “Final 
Offensive,” the leaders of the Guatemalan insurgency did not create any sort of formal 
organization until after their attempt to overthrow the military government had failed.  
• Whereas the FMLN established a number of permanent bases in various parts of the 
country during the first months of the Salvadoran civil war and controlled those 
territories for the duration of the war, the FAR was never able to establish control over 
any sizeable territory. 
 
 Because the FAR lacked any permanent base, its ability to utilize propaganda to 
educate the masses regarding the ideological basis for their opposition to the Guatemalan 
state paled in comparison to that of the FMLN, which used its bases in the mountainous 
regions of Morazán and Chalatenango to operate clandestine radio stations that carried 
the FMLN’s revolutionary message to an even broader audience. Consequently, the FAR 
remained relatively weak, as did its ties to civil society. Whereas the FMLN counted as 
many as 12,000 troops, which allowed it to achieve military parity with the disorganized, 
ill-trained, and poorly equipped Salvadoran armed forces during the early years of that 
country’s civil war, and to consequently harbor realistic illusions of replicating the 
Sandinistas’ victory over the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, the weakness of the FAR, 
                                                 
21
  In Guatemala, the term ladino is used to refer to people who speak Spanish as their native language, exhibit 
primarily Hispanic (rather than indigenous) cultural traits, and dress in contemporary Western attire (as opposed to 
traditional clothing). 
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which had no more than 300 combatants, ensured that the balance of military power 
between government and insurgent forces in Guatemala was sharply tilted in favor of the 
government. 
 In 1964, the Guatemalan armed forces (and their paramilitary allies) launched the 
first of a series of counterinsurgency campaigns designed to root the FAR out from the 
Sierra de las Minas. By 1968, the FAR had been nearly annihilated as a result of military 
campaigns that took the lives of at least 8,000 civilians, its alliance with the PGT had 
dissolved, and its activities were limited to occasional (though often sensational) attacks 
carried out in Guatemala City, such as the August 1968 assassination of US Ambassador 
John Gordon Mein and the April 1970 assassination of German Ambassador Karl Von 
Spreti. However, the military government’s continuing repression of the PGT, labor 
unions, students, intellectuals, and suspected FAR sympathizers soon gave rise to two 
new clandestine groups, the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) 
and the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), both led by former FAR militants who were 
“determined not to repeat the errors of the 1960s” and who believed that a successful 
revolution “would require years of preparation working directly with the country’s poor, 
especially the vast majority in the countryside” (Brockett 2005: 119). 
 Founded in 1971, ORPA strongly resembled the PCS in neighboring El Salvador 
in terms of its approach to building a broad opposition movement; ORPA’s leaders 
“emphasized the need to make broad alliances with progressive middle-class intellectuals 
and professionals” (Jonas 1991: 138) and they also stressed the importance of 
“cultivating relationships with the country’s indigenous community and urban labor 
movements” (Allison 2006a: 62). Indeed, the group, which was largely concentrated in 
the mountains surrounding Lake Atitlán and along the southern Pacific coast, spent 
nearly a decade recruiting members and building relationships with local communities 
before it launched the September 1979 occupation of the Mujuliá coffee plantation in 
Quetzaltenango that constituted ORPA’s first act of militancy. Similarly, the EGP, 
created in Mexico by a group of former FAR militants who had taken up refuge in that 
country before they returned to Guatemala in January 1972, spent nearly three and a half 
years attempting to build a base of support amongst the predominantly Ixil population of 
  157 
the municipalities of Nebaj, Chajul, and Cotzal in the mountainous department of El 
Quiché before committing its first armed acts, the May 1975 assassination of 
“comisionado militar” (civilian counterinsurgency informant) Guillermo Monzón and the 
June 1975 assassination of landowner José Luis Arenas. 
 The emergence of this second wave of insurgent groups prompted the military 
government to shift the focal point of its repressive measures from Guatemala City to the 
highlands of western Guatemala. Beginning in 1976, the armed forces targeted members 
of peasant organizations, activists and community organizers associated with Catholic 
Action (a liberation theology-inspired organization that emerged in the early 1970s), and 
indigenous populations in the “Ixil Triangle.” The scope of repression increased 
significantly throughout the 1978-82 presidency of Gen. Romeo Lucas García. In 
response, many members of the civilian opposition either chose (due to the belief that 
unarmed opposition to the military regime was futile) or felt forced (due to the fear that 
the government would soon liquidate all opposition groups) to join the guerrilla 
movement. As the ranks of ORPA and the EGP, as well as the FAR (which had 
reemerged in the late 1970s), continued to swell, the guerrilla forces expanded and 
intensified their operations; in 1980-81 the insurgents launched an unprecedented number 
of attacks on government forces in the western highlands and in Guatemala City. 
 Amidst escalating violence – it is believed that as many 13,500 people fell victim 
to the government’s counterinsurgency efforts in the year 1981 alone – the EGP, ORPA, 
the FAR, and the PGT joined forces on February 7, 1982 to form the URNG. Six weeks 
later, Lucas García was overthrown by a military coup and replaced by Gen. Efraín Ríos 
Montt. Ríos Montt’s presidency constituted the apex of government repression and 
paramilitary activity – nearly 600 villages were destroyed and as many as 50,000 people 
were killed during his sixteen-and-a-half months in power. The success of the armed 
forces’ “frijoles y fusiles” (beans and rifles) program, a scorched earth campaign 
designed to eliminate the insurgents’ support base, revealed the extent to which the 
URNG had been guilty of “underestimating the level of violence that the armed forces 
would employ and overestimating its own military capabilities” (España-Nájera 2009: 
55). With the URNG forced to abandon its strongholds, its civilian supporters were left 
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unarmed and unable to protect themselves from the government forces’ unremitting 
attacks. By the time Ríos Montt fell victim to an August 8, 1983, coup organized by his 
Defense Minister, Óscar Humberto Mejía, the URNG was severely weakened, and the 
relationships with labor unions, student groups, peasant organizations, and other social 
movements that ORPA and the EGP had cultivated throughout the 1970s had been 
decimated (Isaacs 2010). 
 Mejía’s government paved the way for the 1986 return to civilian rule and it 
presided over a significant decline in the severity of human rights violations carried out in 
rural Guatemala, but it also increased the level of repression in Guatemala City, which 
made it exceedingly difficult for the URNG to attempt to rebuild its ties to civil society. 
While the political opening that accompanied Guatemala’s transition to democratic rule 
and the 1987 initiation of peace talks between the URNG and the government led by 
DCG president Vinicio Cerezo provided space for new civil society movements to 
emerge in the late 1980s, these groups, including the first organizations that began 
mobilizing the Maya as Maya22 (rather than as peasants), remained independent from the 
URNG. Moreover, convinced “that revolutionary success was unlikely … many 
guerrillas left the battlefield to participate in [this] revitalized civil society” (Allison 
2012: 15). Whereas the URNG counted as many as 7,500 combatants in the early 1980s, 
prior to the government’s counterinsurgency campaign, that number may have dropped as 
low as 500 by the mid-1990s (Allison 2006a). 
 By the time the war formally ended in 1996, the URNG was weak not only as a 
fighting force, but also as an organization. Ties between the URNG and civil society were 
much weaker than they were in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Indeed, Guatemala’s various 
social movements participated as an independent actor (as the Civil Society Assembly, 
ACS) during the negotiations that led to the final peace agreement, something that did not 
occur in either El Salvador or Nicaragua (España-Nájera 2009). Consequently, whereas 
the FMLN emerged at the end of El Salvador’s civil war as the clear representative of the 
                                                 
22
  Although a small percentage of Guatemala’s indigenous population is not Mayan in origin – the Xinca people of 
southern Guatemala are believed to predate the Maya, while the Garifuna on the Caribbean coast trace their origins to 
the island of Saint Vincent – the term Maya is often used to describe all indigenous persons. 
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Salvadoran Left, the future relevance of the URNG was unclear as the group initiated its 
transition from guerrilla organization to political party.  
 
Ethno-Linguistic Obstacles to Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages 
 A second relevant difference between Guatemala and El Salvador concerns the 
two countries’ ethno-linguistic profiles. In El Salvador, indigenous languages and 
customs are extinct in all but a handful of small villages; according to the most recent 
census, less than 0.25% of Salvadorans identify themselves as members of an indigenous 
group. Guatemala, on the other hand, is home to a truly multicultural population. 
Roughly 5.6 million people (40% of the national total), including approximately 4 million 
who speak one of twenty-three pre-Colombian languages23 as their native tongue, 
constitute Central America’s largest indigenous population, and indigenous traditions are 
maintained in many areas of the country. One could argue, therefore, that the failure of 
Guatemala’s political parties to establish programmatic ties with the voting public might 
be attributed, at least in part, to cultural and linguistic divisions that impede effective 
communication between the country’s predominantly ladino political elites and the 
largely indigenous masses whose votes they court every four years. 
 The relationship between the Guatemalan Left and the country’s indigenous 
communities is of particular importance for a couple of reasons. First, given the size of 
Guatemala’s indigenous population and the fact that, historically, political elites made no 
efforts to incorporate this population into national politics (Briscoe and Rodríguez 
Pellecer 2010), any political party that succeeds in creating strong institutional linkages 
with the indigenous social movement organizations that have emerged since the 1970s 
(when Guatemala’s indigenous population first began to create national organizations) 
would likely see its vote total increase significantly. Second, because the policy 
preferences associated with indigenous movements in contemporary Latin America 
(particularly in Ecuador and Bolivia) – e.g., opposition to natural resource extraction, 
calls for land distribution and integral rural development, and demands for the 
                                                 
23
  Twenty-one different Mayan languages and two non-Mayan indigenous languages (Xinca and Garifuna) are spoken 
in Guatemala. Roughly three-quarters of the people who speak a language other than Spanish as their native tongue 
speak one of four languages: K’iche’, Q’eqchi’, Kaqchikel, and Mam. 
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recognition of indigenous groups’ political and cultural rights (Vogt 2015) – tend to find 
more support from leftist parties, one would expect that the URNG would stand the best 
chance of building strong ties to Guatemala’s indigenous population. This, however, has 
not been the case; as Vogt (2015: 40) notes, “the relationship between indigenous 
organizations and the left is more complicated in Guatemala than in other Latin American 
countries.” To date, neither traditional Leftist parties nor left-leaning indigenous populist 
parties (Madrid 2012) have succeeded in gaining much support from indigenous voters. 
 The organizations that participated in the first wave of the insurgency (1960-68), 
the PGT and the MR-13, both understood the problems of poverty and inequality in 
strictly classist terms; to the extent that these groups sought to improve the 
socioeconomic conditions of Guatemala’s indigenous communities, they did so not 
because the indigenous population (as a collective entity) suffers from acute ethnic 
discrimination, but because the vast majority of Maya (as individuals) are poor peasants. 
Moreover, inasmuch as guerrilla activity during this period was concentrated in an area 
where the population is almost exclusively ladino, the FAR had little if any direct contact 
with the country’s indigenous communities. This lack of contact between guerrillas and 
Maya would change greatly during the second wave of the insurgency (1971-83), when 
the EGP established its stronghold in the department of El Quiché, where Maya make up 
more than 80% of the local population. 
 During the 1970s, both ORPA and especially the EGP did a much better job of 
“incorporating the indigenous population as a subject of the revolution” (Síchar Moreno 
nd) than the earlier guerrilla groups had done. However, the future relationship between 
this population and the Guatemalan Left was jeopardized during the counterinsurgency of 
the early 1980s, when the EGP spectacularly failed to protect unarmed and largely 
defenseless Mayan civilian populations from government attacks. As Pallister (2013: 
131) notes, “lingering fear and ongoing political violence … [have led] indigenous 
activists to focus on ‘cultural’ rather than socioeconomic issues” and to focus on local 
rather than national politics.24 Moreover, the URNG’s credibility as a representative and 
                                                 
24
  In many municipalities, indigenous groups have taken advantage of a provision in Guatemala’s electoral laws that 
allows civic committees to enter candidates in municipal elections, Moreover, the office of alcalde indígena provides 
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defender of poor Guatemalans was besmirched during the final stages of peace 
negotiations, when “many combatants and supporters [became] outraged at the URNG’s 
acceptance of a weakened Truth Commission that held almost no one accountable for the 
crimes committed” by the state during thirty-six years of civil war (Allison 2012: 16). 
 Developments that occurred within the URNG after the war’s conclusion would 
further alienate Guatemala’s indigenous population. When the URNG began its transition 
from guerrilla organization to political party, its Secretary General was EGP commander 
Ricardo Ramírez (nom de guerre Rolando Morán), a leader identified by many supporters 
of the Guatemalan left as “the individual most capable of keeping the revolutionary left 
united and, at the same time, bridging the gap with the non-revolutionary left” (Allison 
2012: 15). His death, in September 1998, left the URNG in the hands Pablo Monsanto, 
the leader of the FAR, which was “the most outdated and Marxist of the four 
organizations comprising the URNG” (Allison 2012: 16). Under Monsanto, who kept the 
position of Secretary General until August 2001, the URNG retook the position held by 
the FAR and the PGT during the 1960s – namely, that poverty is the only problem faced 
by Guatemala’s indigenous population – a position that was clearly in conflict with the 
collective understanding of social and political rights adopted by the Mayan 
organizations that emerged in the mid-to-late 1980s (Isaacs 2010, Pallister 2013). 
 A decade later, the “remnants of hegemonic attitudes toward Maya organizations 
can easily be identified in the discourses of the [fragmented] Guatemalan Left” (Vogt 
2015: 40). The poor performance of world-renowned K’iche’ activist Rigoberta Menchú 
in her 2007 and 2011 presidential campaigns demonstrates not only the continuing 
weakness of the relationship between the Left and indigenous voters, but also the 
continuing importance of the linguistic, cultural, religious, and ideological divides that 
have hindered both the construction of a powerful pan-Maya identity and the 
development of a national indigenous organization like the ones that have had an 
important impact on electoral politics in Bolivia and Ecuador (Pallister 2013, Vogt 2015). 
                                                                                                                                                 
Guatemala’s indigenous population with an addition avenue for political representation at the local level: since 2002, 
local indigenous leaders “who are designated or elected according to the principles, values, procedures, and traditions 
of those communities” are legally recognized “as representative entities of the community” who possess the right to 
consult with the municipal government and participate in its decision-making process (Congreso de al República de 
Guatemala 2002: Artículo 56).  
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In those two countries, opposition to neoliberalism has been one of the core components 
of the “indigenous populism” that has carried Leftist leaders Evo Morales and Rafael 
Correa to the presidency. In Guatemala, however, “it is precisely the antineoliberal 
populist stance that has helped other indigenous political parties succeed that risks 
provoking violent reaction from the Guatemalan elites” (Pallister 2013: 131). 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
 To date, three decades of democratic elections have not produced programmatic 
political competition in Guatemala. Programmatic party-voter linkages remain 
exceptionally weak as an ever-changing array of poorly institutionalized, ideologically 
indistinct political parties employ exorbitant mass media campaigns to win voters’ 
support. Although it first entered the electoral fray in 1995, the Guatemalan Left has yet 
to establish a firm connection with voters, and it consequently has had little if any 
influence on the development of Guatemala’s party system. 
 Of course, the weakness of programmatic party-voter linkages in contemporary 
Guatemala lines up with the conventional wisdom regarding party system development in 
Latin America. Guatemala is one of the region’s poorest countries, it had relatively little 
experience with democratic elections prior to 1984, and government expenditures on 
social programs are notoriously low. However, the fact that programmatic party-voter 
linkages have emerged in neighboring El Salvador, which shares all of these obstacles to 
the development of a modern, institutionalized party system in which political parties 
utilize programmatic appeals to win voters’ support, tells us that Guatemala’s low level 
of modernization cannot be the sole reason why programmatic party-voter linkages in 
contemporary Guatemala are so weak. 
 In this chapter, I have argued that the absence of an organized and unified Left 
capable of achieving electoral success by actively promoting its ideological 
distinctiveness explains both the low level of institutionalization exhibited by 
Guatemala’s party system and the weakness of programmatic party-voter linkages. 
Without the threat posed by an electorally viable Left, the Guatemalan Right has been 
able to maintain its control over the state without investing in the creation of stable, 
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institutionalized political parties, and is has been able to rely on patron-client 
relationships and mass media campaigns to win elections, without the need to make any 
specific programmatic appeals. 
 While the country’s high level of ethno-linguistic diversity and the insurgents’ 
inability to achieve any lasting military success during the country’s civil war may very 
well have made the URNG’s task of transforming itself from a guerrilla organization into 
a political party more difficult than it would have been had the URNG been as successful 
on the battlefield as the FMLN and the FSLN and if Guatemala’s population were as 
homogeneous as El Salvador’s, these obstacles do not fully explain the Left’s inability to 
achieve electoral relevance. We must recall that the URNG (in alliance with DIA) did 
receive more than 230,000 votes to finish a respectable third in the 1999 legislative 
election, its first direct participation in electoral politics, a signal that there was at least 
some appetite within the electorate for an alternative to the various right-of-center parties 
that have dominated Guatemalan politics since the resumption of democratic rule in the 
1980s. However, the URNG has not been able to build upon this somewhat promising 
entrance into the political arena because it has failed to build relationships with the social 
movements that emerged during the late 1980s. Lacking close institutional ties to 
organized labor, peasant associations, or Mayan organizations, the URNG has not been 
able to establish itself as the clear flag bearer of the Guatemalan Left in the same way 
that the FMLN has made itself synonymous with the Left – and with the policy 
preferences associated with the Left – in El Salvador. 
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Chapter Seven 
Costa Rica: Democratic Stability, Party System Disarray 
 
 As residents of Latin America’s oldest and most robust democracy,1 Costa Rican 
citizens have enjoyed more “opportunities to engage in collective action and … build 
programmatic linkages through an iteration of elections in which politicians and electoral 
constituencies can learn democratic accountability” than the citizens of any other Latin 
American country (Kitschelt et al. 2010: 31, emphasis in original). Moreover, Costa 
Rica’s level of socioeconomic development, the highest in Central America, ensures that 
most voters have access to political information, the cognitive capacity necessary to 
process that information, and a level of material wealth that reduces demand for the 
selective incentives that serve as the currency of patron-client relationships; in other 
words, they possess “the capabilities – in terms of material and cognitive resources – to 
process the information and build the organizations that make possible programmatic 
linkages” (Kitschelt et al. 2010: 31, emphasis in original). According to the conventional 
wisdom on party system development in Latin America, these two characteristics should 
have facilitated the development of programmatic political competition in Costa Rica. 
However, neither Kitschelt et al. (2010) nor I (Chapter Two) find evidence of strong 
programmatic party-voter linkages in Costa Rica. Clearly, some piece of the puzzle is 
missing. What explains the fact that Costa Rica’s political actors have not established 
programmatic party-voter linkages despite possessing the capacity and having had 
sufficient opportunities to do so? 
 Kitschelt et al. (2010: 31, emphasis in original) contend that political capabilities 
and opportunities must be accompanied by the perception of political stakes – “widely 
shared prospective material or cultural gains or losses imposed by authoritative policies 
and institutions locking in such policies” – that motivate political actors “to organize the 
political process around partisan alignments.” Arguing that protracted political struggles 
over the appropriate economic role of the state only developed in those countries that 
                                                 
1
 Under the uninterrupted rule of democratically-elected presidents since November 8, 1953, Costa Rica has been 
assigned a “perfect” Polity score of ten each and every year since 1953. Only two other Latin American countries have 
ever received a Polity score of ten: Uruguay (1989-present) and Chile (2006-present) (Marshall et al. 2012). 
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established relatively inclusive social safety nets, Kitschelt et al. (2010) use the degree to 
which governments introduced social protection for the urban working class during the 
ISI era as an indicator of political stakes. However, Costa Rica performs quite well on 
this measure as well. If elites have not organized political parties around “questions of 
political economic regime form,” and if voters believe that election results are largely 
inconsequential in terms of their impact on the policies and institutions that influence the 
country’s future development, this is not because the Costa Rican state has refrained from 
introducing and enforcing “authoritative rules that (re)assign property rights and regulate 
people’s market behavior” (Kitschelt et al. 2010: 38). Again, we must ask, why are 
programmatic party-voter linkages so weak in Costa Rica? 
 In this chapter, I argue that the non-ideological nature of electoral competition in 
contemporary Costa Rica is the end product of a series of actions taken by the country’s 
political elites over the course of the previous seven decades. More specifically, I contend 
that the absence of programmatic political competition in contemporary Costa Rica can 
be attributed to (1) the perpetual weakness and organizational disarray that has 
characterized the self-proclaimed Costa Rican Left (i.e. the communist Popular Vanguard 
Party and its various successors) since the late 1940s and (2) the ideological ambiguity 
exhibited by those political parties that have expressed support for an interventionist state 
but do not self-identify as Leftists (i.e. the National Liberation Party from its foundation 
in 1951 until the early 1980s and the Citizen’s Action Party since its creation in 2002).  
 In making this argument, I demonstrate that Kitschelt et al. (2010) misidentify the 
direction of causality when they point to the importance of “political stakes.” Whereas 
Kitschelt et al. would argue that Costa Rican political elites have not been motivated to 
invest in the establishment of programmatic party-voter linkages because they believe 
that there is relatively little at stake come election time, I argue that Costa Rican voters 
have reason to believe that election results are of little consequence because the country’s 
political parties have consistently chosen not to invest in the formation of programmatic 
party-voter linkages by distinguishing themselves along programmatic lines. At multiple 
junctures during the past seventy years, political entrepreneurs could have sought to make 
the expansion/retrenchment of the economic role of the state the cornerstone of political 
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debate in Costa Rica. The fact that Costa Rica’s main political parties have not done so 
demonstrates that political parties do not react to political stakes; they create them. 
 In the first section of this chapter, I utilize data from a Q-method study that I 
conducted in Costa Rica and El Salvador and from interviews conducted with party 
officials and party scholars in Costa Rica to examine the policy preferences and symbolic 
referents that party activists from Costa Rica’s main political parties associate with the 
terms Left and Right. By comparing Costa Rican party activists’ understandings of the 
labels Left and Right with the perspectives held by party activists in El Salvador (where 
programmatic party-voter linkages are surprisingly strong), I demonstrate that the main 
reason why left-right self-placement is a poor predictor of voting behavior in 
contemporary Costa Rica is that voters correctly perceive that programmatic differences 
between the country’s relevant political parties are minimal at best. 
 In the rest of the chapter, I demonstrate that the development of the Costa Rican 
party system could have followed a different path than it did, one that would have 
contributed to the formation of programmatic party-voter linkages. At various points in 
time during the past seven decades, economic and/or political developments have 
presented Costa Rica’s political elites with opportunities to initiate a public conversation 
regarding the economic role of the state, a conversation that would have put 
programmatic differences at the center of political competition. Yet, time and again, 
whether reacting to the emergence of the radical Left in the 1930s, the consolidation of 
PLN rule after the 1948 civil war, the economic crisis of the 1980s and the subsequent 
adoption of neoliberal reforms, or the collapse of the two-party system in the early 2000s, 
Costa Rica’s main political parties have, with few exceptions, chosen to focus on short-
term electoral concerns, even when doing so has led them to abandon previously-held 
programmatic positions and/or enter into ideologically inconsistent alliances with former 
rivals. Those decisions, combined with a generalized neglect of the type of political 
education activities organized by El Salvador’s two main political parties, best explain 
the absence of programmatic political competition in contemporary Costa Rica. 
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7.1 Costa Rican Elections: What, if anything, is at Stake? 
 In a country like Costa Rica, where left-right self-placement is a poor predictor of 
voting behavior, we can assume that at least one of the following three conditions holds: 
either (1) the labels Left and Right simply are not used as cognitive short-cuts to 
communicate programmatic meaning, (2) voters fail to recognize programmatic 
differences that could be used to map the country’s main political parties onto a left-right 
continuum because parties do not emphasize these programmatic differences in their 
public discourse, or (3) voters correctly perceive that there are no significant 
programmatic differences between the country’s relevant political parties. To help 
determine which of these three explanations best explains why Costa Rican voters find it 
difficult to identify which parties stand where, I utilize data from a Q-method2 study 
designed to uncover the policy preferences and symbolic referents that party activists 
from the four main political parties in Costa Rica (the PLN, PAC, ML, and PUSC) and El 
Salvador (the FMLN, ARENA, PCN, and PDC) associate with the terms Left and Right. 
 In a process referred to as the Q-sort, study participants were instructed to rank-
order a total of sixty-seven Q-statements – thirty-nine statements that represent seven 
categories of policy-based items (economic inequality, the economic role of the state, 
domestic taxation, free trade, support for democracy, law and order issues, and social 
issues), twenty statements that refer to four categories of symbolic referents (domestic 
political parties and politicians, groups in society, international political actors, and 
personal characteristics), six valence items that refer to government priorities, and two 
country-specific statements3 – according to how closely they associate each statement 
with either the Left or the Right. Factor analysis is then used on the data from these Q-
sorts to identify patterns in the placement of the Q-statements. The resultant factors, 
which reflect the deeper organizing principles present within the population, are referred 
to as “social perspectives.” Since party activists are presumably more likely than people 
                                                 
2
 See Appendix 7.A for a general description of Q-method – a “scientific approach to the study of human subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity” that counts as one of its main strengths the ability to provide “an accurate reflection of the broad 
spectrum of discourses that exist within a larger population” from a relatively small sample of participants (Doody et 
al. 2009: 1130) – and for the details of the Q-method studies I completed in El Salvador and Costa Rica. 
3
 The full list of Q-statements, along with English-language translations, is reported in Appendix 7.A. 
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who are not actively involved in politics to have developed well-formed opinions 
regarding the meanings that are attached to the labels Left and Right, we can assume that 
if partisan competition in contemporary Costa Rica can be mapped onto the left-right 
spectrum in any meaningful way, this would be reflected in the social perspectives that 
emerge from these Q-sorts. 
 If these social perspectives are programmatically incoherent (i.e. the policy-
related Q-statements are not attached to the labels Left and Right in an ideologically 
consistent manner) – a signal that even party activists do not share any coherent 
understanding of the various meanings implied by these labels – we would conclude that 
the reason why relationships between policy preferences, left-right self-placement, and 
voting behavior are weak in Costa Rica is that the labels Left and Right simply are not 
part of the Costa Rican political vocabulary. If the social perspectives that emerge from 
this Q-method study demonstrate that Costa Rican party activists do share a coherent 
subjective understanding of the policy preferences and symbolic referents associated with 
these two labels, we would conclude that the demonstrated weakness of programmatic 
party-voter linkages in contemporary Costa Rica can be attributed to voters’ inability to 
perceive programmatic differences that do indeed exist between the country’s main 
political parties. Finally, if party activists share a coherent subjective understanding of the 
terms Left and Right that includes policy preferences but does not include references to 
domestic political actors, this would suggest that Costa Rica’s main political parties are 
indeed virtually indistinguishable from one another in terms of their placement on the 
left-right continuum. 
 In both Costa Rica and El Salvador, I identify two distinct social perspectives 
regarding the meanings attributed to the terms Left and Right.4 In Costa Rica, fourteen Q-
sorts are identified as defining sorts on the first factor. Of the twenty-six Q-statements 
that load heavily on this factor, twenty-three are related to questions of the economic role 
                                                 
4
 The PQMethod software (Schmolck 2012) I used identifies a maximum of seven factors from any set of Q-sorts. 
For each of the two Q-studies I conducted, only the first two factors had an Eigenvalue greater than 1.00. Tables 7.11 
and 7.12 provide data on which Q-sorts are identified as defining sorts on each factor. 
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of the state, economic inequality, domestic taxation, and free trade.5 Moreover, all of 
these Q-statements are located at the expected end of the left-right continuum – support 
for neoliberal policies is associated with the Right, while opposition to neoliberalism is 
associated with the Left. This finding, together with evidence from public opinion 
surveys which shows that the majority of Costa Rican voters are able to place themselves 
somewhere along the left-right continuum,6 allows us to discard the possibility that the 
relationships between policy preferences, left-right self-placement, and voting behavior 
are weak in Costa Rica because the labels Left and Right do not form part of the Costa 
Rican political vocabulary. 
 To gain further insight, it is useful to compare the first factor that emerges from 
the Q-method study I conducted in Costa Rica with the results of the Q-method study I 
conducted in El Salvador. In El Salvador as in Costa Rica, fourteen Q-sorts are identified 
as defining sorts on the first factor, and a total of twenty-six Q-statements load heavily on 
this first factor.7 Also as in Costa Rica, factor analysis of the Q-sorts completed by 
Salvadoran party activists demonstrates that policy preferences associated with support 
for (or opposition to) neoliberal economic reforms clearly differentiate between the Right 
from the Left – six of the statements most closely associated with the Right and seven of 
the statements most closely associated with the Left refer to economic policy 
preferences.8 The comparisons between the two countries break down, however, when we 
focus on the Q-statements that contain symbolic references to domestic political parties 
and politicians, groups in society, international political actors, and politically-relevant 
                                                 
5
  The twenty-six Q-statements that distinguish between the Right and the Left on the first factor in Costa Rica are 
reported in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. 
6
  Data from the Latinobarómetro public opinion surveys from the years 1996-2007 support my conclusion that most 
Costa Rican voters are at least minimally familiar with the use of the labels Left and Right. Although Costa Rica’s non-
response rate of 26.3% on the question of where survey respondents place themselves on an eleven-point left-right 
scale is the second-highest amongst Latin America’s eighteen electoral democracies (behind Guatemala’s 31.7%), it is 
not so high as to suggest that the labels Left and Right are wholly unfamiliar to Costa Rican voters. Moreover, cross-
country variation on this measure is very limited – Costa Rica is one of nine Latin American countries with a non-
response rate between 22.5% and 26.3% on this question; only Uruguay and the Dominican Republic have non-
response rates below 17.2%.  
7
  These Q-statements are reported in Tables 7.5 and 7.6. 
8
  One of the seven economic policy statements associated with the Left is support for reinstating the colón, the 
domestic currency that was replaced by the US dollar in 2001. Although this policy does not necessarily map onto the 
conventional Left-Right divide regarding the appropriate economic role of the state, the association of support for 
reinstating the colón with the Left is consistent with the fact that the FMLN opposed dollarization when it was 
implemented in 2001 and made reinstating the colón one of the central components of its campaigns in the 2003 
legislative election and the 2004 presidential election. 
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personal characteristics. In El Salvador, thirteen of twenty-one symbolic Q-statements are 
strongly associated with either the Left or the Right; in Costa Rica only three of twenty 
such statements strongly associated with either one of these labels. 
 Particularly interesting is the “performance” of the six Q-statements that make 
reference to specific domestic political actors in each country. On the first factor in El 
Salvador, identification with ARENA, its founder Roberto d’Aubuisson, and former 
ARENA president Alfredo Cristiani are closely associated with the Right, while 
identification with the FMLN and its historic leader Schafik Hándal are closely 
associated with the Left. This same pattern extends to the second factor9 (on which six Q-
sorts are identified as defining sorts); identification with ARENA is closely associated 
with the Right, while identification with the FMLN, Schafik, and Mauricio Funes are 
closely associated with the Left. In Costa Rica, not one of the six Q-statements that make 
reference to domestic political actors (the PLN, its founder José Figueres Ferrer, the 
PUSC, former president Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia, the PAC, and the ML) loads 
heavily on either the first factor or the second factor (on which six Q-sorts are identified 
as defining sorts). 
 The fact that the two social perspectives on the meanings attached to the terms 
Left and Right shared by all but one of the eighteen Costa Rican party activists who 
participated in my Q-method study do not contain any reference to the country’s main 
political parties suggests that the reason why programmatic party-voter linkages in 
contemporary Costa Rica are so weak is that the country’s main political parties are 
indeed virtually indistinguishable from one another, at least in terms of party 
characteristics that map onto shared understandings of the left-right continuum grounded 
in preferences regarding the economic role of the state. Comments made by many of 
these party activists during the follow-up interviews I conducted after they had completed 
the Q-sort process, as well as comments made during interviews I conducted with party 
officials and Costa Rican scholars, support this interpretation. 
                                                 
9
 Tables 7.7-7.10 report the Q-statements that are strongly associated with the labels Right and Left on the second 
factor in Costa Rica and El Salvador. 
  171 
 One PLN activist and member of the party’s Fuerza Verde youth organization 
summarized the opinions expressed by many of the party activists and officials I 
interviewed when she explained that Costa Rica’s political parties “are all the same … 
they all try to attract the support of everyone … and they all have the same vision for the 
country.”10 When asked whether Costa Rica’s parties differ from one another in terms of 
the ideologies they promote, another PLN activist maintained that, “essentially, they do 
not … they all try to promote the same thing.”11 An official from the PUSC similarly 
argued that “political ideologies are not very present in Costa Rica … people tend to vote 
based on habit and their feelings towards former presidents.”12 Amongst the parties that 
received at least 5% of the vote in the 2010 legislative election, only the ML was 
identified (by one PAC official and by a member of the ML’s campaign staff) as a party 
defined by ideology.13 The PLN and the PAC, the top two vote-getters in the 2006, 2010, 
and 2014 elections, were both repeatedly described, by their own party officials and 
activists and by others, as centrist parties.  
 How, in a landscape in which “parties and candidates fight over identifying 
themselves as the party of the center”14 and where “the only thing that changes is the 
government-opposition position,”15 do parties attempt to attract voters? PLN activists 
contend that much of their party’s success can be attributed to its historical record of 
accomplishments; by virtue of having controlled the presidency for thirty-seven of the 
first fifty-seven years that followed the 1953 restoration of democratic rule, the PLN can, 
to a greater degree than any other Costa Rican political party, point to the country’s 
impressive socioeconomic development during the second half of the twentieth century 
and say “we did this.”16 In this light, the party’s “ideological pragmatism” is identified as 
an asset – it is because (PLN founder) “Figueres did not believe in dogmas” and because 
                                                 
10
  Interview conducted in San José, February 18, 2012. 
11
  Interview conducted in San José, February 18, 2012. 
12
  Interview conducted in San José, January 20, 2012. 
13
  Interviews conducted in San José, February 1, 2012 (PAC official) and in San José, February 3, 2012 (ML staff). 
14
  Interview conducted in San José with a PAC official, February 1, 2012. 
15
  Interview conducted in San José with a PLN activist, February 18, 2012. 
16
  Interview conducted in San José with a member of the PLN’s legislative staff, February 18, 2012. 
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“the PLN has not remained glued to the same ideology” that the party has been able to 
move beyond its initial social and ideological bases to remain relevant.17  
 Similarly, PAC activists and officials embrace their party’s ideological ambiguity, 
with one party official explaining that the PAC “puts the country first … there is no 
ideology.”18 Rather than present a different political program than the PLN, the PAC 
aims to differentiate itself from its main rival (and attract voters) by adopting a distinct 
political style, one that emphasizes transparency, citizen participation, and above all else, 
“the proper (i.e. ethical) administration of public resources.”19 For its part, the PUSC 
demonstrated its own non-ideological character in rather spectacular fashion in 2010, 
when presidential candidate Luis Fishman chose “el menos malo” (the least bad) as his 
official campaign slogan.20 
 Quite clearly, at least in terms of “questions of political economic regime form” 
related to the introduction and enforcement of “authoritative rules that (re)assign property 
rights and regulate people’s market behavior,” Costa Rican voters are correct to perceive 
that there is no real distinction between the PLN, the PAC, and the PUSC. Consequently, 
Costa Rican voters can reasonably conclude that there is relatively little at stake when 
they are called to the ballot box. 
 In a certain sense, this recalls the capabilities-opportunities-stakes framework 
employed by Kitschelt et al. (2010) – Costa Rican voters have the capacity to process 
competing programmatic appeals, and they have had multiple opportunities to observe 
the country’s main political parties in action (both on the campaign trail and, in the case 
of the PLN and the PUSC, in power), but the perception that election results will have 
little if any meaningful impact on the country’s future social and economic development 
has inhibited the formation of programmatic party-voter linkages. However, whereas 
Kitschelt et al. (2010) conceive of political stakes as an exogenous condition that 
influences party and voter behavior, I argue that political parties create (or fail to create) 
the perception of political stakes through their public discourse and through their efforts 
                                                 
17
  Interview conducted in San José with a PLN activist on February 18, 2012. 
18
  Interview conducted in San José, January 24, 2012. 
19
  Interview conducted in San José with one of the PAC’s founding members, January 24, 2012. 
20
  Various advertisements from the Fishman campaign, many of which border on self-parody, can be found on 
YouTube by searching for “Fishman menos malo.” 
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(or lack thereof) to develop stable relationships with their supporters that are based, at 
least in part, on programmatic appeals. As I demonstrate in the remainder of this chapter, 
the ideological ambiguity that characterizes party competition in contemporary Costa 
Rica is the product of a series of deliberate choices made by political elites at various 
points in time over the course of the past seven decades. 
 
7.2 The Birth of Modern Costa Rica, 1929-48 
 Lamenting the non-ideological nature of political competition in Costa Rica is 
something of a time-honored tradition. In the 1930s, Quijano Quesada (1939: 33, cited by 
English 1971) concluded that “political parties with definite ideas do not exist in Costa 
Rica.” Costa Rican writer Mario Sancho (1935: 49-50) elaborated further, complaining 
that, while “in other places, parties are formed by individuals who adhere to a particular 
political doctrine .... the only thing that matters to [Costa Rica’s political elites] is to win 
and to enjoy the benefits of power.” While the degree of institutionalization now 
exhibited by Costa Rican political parties far exceeds that of the earlier era of “strictly 
personalist politics” in which elections were contested by parties that “were only 
temporary coalitions designed to further the candidacy of a single individual” (English 
1971: 24), the nature of party-voter linkages appears to have changed very little. 
 By most accounts, the country’s 1948 civil war is identified as the event that gave 
birth to “modern” Costa Rica. However, in order to demonstrate how deliberate decisions 
made by Costa Rica’s party elites have contributed to the weakness of programmatic 
party-voter linkages, I begin by turning the clock back a little further and examining the 
nature of political competition in the 1930s and 1940s. This examination of political 
competition in the distant past is relevant to our efforts to identify the factors that have 
inhibited the development of programmatic political competition in contemporary Costa 
Rica because the three party types that have defined Costa Rican party politics for more 
than a half-century – namely, (1) a radical Left that has for decades exhibited high levels 
of organizational instability while it has struggled (with very little success) to achieve any 
degree of electoral relevance, (2) a reticent Left (a role fulfilled by the National 
Liberation Party until the early 1980s, and by the Citizens’ Action Party since 2000) that, 
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while favoring a high degree of state intervention in the economy, has vehemently 
identified itself as the Center, and (3) a non-Leftist opposition that, while more successful 
than the radical Left, had shared the Left’s organizational instability and its penchant for 
creating ideologically inconsistent coalitions that dilute the nature of its opposition to the 
interventionist social welfare state constructed during the 1940s and 1950s – all emerged 
and began to establish their characteristic patterns of behavior during this period. 
 As in El Salvador, the 1929 global market crash generated acute popular unrest in 
Costa Rica. Government forces faced armed insurrections in the towns of Grecia (1931) 
and San Ramón (1932) as well as the brief occupation of the Bellavista army base in San 
José (1932). Amidst this unrest, the radical Left first appeared in the form of the Costa 
Rican Communist Party (PCCR) led by Manuel Mora Valverde.21 Initially, the 
communists had little success or influence. However, after placing second behind the 
ruling National Republican Party (PRN) in the 1938 legislative election, the radical Left 
experienced a period of rapid growth.22 Paradoxically, while this rapid growth provided 
the communists with an opportunity to inject some degree of ideological content into 
Costa Rican electoral politics, it also initiated a series of events that would ultimately set 
the Costa Rican Left on a path towards electoral irrelevance. 
 Elected president in 1940, Rafael Calderón Guardia distanced himself from the 
classical liberal ideology traditionally associated with the PRN and instead embraced the 
social Christian doctrine expressed in the 1931 papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, a 
doctrine that called for state intervention, social reform, and the creation of cross-class 
labor organizations as means to mediate class conflict and, importantly, provide workers 
with an alternative to Marxist labor unions (Contreras and Cerdas 1988). Although 
Calderón implemented few significant reforms during his first two years in office,23 both 
his rhetorical embrace of state intervention and his decision to enter World War II one 
                                                 
21
 The PCCR, founded June 16, 1931, was renamed the Workers and Peasants Bloc (BOC) in 1932. The BOC was 
then disbanded and replaced by the Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) on June 13, 1943. Mora retained his position as 
undisputed leader of Costa Rica’s radical Left until 1984, when he was ousted from the PVP. 
22
 In 1939, the BOC counted only 150 members and six affiliated labor unions which represented approximately 
2,000 workers; five years later, the PVP counted more than 2,000 members and more than one hundred affiliated labor 
unions representing roughly 30,000 workers (Contreras and Cerdas 1988). 
23
  The most significant reform implemented during this period was the November 1941 creation of the Costa Rican 
Department of Social Security (CCSS, most commonly referred to as the “Caja”). 
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day after the attack on Pearl Harbor created much enmity amongst the country’s powerful 
coffee oligarchs who, incidentally, benefitted from strong commercial ties to German 
capital (Contreras 1995). Ultimately, these groups rallied around Calderón’s predecessor, 
León Cortés Castro, who abandoned the PRN and created two political parties, the 
Democratic Party (PD) and the Cortesista Party, to compete against the Calderonistas in 
the 1942 legislative election. When their electoral strategy failed – the two Cortesista 
parties received only 17.3% of the vote, compared to 63.3% for Calderón’s Independent 
National Republican Party – Calderón’s conservative opponents attempted to convince 
the communists to join forces with them in a bid to overthrow the government. 
 Rather than join this proposed coup coalition, Mora brokered the formation of an 
alliance with Calderón. In the short term, this alliance provided the communists with 
unprecedented influence over public policy; on May 1, 1942, just one month after being 
approached by Mora, Calderón announced plans to implement a number of the reforms 
that the PCCR had first called for in its March 1932 Programa Mínimo, including the 
expansion of the country’s social security system, the legal recognition of workers’ right 
to strike, and the introduction of minimum wage legislation. In order to consolidate the 
relationship with Calderón and win the backing of influential Catholic archbishop Víctor 
Manuel Sanabria, Mora dissolved the BOC on June 13, 1943, and replaced it with the 
Popular Vanguard Party (PVP). Three months later, the PRN and the PVP (which 
pointedly excluded references to socialism from its official party platform) announced the 
creation of an electoral alliance, the Bloque de la Victoria, in support of Teodoro 
Picado’s campaign in the February 1944 presidential election. 
 The decision to dissolve the BOC and replace it with the formally non-communist 
PVP was not entirely inconsistent with the ideological trajectory of the Costa Rican Left. 
The BOC had begun to moderate its ideological stance eighteen months earlier, when it 
adopted an anti-fascist platform that emphasized national unity and “democracy” (not 
“social democracy”). Moreover, Costa Rica’s communists had never been as 
revolutionary as their counterparts in much of Latin America; even in its foundational 
document, the aforementioned Programa Mínimo, the PCCR had declared that 
communism could not be implemented in Costa Rica until after it had been installed in 
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“the metropolis.” In retrospect, however, the Costa Rican Left would regret the alliance 
with Calderón because it would, in a number of ways, contribute to the electoral 
irrelevance of the radical Left in the post-war era. 
 While the period from 1942 through 1948 was particularly consequential for the 
future development of the Costa Rican Left, patterns of political behavior exhibited by 
the various groups that opposed Calderón and his communist allies also left their mark on 
political competition in the post-war era. This opposition was divided into three strains. 
The most conservative members of Costa Rican society, those who had supported Cortés 
Castro in the 1944 presidential election, favored cooperation with the Calderón and 
Picado governments as a means to limit Mora’s influence. A second grouping, led by 
Diario de Costa Rica publisher Otilio Ulate and his National Union Party (PUN), united 
middle-class groups who favored continuous opposition by legal means. Lastly, the 
Social Democratic Party (PSD), formed in March 1945 by the merger of the Center for 
the Study of National Problems (CEPN, a group of intellectuals founded in 1940) and 
Democratic Action (a faction of the Democratic Party that, under the leadership of future 
PLN presidents Figueres and Orlich, had broken away from its parent party after the 1944 
elections), argued that an armed revolt was necessary to overthrow the Calderón-Picado 
regime. 
 United by their opposition to Calderón and little else, the PD, PUN, and PSD 
created a makeshift alliance, the Democratic Union Party (PUD), in late 1945. In 
February 1947, these three parties, along with the Authentic Cortesista Party, held a joint 
national convention in which Ulate defeated Figueres24 and Fernando Castro Cervantes25 
to become the sole opposition candidate in the February 1948 presidential election. 
However, it was Figueres – not Ulate – who led the assault on government forces loyal to 
                                                 
24
  Figueres had entered the political arena in fairly spectacular fashion on July 8, 1942, when he broadcast a radio 
address criticizing the Calderón government’s inability to control anti-German riots provoked by a German U-boat 
attack on the San Pedro in Costa Rica’s Limón harbor. Arrested while still on the air, Figueres was sent to exile in 
Mexico, where he would form close ties with anti-dictatorial dissidents from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the 
Dominican Republic. Upon his return from Mexico in 1944, Figueres joined the PD, and later Democratic Action. A 
month after the PSD’s founding convention, Figueres resigned his position as head of the new party’s finance 
department and returned to the PD. He left the PD again in 1946 to form the Authentic Cortesista Party with Cortés 
Castro’s son, Otto, but he continued to collaborate with the PSD. 
25
  Castro Cervantes had succeeded Cortés Castro as leader of the PD upon the latter’s death in March 1946. 
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Calderón after the legislature voted to annul the election results. The enormous impact 
that this had on Costa Rican politics is still felt today. 
 Ostensibly, Figueres had led the anti-Calderón revolt in order to defend the 
electoral process and allow Ulate to assume the presidency. However, thanks to his 
military exploits during the six-week war, Figueres “became a charismatic national 
caudillo overnight” (English 1971: 47). Suddenly the most powerful political figure in 
Costa Rica, Figueres forced Ulate to agree to an arrangement by which a Figueres-led 
junta would rule the country for eighteen months – during which time elections would be 
held for a Constitutional Assembly and a new legislature – before passing the presidency 
on to Ulate. The decision to postpone the Ulate presidency combined with the policies 
that the Figueres-led junta implemented during those eighteen months precipitated the 
dissolution of the anti-Calderón alliance. 
 The irrevocable split that soon developed between Ulate’s PUN and the Figueres-
led junta has a simple explanation: the two groups had opposed Calderón for different 
reasons. Whereas Ulate was opposed to the social reforms enacted by the Calderón and 
Picado governments, Figueres opposed Calderón on procedural and nationalist grounds – 
he accused Calderón of electoral manipulation and corruption while characterizing his 
alliance with Mora as evidence that Costa Rica had fallen victim to a global communist 
revolution (Bodenheimer 1970) – but he fully supported the reforms that Calderón had 
introduced. As illustrated in Figure 7.1, both the Calderón-Communist alliance and the 
PUD (shaded in grey) crossed ideological lines; in terms of their preferences regarding 
the economic role of the state, the PUN and the PD were clearly to the right of Calderón, 
while Figueres would, first as leader of the junta (1948-49) and then as president (1953-
58 and 1970-74), demonstrate that, in terms of his beliefs regarding the appropriate 
economic role of the state, he had more in common with the Communists (whom he 
nonetheless despised) than with any of his partners in the pre-war anti-Calderón alliance. 
As described below, the formation of ideologically-inconsistent coalitions has been 
something of a recurring pattern in Costa Rican party politics 
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Figure 7.1 – Relative Left-Right Placement, 1948 
 
 Mora   Figueres   Calderón   Ulate   Castro C. 
 PVP  PSD  PRN  PUN  PD 
 
 In the following sections, I abandon a strictly chronological approach in favor of 
one that focuses on the ways that each specific type of actor – the radical Left, the 
reticent Left, and the non-Leftist opposition – has, through the strategic choices it has 
made during the past seven decades, contributed to the weakness of programmatic party-
voter linkages in contemporary Costa Rica.26 
 
7.3 The Long Fall of the Costa Rican Left 
 As noted above, the Calderón-Mora alliance exerted a heavy influence on the 
future development of the Costa Rican Left. First, this alliance made it possible for the 
Calderonistas to take full credit for the progressive reforms – including the promulgation 
of a new Labor Code that gave workers the right to organize and to strike, established 
minimum wage laws, and introduced the eight-hour work day – implemented by the 
Calderón (1940-44) and Picado (1944-48) governments, even though the communists and 
their labor union affiliates had taken a leading role in organizing the series of meetings 
and demonstrations held throughout 1942-43 that raised popular support for these 
reforms. As a result, “the masses ended up believing that these reforms had come to them 
from above, and not that they were fruits that the masses had planted and harvested” 
(Cerdas 1993: 154). After the 1948 civil war, the governing PLN successfully constructed 
a national myth that highlighted Costa Rica’s democratic tradition, its relatively 
egalitarian social order, and its peaceful political history (Bodenheimer 1970). In this 
version of Costa Rican history, Calderón is described as a pawn of the communists, who 
are identified as the party responsible for the violent interruption that culminated in the 
1948 civil war, while Figueres is presented as the savior of the country’s democratic 
tradition. 
                                                 
26
 Appendix 7.B provides a political timeline that readers may find useful. 
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 The pervasiveness of this myth of Costa Rican exceptionalism was evident as I 
conducted interviews with Costa Rican party activists. For instance, one PAC elected 
official explained that “Costa Ricans are not extremists, they are characterized by being 
democratic, pacifist, and having moderate values … the topic of ideology is 
uncomfortable.”27 Similarly, a PLN activist argued that “Costa Rican political parties try 
to avoid aggressive confrontations that would force voters to make a clear choice in favor 
of one camp or the other because Costa Rica characterizes itself as a peaceful country.”28 
Because this pervasive interpretation of Costa Rica’s political history promotes the 
perception that progressive reforms were concessions granted by elites (and not the result 
of political battles won by workers), it has contributed greatly to the repeated failure of 
efforts to build the strong labor organizations that might provide the Left with a stable 
support base. It has also contributed to a clear aversion to being identified with the Left – 
as one scholar of the Costa Rican party system explains, there is still “a very high 
political cost for being identified with the Left … in Costa Rica, being a leftist is 
something bad [that is equated with] being an extremist, with wanting conflict, with using 
violence to achieve your goals.”29  
 Moreover, the implementation, under Calderón and Picado, and the subsequent 
expansion, under PLN presidents Figueres Ferrer (1948-49 and 1953-58) and Orlich 
(1962-66), of many of the reforms that Costa Rica’s communists had pressed for when 
they arrived on the scene in the early 1930s left the PVP and its successors in a situation 
analogous to that of the Socialist Party in the US after Roosevelt introduced the New 
Deal – its call for reform appropriated by other political forces, the Costa Rican Left was 
left without much of a platform to call its own. This has made it difficult for the Left to 
clearly distinguish itself from other parties, which in turn has contributed to the Left’s 
poor electoral performance. 
 Additionally, by allying with Calderón, the communists had chosen the losing 
side of history vis-à-vis the country’s brief 1948 civil war. Although the relationship 
between communists and Calderonistas had become more distant during Picado’s 
                                                 
27
  Interview conducted in San José, January 29, 2012. 
28
  Interview conducted in San José, February 18, 2012. 
29
  Interview conducted with Ronald Alfaro Redondo, via Skype, on February 2, 2012. 
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presidency,30 the PVP supported Calderón’s candidacy in the February 1948 presidential 
election, even though Calderón refused to sign any formal pact with the PVP. When 
Costa Rica’s electoral commission declared opposition candidate Otilio Ulate the 
provisional winner, Calderón called on the legislature to overturn the election results. On 
March 1, the Costa Rican legislature voted 27-19 to annul the results of the presidential 
election. In what party leaders would later recognize as “a grave political and historical 
error” (Contreras 1995: 68), all nine PVP legislators voted in favor of the motion to 
rescind Ulate’s victory. Eleven days later, the National Liberation Army led by José 
Figueres Ferrer launched its insurgency, capturing the town of San Isidro de El General. 
 The Costa Rican civil war was a relatively brief affair; the final battle between 
government forces and insurgents took place on April 19, when Figueres’s forces 
recaptured San Isidro de El General. Two agreements, the Pact of Ochomogo (between 
Figueres and Mora) and the Pact of the Mexican Embassy (between Figueres and 
Picado), put a definitive end to hostilities. Under the terms of the Pact of Ochomogo, 
Mora instructed the communist militias gathered in San José to lay down their arms in 
exchange for Figueres’s promise to maintain the progressive reforms that had been 
enacted since 1940 and to allow the PVP and its associated labor organizations to retain 
their legal status. While Figueres not only preserved but indeed expanded upon the social 
reforms that had been introduced by Calderón and Picado, he reneged on the other terms 
of the Pact of Ochomogo almost immediately. 
 On July 17, the Figueres-led Junta Fundadora de la Segunda República emitted 
Decree 105, which explicitly prohibited the PVP from participating in the electoral 
process because it was “antidemocratic.” This prohibition was retained in Article 98 of 
the 1949 Constitution, written while Figueres served as provisional president. Moreover, 
Figueres targeted members of the PVP and the Confederation of Costa Rican Workers as 
he implemented “a repression never before known in Costa Rica” (Contreras 1995: 76). 
During the eighteen months that the Junta retained power, roughly 3,000 of Figueres’s 
political opponents were put in prison (where at least six were assassinated), another 
                                                 
30
  After publicly protesting the slow pace of reforms under Picado in July 1945, the PVP ran an independent slate of 
candidates in the 1946 legislative. For his part, Picado began to distance himself from the PVP in 1946 as the anti-
fascist rhetoric of the WWII era began to give way to Cold War-era anti-Communism 
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7,000 were forced into exile, and persons affiliated with either Calderón or the 
communists were barred from public employment. As described by Zúñiga and Dobles 
Oropeza (2004: 193), this episode served “as a type of ‘historical fingerprint’ that 
impeded … the Popular Vanguard Party from having any political influence in the 
country” even after the prohibition on communist parties was lifted in 1975. 
 Though prohibited, the PVP never truly disappeared. Although its repeated efforts 
to participate in the electoral process under assumed names were never successful,31 the 
PVP remained relevant by lending organizational support to the four non-communist 
leftist parties that emerged during the 1960s and 1970s.32 While formally prohibited, the 
PVP also participated in community development projects during the late 1950s and early 
1960s, it remained active in Costa Rica’s labor union movement (which, though always 
weak, enjoyed something of a renaissance during the 1970s) and, beginning in the late 
1960s, it played an important role in student politics on the country’s university 
campuses. When the prohibition was lifted in 1975, the PVP was afforded the 
opportunity to gauge its level of popular support for the first time since the 1940s. 
 Ultimately, however, the legalization of the PVP had little immediate impact on 
political competition in Costa Rica. Maintaining the same strategy of alliances that it had 
employed in the 1940s, the PVP soon joined forces with the Costa Rican Socialist Party 
(PSC) and the People’s Revolutionary Movement (MRP) to form the People United 
Coalition (CPU). Although the CPU finished third in the 1978 presidential and legislative 
elections, its vote total was rather meager: with 7.7% of the vote, the CPU won three 
seats in the legislature, while its presidential candidate received only 2.7% of the vote. 
The 1982 election only confirmed the weakness of the Costa Rican Left; even though the 
CPU was ostensibly strengthened by the incorporation of the Costa Rican Popular Front 
(PFPC) and the Socialist Organization of Workers Party (POST), two parties that had 
                                                 
31
  The PVP attempted (unsuccessfully) to register under aliases in 1949 (National Democratic Party), 1953 
(Independent Progressive Party), 1957 (Popular Union Party), 1962 (Costa Rican Socialist Party), 1965 (Socialist 
Popular Alliance Party), and 1969 (Workers, Farmers, and Intellectuals Bloc). 
32
  The Popular Democratic Action Party (PADP), formed by a group that had broken away from the PLN, was the 
first of these four parties; it won one seat in the Legislative Assembly in 1962. The PADP was succeeded by the 
Socialist Action Party (PASO), which won two seats in the 1970 legislative election (one of them occupied by Mora) 
and again in 1974 (when Mora received 2.4% of the vote as the party’s presidential candidate). Both the Costa Rican 
Popular Front (PFPC) and the Costa Rican Socialist Party (PSC) emerged prior to the 1974 election, but neither party 
won any seats in the legislature. 
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participated independently in the 1978 election (receiving a total of 2.0% of the vote and 
one seat in the legislature, won by the PFPC), the CPU’s vote total fell to 6.4%.  
 Shortly after the 1982 election, longstanding ideological differences between 
proponents of revolutionary action (led by Humberto Vargas Carbonell) and supporters 
of a more gradual, reformist approach (led by Mora) – differences that had been brought 
to the fore by disagreements regarding the “correct” analysis of Costa Rica’s political 
situation in light of the Sandinista triumph in neighboring Nicaragua and the rise of the 
revolutionary Left in El Salvador – generated a split within the PVP that eventually led 
Mora to abandon the party and form the Costa Rican People’s Party (PPC) in 1984 
(Zúñiga and Dobles Oropeza 2004). For the next thirty years, the Left repeatedly proved 
itself incapable of maintaining any semblance of organizational stability.33 As a result, 
the Left was in no position to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the PLN’s 
neoliberal turn to finally distinguish itself in programmatic terms and to leverage public 
support for preserving state control over certain sectors of the economy34 by presenting 
and emphasizing a political program that clearly differed from the market-friendly 
reforms offered since the early 1980s by the PLN and the PUSC. 
 Even when the Democratic Force (FD) party did take an active role in generating 
linkages with the social movements that had formed to protest against the proposed 
privatization of Costa Rica’s telecommunications and electricity sectors (the “Combo 
ICE”), the potential benefits of these efforts were soon lost as the party was torn apart by 
internal divisions which eventually led the FD to disappear shortly after the 2002 
election. This episode stands as an example of the organizational instability that, 
                                                 
33
  Additional leftist parties/coalitions that have emerged following the 1984 split within the PVP include: the Popular 
Alliance coalition (formed in 1986 by the PVP and the Broad Democratic Front), the Workers Revolutionary Party 
(PRT, founded prior to the 1990 election), Democratic Force (founded prior to the 1994 election), the National Rescue 
Party (founded in 1996), the Change 2000 coalition (formed by the PVP, the PSC, and the Alajuela Democratic Action 
Party), the United Left coalition (formed prior to the 2006 election by the Autonomous Movement of the People 
United, the Workers and Farmers Movement, the PPC, the PRT, the Workers Socialist Party, and the PVP), the Broad 
Front (founded in 2004 by members of the Alternative Left Movement), the Patriotic Union (founded in 2005), the 
Workers Party (founded in 2012), the New Socialist Party (founded in 2012), and the New Fatherland Party (founded in 
2012). 
34
  In one 1998 survey, 71-85% of Costa Rican voters responded that (1) telecommunications, (2) electricity, (3) water, 
(4) sanitation, (5) health care, (6) basic education, and (7) pensions should remain in the hands of the state (Gangas and 
Retana 2006). 
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combined with the virtual decimation of Costa Rica’s labor movement,35 prevented the 
Left from achieving electoral relevance during the era of two-party rule. Indeed, it would 
not be until 2014, when the Broad Front (FA) received 13.1% of the vote in the 
legislative election, that any party that self-identified as the Left received even 10% of 
the vote. 
 
7.4 “Izquierda” is a Four-Letter Word 
 In the immediate aftermath of the 1948 civil war, Figueres’s supporters attempted 
to use his status as “the last popular caudillo in Latin American history” (Guerra 1997: 7) 
to raise the public profile of the Social Democratic Party. However, the poor results 
obtained by the PSD in the 1948 Constituent Assembly election (when the party won 
only three of forty-five seats, a far cry from the PUN’s thirty-four seats) and the 1949 
legislative election (when the PSD again won only three of forty-five seats) led the 
members of the governing junta to believe that “a completely new organization would 
have to be built around the charismatic personality of Figueres” (English 1971: 48). 
Convinced that the PSD would never be able to “shake its image as a closed group of 
liberal intellectuals” (English 1971: 37), Figueres and his supporters formed Costa Rica’s 
first permanent political party, the National Liberation Party (PLN), in October 1951. By 
August 1952, the PLN had established a presence in each of the country’s eighty-one 
cantones as it prepared to participate in the July 1953 general election. 
 Upon its foundation, the PLN possessed “the roots for a reasonably coherent 
ideology … [influenced by] a variety of sources including the revisionist doctrines of 
European socialism and the domestic oriented approach of the Latin American Apristas, 
tempered by the pragmatism of the New Deal and twentieth-century regulatory 
liberalism” (English 1971: 129-130). The various progressive reforms that Figueres 
implemented while the junta was in power – Figueres not only expanded many of the 
                                                 
35
  After experiencing a brief period of growth during the 1970s, Costa Rica’s private sector labor unions (which were 
largely concentrated in the banana industry) were subjected to renewed repression during the Carazo (1978-82) and 
Monge (1982-86) governments. Failed strikes of PVP-affiliated banana workers in 1982 and 1984 – prolonged conflicts 
that eventually prompted the United Fruit Company to abandon the country – also contributed to the labor movement’s 
decline (Mora Solano 2007). 
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reforms that the Calderón and Picado governments had introduced, but he also introduced 
women’s suffrage, established an independent and non-partisan elections commission, 
abolished racial segregation, nationalized the banking system, introduced loan and 
assistance programs for small farmers, created the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity 
(ICE), and abolished the country’s armed forces – served as a clear demonstration of the 
PLN’s “combination of classical liberal values emphasizing faith in the democratic 
process, the rule of law, and respect for the individual, together with Western socialist 
beliefs in the social use of private property and active state participation in economic 
development” (English 1971: 140). With the communists proscribed and in exile, the 
PLN could have emphasized its ideological identity and established itself as the 
progressive anchor of the Costa Rican party system, and it could have used its relatively 
extensive party organization to foster the growth of programmatic linkages with its 
supporters. It chose not to do so. 
 While in exile in Mexico, Figueres had written that it was necessary to “give the 
country a social orientation; to make the state gradually assume control over all economic 
activity with the objective of increasing the production of wealth and the distribution of 
its benefits” (Figueres 1934, cited by Guerra 1997). However, he also argued that the 
interventionist approach espoused by the PLN – an approach English (1971: 131) 
described as a “moderate and ‘respectable’ brand of socialism” – was simply a pragmatic 
response to the social, economic, and political problems that Costa Rica faced, and not an 
attempt to implement any particular political ideology. Stating that “the business of left or 
right is foolishness,” Figueres was adamant that “we [the PLN] are not from the 
democratic left, nor do we call ourselves by that name” (Bodenheimer 1970: 90). 
Inasmuch as the PLN was essentially built around the charismatic caudillo, Figueres’s 
reticence to describe the party and its political platform in ideological terms discouraged 
the PLN from emphasizing its programmatic identity. 
 The opposition’s weakness and disorganization also effectively discouraged the 
PLN from investing in the formation of programmatic party-voter linkages. The party’s 
landslide victory in the 1953 general election – Figueres defeated PD leader Castro 
Cervantes, the sole opposition candidate, by a 29.4% margin, and the PLN captured thirty 
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of the forty-five seats in the Legislative Assembly – convinced the PLN leadership that 
the party need not invest resources in the construction and promotion of a well-defined 
programmatic identity. Consequently, the PLN made “no attempt … to maintain regular 
contact with the masses in non-election years” during the 1950s and 1960s (Bodenheimer 
1970: 65). 
 The unity of the PLN was put to the test after the 1966 election, when PLN 
candidate Daniel Oduber lost the presidential election to José Joaquín Trejos of the 
National Unification Party following a campaign that uncharacteristically featured public 
debate regarding the appropriate economic role of the state. Due to ideological and 
generational cleavages between the party’s older, more conservative wing (led by 
Figueres and Orlich) and its younger, more progressive wing (led by Oduber), some 
conservatives within the PLN had lent only lukewarm support to Oduber’s 1966 
presidential campaign. Oduber’s defeat exacerbated these tensions to such a degree that, 
in 1968, Figueres threatened to abandon the PLN and resurrect the Social Democratic 
Party if the PLN’s progressive wing did not support his bid to become the party’s next 
presidential candidate. By succumbing to Figueres’s threats – a decision that led a small 
group of progressives to abandon the PLN and form the Socialist Action Party (PASO) in 
1969 – the PLN exhibited what Hernández Naranjo (2009: 11-12) describes as “a certain 
centrifugal tendency,” present throughout its history, by which “groups that come into 
conflict with the party’s leadership have opted to look for another tent [party] or to create 
their own,”36 and it also confirmed its commitment to presenting the party as the center of 
Costa Rica’s political spectrum. 
 The PLN’s commitment to the statist development model introduced by Figueres 
was tested, and quickly broken, by the full-blown economic crisis that descended upon 
Costa Rica in 1979. Since 1950, Costa Rica had enjoyed impressive economic growth 
(annual GDP growth rate averaged 6.2%) by following a development strategy that 
combined reliance on traditional exports (primarily coffee and bananas) with the 
                                                 
36
  Similar episodes occurred prior to elections in 1958 (leading to the formation of the Independent Party and the 
Revolutionary Civic Union, UCR), 1962 (resulting in the creation of the Popular Democratic Action party), 1974 
(resulting in the creation of the Democratic Renovation Party, PRD), and 2002 (leading to the formation of the Change 
2000 coalition and the Citizens’ Action Party, PAC). 
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intervention of an “entrepreneur state” (Seligson and Martínez 2005) that created 
numerous state-owned enterprises in a number of industries. At the same time, Costa 
Rica had created an extensive social welfare state that helped the country achieve 
significant advances in education, health care, social assistance, and housing provision.  
When the collapse of the Central American Common Market, the impact of the 1973 and 
1979 oil shocks, and a decline in global coffee prices generated sizable trade and fiscal 
deficits (and also served to discourage foreign investment in Costa Rica), real disposable 
income fell by almost 40% between 1979 and 1982 (Wilson 1994).  
 Because no Costa Rican government had enacted the tax reforms necessary to 
finance the country’s extensive development and social welfare programs (Bodenheimer 
1970), Costa Rica rapidly became reliant on foreign lending when its economy faltered. 
Between 1978 and 1984, Costa Rica’s foreign debt rose from $1.1 billion to $3.8 billion, 
an amount that not only exceeded the country’s GDP ($3.1 billion) but also gave Costa 
Rica one of the highest per capita debts in the world (Wilson 1994, Seligson and 
Martínez 2005). In the face of heightened economic vulnerability, Costa Rica was forced 
to reconsider the development model that the country had followed since the late 1940s. 
Beginning in 1979, when President Rodrigo Carazo (the PRD leader and former PLN 
legislator who won the 1978 presidential election under the banner of the Unity 
Coalition) introduced a National Export Plan that emphasized the importance of non-
traditional exports, Costa Rica’s political elites started to redefine the economic role of 
the state (Hess and Li 1995).  
 After regaining the presidency in the 1982 election, the PLN faced an important 
political dilemma. While the PLN had long promoted itself as the party responsible for 
the creation of Costa Rica’s social welfare state and for the implementation of the 
heterodox development strategy that had produced three decades of unprecedented 
economic growth, the party’s leadership now believed that fundamental changes were 
required to confront the ongoing economic crisis. Fearing a public backlash to the PLN’s 
imminent about-face regarding the economic role of the state, President Luis Alberto 
Monge entered into a pact with Rafael Ángel Calderón Fournier, the candidate he had 
defeated in the presidential election – in exchange for the opposition’s agreement to 
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support the government’s efforts to pull Costa Rica out of its economic crisis, the PLN 
introduced reforms to the electoral code that allowed the Unity Coalition to register as a 
political party.37 
 The 1982 pact “would mark the tone and character of the interactions between 
these two groupings from that point forward” (Hernández Naranjo 2009: 29) and, in the 
process, dash any hopes that programmatic political competition might emerge as a result 
of electoral competition between a statist PLN and a market-oriented PUSC. As President 
Óscar Arias (1986-90) turned the PLN away from its social democratic roots by 
embracing the neoliberal reforms pushed by the United States38 and the World Bank,39 
programmatic differences between the PLN and the PUSC “mostly revolved around the 
pace rather than the direction of change” (Seligson and Martínez 2005: 6, emphasis in 
original).  
 This process of ideological convergence was made explicit in April 1995, when 
the PLN’s José María Figueres Olsen (winner of the 1994 presidential election) and the 
PUSC’s Rafael Ángel Calderón Fournier (who had held the presidency in 1990-94) 
agreed to implement a new round of legal reforms designed to facilitate the 
transformation/privatization of various state institutions associated with the country’s 
social welfare apparatus. The historical symbolism associated with the Figueres-Calderón 
pact was impossible to ignore: In the 1940s, Figueres and Calderón (fathers) fought a war 
and contributed to the creation of Costa Rica’s interventionist social welfare state; five 
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  Under the terms of laws introduced in 1956, Costa Rican political parties that receive a certain percentage of the 
vote (the threshold was originally set at 10%, lowered to 5% in 1972, and lowered again to 4% in 1997) are eligible to 
have at least some portion of their campaign expenditures reimbursed by the state (the total amount of public financing 
available to political parties for their campaign expenses was originally set at 2% of the average government budget 
during the three years prior to the election; this was later changed, in 1997, to 0.19% of the GDP in the year before the 
election), with these funds distributed to eligible parties in proportion to the number of votes they receive. As the law 
stood in 1982, the four parties that formed the Unity Coalition would have had to forfeit the funds to which they would 
otherwise be entitled if they dissolved their independent party structures to form a new political party. Reforms 
introduced by the PLN in 1983 allowed the PUSC to register as a party and retain the public financing to which the four 
constituent parties of the Unity Coalition were entitled. 
38
  During 1983-85, US aid accounted for 35.7% of the Costa Rican government’s revenues. At the same time, the US 
pushed for the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the promotion of non-traditional exports, a reduction in the 
scope and budgets of state agencies, and reforms designed to permit the establishment of a private banking sector 
(Seligson and Martínez 2005). 
39
  Costa Rica received structural adjustment loans in 1985, 1989, and 1994. In exchange for these loans, which totaled 
$460 million, the World Bank pressured Costa Rica to privatize various industries (including the sugar, cement, 
aluminum, and fertilizer industries), reduce/eliminate subsidies for domestic consumer goods, lower import tariffs, 
remove restrictions on the import of basic grains, foment the growth of the private banking sector, and limit the growth 
of public employment (Vega 1996). 
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decades later, Figueres and Calderón (sons) formed an alliance in order to facilitate the 
process of reducing the economic role of the state. With any semblance of programmatic 
competition replaced by a degree of bi-partisan cooperation that verged on co-
governance, the PLN and PUSC “rapidly became ‘cartel parties’ … oriented toward 
profiting from the immediate benefits derived from their political power” (Rovira Más 
2007: 117). 
 The fact that electoral “competition” between the PLN and PUSC had ceased to 
be truly competitive in a programmatic sense was not lost on Costa Rican voters, many of 
whom responded to the Figueres-Calderón pact by disengaging from the party system. 
Public opinion surveys uncovered a sharp decline in partisanship.40 Seemingly signaling a 
desire for a new alternative to the PLN and the PUSC, voters greeted this new dynamic of 
two-party non-competition with record levels of absenteeism in the 1998 election41 – as 
Oconitrillo (2004) notes, more people (657,282) voted for nobody (via abstention, blank 
ballots, and null votes) than for the winning candidate, the PUSC’s Miguel Ángel 
Rodríguez. A new agreement between the two parties in 1999 regarding the introduction 
of a series of laws (referred to as the Combo ICE) designed to privatize the 
telecommunications sector, reduce the state’s role in electricity production and 
distribution, and allow for the private exploitation of water resources located within 
Costa Rica’s protected areas further stimulated opponents to the PLN’s neoliberal turn 
and the resultant lack of political options. 
 Whereas the neoliberal reforms facilitated by the 1995 Figueres-Calderón pact 
were met with only limited public opposition, the March 20, 2000, vote in favor of the 
extremely unpopular Combo ICE42 generated “one of the strongest social protest 
movements in the country’s recent history” (Hernández Naranjo 2009: 31). Widespread 
                                                 
40
  From 1990 through 1995, the percentage of voters who professed no party identification ranged between 13.4% and 
21.5%; from 1996 through 2001, this figure ranged between 30.1% and 43.5% (Hernández Naranjo 2009: 37). 
41
  From 1962 through 1994, absenteeism in national elections had ranged between 16.7% and 21.4%. In 1998, this 
figure jumped to 30.0%. Since then, absenteeism has ranged between 30.9% and 34.8%. 
42
  Gangas and Retana (2006) cite a public opinion survey conducted in 2000 which found that 81.8% of Costa Rican 
voters opposed the Combo ICE. The Legislative Assembly nonetheless passed the measure by a vote of forty-seven to 
ten. Every PUSC legislator and all but three PLN deputies voted in favor of the Combo ICE. 
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public protests,43 including a March 23 protest march that attracted tens of thousands of 
participants and a general strike called by the Federation of Workers in Limón province, 
forced the government of President Miguel Ángel Rodríguez (PUSC) to initiate (on April 
4) a dialogue with representatives of the loosely-organized network of student groups, 
labor unions, and civil society organizations whose opposition to the Combo ICE could 
be interpreted as a defense of the social democratic beliefs and intentions held by PLN 
founder Figueres Ferrer (Solis 2002).  
 Later that same year, after the Combo ICE had been withdrawn from 
consideration,44 a new candidate to take up the mantle of Costa Rica’s non-radical Left 
emerged: the Citizens’ Action Party (PAC). Founded in December 2000 by a group of 
PLN dissidents who were critical of the PLN’s close relationship with the PUSC – in the 
words of the PAC’s founding members, the Combo ICE revealed the PLN and the PUSC 
to be “a single party with two banners”45 – and corruption within the two parties, the 
PAC achieved unprecedented success for a third party when it received 22% of the 
legislative vote in the 2002 election while its leader, former PLN legislator and 
Economics Minister Ottón Solís, received 26% of the presidential vote, enough to force a 
run-off election between the PLN and PUSC candidates (which was won by the PUSC’s 
Abel Pacheco). The demise of the two-party system that had been in place since the late 
1970s was accelerated by a series of corruption scandals, which first broke in April 2004, 
that eventually resulted in the imprisonment of former presidents Calderón Fournier 
(1990-94) and Rodríguez (1994-98)46 and proved nearly fatal to the PUSC.47  
                                                 
43
  According to Gangas and Retana (2006), there were 103 highway blockages and 274 public acts of protest between 
March 16 and April 4. 
44
  Shortly after public opposition to the Combo ICE exploded, the PLN withdrew its support from measure in an 
effort to shift the blame for the unpopular proposal squarely onto the PUSC’s shoulders (Solis 2002). The Rodríguez 
government subsequently withdrew the proposal (which, in any event, was eventually declared unconstitutional by the 
Constitutional Chamber of Costa Rica’s Supreme Court) and cancelled its plans to move forward with additional 
privatization proposals. 
45
   Interview conducted in San José, January 24, 2012. 
46
  In October 2009, Calderón Fournier was sentenced to five years in prison for his role in a scheme (the CCSS-
Fischel case) by which Finnish company Instrumentarium Medko Medical’s representative in Costa Rica bribed 
government officials in order to win a contract to sell medical supplies to the Costa Rican Department of Social 
Security. On appeal, his sentence was reduced to three years in May 2011. In April 2011, Rodríguez was convicted of 
having received more than $800,000 for providing French telecommunications company Alcatel with a government 
contract to provide cell phone service (the ICE-Alcatel case). His conviction was overturned on appeal in December 
2012. 
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 One month after the CCSS-Fischel case first made headlines, President Pacheco 
signed a free trade agreement with the United States, the other four Central American 
republics, and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA in English, TLC in Spanish), an act that 
set into motion a series of events that ultimately provided the opposition (this time, the 
PAC) with yet another opportunity to present voters with a clear ideological alternative to 
the new, market-friendly development strategy implemented over the course of the 
previous two decades. Although popular opposition to the TLC had emerged as early as 
2003, when the terms of the agreement were still being negotiated, the massive, highly 
decentralized coalition of approximately 200 “Patriotic Committees” that formed the 
“Patriotic Movement No to the TLC” did not begin to take shape until May 2007, five 
months before the October 7, 2007, binding public referendum that was called to 
determine whether Costa Rica would ratify the agreement.  
 Multiple, overlapping interpretations have been offered in response to the 
question of why the TLC generated the largest popular mobilization in recent Costa 
Rican history. The “No” movement has been described as (1) a reflection of Costa Rican 
citizens’ commitment to maintaining the social welfare state constructed during the 1940s 
and 1950s, (2) an expression of popular discontent regarding the role that neoliberal 
reforms introduced during the 1980s and 1990s had played in increasing socioeconomic 
inequality and social exclusion, (3) a fight to defend the social, economic, political, and 
environmental conquests won by previous generations, (4) a reaction to a mode of 
politics characterized by corruption, clientelism, a lack of transparency, and non-
participatory decision-making processes, (5) an exercise of political participation, and (6) 
a process of political education (Raventós 2008, Rayner 2008, Álvarez Rudín 2011). The 
tactics employed by the Patriotic Committees – which included the organization of public 
lectures and training workshops, the creation and distribution of pamphlets, and door-to-
door canvassing – were very similar to the methods employed by El Salvador’s FMLN in 
its efforts to generate popular support by making voters familiar with its programmatic 
preferences. 
                                                                                                                                                 
47
  During the period 1986-98, the PUSC received, on average, 42.3% of the vote in legislative elections and 48.0% of 
the vote in presidential elections. In the period 2006-14, those figures have fallen to 8.7% and 4.5%, respectively. 
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 Inasmuch as the PLN’s transformation from being “first and foremost a reformist 
party that stressed … economic diversification with a strong role for the state, the 
redistribution of income, the building of a robust middle-class, and the expansion of 
social insurance and education” (Seligson and Martínez 2005: 3) to being a party that 
supported privatization and trade liberalization had been one of the factors that 
precipitated the creation of the PAC, one might have expected the new party (which had, 
in 2006, supplanted the PUSC as the main opposition to the PLN) to attempt to position 
itself as the reincarnation of the pre-1980s, social democratic PLN. And indeed, the PAC 
was one of the many political parties48 that mobilized their organizational structures and 
encouraged their sympathizers to participate in the “No” movement (Montero Mejía 
2007). Indeed, in many communities, it was the PAC’s local party organization that 
initiated the creation of Patriotic Committees. 
 However, as the “No” movement rapidly disintegrated after the referendum 
(which resulted in a 51.6% to 48.4% victory for the pro-TLC camp) was held, the PAC 
was unable to create permanent ties with many of the labor unions, civil society 
organizations, and individual voters who had formed the Patriotic Committees, in part 
because of the perception that the PAC offered inconsistent opposition to the TLC 
(Rayner 2008). While the prominent role that the PAC played in the campaign to block 
ratification of the TLC had seemingly provided the party with the opportunity to become 
the stable, organized, electorally-relevant Left that Costa Rica has not had since the early 
1940s, the PAC has instead preferred to emphasize its commitment to increasing citizen 
participation and its fight against government corruption. As a result, contemporary 
electoral competition between the PLN and the PAC reflects the same high degree of 
ideological ambiguity that characterized the relationship between the PLN and the PUSC 
once the PLN embraced neoliberal reform in the early 1980s. 
 In 2000, the Costa Rican Left was incapable of converting public backlash against 
a neoliberal reform (the Combo ICE) into the foundation for the promotion of 
programmatic party-voter linkages. In 2007, the PAC was unwilling to do so. Indeed, 
                                                 
48
  In additional to the PAC, three Leftist parties (the Broad Front, the PPC, and the National Rescue Party) and the 
Accessibility Without Exclusion Party (PASE, a small party that focuses on protecting and promoting the rights of 
disabled persons) played an active role in the anti-TLC movement. 
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since its foundation, the PAC has displayed a stubborn unwillingness to proclaim any 
ideology. Costa Rican sociologist Ciska Raventós suggests that one reason why the PAC 
assiduously attempts to place itself at the center, rather than present itself as the anti-
neoliberal opposition to the PLN, can be traced to the fact that the party’s leadership 
developed within the post-war anti-communist mindset and therefore distances itself from 
being identified with the Left.49 Just as Figueres refused to label the PLN as a leftist 
party, PAC leader Ottón Solis contends that the PAC is “a post-Berlin Wall party. The 
categories left and right [have] become sort of irrelevant.… We are truly middle of the 
road, I think, and coherently so.”50 
 
7.5 Musical Chairs to the Rhythm of Calypso: Opposition to the PLN 
 In Chapter One, I explain that my decision to focus on the organizational and 
political activity of the Left is guided by the fact that, in most of Latin America 
throughout most of the twentieth century, the state was under the control of right-wing 
and/or center-right actors. Under this status quo, it was the Left that most frequently 
constituted the type of “externally mobilized party” (Shefter 1977, 1993) that would have 
the greatest incentive to push for programmatic political competition. Costa Rica, 
however, represents something of a special case in this regard inasmuch as political 
competition in the post-war era has been dominated by the (initially) statist PLN. While it 
is difficult to conceive of any sizable opposition movement forming to the right of the 
military regimes that ruled many Latin American countries (including El Salvador and 
Guatemala), there was certainly sufficient ideological room to the right of the PLN for 
opponents of state economic intervention to seek public support by emphasizing that 
opposition. For this reason, it is important to examine the behavior of the non-left 
opposition to the PLN. 
 As mentioned above, the anti-Figueres opposition was in a state of disarray at the 
time of the 1953 general election. The PUN ultimately chose to support PD leader Castro 
Cervantes after its own presidential candidate, Mario Echandi, withdrew his candidacy. 
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  Interview conducted in San José, February 15, 2012. 
50
  Interview conducted in San José, February 1, 2012. 
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With many of their leaders still in exile, the Calderonistas decided not to participate in 
the 1953 presidential election.51 Even the communists, whose attempt to participate in the 
election under the banner of the Independent Progressive Party was thwarted when that 
party’s registration was revoked two days before the election, supported Castro 
Cervantes, making the anti-Figueres coalition every bit as ideologically incoherent as the 
1948 anti-Calderón coalition had been. 
 Five years later, the Calderonistas (now grouped under the banner of the 
Republican Party, PR) joined forces with the PUN and the PD (the party that, just sixteen 
years earlier, had been plotting a coup to overthrow the Calderón government) to support 
Echandi’s presidential bid. Although this effort was successful – largely because of 
internal divisions within the PLN, Echandi was able to win the presidency with 46.4% of 
the vote52 – and although the PR-PUN-PD coalition exhibited a greater degree of 
ideological consistency than previous opposition coalitions, this grouping fell apart prior 
to the 1962 election, which allowed the PLN’s candidate, Francisco Orlich (50.3% of the 
vote), to secure a relatively easy victory over Calderón (35.3%) and Ulate (13.5%). 
 The 1966 election stands out as another historical moment when Costa Rican 
party elites were presented with an opportunity to make programmatic differences 
regarding the economic role of the state the cornerstone of political competition. Prior to 
the election, the PUN and the Calderonistas joined forces to form a programmatically 
coherent opposition coalition, the National Unification Party (UfN). On the campaign 
trail, the UfN argued that, by expanding the size and role of the state, the PLN had 
created a paternalist state. The PLN responded by accusing the UfN of promoting a weak 
government. Central to the debate between the two parties was the question of 
government control over the banking sector; whereas the PLN defended the 1948 
nationalization of the banking sector as “one of the fundamental pillars of its ideology 
and its style of governing,” the UfN identified it as an example of excessive state 
intervention (Hernández Naranjo 2009: 28). To an even greater degree than in 1958, 
                                                 
51
  They did, however, lend their support to the Independent National Republican Party (PRNI) in the legislative 
election. 
52
  Prior to the 1958 election, a faction led by Jorge Rossi temporarily abandoned the PLN to form the Independent 
Party. Had those voters that voted for Rossi (who received 10.8% of the vote) voted for the PLN candidate, Francisco 
Orlich (who received 42.8% of the vote), the PLN would have retained the presidency. 
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when the PR-PUN-PD coalition had emphasized its programmatic opposition to the 
statist reforms implemented by Figueres, Costa Rican voters were presented with a clear 
choice between two presidential candidates who openly expressed unambiguous, 
opposing preferences regarding the economic role of the state. Again, however, this state 
of affairs would not last long; even victory in the 1966 presidential election (UfN 
candidate José Joaquín Trejos defeated the PLN’s Daniel Oduber) could not ensure the 
survival of the UfN, as the PUN abandoned the coalition one year later. 
 After the 1966 election, the non-left opposition to the PLN underwent yet another 
process of reorganization that included the decline of the UfN, a proliferation of new 
parties,53 and ultimately, in 1976, the formation of a new opposition coalition, the Unity 
Coalition. In 1970, the UfN nominated ex-president Mario Echandi as its presidential 
candidate. Although Echandi’s campaign strategy had centered on attempting to brand 
PLN candidate and fellow ex-president Figueres as a communist, the two candidates’ 
political platforms differed very little (Bodenhiemer 1970, Wells 1970). The relatively 
non-programmatic nature of this election (which resulted in a landslide victory for the 
PLN: Figueres defeated Echandi by a 13.6% margin while the PLN won thirty-two of the 
fifty-seven seats in the legislature, its best performance since 1953) demonstrated that 
neither the PLN nor the opposition had made any concerted effort to emphasize the 
programmatic differences that had briefly come to the fore four years earlier. Although 
discernable programmatic differences between the PLN and its opposition continued to 
exist throughout the 1970s, these differences were not emphasized by either group. 
 Like the parties that created the PUD in 1945 and those that had joined forces to 
support Echandi’s presidential campaign in 1958, the four parties that formed the Unity 
Coalition – the Democratic Renovation Party (PRD), the Popular Union Party (PUP), the 
Calderonista Republican Party (PRC), and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) – had 
little in common aside from a shared rival.54 Despite its ideological incoherence, the 
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  Only five political parties participated in the 1966 legislative election. That number rose to nine in 1970, twelve in 
1974, and fifteen in 1978. 
54
 The social democratic PRD, founded in 1972, grouped together dissidents from the PLN’s progressive wing. Its 
founder, Rodrigo Carazo, had opposed Figueres in the PLN primary held before the 1970 presidential election. In the 
1974 elections, the PRD won three seats in the legislature (with 7.7% of the vote) while Carazo finished forth in the 
presidential contest with 9.1% of the vote. The PUP, founded in 1972 by ex-presidents Echandi (1958-62) and Trejos 
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Unity Coalition immediately supplanted the UfN as the main opposition to the PLN; not 
only did PRD leader Rodrigo Carazo win the 1978 presidential election, but the Unity 
Coalition also won a plurality of seats in the legislature, putting an end to twenty-five 
years of PLN supremacy. 
 In retrospect, 1982 proved to be a pivotal year for the future development of the 
Costa Rican party system. Costa Rican voters unsurprisingly punished the Unity 
Coalition for the economic disaster that had occurred under Carazo’s watch; PLN 
presidential candidate Luis Alberto Monge defeated coalition candidate Rafael Ángel 
Calderón Fournier by a 25.2% margin, and the coalition lost nine of the twenty-seven 
seats that it had won in the 1978 legislative election. Yet, in spite of this electoral 
setback, the coalition not only lived up to its name by maintaining its unity, but it also 
began to exhibit a relatively clear ideological identity as the Christian democratic heir of 
pre-1948 Calderonismo.  
 In terms of the development of programmatic political competition, the long-
delayed formation of an ideologically coherent alternative to the development strategy 
associated with the PLN became a moot point when Arias abruptly turned his back on the 
PLN’s statist identity and implemented a series of neoliberal reforms. Consequently, we 
will never know if the PUSC would have invested in the formation of programmatic 
party-voter linkages if the ideological differences that initially separated the two parties 
had remained intact throughout the period of two-party competition. 
 Precipitated by the aforementioned corruption scandals that discredited much of 
the party’s leadership, the abrupt decline of the PUSC – between 2002 and 2006, the 
number of votes received by the party’s slate of legislative candidates fell by 72% – 
provided the Libertarian Movement (ML) with a brief window to establish itself as the 
main conservative opposition to the status quo. Founded in 1994 as, true to its name, a 
libertarian party, the ML incorporated three other opposition parties – the National 
Christian Alliance (ANC), the National Agrarian Party (PAN), and the General Union 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1966-70) – who had both been expelled from the UfN after criticizing the party’s leadership for collaborating with the 
PLN – espoused the same moderate liberalism previously associated with the PUN. The PDC, which was founded in 
1967 and had won one seat in the 1970 legislative election, and the PRC, founded in 1976 by Rafael Ángel Calderón 
Fournier (son of Calderón Guardia), were both social Christian parties. 
  196 
Party (PUG) – into its fold in 2005, an action that soon gave rise to internal conflicts 
regarding the party’s ideological identity. Ultimately, these conflicts resulted in a 
moderation of the ML’s libertarian ideology, particularly with respect to the state’s role 
in providing education, health care, and infrastructure development (Gómez Campos et 
al. 2013). After the 2010 election, the ML suspended the ideological formation activities 
that the party had previously organized during non-election periods. In 2011, the ML 
revised its statutes and rebranded itself as a “centrist liberal” party. Three years later, the 
party’s founder and long-time leader Otto Guevara again redefined the ML’s ideological 
identity as he presented himself as a defender of Christian values (Murillo 2014). In 
short, rather than follow the example of the ideologically coherent PUSC, the ML has 
replicated the ideological inconsistency exhibited by the non-left opposition to the PLN 
in the 1950s. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
 According to the conventional wisdom regarding party system development in 
Latin America, Costa Rica is the Central American country where the emergence of 
programmatic political competition would appear to be most likely. Yet, after more than 
six decades of democratic elections, programmatic party-voter linkages remain 
remarkably weak as voters struggle to discern any meaningful differences between the 
country’s main political parties. 
 Barred from electoral participation until 1975, the Left has had little impact on the 
Costa Rican party system because its lack of organizational continuity has prevented it 
from achieving much success at the ballot box and from taking advantage of recent 
political episodes (the protest movements that formed to oppose the Combo ICE in 2000 
and CAFTA in 2007) that seemingly presented the Left with an opportunity to tap into 
popular opposition to the country’s embrace of neoliberal reform. Since its foundation, 
the PLN, the pole around which the Costa Rican party system has revolved since the 
restoration of democratic rule in 1953, has assiduously avoided the use of ideological 
labels even as it abandoned its initial embrace of statism to adopt a neoliberal identity in 
the early 1980s. The opposition parties that have emerged during the current millennium 
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(e.g., the PAC and the ML) have followed the PLN’s lead by exhibiting a high degree of 
ideological ambiguity. 
 While the current situation in Costa Rica might not be as hopeless as that of 
Guatemala, where the party system is virtually born anew every four years, we cannot 
expect programmatic political competition to develop until an electorally relevant 
political party makes the investments necessary to ensure that voters are familiar with its 
programmatic preferences and can distinguish those preferences from other main parties’ 
programmatic stance. The PAC, which won the presidency for the first time in 2014, 
might be well-positioned to take that step; only time will tell whether or not the 
development strategy implemented by the Solís government will differ enough from the 
neoliberal policies put in place during the 1980s to make it clear to voters that the PAC 
represents a return to the statist approach that Figueres adopted in the 1950s. The Broad 
Front, which can certainly be defined as an “externally mobilized party,” is another 
candidate for the role of programmatic first mover. If the Broad Front, which has not 
been reticent with regard to the promotion of its ideological identity, can build upon its 
unprecedented success in the 2014 election and become a legitimate contender in future 
elections, it could initiate the development of programmatic political competition. Again, 
only time will tell whether or not the Broad Front can avoid falling victim to the 
organizational instability that has long plagued the Costa Rican Left. 
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Chapter Eight 
Beyond Central America 
 
 In the previous four chapters, I examined party system development in three 
countries – El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica – that vary significantly with regards 
to (1) their level of socioeconomic development, their amount of experience with 
democratic elections, and the magnitude of their state’s social security and welfare 
expenditures (three characteristics that, according to the Lipset and Rokkan-inspired 
conventional wisdom regarding party system development in Latin America, are 
expected to have an enormous impact on the nature of party-voter linkages), (2) the unity 
and organization of the Left, the extent to which leftist parties actively promote their 
ideological distinctiveness, and the degree of success that the Left has achieved at the 
ballot box (factors that I identify as crucial elements of the answer to the question of why 
programmatic political competition has developed in some Latin American democracies 
but not in others), and (3) the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages (my 
dependent variable). Within this small universe of cases, my agent-centered theory 
regarding the development of programmatic political competition outperforms a 
conventional wisdom drawn from modernization theory and social cleavage theory; 
although both approaches correctly predict the weakness of programmatic party-voter 
linkages in Guatemala, only my theory, which emphasizes the importance of elite 
political agency, can account for the surprising strength of programmatic party-voter 
linkages in El Salvador and the weakness of these ties in Costa Rica. 
 While the development of programmatic political competition in El Salvador and 
the weakness of programmatic party-voter linkages in Costa Rica both run counter to the 
predictions derived from a conventional wisdom which argues that economic 
modernization and a long history of democratic elections foster the development of 
programmatic party-voter linkages, these two cases in and of themselves do not provide 
sufficient evidence to conclude that the alternative explanation I offer is indeed superior 
to this conventional wisdom. Consequently, in this chapter, I provide brief examinations 
of party-voter linkages in six additional Latin American democracies. These abbreviated 
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case studies demonstrate the critical importance of elite political agency for 
understanding variation in the nature of party-voter linkages that we observe in 
contemporary Latin America. More specifically, this examination demonstrates that the 
unity, organization, and political activity of the Left best explain the presence or absence 
of programmatic political competition in contemporary Latin America. 
 In the first section of the chapter, I explore the development of programmatic 
political competition in Chile and Uruguay, the two countries that join El Salvador in the 
short list of Latin American democracies where strong programmatic party-voter linkages 
have emerged. As this examination illustrates, the formation of broad, permanent center-
left coalitions in each country – the Broad Front (Frente Amplio, FA) in Uruguay and the 
Coalition of Parties for Democracy (Concertación) in Chile – and the investments that 
these groups have made to construct institutional linkages with sympathetic groups and 
organizations and to highlight their ideological commitments have made it possible for 
voters in these two countries to identify the programmatic differences that distinguish 
these leftist coalitions from their opponents and, consequently, to vote according to their 
own programmatic preferences. 
 In the second section, I examine the party systems of another two countries – 
Nicaragua and Bolivia – where programmatic party-voter linkages, while not particularly 
strong, are nonetheless stronger than expected given their low level of socioeconomic 
development and their limited experience with democratic rule. In the third section, I 
examine party-voter linkages in Argentina and Brazil, where programmatic party-voter 
linkages are weak in spite of these countries’ relatively high level of socioeconomic 
development and the existence of relatively extensive social welfare systems. Again, 
these four abbreviated case studies highlight the importance of elite political agency. 
Whereas the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the Movement Towards 
Socialism (MAS) have contributed to making left-right self-placement a relatively strong 
predictor of voting behavior in Nicaragua and Bolivia by maintaining a permanent 
organizational presence, creating institutional linkages with their support bases, and 
establishing themselves as their countries’ only electorally relevant leftist parties, 
programmatic party-voter linkages remain weak in Argentina and Brazil because the 
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main political parties in these two countries have either been unwilling (Argentina) or 
unable (Brazil) to rely on programmatic appeals to achieve success at the ballot box. 
 
8.1 Elite Political Agency in Uruguay and Chile 
 Whereas El Salvador and Costa Rica constitute interesting cases with regards to 
the examination of programmatic political competition in contemporary Latin America 
because party-voter linkages in the two countries do not correspond to predictions based 
on each country’s history of democratic elections and degree of economic modernization, 
Uruguay and Chile are interesting cases because such predictions are spot on. As 
demonstrated in Chapter Two, Uruguay and Chile are the two countries where (on 
average, during the period from 1996 through 2007) policy preferences best predict left-
right self-placement, and they rank second and third behind only El Salvador in terms of 
the strength of the relationship between left-right self-placement and voting behavior. 
They are also the two Latin American democracies that possess the greatest combination 
of the three factors (economic development, democratic experience, and social 
security/welfare spending) that purportedly facilitate the development of programmatic 
political competition. Seemingly, the development of programmatic party-voter linkages 
in these two countries can be explained by the conventional wisdom. 
 However, I contend that the emergence of programmatic political competition in 
Uruguay and Chile is best explained not by the two countries’ high level of economic and 
political modernization, but rather, by the actions taken by leftist political elites in each 
country. Specifically, by constructing a broad, permanent center-left coalition that has 
actively promoted its programmatic preferences while investing in the creation of 
institutional ties with labor unions, student associations, and other progressive civil 
society organizations, leftist elites in both countries have provided voters with a 
programmatically-defined brand that clearly differs from the image offered by political 
parties/coalitions that collaborated with (in the case of Uruguay) or emerged from within 
(in the case of Chile) the authoritarian regimes that ruled both countries throughout much 
of the 1970s and 1980s. Although the scope of the political violence associated with the 
1973 coups that extinguished democratic rule in Uruguay and Chile certainly pales in 
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comparison to the prolonged, unrestrained violence experienced in El Salvador, and 
although both Uruguay’s Frente Amplio and Chile’s Concertación are organized as 
multi-party coalitions, the parallels between the FA, Concertación, and the FMLN are 
many. 
 The Frente Amplio can trace its roots back to the Socialist Party (PS, founded in 
1910), the Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU, which broke away from the PS in 1920), 
and the Tupamaro National Liberation Movement (MLN, a guerrilla organization that 
emerged in December 1966).1 Unlike their counterparts in most Latin American 
countries, the PS and the PCU were allowed to participate openly in politics throughout 
the period prior to the 1973 coup. While the PCU took advantage of Uruguay’s relatively 
high degree of political openness to establish strong ties to the country’s labor movement 
and the PS did the same with student organizations, this did not lead to any real success at 
the ballot box as elections were dominated by the liberal, rural-oriented Partido Nacional 
(also known as the Partido Blanco) and the republican, urban Partido Colorado.2 In the 
fifteen legislative elections held between 1917 and 1966, the percentage of valid votes 
received by Uruguay’s leftist parties3 averaged only 4.1%, and never exceeded 7.2%.4 
 Beginning in the early 1960s, certain elements within the Left that were frustrated 
by the Left’s poor electoral performance began to seriously question the viability of the 
electoral path. Although Uruguay’s first guerrilla organization, el Coordinador, emerged 
in July 1963, the PCU chose to redouble its efforts to mobilize mass support rather than 
                                                 
1
  In addition to the works cited below, my examination of the development of programmatic party-voter linkages in 
Uruguay also draws from works by Altman (2002), Arrarás (1998), Caetano et al. (2003), Castiglioni (2005), 
Harnecker (1991-b), Luna (2004, 2009), and Piñeiro and Yaffé (2004). 
2
  Some clarification is in order regarding the terminology used to describe political parties in Uruguay. As Altman 
et al. (2008: 154) note, the Blanco and Colorado parties (both founded in 1836) and most other Uruguayan political 
parties (including the FA) are best described as “macro-electoral organizations that seldom behave as unitary actors.” 
Most parties (referred to as lemas) contain multiple fractions (referred to as sublemas) which, come election time, 
compete against one another within their lema while simultaneously competing (collectively) against other lemas. 
Indeed, until constitutional reforms implemented in 1996 established mandatory presidential primaries, the Colorado 
and Blanco parties routinely entered multiple presidential candidates. For its part, while the FA is now the party with 
the largest number of organized fractions, it always presented a single presidential candidate and therefore can be seen 
“more as a solid party than a coalition” (Altman et al. 2008: 155). 
3
  These election results refer to the PS, the PCU, the Popular Union (an alliance formed in 1962 between the PS and 
progressive Partido Blanco dissident Enrique Erro), and the Leftist Liberation Front (FIDEL, a coalition created in 
1962 by the PCU and a number of independent leftist politicians). 
4
  Since 1910, Uruguay has employed a double simultaneous vote system with closed lists organized by sublema; 
elections are won by the candidate of the sublema that receives a plurality of the votes cast for the lema that receives a 
plurality of all votes cast. 
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join forces with this incipient armed Left. Although the PCU served as the driving force 
behind the 1964 creation of the National Convention of Workers, an all-encompassing 
umbrella group for Uruguay’s trade unions, and the organization of the 1965 People’s 
Congress, a conference that attracted 1,376 delegates from 707 different organizations, 
these efforts did not have any measurable impact on the Left’s electoral fortunes; in the 
November 1966 general election, the Left won the same number of seats (five) in the 99-
seat Chamber of Deputies as it had four years earlier. The MLN appeared one month after 
this election. 
 Initially a small group (numbering roughly fifty militants) best described not as a 
guerrilla movement but rather as a political movement that committed acts of armed 
propaganda (Real de Azúa 1988), the MLN grew rapidly as radical members of the PS 
and other leftist organizations swelled its ranks to approximately 2,000 by the year 1970. 
Even as the government introduced a significant degree of repression in its fight against 
the Tupamaros, the PCU maintained its faith in the electoral process. The PCU achieved 
one of its principal goals, the political unification of the Left, on February 5, 1971, when 
nineteen leftist parties and organizations joined forces to create the Frente Amplio. While 
the FA would go on to achieve unprecedented success in the November 1971 election, 
receiving 17.6% of the vote, the political situation in Uruguay was clearly spiraling out of 
control. 
 During 1970-71, the MLN had transformed itself from a political movement with 
arms into a genuine guerrilla movement. President Jorge Pacheco responded to the 
increasing scope and intensity of the Tupamaros’ armed activities by instructing the 
armed forces to take the lead in the fight against the MLN. On April 14, 1972, the 
Tupamaros launched a full-scale offensive that resulted in unmitigated disaster. By the 
end of 1972, the MLN ceased to exist as an operational political-military organization as 
its entire leadership structure had been captured by government forces. Soon, Uruguay’s 
democracy would also cease to exist; on June 27, 1973, President Juan María Bordaberry 
dissolved the legislature and invited a civic-military State Council to rule the country. 
 Despite the obvious difficulties associated with life under a repressive 
authoritarian regime – in addition to the 140-180 leftist militants who were disappeared 
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during this period, some 12,500 PCU members (roughly one-quarter of the party’s 
membership in the early 1970s) were detained and in many cases tortured by the state’s 
police and military forces – the PCU managed to maintain a functioning political 
structure throughout the period of authoritarian rule, it continued to promote labor 
organization and mobilization, and it continued its efforts to expand the Frente Amplio by 
creating alliances with other pro-democratic political forces. During this same period, the 
MLN began its transition from guerrilla group to political organization. As early as 
February 1973, the Tupamaros initiated a concerted effort to provide its militants and 
sympathizers with an ideological education through the establishment of political training 
schools and the publication of pamphlets describing the group’s Marxist-Leninist 
ideology. In August 1973, shortly after the coup, the MLN abandoned its initial plans to 
retake arms against the Uruguayan state and instead turned its focus towards the 
formation of a broad pro-democracy alliance. 
 The November 1984 general election, which paved the way for the resumption of 
democratic rule, provided the Left with its first opportunity to judge the impact that 
eleven years of authoritarian rule had had on its efforts to build an electorally-relevant 
coalition. Buoyed by the relatively promising results of this election (with 21.3% of the 
vote, the FA won twenty-one seats in the Chamber of Deputies), the PCU spent the next 
five years investing in the growth of its organization and the education of its members. 
As a result, the PCU’s membership grew from 15,000 to 50,000, and more than 15,000 
voters participated in the PCU’s political education programs. During this same period, 
the MLN intensified its own efforts to expand and educate its support base by using its 
biweekly newspaper Mate Amargo (established in July 1986), the political magazine 
Germen (created in June 1987), Radio Panamericana (which first went on air in June 
1988), citizen workshops, and mateadas (town hall-style meetings in which MLN 
members engaged their neighbors in political dialogue) to broadcast its message, build 
linkages with workers and other sympathetic citizens, and contribute to their political 
education.  
 In 1987, the FA employed, for the first time, a strategy that would serve the party 
well as it worked to construct institutionalized linkages with various interest groups and 
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social movements. Taking advantage of provisions in the Uruguayan Constitution that 
provide citizens with the ability to force a binding plebiscite5 and either introduce or 
overturn legislation, the FA worked with human rights groups to mobilize opposition to a 
law, passed in December 1986, that granted immunity for human rights violations 
committed during the civic-military dictatorship. After the FA and its allies had collected 
more than 500,000 signatures, the government scheduled a referendum for April 1989. 
Although these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful – 57.5% of the valid votes cast in the 
referendum were in favor of retaining the amnesty law – the episode “proved that the 
direct democracy instruments included in the Constitution could be used effectively for 
opposing legislation and mobilizing popular support” (Luna 2006: 166). 
 Throughout the rest of the FA’s time as an opposition party (i.e. through 2004), 
“the use of direct democracy mechanisms against reform proposals [formed] a crucial 
part of [the] FA’s opposition strategy” (Luna 2007: 13). By leading coalitions that 
organized referenda which successfully blocked legislation regarding pension reform and 
the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the Frente Amplio not only fostered close 
ties with public employees and pension beneficiaries, two well-organized groups that 
make up nearly 40% of the electorate (Luna 2007), but it also cemented the FA’s identity 
as the defender of Batllismo, the national ideology based on the progressive, statist 
development model that Colorado leader José Batlle had introduced during his second 
term as president (1911-15). Although neither the Partido Colorado nor the Partido 
Blanco can be accurately described as an ideologically-motivated advocate of 
neoliberalism, both parties have (since the restoration of democratic rule) favored the 
implementation of certain neoliberal reforms in the face of the economic stagnation. The 
FA’s very active opposition of these neoliberal reforms demonstrated to voters that the 
Frente Amplio provided an ideologically distinct alternative to the country’s two 
traditional parties. 
                                                 
5
  To force a referendum, interested parties must collect and submit the signatures of at least 10% of registered 
voters. For a referendum to pass, it must be approved by at least 50% of those who vote and by at least 35% of all 
registered voters. 
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 However, the impact of these efforts was not immediately apparent. The FA’s 
performance in the November 1989 general election was virtually identical6 to the results 
obtained five years earlier: it received 21.2% of the vote and again won twenty-one seats 
in the Chamber of Deputies. There are two principal reasons why the aforementioned 
efforts to build linkages with workers, pensioners, and progressive elements of civil 
society and to educate voters about the programmatic preferences and ideological 
commitments that differentiate the FA from Uruguay’s traditional parties did not result in 
a surge of electoral support. First, the FA was weakened by the desertion of the social 
democratic Party for the Government of the People (PGP), the sublema that had received 
the largest number of votes in the 1984 election. If the PGP, which competed as a 
separate lema and received 9.0% of the vote, had remained a part of the Frente Amplio, 
the number of votes separating the FA from the second-place Partido Colorado would 
have been only 1,108, less than 0.06% of the valid votes cast. Second, although the MLN 
had formally aligned itself with the FA earlier in the year via the creation of the Popular 
Participation Movement (MPP) sublema, none of the Tupamaros presented themselves as 
candidates in the 1989 election. 
 After the 1989 election, the internal balance of power within the FA began to 
change. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PCU, which was the FA’s largest 
sublema in the 1989 election, struggled financially to maintain its broad network of local 
organizations. The decline of the ideologically rigid PCU, the successful integration of 
the more flexible MPP (which had become the FA’s largest fraction when internal 
elections were held in 2002), the FA municipal government in Montevideo’s 
implementation of an administrative decentralization project that facilitated contact 
between FA activists and residents of the capital’s poorer neighborhoods (many of whom 
are employed in the informal sector and therefore not attached to the labor union 
movement), and the absence of any electorally viable party to its left7 all helped the 
                                                 
6
  It is important to note, however, that the FA did win control of the Montevideo municipal government for the first 
time in 1989. 
7
  The FA did suffer some defections during the 1990s as it repositioned itself as a more moderate left – most 
notably, the 1993 separation of the Oriental Revolutionary Movement (MRO), one of the FA’s founding member 
organizations – none of these groups has achieved any success at the ballot box. 
  206 
Frente Amplio attract new supporters without alienating its established support base 
(organized labor). 
 Subsequent election results (summarized in Figure 8.1) are a testament to the fact 
that the FA was indeed successful in its efforts to move closer to the center of the 
ideological spectrum without losing the support of the Left. In 1994, the FA’s vote haul 
jumped from 21.2% to 30.6%. Five years later, the party received 40.1% of the vote (a 
plurality), but its presidential candidate, Socialist Party leader Tabaré Vázquez, was 
defeated in the presidential runoff election after the National Party endorsed Colorado 
candidate Jorge Batlle Ibáñez. In 2004, the FA (again led by Vázquez) won the 
presidency and also a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The Frente Amplio repeated 
this feat in 2009 (when MPP leader José Mujica won the presidency) and again in 2014 
(when Vázquez was elected for the second time). 
 
Figure 8.1 – Electoral Growth of the Frente Amplio, 1984-2014 
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 Even as the party has moderated its political rhetoric since capturing the 
presidency, the FA has continued to cultivate close relationships with organized labor 
(which benefited from the restoration of its right to participate in tripartite collective 
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bargaining with business and the state), pensioners, student organizations, social 
movements (particularly the cooperative movement that has emerged in the social 
housing sector), and the urban poor (who have been the main beneficiaries of targeted, 
means-tested welfare programs implemented by the Social Development Ministry, a 
Vázquez creation). By occasionally holding open cabinet meetings, by introducing 
participatory budgeting processes at the municipal level, and by fomenting open 
dialogues on public policy, the party has demonstrated an ongoing commitment to 
increased political participation. Luna (2006: 415, emphasis added) concludes that the 
FA’s electoral success “can be interpreted as the result of a particular combination of the 
party’s programmatic linking with middle and upper social strata and a complex 
intertwining of personality-based, community service-oriented linkages, and localized 
efforts to raise the level of social organization and political awareness of lower class 
constituencies.” I contend that the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages in 
Uruguay can be attributed to these same factors. 
 Whereas Uruguay had no history of programmatic political competition prior to 
the restoration of democratic rule in 1984 (ideological differences within the long-
hegemonic National and Colorado Parties were greater than ideological differences 
between the two parties), Chile witnessed the emergence of a party system that was 
clearly divided along ideological lines between the Right, the Center, and the Left as 
early as the 1930s.8 Remmer (1980: 280-282) contends that the high level of electoral 
support that Chile’s class-based (Marxist) parties received, the role that these parties’ 
leaders played in organizing the Chilean labor movement, labor unions’ high level of 
political activity, and survey data which demonstrate that “public opinion [was] 
characterized by sharp class contrasts in political perceptions and highly ideological 
orientations to electoral alternatives” as early as the 1950s are all evidence that “lower-
class organization and political consciousness” were quite strong in pre-coup Chile. This, 
in turn, led to the development of “relatively high levels of programmatic structuring and 
                                                 
8
  In addition to the works cited below, my examination of the development of programmatic party-voter linkages in 
Chile also draws from works by Cavallo (1998), Garretón (1988), Garretón et al. (1994), Munck (1994), Navia (2006, 
2009), Roberts (1998), Scully (1992), Toro Maureira (2008), and Valenzuela (1995, 1999). 
  208 
party competition … [and] the presence of strong partisan subcultures in society” (Luna 
2006: 439). 
 The programmatic nature of political competition became exceptionally (and, 
ultimately, painfully) clear during 1960s and early 1970s. During this period, an 
exceptionally rapid process of political mobilization (which saw union membership, 
membership in rural cooperatives and associations, and involvement in neighborhood 
associations and community action programs all skyrocket),9 increasing ideological 
polarization (during the 1960s, the Chilean Socialist Party, PS, moved further to the left 
and eventually formed the Popular Unity coalition with the Communist Party, PCCh, and 
a faction of the Radical Party while the Right became progressively more authoritarian 
after the Liberal and Conservative parties merged in 1967 to form the National Party), 
and changes in party alliance dynamics (the possibility that a center-left governing 
coalition such as the one that ruled the country in 1938-46 might again form dissolved 
during the 1960s as the clerical Christian Democratic Party, PDC, replaced the secular 
Radical Party as the main centrist party) combined to create an environment in which 
governance was virtually impossible when Popular Union candidate Salvador Allende 
was elected president in 1970 (Remmer 1980, Valenzuela and Scully 1997, Luna 2006, 
Navia 2007). The election of Allende not only prompted the PDC to align itself with the 
National Party to form the Democratic Confederation as a counterweight to the PS-
dominated Popular Union coalition, but it also generated an intense counter-mobilization 
of middle- and upper-class Chileans and, finally, of the armed forces. 
 Scholars continue to debate the extent to which the current party system – which 
began to take shape in 1987, when the government formally lifted the ban on political 
parties that Pinochet had enacted shortly after the September 11, 1973, coup that 
extinguished Chile’s democracy – resembles the pre-1973 party system (e.g., Scully and 
Valenzuela 1993, Valenzuela 1994, Siavelis 1997, Valenzuela and Scully 1997, 
                                                 
9
  Arguing that “the level of popular involvement in politics by 1973 probably exceeded that of any country in 
Latoin America, with the possible exception of Cuba,” Remmer (1980: 279) notes the following: (1) membership in 
legally recognized unions jumped from 10.3% of the workforce in 1964 to 22.2% in 1972, (2) including illegal and/or 
unrecognized unions, 32-41% of the economically active population were union members in 1973, (3) membership in 
rural cooperatives and associations grew by more than 1040% between 1964 and 1969, and (4) more than 660,000 
persons became active in community action programs and neighborhood associations during the 1964-70 presidency of 
Christian Democratic Party (PDC) leader Eduardo Frei. 
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Coppedge 1998, Plumb 1998, Montes et al. 2000, Navia and Joignant 2000, Carey 2002, 
Torcal and Mainwaring 2003, Luna 2006). Some see the Concertación – the center-left 
coalition of sixteen political parties that successfully convinced voters to reject the 1988 
referendum that would have permitted Pinochet another eight years as president – as the 
reincarnation of the center-left coalition that supported the successful presidential 
campaigns of Radical Party candidates Pedro Aguirre Cerda (1938-41) and Juan Antonio 
Ríos (1942-46). Others contend that the “rapid and intense process of political 
demobilization” (Remmer 1980: 275) that occurred under the repressive military regime 
combined with the effects of the neoliberal economic policies that Pinochet implemented 
– namely, the diminished size of the urban working class and the decreased political 
organization of rural workers (Torcal and Mainwaring 2003) – precipitated the creation 
of a new party system in which the extreme polarization of the 1960s and early 1970s has 
been replaced by a remarkable degree of policy convergence. 
 
Figure 8.2 – Elections to Chile’s Chamber of Deputies, 1989-2013 
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 Plumb (1998: 93) notes that, “despite the extended interruption … the parties, 
their respective popularity, and even many principal leaders have not changed 
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significantly since the 1973 coup.” Figure 8.2, which charts the post-dictatorship electoral 
performance of the political parties that dominated political competition during the pre-
coup era (and their direct descendents),10 demonstrates a fairly high degree of continuity 
between the two eras, with the main parties of the Right, Center, and Left each garnering 
the support of one-quarter to one-third of the electorate, just as they had during the final 
years before the 1973 coup. Obscured by these vote totals, however, are a number of 
important changes that occurred during the 1973-90 period of authoritarian rule. 
 Along with labor unionists, Leftist politicians were amongst the main targets of 
the repression that characterized Pinochet’s dictatorship. The PCCh reacted to the 1973 
coup by developing a clandestine organization (and, eventually, an armed branch) and by 
emphasizing its ties to student associations and the urban poor. In the process, the party 
moved further to the Left, explaining why the PCCh has to date not joined Concertación 
(although it did formally align itself with Concertación in the 2009 and 2013 elections as 
part of the Juntos Podemos Más por Chile11 coalition). The other main pre-1973 leftist 
party, the PS, saw much of its leadership escape to foreign exile, where the party split 
into two factions: (1) a moderate faction that sought to form an alliance with the political 
center and that eventually formed the Party for Democracy (PPD), which paints itself as 
something of a post-materialist, progressive yet non-ideological “party of issues” (Plumb 
1998), and (2) a more radical faction that maintained the pre-1973 alliance with the PCCh 
– leading to the 1988 formation of the short-lived Broad Party of the Socialist Left 
(PAIS) – before moderating its stance and joining the Concertación after the 1989 
election. 
 If any pre-1973 political party can be said to have benefitted from the Pinochet 
dictatorship, it would be the centrist PDC. Perhaps because the party had allied itself with 
the right-wing National Party in opposition to the Allende government, the PDC, though 
                                                 
10
  In Figure 8.2, the Left includes the PCCh, the PS, the Party for Democracy (PPD, formed in 1987 by a moderate 
faction within the PS) and the short-lived Broad Party of the Socialist Left (PAIS, formed in 1988 by a radical faction 
of the PS). The Center includes the PDC, the Radical Party, and its successor, the Social Democrat Radical Party 
(formed by the 1994 union of the Radical Party and the Social Democracy Party). The Right includes National Renewal 
(RN, formed in 1987 as the successor to the National Party) and its main partner in the center-right Alliance for Chile, 
the Independent Democratic Union (UDI, founded in 1983). 
11
  The coalition’s name translates as “Together We Can Do More for Chile.” Podemos also serves as an acronym for 
poder democrático social – “social democratic power.” 
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formally banned like all other political parties, was to some degree tolerated by the 
Pinochet regime. This not only allowed the PDC to consolidate its position as the 
preeminent centrist party, but it also provided the PDC with an opportunity to use its 
relationship with the Catholic Church as a means to build linkages with pro-democracy 
social movement (Luna 2006, Joignant and Navia 2007). Yet, in spite of its relatively 
privileged position, the PDC eventually became disenchanted with the realities of 
authoritarian rule and switched its allegiances in 1983, when it started to cultivate 
relationships with the Socialist, Radical, and Social Democratic parties in a process that 
culminated in the creation of the Concertación (Navia 2007). 
 In terms of party identity and organization, the Right experienced the greatest 
change under Pinochet. Heeding the prohibition of political parties, the National Party 
disbanded shortly after the 1973 coup, and many of its leaders assumed positions in the 
Pinochet government. Both UDI, which emerged in 1983 as an ultra-conservative party 
loyal to Pinochet, and the RN, which formed in 1987 as the successor to the National 
Party, espouse a broadly conservative ideology in defense of the neoliberal economic 
reforms that were introduced by the military dictatorship. Since the restoration of 
democratic rule, UDI has distinguished itself through its efforts to recruit and train party 
activists and to “extend its electoral appeal and organizational penetration of society to 
districts in which the party previously lacked influence” by emphasizing efficient 
solutions to concrete problems (Luna 2006: 373; also Huneeus 2001, Navia 2001). 
 Two additional and highly significant differences between the post-coup party 
system and the pre-1973 system concern (1) the nature of party alliances and (2) the 
degree of ideological polarization between parties/alliances. As Navia (2007) notes, while 
the electoral triumph of the forces favoring the “No” vote in the 1988 plebiscite made it 
obvious that Concertación would likely win the December 1989 presidential election, it 
was less obvious at the time that Concertación would persevere in the face of the 
demands associated with electoral competition and, later, with forming a government. 
Yet, while occasionally threatened by ideological and/or programmatic differences 
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between the PDC, the PPD, and the PS (which joined the coalition shortly after the 1989 
election), Concertación has maintained its unity throughout the post-Pinochet era.12 
 While the enduring nature and overwhelming electoral success13 of the 
Concertación and Alliance for Chile coalitions have provided Chile with a high level of 
democratic stability,14 the post-Pinochet era has also exhibited a clear reversal of the 
extreme polarization that characterized the Chilean party system during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. Since the late 1980s, when “the Chilean transition was marked by a 
discourse in which themes of social justice, class, and redistributive issues were muted” 
(Torcal and Mainwaring 2003: 82), Concertación’s left wing (the PS and the PPD) has 
deliberately deemphasized many elements of its traditional concern with socioeconomic 
equality. While this to some degree represents an instrumental response to Chile’s 
majoritarian binomial electoral laws, which make it extremely difficult for any party 
outside of the two main coalitions to win representation, it also reflect the extent to which 
these parties (particularly the PPD) have responded to the popular consensus that formed 
in favor of the economic policies implemented by Pinochet’s “Chicago boys.” Table 8.1, 
which is drawn from survey data from 1991 (reported by Plumb 1998), demonstrates the 
extent to which Chilean voters in the early 1990s backed the market-based, 
internationally-oriented economic policies that helped Chile achieve rapid economic 
growth even as they rejected the authoritarian regime that introduced those policies. 
Regardless of where they placed themselves on a left-right continuum, voters clearly 
favored free markets to state planning.15 In this light, the PPD’s efforts to “redirect leftist 
discourse away from traditional economic paradigms” by promoting “education and an 
                                                 
12
  To date, only two parties that have participated in elections under the Concertación banner have subsequently 
abandoned the coalition: the Humanist and Green parties, which both deserted in 1993. In terms of the total number of 
votes received during the 1997-2013 period, the Humanist Party has, with 1.87% of the vote, been the second-most 
successful party (after the PCCh) that is not aligned with either Concertación or the Alliance for Chile; however, the 
Humanists have yet to win a single seat in the Chamber of Deputies as an independent party. The Green Party dissolved 
after the 1997 election, when it formed a coalition with the Humanist Party. 
13
  In the seven general elections held since 1989, parties and independent candidates affiliated with Concertación 
and the Alliance for Chile have received, on average, 88.4% of the votes cast for members of the Chamber of Deputies, 
and they have captured 822 of the 840 seats in that body. 
14
  Of course, the majoritarian binomial electoral system that Chile has used since 1989 provides political parties with 
a powerful incentive to maintain these coalitions. The role that electoral institutions play in the development of 
programmatic political competition will be discussed in Chapter Nine. 
15
  Survey respondents were asked to place themselves on a seven-point scale, where support for free markets (1) and 
support for state planning (7) were the endpoints. In Table 8.1, responses 1-3 are coded as support for free markets, 
while responses 5-7 are coded as support for state planning. 
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expanded notion of human rights” rather than income redistribution as the remedy for 
socioeconomic inequality, and by placing a greater importance on “new issues such as 
environmental protection, feminism, consumer rights, indigenous rights, and AIDS 
prevention” (Plumb 1998: 94), can be interpreted as a strategic response to voters’ policy 
preferences – and not simply as a concession made to ensure the survival of the Left’s 
alliance with the Christian Democrats. 
 
Table 8.1 – Support for Free Markets in Post-Pinochet Chile 
 
 Ideological Self-Placement 
 Right Center Left Independent 
Free Market 62.1% 57.9% 51.7% 44.3% 
State Planning 19.4% 19.1% 23.9% 24.2% 
Ratio 3.2:1 3.0:1 2.2:1 1.8:1 
 
 While it is certainly true that the Chilean party system “no longer has the same 
sharp ideological distance between the main parties as was the case before the breakdown 
… [as] there is currently a considerable consensus over fundamental issues pertaining to 
the nation’s socioeconomic institutions” (Scully and Valenzuela 1993), and while it may 
be true, as Luna (2006: 321-322, emphasis added) contends, that “the absence of 
significant partisan divides on salient economic issues in the post-transition to democracy 
reduced the importance of programmatic party-voter linkages in the system,” the data I 
present in Chapter Two demonstrate that the high degree of policy convergence exhibited 
by Chile’s two dominant party coalitions has not eliminated the importance of 
programmatic party-voter linkages. If there are few programmatic differences between 
Concertación and the Alliance for Chile, why are the relationships between policy 
preferences, left-right self-placement, and voting behavior as strong as they are? 
 Various examinations of the relationship between policy preferences and voting 
behavior in contemporary Chile (e.g., Tironi and Agüero 1999, Tironi et al. 2001, Ortega 
2003, Luna and Zechmeister 2005, Siavelis 2009, Lucas 2012) have uncovered the 
presence of a regime divide between Concertación voters who express strong support for 
democracy and Alliance for Chile voters who express greater ambivalence regarding the 
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intrinsic value of democratic institutions. In short, counter to the expectation that the 
importance of this regime divide would recede over time following Chile’s successful 
transition to democratic rule (Moreno 1999), and even though UDI and the RN have 
clearly embraced electoral democracy, the question that was presumably answered once 
and for all with the 1988 plebiscite continues to exert a strong influence over voting 
behavior a quarter-century after Pinochet relinquished power. Consequently, the 
relatively strong programmatic party-voter linkages found in contemporary Chile can be 
attributed not to any ongoing efforts by the country’s main political parties to build 
institutionalized ties to certain sectors of society and/or demographic groups or to 
promote their ideological distinctiveness, but rather, to the efforts that the political parties 
which are now grouped together as the Concertación made decades earlier to foster ties 
to labor unions, rural associations, and student organizations as well as the significant 
efforts these parties made to mobilize voters to vote in favor of a return to democratic 
rule in the 1988 plebiscite. The implications that the fairly remote origins of 
programmatic party-voter linkages, as well as the fact that these linkages center on a 
democracy-authoritarian divide rather than on opposing economic policy preferences, 
might have for the future survival of programmatic political competition in Chile will be 
discussed in Chapter Nine. 
 
8.2 Programmatic Political Competition in Nicaragua and Bolivia? 
 Based on their level of economic development, their prior experience with 
democratic elections, and the size of their social welfare programs, neither Nicaragua nor 
Bolivia would be identified as particularly strong candidates for the development of 
programmatic political competition. Yet, both countries exhibit evidence of 
programmatic party-voter linkages that, while not nearly as strong as those found in Chile 
and Uruguay, are stronger than expected. In this sense, Nicaragua and Bolivia bear at 
least a passing resemblance to El Salvador. The question I address here is: to what extent 
has the development of stronger-than-predicted programmatic party-voter linkages in 
these two countries followed the same historical pattern that I identified in my 
examination of the emergence of programmatic political competition in El Salvador, 
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Uruguay, and Chile – namely, a pattern of development that is set into motion by the 
unity, organization, and political activity of the Left? 
 The abbreviated cast studies that follow demonstrate the existence of clear 
parallels between the active role that El Salvador’s FMLN, Uruguay’s Frente Amplio, 
and the parties that constitute Chile’s Concertación have played in the development of 
programmatic political competition in their respective countries and the impact that the 
FSLN and MAS have had on party-voter linkages in Nicaragua and Bolivia.16 Although 
these two parties have significantly different origins (whereas the FSLN came to life in 
1961 as a guerrilla organization seeking to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship, MAS was 
founded in 1995 as the political arm of a network of labor unions, social movements, and 
indigenous organizations that represent the interests of coca farmers in Cochabamba’s 
Chapare province) and have assumed different organizational types (while the FSLN has 
evolved from revolutionary force to populist political machine, MAS exists as a unique 
blend of social movement and political party) (Roberts 2007), they both exhibit certain 
characteristics (namely, both parties were key actors in political crises that resulted in 
profound changes to the previous status quo, both have established themselves as the sole 
electorally relevant option on the left end of the ideological spectrum, both maintain a 
permanent organizational presence, and both have invested in creating institutional 
linkages with their support bases) that, I contend, explain why left-right self-placement is 
a relatively strong predictor of voting behavior in Nicaragua and Bolivia. At the same 
time, MAS and the FSLN also differ from the FMLN, the Frente Amplio, and 
Concertación in certain ways – particularly with regards to the high degree of 
personalized leadership that each party exhibits and, especially in the case of the FSLN, 
in terms of their ideological clarity – that help explain why the relationship between 
policy preferences and left-right self-placement is not as strong as the relationship 
between left-right self-placement and voting behavior in these two countries. 
 Like the FMLN, the FSLN originated as a leftist guerrilla organization; unlike the 
FMLN, however, the FSLN actually achieved its goal of overthrowing the incumbent 
                                                 
16
  In additional to the sources cited below, these case studies draw from works by Cardenal and Miller (1982), 
DeShazo (2006), Hanemann (2005), LaRamée and Polakoff (1997), Madrid (2005-a), Prevost (1992), Robinson (2003), 
Rogers (2008, 2013), Van Cott (2000), Williams (1994), and Yashar (2005). 
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authoritarian regime. After years of scattered armed resistance to the Somoza regime, the 
pluralist, pragmatic FSLN Insurreccional (generally referred to as the Terceristas)17 
launched the first of a series of major urban insurrections in October 1977. The success of 
this sustained offensive prompted the March 7, 1979, reunification of the FSLN. On June 
4, 1979, the FSLN-aligned United Peoples Movement, a broad coalition of popular 
organizations, organized a general strike while the FSLN called for the public to 
participate in a final offensive against the Somoza regime. By the end of the month, 
FSLN forces had established control over most of the country. On July 17, Anastasio 
Somoza DeBayle resigned the presidency, putting an end to forty-two years of dictatorial 
rule; two days later, FSLN forces entered Managua and initiated the rule of a five-person 
Junta de Reconstrucción Nacional led by Daniel Ortega.18 
 During its eleven years in power, the Sandinistas employed the resources of the 
state to mobilize support for the revolution. A massive national literacy campaign, 
implemented in 1980, not only succeeded in reducing the country’s illiteracy rate from 
roughly 50% to less than 25% (Hanemann 2005), but it was also used as a means of 
political education to foster support for and participation in the revolution. Shortly after 
taking power, the FSLN established of a network of neighborhood groups (the Sandinista 
Defense Committees) that were used for political education (indoctrination) and to 
convince (coerce) citizens to support the regime. The FSLN also used its control of the 
state to further strengthen and institutionalize its ties to the various worker and peasant 
organizations that had emerged during the 1970s; these groups (particularly labor unions) 
saw their influence grow throughout the early 1980s. At the same time, Nicaragua’s 
economic elites – whose interests were represented by the Superior Council of Private 
Enterprise (COSEP) and the National Union of Nicaraguan Farmers and Cattlemen 
(UNAG) and championed by the conservative leadership of the Catholic Church – 
                                                 
17
  In 1975-76, the FSLN split into three factions: the FSLN Guerra Popular Prolongada (Prolonged Popular War) 
retained the Maoist/Guevarist/foquista ideology that had become dominant within the FSLN after the group’s defeat in 
the August 1967 Battle of Pancasán, the FSLN Proletario focused on the creation of an urban workers party to serve as 
the revolutionary vanguard, while the Terceristas worked to build a broad coalition of Marxist, social democratic, and 
Christian democratic forces in order to prepare a popular insurrection against the Somoza regime.  
18
  Alfonso Robelo and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the two non-FSLN members of the Junta, both resigned in 
April 1980. The Junta stayed in power until January 10, 1985, when Ortega assumed the presidency after winning the 
November 4, 1984, election with 67.0% of the vote. Ortega retained the presidency until April 25, 1990, when he was 
replaced by Chamorro, who won the February 25, 1990, presidential election with 54.7% of the vote. 
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launched a popular counter-mobilization that eventually gained hundreds of thousands of 
supporters. In short, upon assuming power, the FSLN invested heavily in creating 
institutional linkages to civil society and in educating citizens about the goals of the 
Sandinista revolution, while its opponents in the private sector and in the Catholic Church 
also sought to build a large anti-FSLN coalition – precisely the type of elite political 
activity that has the potential to accelerate the formation of programmatic party-voter 
linkages in a society caught in the midst of political violence. 
 However, as Booth and Richard (2006: 127-28) note, “the FSLN’s links to its 
mass groups became increasingly authoritarian during the mid-to-late 1980s.” Faced with 
the threat posed by the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the Democratic 
Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), and other armed counterrevolutionary groups 
collectively known as the Contras, the FSLN introduced a state of emergency in March 
1982 that placed important limitations on civil society activity (including restrictions on 
press freedom, the right to organize demonstrations, and workers’ right to strike). These 
restrictions were further expanded in October 1985, when the government extended the 
scope of the state of emergency, which would remain in place until January 1988. Just as 
the state of emergency and the war against the CIA-backed Contras (which forced the 
FSLN to institute an unpopular compulsory military draft and to make severe cutbacks to 
the social programs it had introduced during the party’s first years in power) served to 
weaken the FSLN’s linkages with civil society, the increasing personalization of the party 
under the leadership of Daniel Ortega hinted at future developments that would transform 
the FSLN’s image and muddle its ideological identity. 
 In 1999, after Ortega had suffered a surprising defeat in the February 1990 
election (when United Opposition candidate Violeta Chamorro defeated Ortega by 13.9% 
of the vote after pre-election polls predicted a FSLN victory) and an expected defeat in 
the October 1996 election (when Liberal Alliance candidate Arnoldo Alemán topped 
Ortega by a 13.2% margin), Ortega and Alemán agreed to a power-sharing arrangement 
referred to simply as “The Pact” and described by the Citizens’ Union for Democracy as 
“a corrupt model based on cronyism and privileges that will forever impede the 
economic, political, and social development of Nicaragua” (Rogers 2009). Although 
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Ortega lost the November 2001 election to Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) 
candidate Enrique Bolaños (who subsequently endeavored to have Alemán tried and 
convicted in 2003 for embezzling $100 million during his presidency), he took advantage 
of amendments to the country’s electoral laws (amendments that formed part of The 
Pact)19 and divisions within the PLC20 to win the presidency in November 2006 with only 
38.1% of the vote, a smaller percentage than he had received as a losing candidate in the 
1990 and 2001 elections. Three months after Ortega took office, the FSLN demonstrated 
that The Pact was still in effect as it voted in favor of legislation that retroactively 
reduced the maximum sentence for money laundering (the crime Alemán had been 
convicted of) to five years as part of a quid pro quo that ensured PLC support for the 
Sandinistas’ policy agenda. 
 That the leader of the “revolutionary” FSLN would form an enduring political 
alliance with Arnoldo Alemán – who placed ninth on Transparency International’s list of 
the ten most corrupt leaders of all time (Rogers 2007) and who is the leader of the PLC, 
the successor of Somoza’s Nationalist Liberal Party – demonstrates the extent to which 
the FSLN has turned away from its ideological origins to become an opportunistic 
political machine. While it is understandable why, for historical reasons, Nicaraguan 
voters continue to associate the FSLN with the Left a quarter-century after the election of 
Violeta Chamorro brought the Sandinista Revolution to an end, it is also understandable 
why those same voters, who have witnessed Ortega’s ongoing efforts to attain/retain 
personal power at any cost, find it difficult to identify programmatic differences between 
the FSLN and its Liberal opponents. 
 Like Nicaragua, Bolivia also experienced a short-lived revolution. On April 11, 
1952, widespread opposition to the military junta that had assumed power eleven months 
earlier in order to prevent Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) leader Víctor Paz 
Estenssoro from assuming the presidency (and to the oligarchic social order that the junta 
                                                 
19
  The new electoral provisions abolished the presidential run-off election as long as the top vote-getter receives at 
least 40% of the vote, or at least 35% as long as he/she enjoys a margin of at least 5% over the runner-up. 
20
  Discontent caused by The Pact and by the imprisoned Alemán’s continuing control over the PLC led a number of 
Liberals to form a breakaway party, the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), in 2005. In the 2006 presidential election, 
the ALN candidate (Eduardo Montealegre) and the PLC candidate (José Rizo) combined to receive 55.2% of the vote; 
there can be little doubt that either one of these candidates would have defeated Ortega in a presidential run-off election 
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sought to preserve), culminated in a victory over the Bolivian armed forces. Under the 
leadership of Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles Zuazo, the MNR, which introduced 
various progressive reforms including the establishment of universal suffrage, the 
creation of a national trade union federation, military reform, education reform, land 
reform, and the nationalization of the mining industry, dominated politics21 until 
November 4, 1964, when Paz Estenssoro’s vice-president, Air Force General René 
Barrientos, led a military coup that paved the way for eighteen years of authoritarian rule. 
 To a certain extent, the restoration of democratic rule in 1982 appeared to 
represent something of a reincarnation of the Bolivian Revolution. Siles Zuazo and Paz 
Estenssoro, the two men who had alternated presidential terms from 1952 through 1964, 
were the first two presidents of the post-transition era. This, along with the fact that Paz 
Estenssoro’s successor as leader of the MNR, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, was twice 
elected president (in 1993 and 2002), provides an illusion of party system continuity. 
However, a closer examination of the six presidential elections held during the period 
1980-2002 demonstrates that the post-transition party system was plagued by high levels 
of party fragmentation and electoral volatility. In these six elections, no presidential 
candidate ever received more than 38.7% of the vote; on three occasions (1989, 1997, 
and 2002), the winning candidate received 22.5% of the vote or less. Because the 
electoral laws that were in place during this period required winning candidates to receive 
a majority of the vote yet contained no provisions for a presidential run-off election when 
no candidate achieved the required majority, these six elections were all decided by the 
Bolivian Congress. As a result, the MNR, the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), and 
the conservative Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN) established “a system of pacted 
democracy in which [they] took turns governing the country, usually in alliance with each 
other and younger parties” (Madrid 2008-a: 492). This power-sharing arrangement 
remained in place until October 17, 2003, when Sánchez de Lozada succumbed to 
months of protests and resigned the presidency. 
                                                 
21
  Siles Zuazo won the 1956 presidential election with 84.4% of the vote; Paz Estenssoro won the 1960 and 1964 
presidential elections with 76.1% and 97.0% of the vote, respectively. 
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 A second manner in which the post-1982 democracy clearly differs from the 
earlier period of MNR one-party rule concerns Bolivia’s “revolutionary-populist heritage 
of ‘social rights’ … [and] the idea of ‘social citizenship’” (Larson 2008: 10). As Larson 
(2008: 9) notes, the MNR regime that assumed power in 1952 “was at the forefront of 
Latin American populist regimes that began to broaden the notion of citizenship rights to 
include social rights to basic economic livelihood and security … universal literacy and 
education, healthcare, and participatory unionization and democracy.” Both the 
ideological reputation of the MNR and Bolivian voters’ expectations that the government 
would play an active role in the economy and provide a wide array of public services 
sustained a significant blow in August 1985 when Paz Estenssoro and Sánchez de Lozada 
(then the Minister of Planning) introduced neoliberal shock therapy (including a 93% 
devaluation of the Bolivian peso, the elimination of price controls and subsidies, the 
privatization of various state-owned enterprises, and a sharp reduction in the number of 
persons employed in state-run oil and mining sectors) in a bid to reel in hyperinflation. 
 Certainly, both the “policy switch” (Stokes 2001) implemented by the MNR (the 
architect of many of the social rights that were eroded by the neoliberal reforms that were 
introduced in the 1980s) and the creation of an ideologically incongruent political 
alliance between the MNR, MIR, and ADN would have impeded Bolivian voters’ efforts 
to discern clear programmatic and/or ideological differences between these three parties. 
In order to identify the roots of the stronger-than-predicted relationship between left-right 
self-placement and voting behavior that became evident in the 2009 election, we must 
look not at the three traditional parties that controlled the presidency during the period 
from 1982 through 2003, but at the “ethno-leftist populist movement whose main 
ideological and political characteristic is the belief in communitarian democracy” 
(Mayorga 2008: 7) that emerged in 2002: the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS). 
 Drawing inspiration from the Katarista22 indigenous movement that emerged in 
the late 1970s to organize and represent the Aymara people (who, together with the 
Quechua, make up roughly 60% of Bolivia’s population) and taking advantage of the 
                                                 
22
  The Tupac Katari Revolutionary Movement, founded in 1978 and named after the leader of a 1780s indigenous 
uprising, spawned a number of splinter groups and political parties that also incorporated the Katari name. 
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popular discontent generated by the country’s neoliberal turn (discontent that boiled over 
in early 2000 as protests initially focused on the privatization of the municipal water 
company in Cochabamba spread throughout much of the country, prompting the 
government to declare a state of siege on April 8), cocalero union leader and activist Evo 
Morales rapidly built the MAS into the country’s largest political party. Morales, who 
since the early 1980s had held a series of leadership positions in the cocalero unions that 
gained recognition for their opposition to coca eradication programs implemented under 
pressure from the US, had been elected to the Bolivian Congress in 1997 as a member of 
the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (ASP), the political arm of a coalition of 
labor confederations that itself formed part of the United Left coalition. In 1998, the ASP 
split and Morales founded the Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples 
(IPSP), which rechristened itself as MAS the following year. 
 Following the example of Colombia’s Indigenous Social Alliance, Latin 
America’s first successful leftist ethno-populist party,23 Morales utilized a “dual strategy 
of mobilization and participation in democratic elections” (Mayorga 2008: 5) to build 
MAS into an inclusive party that “embodies, or hopes to embody, the synthesis of an 
older brand of ‘social rights’ … and the recent indigenous mobilization for ethnic rights 
… while also attacking the intractable problems of poverty and social marginalization” 
(Larson 2008: 11). MAS has appealed to the country’s majority indigenous population by 
embracing a number of indigenous demands (including demands for land reform, 
bilingual education, and greater local autonomy and the recognition of indigenous 
traditions and identities), by maintaining strong institutional linkages to various 
indigenous organizations (which allowed the party to tap into those organizations’ 
network of activists to reach out to voters), by including a large number of indigenous 
persons in party leadership positions and as candidates for elected office – something that 
                                                 
23
  The Indigenous Social Alliance (ASI), formed in 1991 and rechristened as the Independent Social Alliance in 
2011, has been surprisingly successful in local and regional elections  – winning, for instance, mayoral elections in 
various major cities including Bogotá, Medellín, Cúcuta, and Cartagena – in spite of the fact that indigenous people 
make up only 3% of Colombia’s population. 
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Bolivia’s main political parties had never done (Albó 2002, Madrid 2005-b)24 – and by 
making “numerous rhetorical and symbolic appeals” (Madrid 2008-a: 486) designed to 
make indigenous voters identify with MAS. The party also appeals to many non-
indigenous voters by espousing “redistributive, nationalist, and state interventionist 
policies” (Madrid 2008-a: 491) that capitalize on popular opposition to the neoliberal 
reforms introduced in the 1980s and 1990s (particularly the privatization of natural 
resource extraction industries) and to US political and economic intervention. 
 Although the new party’s performance in the 1999 municipal elections (the 
party’s first) was not particularly impressive – nationwide, MAS obtained only 3.3% of 
the vote, although it did receive nearly 40% of the vote in its “home department” of 
Cochabamba – MAS activists continued to cultivate close relationships to labor unions 
and peasant associations and to campaign heavily, particularly in predominantly-
indigenous areas, in preparation for the June 2002 national election. In that election, 
Morales received 20.9% of the vote (second only to the MNR’s Sánchez de Lozada, who 
was elected with 22.5% of the vote) and MAS established itself as the largest opposition 
party by winning twenty-seven seats in the 130-seat Congress and eight seats in the 27-
seat Senate. Using the platform afforded him as leader of the opposition to broadcast 
MAS’s programmatic and ideological opposition to the Sánchez de Lozada government, 
Morales “positioned himself at the forefront of anti-globalization forces” (Larson 2008: 
9). In September 2003, MAS played a leading role in organizing mass demonstrations 
against the government’s proposal to build a pipeline from Tarija department (where 
massive natural gas reserves were discovered in the 1990s) to the Chilean port of 
Mejillones in order to export natural gas to the United States and Mexico. As these 
demonstrations grew increasingly confrontational – protesters blocked many key roads, 
leading to fuel and food shortages in La Paz; the government responded by imposing 
martial law and mobilizing its police and military forces, leading to more than sixty 
deaths – the New Republican Force, led by Manfred Reyes Villa (who had finished third 
in the 2002 presidential election, with 20.9% of the vote), and vice president Carlos Mesa 
                                                 
24
  For instance, the three largest parties in the legislature elected in 1997 (the MNR, MIR, and ADN) controlled 
eighty-one seats in the Congress and twenty-two seats in the Senate. Only one of those 103 representatives was 
indigenous. 
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withdrew their support for the Sánchez de Lozada government, prompting the president 
to resign his post and flee to the US on October 17. 
 The extent to which MAS’s innovative mix of programmatic and ethno-populist 
politics has won over Bolivian voters was made evident by the results of the December 
2005 election (held eighteen months ahead of schedule after Mesa, who assumed the 
presidency after Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation, was also forced to resign in the face of 
widespread protests on June 6, 2005) – Morales won the presidency with 53.7% of the 
vote, and MAS captured a majority of seats in the Congress and twelve of twenty-seven 
seats in the Senate. Subsequent elections results have confirmed the party’s dominance of 
Bolivian politics.25 Evidence that programmatic party-voter linkages began to form 
during this period – not only was left-right self-placement a much better predictor of 
voting behavior in 2009 than it had been in 2002 and 2005, but the strength of the 
relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-placement peaked in 2007 (the 
last year I incorporate in the examination of Latinobarómetro public opinion surveys 
described in Chapter Two) – suggests that, even if MAS has “relied heavily on the 
charismatic appeal of Evo Morales” (Madrid 2008-a: 491), the party’s strong ties to labor 
unions and indigenous social movements and its demonstrated commitment to expanding 
the economic role of the state have made it easier for Bolivian voters to identify the 
programmatic and ideological differences that separate MAS from its rivals. 
 Interestingly, the other two countries where “new political movements forged 
during the period of economic transition … [that] openly identify with Latin America’s 
socialist and revolutionary Marxist traditions” (Roberts 2007: 7-8) have risen to 
prominence – Ecuador and Venezuela – also exhibited a spike in the strength of the 
relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-placement towards the end of 
the period I examine in Chapter Two (see Table 2.29). Although neither Rafael Correa’s 
Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Alliance (Alianza PAIS) nor the Chavista movement in 
                                                 
25
  MAS has received a majority of the vote in each of the six national elections/referenda held during the past ten 
years. The party won a majority of seats in the July 2006 Constitutional Assembly election. Morales received the 
support of 67.4% of voters in the August 2008 national vote of confidence. The MAS-promulgated Constitution was 
approved by 61.4% of voters in a January referendum. In both the December 2009 and October 2014 general elections, 
Morales retained the presidency (with 64.2% of the vote in 2009 and 61.4% in 2014) while MAS won a majority of 
seats in the Congress and in the Senate. 
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Venezuela exhibit the same high “level of autonomous social mobilization” that makes 
Bolivia’s MAS “a rare example of social protest movements that move beyond mass 
protests to develop overarching appeals, enter and contest the electoral arena, and capture 
state power by electoral means” (Roberts 2007: 8-9), both groups have employed a 
similar mixture of programmatic appeals “based on their rejection of the neoliberal 
economic model and their emphasis on poverty alleviation” (Rice and Van Cott 2006: 
721-22) and populist leadership to garner popular support. Tentative evidence that the 
strength of programmatic party-voter linkages may be on the rise in all three countries is, 
of course, consistent with my argument that elite political agency – particularly the 
unification, organization, and political activity of the Left – can accelerate the political 
learning process that underlies the development of programmatic political competition. 
 
8.3 Argentina and Brazil: Impact of an Unclear Left 
 This final section examines two countries, Argentina and Brazil, where 
programmatic party-voter linkages are weaker than we might expect them to be given 
each country’s relatively high level of political and socioeconomic development.26 Just as 
I argue that the presence of an organized and unified Left that has achieved electoral 
success by actively promoting its ideological distinctiveness is the common denominator 
that explains why programmatic party-voter linkages are stronger in Chile, Uruguay, and 
El Salvador than in any other Latin American democracy, I contend that the surprising 
weakness of programmatic party-voter linkages in Argentina and Brazil is a consequence 
the failure of leftist political elites in these two countries to construct a single political 
party (or durable coalition) that provides voters with a clear, programmatically distinct 
option at the left end of the ideological spectrum. In the Argentine case, party labels fail 
to provide voters with a programmatically meaningful informational shortcut because 
programmatic and ideological differences within the country’s main political parties far 
                                                 
26
  In addition to the sources cited below, my examination of party-voter linkages in Argentina draws from works by 
Adelman (1992), Canton and Jorrat (1998), Corradi (1977), Di Tella (1994), Kirkpatrick (1971), Levitsky (2003), 
McGuire (1997), Nolte (1995), Ranis (1979) Rock (1987), Schoultz (1977), Smith (1969), and Snow (1969) while my 
examination of the Brazilian party system draws from works by Ames (2001), Desposato (2006), Epstein (2009), 
Hagopian (1996), Hagopian et al. (2009), Hunter and Power (2007), Lyne (2005), Mainwaring (1999), Power (2000), 
Power and Zucco (2012), Rennó and Cabello (2010), Singer (2009), and Zucco (2008). 
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exceed differences between parties. In Brazil, an extraordinarily high level of party 
system fractionalization provides voters who identify themselves as leftists with a 
plethora of viable options. Consequently, in both countries, it is less than clear which 
political party leftist voters should support. 
 No Latin American country has swung back and forth between democracy and 
authoritarianism more often than Argentina, which experienced nine such transitions 
between 1946 and 1983 (Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005). Excepting the periods from 
December 1955 through January 1972 (when Peronism was officially banned) and from 
March 1976 through December 1983 (when the country was ruled by a military junta), 
Peronism has been the dominant force in Argentine politics since the mid-1940s, when 
Col. Juan Perón rose to prominence via his position as head of the military government’s 
Labor Department – a position that allowed him to establish strong linkages with the 
country’s labor unions. Peronists (including Perón himself on three occasions) have won 
nine of the eleven presidential elections held since 1946 in which Peronist parties were 
permitted to compete. Consequently, any examination of party system development in 
Argentina must address the following question: what is this “mass-movement-cum-
political party” (Lupu and Stokes 2009: 58) known as Peronism? 
 Seventy years after Perón first rose to political prominence, this question still has 
no widely-accepted answer. In terms of its support base, Peronism has been described 
both as a working class party and as a multiclass movement (Lupu and Stokes 2009). In 
ideological terms, Peronism has been described at various times, and by various authors, 
as fascist, conservative, neoconservative, anti-Marxist, anti-democratic, illiberal, 
neoliberal, ultraliberal, rightist, corporatist, pragmatic, Christian democratic, clientelist, 
populist, personalist, centrist, center-left, laborist, social democratic, social Christian, 
socially liberal, progressive, leftist, socialist, radical, and revolutionary (Mossige 2009, 
Ostiguy 2009). 
 This confusion has clear roots. In 1949, Perón coined the term justicialismo 
(shorthand for social justice) to describe Peronist doctrine, a doctrine that “claimed to 
transcend left and right … [but that] in practice completely lacked specifics, and could 
indeed mean all things to all men” (Mossige 2009: 95-96). By the mid-1960s, with Perón 
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exiled in Spain, “centrifugal tendencies [that] had been latent in the movement-party 
since the beginning [generated] an unparalleled level of infighting and division” 
(Mossige 2009: 107). Even Perón’s return to Argentina in 1973, after eighteen years of 
exile, could not resolve the conflicts that had emerged within Peronism between the 
increasingly conservative labor organizations and the left-wing Montonero movement. 
Indeed, the brief (1973-76) return to civilian rule eliminated the one element (opposition 
to military rule) that had provided these two groups with a common cause (Cavarozzi 
1986); consequently, the 1970s saw Montonero guerrillas assassinate Peronist politicians 
and labor union leaders while death squads associated with Peronist labor unions 
assassinated real or perceived leftists, all in the name of Peronism (Manzetti 1993, 
Mossige 2009, Ostiguy 2009). 
 Although there has not been any violent conflict between Peronist factions during 
the current period of democratic rule (1983-present), the Justicialist Party (PJ) remains 
organizationally unstable and programmatically incoherent. After defeating Peronist 
Renovation27 leader Antonio Cafiero in the PJ’s May 1988 primary election and then 
winning the May 1989 presidential election, Carlos Menem “abruptly shifted the PJ’s 
programmatic and ideological orientation” (Mossige 2009: 123) when he implemented 
various neoliberal economic reforms, including the privatization of many state-owned 
enterprises, during his ten-year presidency. Menem’s neoliberal turn prompted a number 
of progressive Peronists to join forces with other leftists to create the Front for a Country 
in Solidarity (FREPASO). Ideological divisions within the PJ became so intractable that 
the party was unable to nominate a candidate for the April 2003 presidential election.28 
 Although Néstor Kirchner, who was elected president in 2003, and his wife, 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who won the 2007 and 2011 presidential elections, have 
“ambitiously sought to redefine the PJ’s ideological position as one of the center-left, and 
                                                 
27
  While the socially and economically conservative Orthodox Peronists defended the organizational verticalism that 
has characterized the Peronist movement since its foundation, the Peronist Renovation faction, created in 1983, not 
only called for democratic reform within the PJ, but it also called for Argentina to stop making payments on the 
massive foreign debt contracted by the country’s military rulers and it advocated progressive views on various social 
issues (Mossige 2009). 
28
  Consequently, three Peronist candidates – Menem, Néstor Kirchner, and Adolfo Rodríguez Saá – participated in 
the April 2003 presidential election. Memem received a plurality of the vote (24.5%) but subsequently withdrew from 
the runoff election, allowing Kirchner (who had received 22.2% of the vote) to assume the presidency. 
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to imbue the party with a trait it had never contained in the past: a clear and consistent 
ideological position in terms of left and right,” the PJ continues to house disparate 
factions that range from the center-left to the far right on the ideological spectrum, in 
addition to an Orthodox faction that “continue[s] to deny the applicability of the left-right 
dimension in Argentine politics” (Mossige 2009: 96, 159-60). The anti-Peronists, too, 
have failed to establish any clear ideological identity; as Ostiguy (2009: 2-4, emphasis in 
original) notes, “although left and right are highly relevant in Argentine politics … it has 
been relatively easy and frequent for the Peronist party … and the main anti-Peronist 
parties to leapfrog one another along the left-right axis, without fundamentally altering 
the party system.”  
 Mossige (2009: 141-42) concludes that “Argentina’s main political parties [have] 
very poorly fulfilled the crucial party role of providing voters with clearly defined and 
distinguishable platforms ... [and] providing a semblance of ideological and 
programmatic consistency.” Inasmuch as the divide between Peronism and anti-Peronism 
appears to be primarily a question of cultural (as opposed to ideological or programmatic) 
identity (Ostiguy 1998), and given the clear ideological divisions that persist within the 
PJ (which remains divided into pro- and anti-Kirchner camps), it should come as no 
surprise that programmatic party-voter linkages in Argentina continue to be notably 
weak. 
 The notoriously low level of ideological consistency exhibited by Argentina’s 
main political parties makes the country something of an ideal fit for my argument that 
elite political agency plays a vital role in determining the type of party-voter linkages that 
will develop in a given polity. The Brazilian party system, on the other hand, presents my 
contention that countries like Costa Rica and Argentina exhibit weaker-than-expected 
programmatic party-voter linkages because they lack an organized and unified Left that 
has achieved electoral success by actively promoting its ideological distinctiveness with a 
sterner test. Given the fact that Workers’ Party (PT) leader Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva’s 
victory in the October 6, 2002, presidential election is heralded as one of the key 
moments of Latin America’s left turn, the unprecedented series of leftist triumphs that 
swept across much of the region during the first decade of the twenty-first century, one 
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might reflexively assume (1) that Brazilian voters clearly identify the PT as a leftist party 
and (2) that leftist voters overwhelmingly support the PT. In making my argument that 
Brazil, too, lacks the sort of Left that is likely to give rise to the development of 
programmatic party-voter linkages, I will address both of these assumptions. 
 The PT’s recent electoral success – Lula was reelected in 2006, then succeeded by 
his Chief of Staff, Dilma Rousseff, who won the 2010 and 2014 presidential elections, 
and the PT has been the leading vote-getter in the last four legislative elections – presents 
a distorted view of the party’s strength in the electorate. While the party’s rise from rather 
humble origins – in 1982, in Brazil’s first multi-party elections, the PT finished in fifth 
(last) place with only 3.5% of the vote – is certainly impressive, it masks the party’s 
inability to establish anything resembling the clear monopoly over the Left enjoyed by 
parties such as the FMLN, the Frente Amplio, the FSLN, and MAS. Figure 8.3, which 
shows the vote received by the PT in elections to Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies compared 
to the combined vote total of five other parties that are also universally regarded (e.g., 
Figueiredo and Limongi 2000, Leoni 2002, Power and Zucco 2009, Wiesehomeier and 
Benoit 2009, Lucas and Samuels 2010) as left-of-center parties,29 demonstrates that, 
although the PT has been the largest leftist party since 1986 (when it first surpassed the 
PDT), it has thus far been unable to distinguish itself as the only electorally-viable option 
on the Left. Since 1982, Brazil’s six largest leftist parties (the PT, PDT, PSB, PPS, 
PCdoB, and PSOL) have, on average, received 25.5% of the votes cast in the country’s 
congressional elections; the PT accounts for only 48.3% of this total. The fact that the PT 
has become the largest party in the Brazilian Congress without ever exceeding the 18.4% 
of the vote that it received in 2002 says more about the extreme level of fragmentation 
exhibited by the Brazilian party system30 than it does about the PT’s ability to consolidate 
its position as symbol of the Brazilian Left. It is quite clear that, while the PT may indeed 
                                                 
29
  These five parties are the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), the Democratic Labor Party (PDT), the Popular Socialist 
Party (PPS), the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), and the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL). Additional leftist 
parties that are excluded from this total because they have never received more than 1% of the vote include the United 
Socialist Workers’ Party (PSTU), the Free Homeland Party (PPL), the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), and the 
Workers’ Cause Party (PCO). 
30
  In the 1990-2014 elections, an average of twenty-one parties won representation in the Chamber of Deputies, 
while the effective number of parties (based on the number of seats won by each party) averaged 9.34. 
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have a history of “anchoring the left” (Mainwaring 1999: 19), Brazilians who want to 
vote for the left have other viable options. 
 Of course, the results obtained by Lula (1989-2006) and Dilma (2010-14) in the 
first round of Brazil’s presidential elections (illustrated in Figure 8.4) do paint a different 
picture. Although Lula barely edged out PDT founder Leonel Brizola (who received 
16.0% of the vote) to finish second in the 1989, the PT has clearly been the standard 
bearer of the Brazilian Left in presidential elections since 1994. Some of the PT’s success 
in presidential elections must be attributed to the additional publicity that the party 
received by virtue of the fact that Lula qualified for the presidential run-off elections in 
1989, 1994, and 1998.31 Lula’s victory in the 2002 election can also be attributed to the 
gradual process of ideological moderation that the PT initiated in the aftermath of Lula’s 
defeat in the 1994 presidential election and accelerated following his loss in the 1998 
election; whereas the PT of the 1980s and early 1990s “advocated the repudiation of 
Brazil’s external debt, the nationalization of the country’s banks and mineral wealth, and 
radical land reform,” by 2002, Lula and the PT exhibited a commitment “to maintaining 
key ‘neoliberal’ elements of incumbent president Cardoso’s economic program” 
(Samuels 2004: 1000, 1002). Neither of these factors, however, can explain the large and 
enduring gap between the number of votes received by the PT’s presidential candidates 
and the number of votes its candidates have received in elections to the Chamber of 
Deputies. Only the changing nature of the PT’s electoral alliances can explain the 
disparity between the success of Lula and Dilma and the party’s stagnant performance in 
legislative elections. 
 
                                                 
31
  The extent to which Lula and the PT surpassed other Brazilian parties and politicians in terms of name recognition 
was demonstrated by a 2002 survey of São Paulo residents in which more persons were familiar with the PT (80%) 
than with any other political party (the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, PMDB, followed with 59% 
recognition). Moreover, while 78% of respondents knew that Lula was affiliated with the PT, only 29% correctly 
identified the party affiliation of sitting president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Kinzo 2005: 71-72).  
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Figure 8.3 – The PT and the Rest of the Left 
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Figure 8.4 – Electoral Performance of the PT, 1989-2014 
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 In each of Lula’s three unsuccessful presidential bids, the PT maintained a highly 
selective strategy with regards to the formation of electoral alliances. With the exception 
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of the Green Party, all of the parties that entered into formal alliances in support of Lula’s 
candidacy in the 1989, 1994, and 1998 elections were clearly leftist parties.32 The PT 
abruptly and dramatically abandoned this strategy (and the party’s ideological purity) in 
2002 when it invited José Alencar of the right-wing Liberal Party (PL) to serve as Lula’s 
running mate (Samuels 2004, Baker et al. 2016). Four years later, two additional right-
wing parties – the Progressive Party (PP) and the Brazilian Republican Party (PRB) – and 
the largely non-ideological, catch-all PMDB were all incorporated into the PT’s pro-Lula 
alliance. By this time, although the PT remained “the only Brazilian party with extensive 
roots in civil society” (Samuels 2006: 22), it had also become “an integral part of the 
political mainstream” (Hunter 2010: 200) as its previous reliance on its leftist policy 
stances and its strong institutional ties to urban labor, progressive civil society 
organizations, and various left-leaning social movements (Keck 1992, Samuels 2006, 
Baker et al. 2016) was replaced by an electoral strategy that privileged the creation of an 
expansive, ideologically incoherent electoral alliance. Not coincidentally, the drop-off 
between the vote for Lula and the vote for the PT’s congressional candidates (illustrated 
in Table 8.2) grew substantially just as the party began forming alliances with political 
parties that clearly do not share the leftist ideology traditionally espoused by the PT. 
 
Table 8.2 – PT: President versus Party, 1994-2014 
 
 Year Presidential Vote Congressional Vote Difference 
 1994 17,116,579 5,859,347 11,257,232 
 1998 21,470,033 8,786,499 12,683,534 
 2002 39,436,099 16,093,987 23,342,112 
 2006 46,662,365 13,989,859 32,672,506 
 2010 47,651,434 16,289,199 31,362,235 
 2014 43,267,668 13,554,166 29,713,502 
 
 Returning to the question of party-voter linkages in contemporary Brazil, I 
contend that the confluence of the factors described above – i.e., the fact that the PT 
                                                 
32
  In 1989, the PCdoB and the PSB formally supported Lula’s presidential bid. In 1994, those two parties were 
joined by the PPS, the PSTU, and the Green Party. In 1998, the pro-Lula coalition again included the PCdoB and the 
PSB, and it also included the PCB and the PDT. 
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generally receives only one-half of all votes cast for leftist parties, the process of 
ideological and programmatic moderation that the PT initiated in the mid-1990s, and the 
PT’s 2002 decision to no longer use ideology as a criteria for selecting its alliance 
partners – explain the demonstrated weakness of the relationships between Brazilian 
voters’ policy preferences, their left-right self-placement, and their voting behavior. Even 
in the extremely unlikely event that every single person who voted for the PT’s 
congressional candidates also voted for the party’s presidential candidates, 59-70% of the 
votes received by Lula and Dilma would have come from persons who did not support 
the PT. In numerical terms, then, the PT has been a minority partner in its own 
presidential candidates’ success. While the PT of the 1980s and early 1990s adopted the 
same strategies that the FMLN employed to great effect in El Salvador – it actively 
promoted its ideological distinctiveness while creating an intensive and pervasive party 
organization – it was not particularly successful in doing so. The PT has not forged the 
unification of the Brazilian Left, and its success in presidential elections masks the 
party’s inability to win the support of even 20% of Brazilian voters in legislative 
elections. With the PT now presiding over an ideologically incoherent coalition that is 
locked in competition with another broad coalition led by the centrist Brazilian Social 
Democracy Party (PSDB), the short-term prospects for the development of programmatic 
party-voter linkages in Brazil appear to be rather meager. 
 
8.4 Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I set out to demonstrate that my agent-centered theory regarding 
the development of programmatic political competition in contemporary Latin America – 
a theory that identifies the unity and organization of the Left, the extent to which leftist 
parties actively promote their ideological distinctiveness, and the degree of success they 
have achieved at the ballot box as key factors in the development of programmatic party-
voter linkages – can successfully be applied beyond the three countries that I examine in 
the previous chapters, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. My examination of the 
development of programmatic party-voter linkages in Uruguay and Chile demonstrates 
the existence of clear parallels between the Frente Amplio, the Concertación, and the 
  233 
FMLN in terms of their efforts to build strong institutional linkages with labor unions, 
peasant associations, and other progressive elements of civil society and to highlight the 
ideological and programmatic differences that distinguish them from right-wing and 
center-right opponents associated with previous authoritarian regimes. 
 The complicated role that the FSLN has played in influencing the nature of party-
voter linkages in contemporary Nicaragua provides further evidence in support of my 
claim that the organization and political activity of the Left is of critical importance, for 
the FSLN shares many characteristics with the FMLN, the Frente Amplio, and the 
Concertación, but it also differs from them in significant ways. While the FSLN’s 
success in overthrowing the Somoza dictatorship and its use of state resources during the 
years of the Nicaraguan Revolution (1979-90) to build strong ties with labor unions and 
peasant organizations and to educate voters about the party’s ideological identity 
paralleled the efforts made by the FMLN which resulted in the development of strong 
programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador, its post-1990 conversion into an 
opportunistic and highly personalized political machine has inhibited voters’ ability to 
identify how the FSLN differs from its rivals. 
 Bolivia’s MAS provides another intriguing case of a political party that exhibits 
some but not all of the characteristics that allowed the FMLN, the Frente Amplio, and the 
Concertación to serve as the cornerstone for the development of programmatic political 
competition in El Salvador, Uruguay, and Chile. Though highly personalized like the 
FSLN, MAS rose to prominence by forging strong institutional ties to labor unions and to 
social movements representing Bolivia’s majority indigenous population and by actively 
publicizing its opposition to neoliberal reforms introduced during the 1980s and 1990s 
and to US intervention. Unlike the FSLN, MAS continues to emphasize its ideological 
identity, suggesting that the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages in Bolivia may 
continue to rise. Evidence that programmatic party-voter linkages were beginning the 
emerge in Ecuador and Venezuela, where the Alianza PAIS and the Chavista movement 
rose to prominence employing the same mixture of programmatic appeals and populist 
leadership that MAS has employed in Bolivia, further demonstrate the potential impact of 
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a unified Left that achieves success at the ballot box while employing programmatic 
appeals in its efforts to attract voters’ support. 
 Finally, Argentina and Brazil provide two examples of countries where leftist 
political elites have been unable to construct a single, unified front that provides voters 
with clear programmatic signals. The Argentine case, where programmatic party-voter 
linkages are notably weak because elections have been dominated by catch-all parties that 
exhibit unclear and/or inconsistent programmatic identities, finds parallels in other Latin 
American countries such as Peru, Honduras, Panama, and Paraguay. Brazil’s PT is rather 
unique inasmuch as the party has captured the presidency in each of the past four 
elections in spite of its inability to establish itself as the sole electoral vehicle of the 
Brazilian Left. However, if we use results from Brazil’s legislative elections to measure 
the electoral strength of the PT (as opposed to the much broader support for the party’s 
presidential candidates), the correlation between the electoral weakness of the Left and 
the weakness of programmatic party-voter linkages that we observe in the Brazilian case 
finds parallels in countries such as Guatemala and Colombia where leftist political parties 
have found little support. 
 Ultimately, then, this chapter’s examination of the development of programmatic 
political competition in Chile and Uruguay, the presence of stronger-than-predicted 
programmatic party-voter linkages in Bolivia and Nicaragua, and the surprising weakness 
of programmatic party-voter linkages in Argentina and Brazil uncovers no evidence that 
clearly contradicts my contention that elite political agency – particularly the unity, 
organization, and political activity of the Left – is the factor that best explains why 
programmatic political competition has developed in some Latin American democracies 
but not in others. In the following chapter, I provide a summary of the arguments and 
evidence that I have presented in the preceding chapters, consider the likelihood that 
programmatic party competition will endure in those Latin American countries where it 
has been established and that it might be established in those countries where 
programmatic party-voter linkages remain weak, and discuss future research that might 
employ the theoretical framework I have developed to further our understanding of the 
evolution of party-voter linkages. 
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Chapter Nine 
Final Thoughts 
 
 The surprising fact that left-right self-placement is a better predictor of voting 
behavior in El Salvador than in any other Latin American democracy constitutes the 
principal empirical puzzle that motivates this dissertation. The surprising strength of 
programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador prompts questions about party system 
development and the nature of party-voter linkages on three levels. Most immediately, 
evidence of strong programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador raises the question 
of how we can explain the emergence of programmatic political competition in a country 
where limited previous experience with democratic elections and a relatively low level of 
socioeconomic development would presumably make it more difficult for voters to learn 
how to vote “correctly.” Branching out from this fairly narrow query regarding the 
surprising strength of programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador – and motivated 
by the finding (presented in Chapter Two) that pre-WWII economic prosperity, post-
WWII experience with democratic rule, and state expenditures on social welfare 
programs are all poor predictors of the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages in 
contemporary Latin America – I ask how we can best explain variation in the degree to 
which the region’s eighteen electoral democracies exhibit evidence of programmatic 
political competition. At the macro level, this analysis of party-voter linkages in El 
Salvador and, more broadly, in all of Latin America, casts doubt over a conventional 
wisdom that identifies certain social, economic, and political characteristics associated 
with modernization as prerequisites for the development of programmatic political 
competition at the same time as it calls for a careful examination of the role that elite 
political agency plays in determining the nature of party-voter relationships. 
 In the first section of this chapter, I summarize my responses to these queries 
about the development of programmatic political competition in El Salvador, about the 
observed variation in the strength of the relationships between policy preferences, left-
right self-identification, and voting behavior in contemporary Latin America, and about 
the role that elite political agency plays in either hindering or facilitating the development 
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of programmatic party-voter linkages. In the following section, I discuss the future 
prospects for programmatic political competition in Latin America, speculating about the 
likelihood that programmatic party-voter linkages will remain strong in El Salvador, 
Chile, and Uruguay and the likelihood that programmatic political competition will 
emerge elsewhere in the region. Lastly, in the final section of this chapter, I discuss future 
research that would provide us with greater insight into (1) the role that electoral 
institutions play in conditioning the type of party-voter linkages that are likely to emerge 
in a given polity, (2) the considerations that political elites take into account when they 
decide if they will invest in the creation of permanent party organizations and whether or 
not they will emphasize programmatic appeals in their communications with voters, (3) 
the nature of the relationships between policy preferences, left-right self-placement, and 
voting behavior in democratic regimes outside of Latin America, and (4) the relationship 
between programmatic political competition and the quality of democracy. 
 
9.1 The Development of Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages 
 Chapter Two’s empirical analysis of the relationships between policy preferences, 
left-right self-placement, and voting behavior demonstrates that, when we include all 
eighteen Latin American democracies, economic prosperity, prior experience with 
democratic elections, and government spending on social safety nets are all poor 
predictors of the development of programmatic political competition in contemporary 
Latin America. Moreover, the finding that left-right self-placement is a better predictor of 
voting behavior in El Salvador than in any other Latin American democracy demonstrates 
that neither a high level of economic development, a long history of democratic elections, 
nor the establishment of a relatively inclusive social safety net can be considered 
necessary preconditions for the development of programmatic party-voter linkages. The 
results of this survey-based analysis do not, however, point to any specific alternative 
theory regarding the development of programmatic political competition that would 
outperform a conventional wisdom which argues that lasting programmatic party-voter 
linkages are the end product of long-term processes of political learning that requires a 
relatively high level of economic and political modernization. To develop (and test) such 
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an alternative explanation, I take a closer, more nuanced look at party system 
development in nine of Latin America’s eighteen electoral democracies, a group of 
countries that includes (as illustrated in Figure 9.1) some where programmatic party-voter 
linkages are strong and others where they are weak, cases where predictions derived from 
the aforementioned conventional wisdom are accurate and cases where they are not. 
 
Figure 9.1 – Predicted versus Observed Programmatic Political Competition 
 
   Observed PPC  
 Predicted PPC   Weak   Strong 
 Weak   Guatemala   El Salvador 
      Nicaragua 
       Bolivia 
 Strong   Costa Rica   Uruguay 
    Argentina   Chile 
    Brazil   
 
 As noted above, evidence that strong programmatic party-voter linkages have 
developed in El Salvador constitutes the single most striking result of my survey-based 
examination of the strength of the relationships between policy preferences, left-right 
self-placement, and voting behavior in contemporary Latin America. My examination of 
party system development in El Salvador (Chapter Five) demonstrates that ARENA and 
the FMLN, the two parties that have dominated electoral competition since the 
conclusion of the country’s decade-long civil war, have been the protagonists responsible 
for the development of programmatic political competition. Beginning in 2002, when 
Schafik Hándal and the ortodoxos established their control over the party, the FMLN (as 
political party) moved to revitalize the close relationships with urban labor unions, 
student organizations, and peasant associations that had greatly contributed to the growth 
of the FMLN (as guerrilla movement) during the 1970s and to the group’s ability to 
withstand the Salvadoran armed forces’ counterinsurgency efforts during the middle 
phase of the civil war (1984-89). Taking advantage of the organizational framework that 
it had created since the war’s end – even as it confronted various internal divisions for a 
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full decade while it struggled to complete a successful transition from guerrilla 
organization to political party, the FMLN built an extensive network of local party 
organizations – the ortodoxo-led FMLN launched an aggressive voter education 
campaign that recalled the earlier activities of the Salvadoran Communist Party as well as 
the wartime use of schools and radio stations established in FMLN-controlled territories. 
 These aggressive political outreach activities, combined with the FMLN’s 
decision to name Schafik as its candidate in the 2004 presidential election and to use its 
campaign propaganda to highlight the party’s programmatic positions and ideological 
principles, served to clarify the party’s ideological identity. The success of these efforts – 
in the 2003 legislative election, the FMLN received a plurality of the votes cast for the 
first time – prompted ARENA to initiate its own efforts to educate voters about the 
party’s policy preferences and its ideological commitments. The extent to which these 
two parties’ efforts to cultivate programmatic linkages with their supporters had made it 
easier for Salvadoran voters to identify the ideological and programmatic differences 
between the FMLN and ARENA became quite clear in 2004, when the strength of the 
relationship between voters’ policy preferences and their left-right self-placement 
increased dramatically. 
 The process of moving from this targeted examination of the development of 
programmatic political competition in El Salvador to the broader topic of cross-country 
variation in the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages in contemporary Latin 
America begins with my analysis of party system development in Guatemala (Chapter 
Six) and Costa Rica (Chapter Seven). The continuing fragmentation of the Guatemalan 
party system – evident both on the Left, where the URNG has been unable to establish 
itself as a electorally relevant party, and on the Right, where political parties frequently 
multiply, splinter, and dissolve as a result of individual party leaders’ presidential 
aspirations – demonstrates that neither the FMLN’s successful transition from guerrilla 
organization to political party nor ARENA’s success in establishing itself as El 
Salvador’s predominant right-wing party was predetermined by the role that these two 
parties played during El Salvador’s civil war. The weakness of programmatic party-voter 
linkages in Guatemala supports my contention that the development of programmatic 
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political competition in El Salvador cannot be dismissed as the result of that country’s 
civil war, and it also provides support for the argument that, in the absence of a 
successful “externally mobilized party,” right-of-center parties that benefit from the 
status quo have little incentive to invest in the creation of permanent party organizations 
or the development of programmatic party-voter linkages. 
 My examination of party-voter linkages in Costa Rica demonstrates how the 
ideological ambiguity exhibited by the country’s main political parties (the PLN and the 
PAC) and the organizational weakness that has characterized the Costa Rican Left have 
inhibited voters’ ability to vote “correctly.” Banned from participating in electoral 
politics from 1948 through 1975, the radical Left has failed to establish any permanent 
organizational presence or to achieve any significant degree of electoral success. 
Although the PLN adopted and expanded upon many of the policy proposals that the 
Costa Rican Communist Party had introduced during the 1930s and 1940s, party founder 
and longtime leader José Figueres publicly and aggressively dissociated the party from 
the leftist label while defining the PLN as a pragmatic, non-ideological party. Similarly, 
while the PAC, which emerged two decades after the PLN had abandoned the statist 
development strategy that it had promoted since the 1950s, is critical of the neoliberal 
reforms that the PLN has implemented over the course of the previous three decades, its 
founder and longtime leader Ottón Solís insists that the PAC is a centrist party. Inasmuch 
as the country’s main political parties have consciously and consistently deemphasized 
ideology, it should come as no surprise that, even after six decades of democratic 
elections, Costa Rican voters are unable to identify clear programmatic differences 
between the country’s main political parties. Just as the surprising strength of 
programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador points to the important role played by 
ARENA and particularly the FMLN in educating voters and providing them with a clear 
choice between two ideologically and programmatically distinct options, the enduring 
weakness of programmatic party-voter linkages in Costa Rica demonstrates just how 
difficult it is for voters to vote “correctly” when party elites do not provide them with 
appropriate clues about the programmatic and/or ideological differences that separate the 
country’s main political parties. 
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 Chapter Eight’s abbreviated case studies of party system development in six more 
countries continue this examination of cross-country variation in the degree to which 
Latin American party systems exhibit evidence of programmatic political competition. 
The presence of stronger-than-predicted programmatic party-voter linkages in Nicaragua 
and Bolivia further demonstrates the inadequacy of a conventional wisdom which 
suggests that the development of programmatic political competition requires a relatively 
high degree of socioeconomic development and an iteration of democratic elections, 
while the weakness of programmatic party-voter linkages in Argentina and Brazil 
demonstrates that socioeconomic and political modernization will not necessarily result 
in the development of programmatic political competition. Moreover, an examination of 
the Left in these six countries bolsters one of the main conclusions that I draw from my 
examination of party system development in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica – 
namely, that the unity, organization, and political activity of the Left are key determinants 
of the type of party-voter linkages that can be found in Latin American party systems. To 
varying degrees, Uruguay’s Frente Amplio, Chile’s Concertación, Bolivia’s MAS, and 
Nicaragua’s FSLN all resemble El Salvador’s FMLN inasmuch as they have all taken an 
active role in deliberately fostering the formation of programmatic ties to their 
supporters. Similarly, the weakness and disunity of the Left in Brazil and Argentina 
(where programmatic party-voter linkages are much weaker than expected) parallels the 
weakness and disunity of the Left in Costa Rica and Guatemala (where programmatic 
party-voter linkages are also weak). 
 Based on this examination of party-voter linkages in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Argentina and Brazil, I offer a distinct 
explanation for variation in the extent to which programmatic party-voter linkages have 
formed in Latin America’s eighteen electoral democracies, an explanation that 
emphasizes elite political agency rather than structural characteristics associated with 
economic and political modernization. In arguing that political crises which result in the 
destruction of the existing party system provide political elites – even those found in 
countries that exhibit a relatively low level of socioeconomic development and that lack 
any stable pattern of social cleavages – with an opportunity to accelerate the process of 
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political education through which stable political identities and political attachments 
form, I challenge both the assumption (associated with modernization theory) that 
substantial material resources are required to build the permanent political organizations 
that make programmatic political competition possible and the assumption (associated 
with the Michigan model of partisan identification) that the formation of programmatic 
party-voter linkages necessarily results from a long-term process of political learning that 
can be achieved only through decades of competitive elections. 
 Of course, simply claiming that agency matters hardly constitutes a fully formed 
theory of party system development; we must know which agents are most likely to 
attempt to initiate the construction of programmatic party-voter linkages, and we must 
also know how these agents can succeed in accelerating the process through which these 
linkages form. Because the region’s leftist parties generally lack access to the financial 
resources that would be necessary to match the expenditures on mass media campaigns 
and on maintaining extensive networks of patron-client relationships that established 
conservative and catch-all parties use to win votes, the Left has (at most times, in most 
Latin American countries) had the greatest incentive to attempt to convince voters to base 
their voting decisions on programmatic considerations. It is for this reason that I argue 
that variation in the unification, organization, and political activity of the Left best 
explains why programmatic political competition has developed in some Latin American 
democracies but not in others; strong programmatic party-voter linkages have formed 
only in those countries where a unified Left has achieved success at the ballot box by 
using programmatic appeals that emphasize the Left’s distinct ideological identity.  
 Regarding the question of how leftist political elites in El Salvador, Chile, and 
Uruguay succeeded in generating programmatic party-voter linkages, political crises that 
disrupted the previous partisan status quo (i.e. the civil war in El Salvador, military coups 
and the subsequent repression of civil society in Chile and Uruguay) certainly played an 
important role. However, even if the Left’s resource disadvantage provides leftist 
political elites with an incentive to push for the development of programmatic political 
competition and even if political crises provide them with an opportunity to clearly 
distinguish themselves from established political actors, they must act decisively if they 
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are to succeed in accelerating the process through which programmatic party-voter 
linkages form. Only where the Left has formed an ideologically coherent party (or stable 
coalition) that has maintained its unity, where it has created and maintained permanent 
party organizations that cultivate strong ties with labor unions, peasant associations, and 
other civil society organizations, where it makes concerted efforts to educate voters about 
the Left’s ideological commitments and its programmatic platform both through its 
campaign rhetoric and through the activities of its local party organizations, and where it 
has achieved success at the ballot box while doing so have strong programmatic party-
voter linkages emerged. Where the Left has been either unwilling or unable to create a 
successful political party that actively promotes its programmatic and ideological 
distinctiveness, programmatic party-voter linkages remain weak and voters find it much 
more difficult to vote “correctly.” 
 Even if this argument that emphasizes the unity, organization, and political 
activity of the Left solves the puzzle of why El Salvador, Chile, and Uruguay are the only 
three Latin American democracies where strong programmatic party-voter linkages have 
formed, many other important questions remain unanswered. In the section that follows, I 
address one of these questions: what does the future hold; how likely is it that 
programmatic party competition will endure in those Latin American countries where it 
has been established, and how likely is it that strong programmatic party-voter linkages 
might develop elsewhere in the region? 
 
9.2 Latin America: Looking towards the Future 
 If the presence of a unified Left that has achieved electoral success by actively 
promoting its ideological distinctiveness is the common link that explains the 
development of programmatic political competition in Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador, 
it is not unreasonable to assume that the continued unity and success of an ideologically 
distinct Left would increase the likelihood that programmatic party-voter linkages will 
remain strong in these three countries. In all three countries, the leftist party/coalition 
responsible for introducing programmatic party-voter linkages (Chile’s Concertación, 
Uruguay’s Frente Amplio, and El Salvador’s FMLN) continues to enjoy unprecedented 
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success in all three countries; the FMLN has won the last two presidential elections, the 
Frente Amplio the last three, and Concertación five of the last six. Moreover, although 
these parties (particularly in Uruguay and El Salvador, where the Left’s radical origins 
are more pronounced) have – as is to be expected – exhibited some degree of moderation 
with regards to their domestic policy proposals and their foreign relations (particularly 
with the US) as it transitioned from opposition force to governing party, they are still 
quite clearly the only electorally viable left-of-center option in their respective countries. 
Consequently, I would argue that, as long as the FMLN and the Frente Amplio continue 
to enjoy success at the ballot box while representing a unified Left whose economic 
policy preferences clearly differ from those of their rivals, programmatic party-voter 
linkages are likely to remain strong in El Salvador and Uruguay. Chile, on the other hand, 
may have a different prognosis. 
 As noted in Chapter Eight, various examinations of the relationship between 
Chilean voters’ policy preferences and their voting behavior have found that voters who 
identify themselves as Leftist and those who identify themselves with the Right are 
divided not by their preferences regarding the economic role of the state – regardless of 
the ideological self-placement, Chileans are much more likely to express support for 
retaining the market-based economic policies that Pinochet introduced in the 1970s than 
for a return to the statist development policies associated with Allende – but, rather, by 
the extent to which they assign intrinsic value to democracy and democratic institutions. 
Surprisingly, even after a quarter-century of uninterrupted democratic rule, this regime 
divide is still the most obvious factor that distinguishes voters who support Concertación 
from those who support the Alliance for Chile. There is, however, reason to believe that, 
as time continues to pass by, this retrospective regime divide between Concertación and 
the Alliance for Chile will become much less relevant. 
 Luna (2006: 445) contends that Chile is beginning to exhibit a “dual configuration 
that combines programmatic linking in the upper sectors of society and increasing levels 
of personalization … municipalization … and mercantilization … of non-programmatic 
linkages in the lower sectors of society.” Various data support the notion that increasing 
numbers of Chilean voters no longer feel represented by the country’s two main party 
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coalitions. Navia (2007) presents data from biannual public opinion surveys which show 
that a large and enduring increase in the number of respondents who do not identify 
themselves with the left, the center, or the right occurred in the mid-1990s – during the 
period from 1990 through 1994, the percentage of survey respondents who claimed no 
ideological identification hovered between ten and fifteen percent; from 1995 through 
2006, this percentage consistently topped twenty-five percent, and it often reached thirty-
five percent or more. Moreover, Luna (2006) and Navia (2007) both attribute the decline 
in voter turnout (evident since 1997) to voter disenchantment with the options provided 
by Concertación and the Alliance for Chile. Luna (2006) contends that (1) many lower 
class voters and younger voters (those who came of age after the 1988 plebiscite) feel 
unrepresented by these political coalitions that are divided only by the aforementioned 
regime divide, and that (2) while some of these disenchanted voters have lent their 
support to the Communist Party, many more abstain from politics altogether.1 Voter 
registration data – Siavelis (2009: 5) reports that in 2008, 95% of Chileans aged fifty-five 
and older were registered to vote, but only 22% of 18-24 year-olds had done so – strongly 
supports the conclusion that the majority of young voters have disengaged from party 
politics. 
 Consequently, it appears likely that as time continues to pass by (and as persons 
who experienced the 1973 coup and the subsequent repression of the Pinochet regime 
inevitably become an ever smaller proportion of Chile’s adult population) the strength of 
programmatic party-voter linkages in Chile will diminish unless the division between 
Left and Right comes to be dominated by some policy area that is more relevant to the 
political experience of voters who came of age after the 1988 plebiscite than the existing 
regime divide. Of course, inasmuch as I concur with Torcal and Mainwaring (2003: 59), 
who argue that “the interaction of competing political parties, their political discourses, 
electoral platforms and policy making… is responsible for creating, transforming, 
                                                 
1
  Chile’s unique majoritarian binomial electoral laws, which make it exceedingly difficult for any party that does 
not form part of one of the two main coalitions to win representation in the legislature – since 1989, non-aligned parties 
have, on average, received 11.6% of the vote in legislative elections but only 2.1% of seats in the Chilean Congress – 
likely limits the perceived utility of voting for any independent party or coalition. Indeed, from 1993 through 2005, 
there was no practical difference between voting for the PCCh and abstaining; although the Communists’ vote haul 
ranged from 5.0% to 6.9% during this period, the party did not obtain a single seat in the legislature until 2009, when it 
formally allied itself with (but did not join) the Concertación. 
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deepening or diffusing specific social and economic conflicts,” I contend that the regime 
divide will only be replaced by a new source of programmatic party-voter linkages if 
some group of political elites – either within one of the two dominant coalitions or, more 
likely, some group of political outsiders not currently represented by either the 
Concertación or the Alliance for Chile – invests in the creation of an ideologically 
coherent political party that actively promotes its programmatic distinctiveness. 
 Admittedly, moving from the question of whether programmatic political 
competition will endure in Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador to the question of whether 
strong programmatic party-voter linkages are likely to emerge elsewhere in the region 
involves a greater degree of speculation; the high levels of party system instability and 
fragmentation observed in many Latin American democracies necessarily make any 
predictions about future party system development in the region much more tentative. 
Nonetheless, many of the region’s electoral democracies exhibit patterns of party system 
development that permit educated guesses to be made. 
 If we assume that programmatic political competition enhances the quality of 
democracy (an assumption that will be examined in the following section), then there is 
reason to be optimistic about the prospects that relatively strong programmatic party-
voter linkages may be in formation, or could at least soon emerge, in a fair number of 
Latin American countries. As noted in Chapter Eight, during its rapid rise to prominence, 
Bolivia’s MAS adopted many of the tactics that the Left used in Chile, Uruguay, and El 
Salvador to forge institutional linkages with labor unions and peasant associations and to 
ensure that voters are aware of its distinct ideological/programmatic identity. Even 
though MAS exhibits a higher level of personalization than Concertación, the Frente 
Amplio, or the FMLN, the survey data I examine in Chapter Two (data which only extend 
through 2007 for the relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-
placement, and through 2009 for the relationship between left-right self-placement and 
voting behavior) suggests that these efforts were already having a positive impact on the 
strength of programmatic party-voter linkages in Bolivia. I contend that further 
development of programmatic political competition in the country is largely dependent 
upon the ongoing development of MAS. If the party continues to enjoy success while 
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emphasizing its ideological distinctiveness, programmatic party-voter linkages are likely 
to become stronger. If, however, MAS follows the path taken by the Daniel Ortega-led 
FSLN and becomes increasingly identified not with its ideology or its policy platform but 
with its leader (Evo Morales), the development of programmatic party-voter linkages is 
likely to stall (as it seemingly has in Nicaragua). 
 The same general prognosis can be made for a number of other countries where 
leftist party-movements have recently risen to prominence. Like Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela also exhibit signs that programmatic party-voter linkages were beginning to 
form during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Yet, when compared to MAS, 
both Rafael Correa’s Alianza PAIS and Venezuela’s neo-Bolivarian Chavista movement 
are poorly institutionalized. Elsewhere, it is entirely possible that Ollanta Humala’s 
Peruvian Nationalist Party (which captured the presidency in 2011), the Liberty and 
Refoundation Party formed by supporters of deposed Honduran president Manuel Zelaya 
(which surpassed the Liberal Party to finish second to the National Party in the 2013 
presidential and parliamentary elections), and Mexico’s Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (whose candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, finished in second place in 
the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections) might follow the same trajectory as the FMLN, 
the Frente Amplio, and Concertación in terms of their impact on the development of 
programmatic political competition. Of course, it is also possible that programmatic 
party-voter linkages will remain weak in these five countries; programmatic political 
competition is likely to emerge in these five countries only if the aforementioned political 
parties achieve success at the ballot box while maintaining their unity, investing in the 
construction of stable party organizations, and actively promoting the ideological and 
programmatic distinctiveness of the Left. 
 The development of programmatic political competition in Bolivia or in any one 
of the five countries mentioned in the previous paragraph would shed welcome light on 
the relationship between political crisis and the formation of programmatic party-voter 
linkages. In Chapter One, I note that widespread and persistent political violence 
preceding the establishment/restoration of democratic rule likely helped accelerate the 
process through which strong programmatic party-voter linkages formed in Chile, 
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Uruguay, and El Salvador. The emergence of new, electorally-viable leftist parties in 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, Honduras, and Mexico has not been accompanied by 
any episodes of sustained political violence comparable to the violent repression of civil 
society experienced in Chile and Uruguay during the 1970s and 1980s or the Salvadoran 
civil war. Rather, it was varying degrees of party system collapse that provided political 
outsiders (i.e. leftist political elites) in these six countries with an opportunity to achieve 
unprecedented success at the ballot box. Should programmatic party-voter linkages 
become as strong in any one of these six countries as they are in Chile, Uruguay, and El 
Salvador, this would provide support for my contention that the impact that political 
crises have on the development of programmatic political competition is largely 
dependent upon the decisions made and actions taken by party elites (rather than the 
nature or scope of the political crisis). 
 Moving on to the rest of the region, I argue that, compared to the countries 
examined above, the remaining eight Latin American democracies (Guatemala, Costa 
Rica, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay) are 
unlikely to witness the development of strong programmatic party-voter linkages in the 
near term. In Paraguay, the meteoric rise of Fernando Lugo (who brought an end to sixty 
years of Colorado Party rule when he was elected president in 2008) did not result in the 
development of any consolidated, electorally-viable leftist party. Lugo’s Patriotic 
Alliance for Change (a broad coalition of leftist and center-left parties formed in 2007) 
had already dissolved before Lugo himself was stripped of the presidency in 2012 via an 
irregular impeachment process, resulting in the fragmentation and debilitation of the Left 
– in the 2013 election, the main leftist parties/coalitions (the Guasú Front coalition, the 
National Encounter Party, the Forward Country alliance, and the Democratic Progressive 
Party) combined to win only five of the eighty seats in Paraguay’s Chamber of Deputies. 
Similarly, no institutionalized, electorally-viable, programmatically distinct leftist party 
that emphasizes its ideological identity has emerged in Guatemala (where UNE’s leftist 
credentials are somewhat unconvincing), Panama, Colombia, Argentina (where 
Kirchnerism continues to be no more than a leftist current of Peronism), or the 
Dominican Republic. 
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 The historic nature of Costa Rica’s 2014 election – the PAC captured the 
presidency for the first time and the Broad Front (which won nine seats in the legislature 
with 13.1% of the vote) enjoyed the greatest performance by any leftist party since 1942 
– suggests that the Costa Rican party system may find itself at something of a turning 
point. While it is conceivable that either the PAC or the Broad Front might transform 
itself into the stable, organized, electorally-relevant Left that has been absent from Costa 
Rican politics since the late 1940s, it remains to be seen whether the PAC will use the 
presidency to emphasize the anti-neoliberal side of its identity (as opposed to simply the 
anti-corruption side) and reposition itself as a center-left party (instead of a non-
ideological party), or whether the Broad Front will be able to build upon its recent surge 
in support. At present, however, there is no strong reason to believe that either the PAC 
or vast numbers of Costa Rican voters will suddenly embrace the Left. 
 Finally, as noted in Chapter Eight, the Brazilian party system faces a fairly unique 
obstacle to the development of strong programmatic party-voter linkages: while the PT 
has constructed a permanent party organization, cultivated strong ties to labor unions and 
other groups in civil society, and clearly demonstrated its electoral viability, it has not 
succeeded in establishing itself as the only electorally-viable leftist party. Moreover, by 
abandoning its previous policy of only forming electoral alliances with other leftist 
parties, the PT has diluted its ideological identity over the course of the past thirteen 
years. If the PT could not consolidate control over the Brazilian Left while Lula was at 
the height of his popularity, it is hardly likely to do so now, as the party is embroiled in 
scandal while Dilma faces calls for her impeachment. Consequently, the PT is also 
unlikely to serve as the protagonist in the development of programmatic political 
competition. 
 Of course, only time will tell whether the predictions I have offered in this section 
provide an accurate account of the future development of programmatic political 
competition in Latin America. In the section that follows, I consider a set of unanswered 
questions about the development of programmatic party-voter linkages that can be 
addressed in the here and now 
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9.3 Future Research 
 Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that elite political agency – 
particularly the unity, organization, and political activity of the Left – is responsible for 
the development of programmatic political competition in Uruguay, Chile, and El 
Salvador. My examination of the development of programmatic party-voter linkages in 
these three countries emphasized the importance of leftist elites’ decision to invest in the 
creation and maintenance of stable, institutionalized parties that employ programmatic 
appeals in their campaign rhetoric and make concerted efforts to educate voters about the 
ideological and programmatic differences between these leftist parties and their right-
wing and center-right rivals. What this examination did not do, however, is explore in 
any great detail the process through which the leaders of the Frente Amplio, 
Concertación, and the FMLN arrived at this decision. Why, for instance, did the FMLN’s 
ortodoxo current insist that the party continue to emphasize its revolutionary identity 
even as other factions within the FMLN called for the party to moderate its ideology and 
deemphasize its guerrilla past? Why did the leaders of the various political parties that 
joined forces to create Concertación and the Frente Amplio decide that their parties’ 
interests would be better served by their incorporation into a durable leftist coalition than 
by entering the electoral arena as independent parties? Research designed to uncover the 
reasons why leftist party elites in these three countries decided that investing in the 
development of programmatic party-voter linkages constituted the most efficient use of 
these parties’ limited resources would likely provide help explain why other left-of-center 
parties in the region have not attempted to foster the development of programmatic 
political competition. 
 Another, clearly related question concerns the role that electoral institutions may 
play in either facilitating or hindering the development of programmatic party-voter 
linkages via their impact on elite political behavior. Beginning with Duverger (1954), a 
number of highly-influential studies of party system development (e.g., Taagepera and 
Shugart 1989, Cox 1990, Lijphart 1994, Cox 1997) have examined the manner in which 
various electoral institutions influence the number and type of political parties that form 
in a given polity. While examinations of the impact of direct presidential elections (Key 
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1958, Lipset 1963), presidential runoff elections (Shugart and Carey 1992, Jones 1994), 
proportional representation (Lijphart 1999), district magnitude (Taagepera and Shugart 
1989), obstacles to party registration (Rosenstone et al. 1984, Hug 2000, Brirnir 2004, 
Tavits 2006), and party access to public funding (Mendilow 1992, Katz and Mair 1995, 
Samuels 2001, van Biezen 2005) have all demonstrated that these institutions do indeed 
influence the behavior of political elites in terms of their decision to invest in the creation 
of stable political parties, this literature provides few (if any) specific predictions 
regarding the impact that these institutions have on the nature (programmatic or non-
programmatic) of party-voter linkages. 
 However, if we can assume that there is an inverse relationship between the 
number of political parties in a given party system and the average voter’s ability to 
correctly identify competing political parties’ issue preferences, determine which party’s 
platform is most similar to his/her own preferences, and then vote accordingly, then we 
can also assume that federalism, proportional representation, high district magnitudes, 
and other institutional features that fail to provide elites with incentives to reduce the 
number of political parties decrease the likelihood that programmatic party-voter linkages 
will form, even in countries where shared understandings of the programmatic meanings 
attached to the labels “right” and “left” have been established. A targeted examination of 
the impact that various electoral laws and institutions may have not only on the number 
of political parties that form but also on the type of parties that form would provide a 
more holistic view of the relationship between elite political agency and the development 
of programmatic political competition. 
 Just as my agent-centered examination of programmatic party-voter linkages in 
contemporary Latin America invites complementary research designed to measure the 
impact that electoral institutions have on political elites as they decide whether or not to 
invest in the creation of stable, institutionalized, ideologically coherent political parties 
that utilize programmatic appeals to win voters’ support, it also invites research that 
would test the theoretical framework I have developed beyond the confines of Latin 
America. The expansion and proliferation of national public opinion surveys and of 
coordinated international survey projects such as the Eurobarometer, the World Values 
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Survey, and, more recently, the Afrobarometer provides researchers with the opportunity 
to explore the relationships between policy preferences, left-right self-placement, and 
voting behavior in an ever-larger number of democratic and semi-democratic regimes. 
Certainly, scholars with the requisite regional expertise in other areas that are home to a 
large number of relatively new democracies – e.g., Africa, Asia, and Central and Eastern 
Europe – could replicate my examination of the role that elite political agency has played 
in determining the nature of party-voter linkages in Latin America 
 Closing the circle, a final avenue for future research concerns the relationship 
between programmatic political competition and democratic quality. As I note in Chapter 
One, the normative argument that priviliges programmatic party-voter linkages over other 
types of party-voter linkages identifies the development of rational, deliberative 
programmatic linkages between voters and their agents (elected officials) as a crucial 
factor that facilitates the establishment of democratic accountability. However, relatively 
little empirical research has been done on the relationship between the strength of 
programmatic party-voter linkages and the quality of democratic rule. Moreover, the 
nature of that relationship remains unclear. Keefer (2006), who examines the relationship 
between programmatic political competition and various measures of democratic quality 
in 127 countries, does find that the presence of programmatic political parties has a 
positive impact on public policy because it improves candidates’ ability to make credible 
promises to the voting public. Rae (2007), however, argues that the increasingly 
programmatic nature of party-voter linkages in the United States since the late 1970s has 
had a negative impact on the quality of democracy by contributing to enhanced policy 
gridlock and, as a consequence, to growing popular frustration with government. 
 The same Americas Barometer and Latinobarómetro surveys that I use to examine 
the relationships between policy preferences, left-right self-placement, and voting 
behavior could also be used to determine whether variation in the strength of 
programmatic party-voter linkages is reflected by indirect measures of democratic quality 
(such as citizens’ satisfaction with democratic rule and their evaluations of various 
democratic institutions). Other, more direct indicators of government performance drawn 
could also be used to determine whether the development of relatively strong 
  252 
programmatic party-voter linkages in Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador has had the 
presumed positive impact on democratic quality in those three countries. Such research is 
obviously important because, ultimately, our interest in the development of programmatic 
party-voter linkages is driven by an assumption that this is how representative democracy 
should work. 
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Appendix 2.A 
In Defense of Small Countries 
 
 While lamenting the fact that their exclusion of six of Latin America’s eighteen electoral 
democracies both reflects and reproduces “the relatively sparse attention research on Latin American 
politics has given to the Central American polities,” Kitschelt et al. (2010: 343) contend that their sample is 
nonetheless representative of Latin America not only because it “includes more than 90 percent of the Latin 
American population,” but also because it “includes countries with large and small indigenous minorities, 
low- and middle-income economies, and long-standing democracies ... alongside countries that have 
transited to democracy more recently and some others with dubious democratic credentials at least for some 
time period.” As I demonstrate in this chapter, the data constraints that Kitschelt et al. (2010) allude to as 
they explain their decision to exclude Guatemala, Panama, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Paraguay from their analysis can be overcome by utilizing different proxy measures for the theoretical 
concepts they employ. The question of how well the twelve countries they do examine represent Latin 
America is a matter that requires further discussion. 
 
Table 2.13 – Population in Latin America, 2010 (in millions) 
Brazil 195.5  Guatemala 14.4  Paraguay 6.5 
Mexico 110.7  Ecuador 13.8  El Salvador 6.2 
Colombia 46.3  Cuba 11.2  Nicaragua 5.8 
Argentina 40.7  Bolivia 10.0  Costa Rica 4.6 
Peru 29.5  Dominican Rep. 9.9  Panama 3.5 
Venezuela 29.0  Honduras 7.6  Uruguay 3.4 
Chile 17.1 
    
  
 
 While it is true that the countries Kitschelt et al. include do account for the vast majority of the 
region’s population – in 2010, these twelve countries’ combined population of 510.6 million accounted for 
90 percent of the region’s population (CEPAL 2011: 23) – it is not clear how this is relevant to the study of 
party systems. Although, as Table 2.13 shows, five of the six countries that Kitschelt et al. exclude are 
amongst the seven smallest Latin American countries in terms of population, not even the smallest country 
in this group – Panama, with a population of 3.5 million – can be considered a micro-state, so there is 
therefore no theoretical reason to believe that these countries’ relatively small size somehow exempts them 
from the same processes of party system formation and development that we expect to observe in their 
larger neighbors. Certainly, Kitschelt et al. do not provide any a priori reason to believe that the 
development of a national party system in a small country like Panama should follow a different logic than 
that which governs national party system development in a much larger country like Brazil. 
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 Moreover, any such argument would undermine the empirical evidence that Kitschelt et al. (2010) 
present in support of their contention that contemporary levels of programmatic political competition can 
be attributed to variation in pre-WWII levels of economic prosperity, post-WWII experience with 
democratic elections, and the inclusiveness of the social safety net established during the ISI era. The 
region’s two most populous countries – Brazil and Mexico – both “emerge as consistent and stubborn 
outliers” (Kitschelt et al. 2010: 206) in terms of the discrepancy between predicted and observed levels of 
PPS. Indeed, if we were only interested in studying polities where the majority of Latin Americans live, 
then a sample including only these two countries would suffice, since Brazil and Mexico account for fifty-
four percent of the region’s population. The fact that neither one of these two countries conforms to their 
predictions would positively condemn the theoretical framework that Kitschelt et al. adopt if we chose to 
take population size into consideration. 
 At the other end of the size spectrum, it is important to note that Uruguay, a country that Kitschelt 
et al. do include and also one of only two countries (along with Chile) that consistently exhibit high levels 
of PPS according to each of the four measures they use, has the smallest population in all of Latin America. 
Moreover, as I demonstrate in this chapter, Uruguay stands out as a significant outlier that tilts the evidence 
in favor of the theoretical framework Kitschelt et al. employ. Had they excluded Uruguay from their 
analysis because of its small population, the evidence Kitschelt et al. present in support of their theory 
would have evaporated. If the region’s least populous country is to be included – even though this country 
proves to be an outlier not only on the dependent variable but also on the key independent variables – then 
there can be no theoretically valid reason to exclude any other country based on its size. 
 Now, what is to be made of Kitschelt et al.’s claim that their twelve-country sample is fairly 
representative of the region as a whole? First, I will address the issue of economic development. While it is 
true that their sample includes both low- and middle-income countries, it does not include them in equal 
proportions. Table 2.14 shows that five of the six countries that Kitschelt et al. exclude from their analysis 
currently rank amongst the six poorest countries in the region (Avakov 2010). The average GDP per capita 
of the countries that Kitschelt et al. include ($8,253) is nearly double the average GDP per capita of the 
countries they exclude ($4,550). Quite plainly, their sample is biased towards the region’s wealthiest 
nations. 
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Table 2.14 – GDP per Capita, 2000, at Purchasing Power Parity, Measured in 2007 Dollars 
 
Chile $11,673   Peru $5,730  
 
Mexico $11,527   Ecuador $5,378  
 
Venezuela $11,425   Dominican Rep. $5,271  
 
Argentina $11,318   El Salvador $5,076  
 
Uruguay $9,898   Guatemala $4,308  
 
Costa Rica $8,670   Paraguay $3,997  
 
Panama $8,613   Bolivia $3,777  
 
Brazil $8,383   Honduras $3,000  
 
Colombia $5,988   Nicaragua $2,306  
 
 Similarly, their twelve-country sample is strongly biased towards countries that have had more 
experience with democratic competition during the post-WWII era. Kitschelt et al. include the eleven 
countries that top Table 2.2, the ranking of democratic experience during the years 1945-98. For the twelve 
countries they include, the average score on this measure is 30.5; for the six countries they exclude, the 
average score is only 11. Again, we must conclude that, in terms of past democratic experience, this 
twelve-country sample does not represent the region as a whole. 
 So, the twelve-country sample that Kitschelt et al. examine has proven not to be strongly 
representative of Latin America in terms of economic development (the proxy for their concept of political 
capabilities) or in terms of prior democratic experience (their proxy for political opportunities). What of 
their third predictor of the formation of programmatic political competition – political stakes? Here, the 
evidence is mixed. Although average social security and welfare spending as a percentage of GDP during 
the years 1970-2000 (figures presented in Table 2.3) for the twelve countries that Kitschelt et al. include 
(4.2%) is more than twice the corresponding figure for the six countries that they exclude (1.9%), not all of 
the excluded countries are found at the bottom of the rankings. Panama and Nicaragua are ranked fifth and 
seventh, while Paraguay falls just short of the top half of the rankings in tenth position. Therefore, it is 
perhaps fairest to conclude that Kitschelt et al.’s twelve-country sample is at least fairly representative of 
the region as a whole in terms of this measure of political stakes. 
 To conclude, I simply suggest that the evidence presented in this appendix presents a convincing 
argument in favor of the inclusion of the six countries that Kitschelt et al. exclude from their analysis. Not 
only are there strong theoretical grounds for their inclusion – as there is no reason why these countries 
should be ignored simply because they are, with the exception of Guatemala, smaller than most of the 
countries that Kitschelt et al. do include – but there are also strong practical reasons for their inclusion, 
since Kitschelt et al.’s twelve-country sample under-represents the region’s low-income countries, and it 
also under-represents those countries that have relatively limited post-WWII experience with democratic 
rule. 
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Appendix 2.B 
On Measurement 
 
 As noted in the text of this chapter, in order to generate predictions of the strength of 
programmatic party-voter linkages in each of Latin America’s eighteen electoral democracies based on 
Kitschelt et al.’s (2010) reformulation of the conventional wisdom regarding the development of 
programmatic political competition, I needed to identify alternatives to the indicators of pre-WWII 
economic prosperity (political capabilities), experience with democratic competition during the post-WWII 
era (political opportunities), the degree to which governments introduced social protection for the urban 
working class during the ISI era (political stakes), and programmatic party structuration that Kitschelt et al. 
utilize. In this appendix, I demonstrate that the indicators I utilize in this chapter capture the same 
theoretical concepts as the measures that Kitschelt et al. employ, and that the conclusions I draw in this 
chapter are unaffected by my choice of indicators. 
 
Political Capabilities 
 To measure pre-WWII economic prosperity, I replace the data that Kitschelt et al. use – GDP per 
capita estimates for the year 1928 taken from Bulmer-Thomas (1994) – with GDP per capita estimates for 
the year 1929 taken from Avakov (2010). Avakov’s estimates, which are all either taken from Maddison 
(1995, 2001, 2003, and 2007) or extrapolated from the data that Maddison provides, are preferred for two 
reasons. First, Avakov provides “pure” (i.e. not extrapolated) estimates for thirteen countries, compared to 
only nine pure estimates in the data that Kitschelt et al. (2010) use. Second, Avakov uses more temporally 
proximate data as the basis for creating extrapolated estimates for those countries where pure estimates are 
not available than do Kitschelt et al; whereas Avakov uses pure estimates for the year 1950 to create 
extrapolated estimates of GDP per capita in 1929 in five countries, Kitschelt et al. use data from the years 
1960 and 1980 to generate extrapolated estimates when pure estimates are not available. 
 To ensure that my decision to replace the data that Kitschelt et al. use with the data presented by 
Avakov does not have any undue influence on the predictions of programmatic party-voter linkages that I 
calculate in this chapter, I compare these two measures for the nine countries for which both Avakov and 
Bulmer-Thomas provide pure estimates. Both a simple comparison of the rank orderings presented in Table 
2.15 – which finds that no country moves more than two spots up or down in the rankings – and the 
calculation of the correlation between these two indicators (Pearson’s R = .86) reveal that they are closely 
related. Although the score for Venezuela does differ considerably between the two indicators, a difference 
that has a substantial impact on the correlation coefficient (when Venezuela is excluded, Pearson’s R rises 
to .98), Venezuela’s position in the country ranking differs by only two spots. The strong correlation 
between these two measures suggests that the GDP per capita estimates I use in this chapter (and report in 
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Table 2.1) can be regarded as reliable proxy measures of pre-WWII economic development, both for the 
nine countries included in Table 2.15 and for the nine countries for which Kitschelt et al. do not provide 
GDP per capita estimates. 
 
Table 2.15 – Estimates of GDP per Capita in 1928/29 
 
Data from Kitschelt et al. (2010)  Data from Avakov (2010) 
 
Uruguay 1.51  Argentina 1.51 
 
Argentina 1.39  Uruguay 1.07 
 
Chile 1.02  Chile 1.05 
 
Mexico -0.33  Venezuela 0.72 
 
Costa Rica -0.51  Mexico -0.67 
 
Venezuela -0.63  Peru -0.79 
 
Brazil -0.79  Costa Rica -0.82 
 
Peru -0.81  Colombia -0.88 
 
Colombia -0.84  Brazil -1.19 
 
Note: Because Kitschelt et al. (2010: 180) present their GDP per capita estimates in terms of standard deviations from 
the unweighted mean, here I also present the estimates taken from Avakov (2010) in that same format.  
 
Political Opportunities 
 Because the original source of the data that Kitschelt et al. (2010) use to measure previous 
democratic experience (Mainwaring et al. 2001) provides data for all eighteen Latin American 
democracies, there was no need to develop an alternative indicator of political opportunities. Therefore, I 
simply calculated scores for the six countries that Kitschelt et al. (2010) exclude from their analysis based 
on the original data presented by Mainwaring et al. (2001), and recalculated the scores for Mexico and Peru 
the scores that Kitschelt et al. report for these two countries differ from the scores derived from the data 
that Mainwaring et al. provide.  
 I did, however, make one change to the way this proxy measure of political opportunities is used; 
whereas Kitschelt et al. create two separate measures of previous democratic experience – one using data 
for the years 1945-98 and another that only incorporates data for the years 1945-73 – I use only the first 
measure. 
 Kitschelt et al. provide a pragmatic rationale for the creation of their second measure of 
democratic experience: they note that the correlations between this measure (which only includes data for 
the years 1945-73) and their four measures of programmatic party structuration (PPS) are stronger than the 
correlations that result from using data on democratic experience during the entire post-war era. Kitschelt et 
al. (2010: 184-185) suggest that this finding could signify that “electoral contestation was particularly 
important for the long-term development of PPS when it coincided with a critical period of political-
economic restructuring that featured big ‘stakes’ of societal reorganization dividing political camps.” 
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 This explanation would fit in perfectly if Kitschelt et al.’s broader theoretical argument regarding 
the formation of programmatic party competition was predicated on a claim that the first quarter-century 
following WWII constituted a critical juncture that set in place the basis for the future development of the 
region’s party systems. However, the decision to only measure democratic experience prior to 1974 fits 
poorly with the capabilities-opportunities-stakes framework they introduce. If the reason we measure prior 
democratic experience is to gauge the extent to which parties and voters alike have had opportunities to 
learn democratic accountability through practice, then we must ask, why exclude the years 1974-98, a 
period when numerous Latin American countries made transitions between authoritarian and non-
authoritarian regimes? To contend that a measure of democratic experience that excludes these data points 
is superior to a measure that includes them is to contend that the political developments of this 25-year 
period had no influence over the type of party-voter linkages that were evident at the end of the twentieth 
century. This seems to be an unlikely proposition, at best. 
 Even if we confine our analysis to Chile and Uruguay, the two countries that exhibit the highest 
levels of PPS according to the measures that Kitschelt et al. employ, serious doubts arise. How likely is it 
that Uruguay’s Frente Amplio, formed in 1971, would have eclipsed the Partido Nacional and the Partido 
Colorado to become that country’s majority party, or that Chile’s socialists and Christian democrats would 
have formed an electoral coalition that has endured for more than two decades, if the leaders of the military 
coups that toppled democratic regimes in both countries in 1973 had decided to return to their barracks 
after a short stay in power rather than remaining in government for more than a decade? What would 
contemporary party-voter linkages in these two countries look like if Chile’s Concertación did not exist and 
if the Frente Amplio was still trying to establish itself as a viable alternative to the two parties that had 
dominated Uruguayan politics for more than a century? These unanswerable questions provide the rationale 
for including data for the years 1974-98 in any measure of past democratic experience. 
 
Political Stakes 
 Kitschelt et al. (2010) consider a number of measures of the degree to which governments 
introduced social protection for the urban working class during the ISI era before settling upon a measure 
of social policy expenditure as a percent of GDP in the year 1973 as their proxy for political stakes. 
Because the source for the data that they use (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001) does not provide data 
for Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, or Panama, I was forced to identify an alternate proxy measure of 
political stakes. I, too, considered multiple indicators, including data on the percentage of the economically 
active population that was covered by social security schemes in the year 1980 (Mesa-Lago 1989: 10) and 
two sets of data on average social spending as a percentage of GDP during the period 1970-2000 (Huber et 
al. 2008: 428) – one that includes only social security and welfare spending and another that also includes 
expenditures on health care and education. 
  278 
 Since the three alternate measures of political stakes that I considered are all strongly correlated to 
one another (with Pearson’s R values ranging from .75 to .90) and to the indicator that Kitschelt et al. use 
(Pearson’s R ranges from .74 to .86), I ultimately decided to use the data on social security and welfare 
spending as a percentage of GDP during the period 1970-2000 as my proxy measure of the degree to which 
governments introduced social protection for the urban working class during the ISI era. I chose this 
measure because it proves to be more strongly correlated with Kitschelt et al.’s measures of programmatic 
party structuration and with the measure of programmatic party-voter linkages that I create than either of 
the two alternatives. Therefore, selecting this measure, which is presented in the first column of Table 2.16, 
alongside the other two indicators I contemplated using and the indicator that Kitschelt et al. utilize, allows 
for the fairest test of the predictive power of the theoretical framework they employ. 
 
Table 2.16 – Measuring Political Stakes 
 Social Security & Total Social  % EAP  Social Policy 
 Welfare Spending Spending  Insured    Spending 
Country 1970-2000 1970-2000   1980   1973 
Uruguay 13.7  18.7 [1]   81.2 [2]   13.5 [2] 
Chile 8.7  14.6 [2]   61.7 [5]   13.9 [1] 
Brazil 7.4  11.9 [5]   95.6 [1]   7.8 [5] 
Argentina 5.5  10.9 [6]   69.1 [3]   11.4 [3] 
Panama 4.5  14.5 [3]   45.6 [7]     
Costa Rica 3.7  13.2 [4]   68.3 [4]   10.7 [4] 
Nicaragua 3.0  8.8 [8]   18.9 [13]     
Bolivia 2.9  8.9 [7]   18.5 [14]   3.3 [12] 
Mexico 2.9  8.4 [9]   42.0 [8]   5.6 [8] 
Paraguay 2.2  4.7 [14]   14.0 [16]     
Colombia 1.8  7.4 [10]   22.4 [12]   6.4 [7] 
Venezuela 1.8  7.2 [11]   29.8 [6]   7.2 [6] 
Dominican Rep. 0.9  4.4 [16]   14.0 [16]   5.3 [9] 
Peru 0.9  4.7 [14]   37.4 [9]   5.3 [9] 
Honduras 0.7  6.7 [12]   14.4 [15]     
Guatemala 0.6  3.2 [18]   33.1 [10]     
El Salvador 0.5  4.2 [17]   11.6 [18]     
Ecuador 0.2   4.8 [13]     23.2 [11]     4.1 [11] 
  Pearson’s R .81  .86    .74      
 
 Table 2.16 lists Latin America’s eighteen democracies according to their rank order on the 
measure I use; the rank orderings for the other three measures are provided in brackets, while the 
correlation coefficients provided in the final row report the correlation between each of the three alternate 
measures I examined and the indicator that Kitschelt et al. use. An examination of this table demonstrates 
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that the proxy measure of political stakes that I introduce is compatible with the measure that Kitschelt et 
al. use. Indeed, the strong correlations between these four measures, combined with the fact that the rank 
orderings are all broadly consistent with one another, suggest that all four indicators do indeed measure the 
same underlying concept. It is particularly important to note that the choice of indicator does not have too 
great of an impact on the extent to which El Salvador and Uruguay appear as outliers; while Uruguay ranks 
first or second on all four measures, El Salvador occupies either the last or the penultimate position in the 
rank ordering for each of the three measures I consider. 
 Similarly, Table 2.18, which provides the predictions of programmatic political competition that 
are generated when each of these four indicators of the inclusiveness of Latin America’s social safety nets 
is incorporated as the proxy measure of political stakes, demonstrates that the choice of indicator has 
minimal impact on the extent to which El Salvador and Uruguay appear as outliers. Regardless of which 
proxy measure of political stakes is used, Uruguay tops the ranking of the predicted likelihood of 
programmatic political competition. Moreover, the first six countries in the rankings remain the same 
regardless of which measure of political stakes is used. At the bottom of the rankings, El Salvador’s 
position does improve when the measure I use is replaced by either one of the other two alternative 
measures that I considered, but this movement is minimal. The fact that these four sets of predictions are 
strongly correlated to one another (as shown in Table 2.17) provides further evidence that the conclusions I 
draw in this chapter are not dependent on my choice of indicators. 
 
Table 2.17 – Predictions of Programmatic Political Competition: Pearson’s R 
 
Social Security & Total Social % EAP Social Policy 
 
Welfare Spending   Spending Insured   Spending 
      1970-2000 1970-2000 1980 1973 
SS & WS ’70-00 ---- 
   
TSS ’70-00 .98 ---- 
  
% EAP ’80 .96 .96 ---- 
 
SPS ’73 .96 .98 .92 ---- 
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Table 2.18 – Predicted PPC: Comparing Four Measures of Political Stakes 
 
Social Security & Total Social  % EAP 
 
Social Policy 
 
Welfare Spending   Spending  Insured 
 
  Spending 
Country     1970-2000 1970-2000   1980 
  
1973 
Uruguay 2.44  2.17 [1]   1.86 [1]   1.45 [1] 
Chile 1.70  1.63 [2]   1.40 [2]   1.14 [2] 
Argentina 1.16  1.12 [3]   1.36 [3]   .63 [3] 
Venezuela .90  .95 [5]   1.23 [4]   -.16 [5] 
Costa Rica .72  1.10 [4]   1.11 [5]   .58 [4] 
Brazil .39  .23 [6]   .80 [6]   -.47 [6] 
Colombia -.17  -.10 [8]   -.25 [8]   -.70 [7] 
Ecuador -.28  -.27 [9]   -.17 [7]   ----- 
 
Bolivia -.36  -.28 [10]   -.63 [13]   ----- 
 
Panama -.37  .05 [7]   -.40 [10]   ----- 
 
Peru -.53  -.61 [13]   -.27 [9]   -1.19 [8] 
Nicaragua -.61  -.56 [12]   -.88 [16]   ----- 
 
Mexico -.68  -.65 [14]   -.58 [12]   -1.30 [9] 
Honduras -.68  -.55 [11]   -.76 [14]   ----- 
 
Dominican Rep. -.75  -.86 [15]   -.85 [15]   ----- 
 
Guatemala -.80  -.99 [16]   -.57 [11]   ----- 
 
Paraguay -1.01  -1.24 [18]   -1.25 [18]   ----- 
 
El Salvador -1.07  -1.15 [17]   -1.16 [17]   ----- 
 
 
 
Measuring Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages 
 As described in the text of this chapter, I borrow an indicator introduced by Mainwaring and 
Torcal (2005) to create a summary measure of the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages in each 
country. Following Mainwaring and Torcal (2005), I take data from the Americas Barometer survey 
conducted most immediately following each of thirty-two presidential elections held in Latin America’s 
eighteen electoral democracies during the years 2001-2009 and run logistic regressions on each of the three 
pairs formed by the three leading vote-getters in each election, using survey respondents’ left-right self-
identification (as measured on a 10-point scale) as the sole independent variable and their reported vote 
choice as the dependent variable. The summary measure of the strength of programmatic party-voter 
linkages is then created by calculating the average of the Nagelkerke R2 values from each of these three 
logistic regressions, with .00 entered rather than the reported Nagelkerke R2 value if the logistic regression 
coefficient is not significant at the .95 confidence level. 
 For example, to construct this measure for the 2006 presidential election in Colombia, I first 
identify the top three vote getters (Álvaro Uribe, Carlos Gaviria, and Horacio Serpa) and then perform 
logistic regression analysis on each of the three pairings formed by these candidates (Uribe-Gaviria, Uribe-
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Serpa, and Gaviria-Serpa), using left-right self-identification as the sole independent variable and reported 
vote choice as the dependent variable. The Nagelkerke R2 values for these three regressions are .0677, 
.0006, and .0947, respectively. Because the regression coefficient for the second model (Uribe-Serpa) is not 
statistically significant, the Nagelkerke R2 value for this regression (.0006) is replaced by .00. Finally, I 
calculate the mean of the three values (.0541). 
 Before deciding to use the same mean Nagelkerke R2 value that Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) 
use, I explored a number of alternate methods for creating a measure of the degree to which left-right self-
identification predicts voting behavior using the same set of Americas Barometer survey data. In the end, 
each of the six different methods I analyzed – (1) weighting the party-pair Nagelkerke R2 values by the 
proportion of the percentage of valid votes received by each pair compared to the percentage of valid votes 
received by the three top vote-getters, (2) using the Nagelkerke R2 value produced by running a logistic 
regression including only the top two vote-getters, (3) employing the regression coefficient from the 
logistic regression that includes the top two vote-getters, (4) using the maximum party-pair Nagelkerke R2 
value instead of the mean value, (5) employing the maximum party-pair logistic regression coefficient, or 
(6) using the adjusted R2 from OLS regression models which take the respondents’ left-right self-placement 
as the sole independent variable and the left-right position of the party that the respondents’ reportedly 
voted for, as measured on the twenty-point scale developed by Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009), as the 
dependent variable – produced similar results in terms of which countries emerge at the top of the ranking 
on this measure of the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages. 
 
Predicting the Development of Programmatic Political Competition 
 In the previous four sections of this appendix, I have demonstrated that the indicators I use to 
measure pre-WWII economic prosperity, experience with democratic competition during the post-WWII 
era, the degree to which governments introduced social protection for the urban working class during the 
ISI era, and the strength of programmatic party-voter linkages are all compatible with the indicators 
Kitschelt et al. (2010) use. In this final section, I demonstrate the robustness of the conclusion I reach in 
this chapter – namely, that when we reincorporate the six countries that Kitschelt et al. (2010) exclude from 
their analysis, pre-WWII economic prosperity, post-war experience with democracy, and the inclusiveness 
of State welfare programs are (individually and in tandem) poor predictors of the strength of programmatic 
party-voter linkages in contemporary Latin America – by demonstrating that my choice of indicators does 
not have any undue influence on the analysis that I present in this chapter. 
 Table 2.19 presents three sets of predictions; the first set of predictions is generated using the 
indicators I use in the text of this chapter – Avakov’s (2010) data on GDP per capita in the year 1929, 
Mainwaring et al.’s (2001) data on democracy, semi-democracy, and authoritarianism during the years 
1945-98, and Huber et al.’s (2008) data on average social security and welfare spending as a percentage of 
GDP during the period 1970-2000. The other two sets of predictions are generated using the proxy 
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measures that Kitschelt et al. (2010) utilize; “Kitschelt 98” uses their measure of democratic experience 
that includes the entire post-war era through 1998, while “Kitschelt 73” only uses data from 1945-73. 
Countries are listed according to their rank order on the first measure; rank orderings for the other two 
measures are provided in brackets after each figure. The Pearson’s R values listed in the final row report 
the strength of the correlation between the predictions generated using “my” indicators and the predictions 
generated using the indicators that Kitschelt et al. employ. 
 
Table 2.19 – Predicting the Relative Likelihood of Programmatic Political Competition 
 Country Lucas   Kitschelt 98   Kitschelt 73 
 Uruguay 2.44  1.45 [1]   1.57 [1] 
 Chile 1.70  1.14 [2]   1.46 [2] 
 Argentina 1.16  .63 [3]   .34 [4] 
 Venezuela .90  -.16 [5]   -.46 [5] 
 Costa Rica .72  .58 [4]   .35 [3] 
 Brazil .39  -.47 [6]   -.48 [6] 
 Colombia -.17  -.70 [7]   -1.02 [8] 
 Ecuador -.28       ----       ----  
 Bolivia -.36       ----       ----  
 Panama -.37       ----       ----  
 Peru -.53  -1.19 [8]   -1.11 [9] 
 Nicaragua -.61       ----       ----  
 Mexico -.68  -1.30 [9]   -.67 [7] 
 Honduras -.68       ----       ----  
 Dominican Rep. -.75       ----       ----  
 Guatemala -.80       ----       ----  
 Paraguay -1.01       ----       ----  
 El Salvador -1.07        ----          ----   
 Pearson’s R 
  
.96    .92  
 
 A simple examination of the rank orderings generated by these three sets of predictions provides 
further evidence that the proxy measures I use as indicators of political capabilities, opportunities, and 
stakes are indeed compatible with the measures of these concepts that Kitschelt et al. employ. Amongst the 
nine countries for which predications can be calculated based on the data Kitschelt et al. provide, 
Venezuela is the country whose relative likelihood score is most greatly affected by my choice of 
indicators, and even its movement within the rank orderings is minimal. The Pearson’s R values reported in 
the last row of the table show that, in spite of Venezuela’s movement in the rankings (which results from 
the discrepancy between Avakov’s GDP per capita estimate and the estimate that Kitschelt et al. use), the 
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predictions I use in this chapter and the predictions generated using Kitschelt et al.’s data are strongly 
correlated. 
 Finally, Table 2.20 shows that, for the nine countries1 for which Kitschelt et al. provide data on all 
three of their indicators of political capabilities, opportunities, and stakes, my predictions, which are based 
on GDP per capita in 1929, the years of democratic rule during 1945-98, and average social security and 
welfare spending during 1970-2000, outperform both sets of predictions generated using the data that 
Kitschelt et al. (2010) employ. This finding provides increased confidence that the figures I present in 
Table 2.4 represent an appropriate indication of the predictions generated by the theoretical framework that 
Kitschelt et al. employ. Consequently, this finding also generates confidence that, in using the figures from 
Table 2.4 to analyze the relationship between predicted and observed levels of programmatic political 
competition, I do indeed provide for a fair test of the predictive power of the conventional wisdom which 
posits that economic and political modernization facilitate the development of programmatic party-voter 
linkages. 
 
Table 2.20 – Predicted vs. Observed Programmatic Political Competition 
 Correlation Coefficient (Pearson’s R) (n=9) 
 Prediction Observed PPC 
 Lucas  .75 
 Kitschelt 98  .64 
 Kitschelt 73  .70 
 
                                                 
1
  Predictions based on the indicators used by Kitschelt et al. (2010) cannot be generated for Bolivia, Ecuador, or the 
Dominican Republic because they do not provide GDP per capita estimates for those three countries. 
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Appendix 2.C 
Table 2.7, Revisited 
 
 Table 2.21, an extension of Table 2.7, reports the values obtained on the indicator I use to measure 
programmatic party-voter linkages for thirty-two presidential elections held in Latin America’s eighteen 
electoral democracies during the years 2001-2009. An examination of the scores and rank positions of the 
twelve countries that are included multiple times reveals a high degree of continuity, suggesting that this 
indicator does indeed measure a relatively stable characteristic that describes the nature of electoral 
competition in these countries. Of these twelve countries, only two – Bolivia and Honduras – present 
differences of .05 or greater between the highest and lowest values reported in Table 2.21. As noted in the 
text of this chapter, the practical significance of the surprisingly high value associated with the 2001 
presidential election in Honduras should not be exaggerated, for the fifth panel of Figure 2.1 shows that 
left-right self-identification was a poor predictor of vote choice in this election. The apparent emergence of 
relatively strong programmatic party-voter linkages in Bolivia, which might be explained by the rather 
unique dynamics associated with the dual (descriptive and ideological) bases of Evo Morales’s successful 
electoral coalition (Madrid 2005-b; Yashar 2005), will be discussed in Chapter Eight. 
 
Table 2.21 – Left-Right Self-Identification as a Predictor of Voting Behavior 
 El Salvador, 2009 .277 Mexico, 2006 .033 
 El Salvador, 2004 .260 Costa Rica, 2002 .020 
 Uruguay, 2004 .259 Argentina, 2007 .019 
 Uruguay, 2009 .223 Ecuador, 2006 .018 
 Chile, 2009 .152 Ecuador, 2002 .017 
 Chile, 2005 .134 Panama, 2009 .014 
 Venezuela, 2006 .121 Costa Rica, 2006 .013 
 Bolivia, 2009 .108 Guatemala, 2007 .007 
 Nicaragua, 2006 .077 Panama, 2004 .005 
 Nicaragua, 2001 .055 Ecuador, 2009 .005 
 Colombia, 2006 .054 Dominican Rep., 2008 .005 
 Honduras, 2001 .051 Dominican Rep., 2004 .004 
 Colombia, 2002 .050 Paraguay, 2008 .004 
 Bolivia, 2002 .044 Brazil, 2006 .000 
 Bolivia, 2005 .042 Guatemala, 2003 .000 
 Peru, 2006 .039 Honduras, 2009 .000 
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Appendix 2.D 
Behind the Scenes of Figure 2.3: The Meaningfulness of Left-Right 
Semantics in Contemporary Latin America 
 
 In the second section of this chapter, I provide evidence that left-right self-identification is a better 
predictor of voting behavior in El Salvador, Uruguay, and Chile than in any other Latin American 
democracy. As I note in the introduction to the following section, this finding can only be accepted as 
evidence that strong programmatic party-voter linkages have developed in El Salvador, Uruguay, and Chile 
if we can also demonstrate that the terms Left and Right are used to convey programmatic (rather than 
merely symbolic or affective) meaning in these three countries. In this appendix, I explain how I generated 
the evidence – summarized in Figure 2.3 – which demonstrates that the relationship between policy 
preferences and left-right self-placement is strongest in the same three countries where left-right self-
placement best predicts voting behavior. 
 To analyze the relationship between voters’ policy preferences and their left-right self-
identifications, I created a composite dataset using data from the Latinobarómetro public opinion surveys 
conducted throughout the region in the years 1996-2007. This dataset, which includes a total of 162,788 
respondents from all eighteen of the region’s electoral democracies, incorporates fourteen demographic 
variables, six variables that measure respondents’ evaluations of the United States and of selected foreign 
leaders, and fifty-six variables that measure respondents’ preferences regarding (1) economic nationalism, 
(2) the economic role of the State, (3) taxation and public spending, (4) economic inequality, (5) labor 
unions, (6) support for democracy, (7) questions regarding the rule of law and the tradeoffs between order 
and liberty, and (8) various social issues. Because the eleven annual surveys that are included in this 
composite dataset each contain a unique combination of variables, a variety of possible analytical 
approaches were considered. 
 The use of a linear regression model incorporating only those independent variables that were 
included in each of the eleven survey years would allow for an analysis of the manner in which the 
relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-identification varies not only across countries, 
but also across time. However, data constraints severely limit the viability of this approach, because only 
thirteen variables (nine of them demographic variables) are included in every survey year. A second 
approach sacrifices parsimony for inclusivity by creating a unique regression model for each survey year 
that would include all of the independent variables included in that year’s surveys. While this approach 
counts as its main advantage the maximum possible inclusion of respondents’ preferences regarding a 
variety of policy areas, the sheer number of independent variables included in these models (which ranges 
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from nineteen to thirty-eight) raises complications both with regards to the problems associated with 
missing data1 and in terms of appropriate model specification. 
 Therefore, I utilize a compromise approach. By employing year-specific regression models that 
aim to maximize the incorporation of variables that correspond to respondents’ preferences regarding the 
policy areas that are the strongest and most consistent predictors of ideological self-placement while 
minimizing both the total number of independent variables and the extent to which the regression models 
differ from one survey year to another, I attempt to reap the benefits of the “parsimonious” and “inclusive” 
approaches described above while mitigating the negative aspects of each. As noted in the text of this 
chapter, these year-specific regression models include 5-12 variables drawn from a pool of sixteen 
variables that measure respondents’ attitudes towards regional economic integration, the economic role of 
the State, and economic inequality, their support for democracy, their attitudes regarding the rule of law, 
and their attitudes towards abortion, homosexuality, and women’s role in society. 
 In order to select the appropriate independent variables for inclusion in these regression models, I 
ran a series of underspecified regression models using the respondents’ left-right self-placement on an 11-
point Left-Right scale (where 0 represents the extreme Left, and 10 the extreme Right) as the dependent 
variable and each of these seventy-six variables, individually (except in the three cases where multiple 
dummy variables are formed from a single survey question), as the sole independent variable, for each of 
the eighteen single-country pooled samples.2 This admittedly unsophisticated approach to selecting 
variables for inclusion counts as its main advantage the fact that it allows for an examination of the strength 
and consistency of the relationship between each independent variable and left-right self-placement.  
 To measure the consistency of the relationship between each independent variable and left-right 
self-placement, I first assigned a value of “1” if the regression coefficient is significant and positive, “-1” if 
it is significant and negative, and “0” if it is not statistically significant (at the .05 level) for each single-
country pooled sample. Then I divided the absolute value of the sum of these values by the number of 
countries in which the independent variable in question was included in at least one wave of the 
                                                 
1
  This is no trivial consideration – when list-wise deletion is used to eliminate observations that have missing values 
on one or more independent variables, the number of observations in the dataset decreases by 44.8%, from 162,788 
respondents to 89,905. The regression models used to generate the figures reported in Figure 2.3 replace missing data 
with imputed values (calculated based on the survey year and the respondent’s nationality, gender, age, socioeconomic 
status, and left-right self-identification) for all the independent variables, with two exceptions. First, imputed values 
were not created for variables that were excluded from the Latinobarómetro survey for a particular country-year. 
Second, imputed values were not used for the variables that report respondents’ evaluations of George W. Bush, Fidel 
Castro, and Hugo Chávez because 31.8% of the respondents in the three years (2005-07) when these items were 
included in the Latinobarómetro surveys provided no response to at least one of these three questions. 
2
 Computationally, these underspecified linear regression models are essentially equivalent to Pearson’s product-
moment correlations, since the R2 reported for any linear regression model with a singular independent variable is the 
square of the Pearson correlation coefficient reported for the product-moment correlation between those same two 
variables. I used underspecified linear regression models rather than use product-moment correlations primarily 
because the use of regression models facilitates the simultaneous analysis of multiple dummy variables (such as the 
dummy variables that are used to denote respondents’ religious and racial/ethnic identities).  
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Latinobarómetro surveys3 to create a “consistency score” (range 0-1) for each variable. To measure the 
strength of the relationship between each independent variable and left-right self-placement, I calculated 
the average of the R2 values reported for the underspecified, single-country regression models for that 
variable (after first replacing the reported R2 value with a value of zero for each model where the regression 
coefficient is not statistically significant) and then divided this value by the average value for all seventy-
six variables in order to create a “strength score” (mean value 1) for each variable. 
 These consistency (CS) and strength (SS) scores (which are reported in Table 2.22, along with the 
predicted direction of the relationship between each variable and left-right self-placement) were used to 
whittle the initial set of seventy-six independent variables down to thirty: nine variables that report each 
respondent’s gender, age, education, socioeconomic status, religious denomination, the strength of his/her 
commitment to that religion, native tongue (an indicator of indigenous ethnicity), and place of residence 
(urban/rural), five indicators of the respondents’ attitudes towards the United States and selected foreign 
leaders (George W. Bush, Fidel Castro, and Hugo Chávez), and the sixteen policy-related variables 
described in Table 2.23.  
 Ultimately, the regression models I used to generate the data that are illustrated in Figure 2.3 (and 
reported in Tables 2.28 and 2.29) – data that demonstrate that the relationship between policy preferences 
and left-right self-placement is strongest in the same three countries where left-right self-placement best 
predicts voting behavior – only incorporate variables from the pool of sixteen policy-related variables.4 
There are two main motivations for dropping respondents’ demographic characteristics and their 
evaluations of the United States and of selected foreign leaders from the final regression models. First, the 
exclusion of these variables helps to limit both the number of variables in each regression model and the 
extent to which the models differ from one survey year to another. Second, the exclusion of demographic 
variables and of indicators of the affective/emotive connections between respondents’ opinions of the 
United States and their use of the labels Left and Right allows me to focus on the substantive, 
programmatic meanings that Latin American voters assign to these ideological labels. 
 Of course, the decision to drop the demographic variables and the indicators of respondents’ 
attitudes towards the United States and selected foreign leaders can only be justified if the exclusion of 
these variables does not have a substantial impact on the cross-country variation in the strength of the 
relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-identification, the focus of the third section of 
this chapter. To ensure that the results reported in Figure 2.3 are not unduly affected by my decision to 
exclude these variables, I used the same process described above to create a summary measure of the 
                                                 
3
 This number ranges from 16 to 18; it is not 18 for all variables because (1) the Latinobarómetro survey was not 
introduced in the Dominican Republic until the year 2004, so variables that did not appear in any survey during the 
years 2004-2007 cannot be analyzed for the Dominican Republic, and (2) a small number of questions were never 
asked in certain countries. 
4
  Table 2.23 illustrates the exact set of independent variables used in each year-specific regression model. 
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degree to which left-right self-placement in each of Latin America’s eighteen electoral democracies can be 
predicted by a given set of independent variables for six additional sets of regression models. 
 In Table 2.25, which displays the rank ordering of the strength of the relationship between left-
right self-placement and the included independent variables in Latin America’s eighteen electoral 
democracies using each set of regression models (along with the average R2 value and the total number of 
independent variables for each model), the model used to generate the values reported in Figure 2.3 is 
rechristened Model 1. Model 2 represents the “inclusive” approach to measuring the predictability of left-
right self-identification in Latin America; for each survey year, these regression models include every one 
of the variables from the initial list of seventy-six that was included in that year’s surveys. Model 3 utilizes 
the sixteen policy preference variables included in Model 1, plus the nine demographic variables mentioned 
above and two variables that measure respondents’ opinion of the United States. Model 4 drops the 
demographic variables from Model 3; in other words, it is identical to Model 1 save for the inclusion of the 
USA1/USA2 variable. Models 5-7 represent the “parsimonious” approach to predicting left-right self-
identification; Model 5 includes only the four policy-related variables that were included in every survey 
year, Model 6 adds the USA1/USA2 variable, and Model 7 adds the seven demographic variables that were 
included in every survey year.5 
 The degree of consistency revealed by the rank orderings reported in Table 2.25 is rather 
remarkable given the fact that the number of independent variables considered for inclusion in these 
regression models varies greatly, from four (Model 5) to seventy-six (Model 2). Regardless of which model 
specifications are utilized, Chile and Uruguay hold the top two positions in the rank orderings, followed by 
El Salvador and then Argentina. The only other country that achieves an average standardized R2 value 
greater than zero for any model is Nicaragua, which has a positive average standardized R2 value only in 
the all-inclusive Model 2. 
 Nicaragua exhibits an interesting pattern; the country appears near the top of the rankings reported 
in Table 2.25 for the five models that include the variables that measure respondents’ attitudes towards the 
United States and selected foreign leaders, but its position drops considerably in the two models (Models 1 
and 5) that exclude these variables. This pattern suggests that the relationship between left-right self-
placement and attitudes towards the United States is stronger in Nicaragua than anywhere else in the 
region. Aside from the case of Nicaragua, there are no discernable patterns that suggest that the inclusion or 
exclusion of any particular set of independent variables has a substantial impact on cross-country variation 
in the degree to which the demographic characteristics and attitudinal variables included in the 
Latinobarómetro surveys predict left-right self-placement. 
                                                 
5
  All of these models employ imputed data except for Model 2 in the years 2005-07, when the CHAVEZ, FIDEL, 
and BUSH variables are included in the model. For the six models that utilized imputed data, regression analysis was 
also conducted using list-wise deletion of observations with missing values. On average, the R2 values obtained from 
the regression models that employ list-wise deletion are 14.0% greater than those obtained from the regression models 
that use imputed data. As shown in Table 2.26, the two sets of R2 values are very strongly correlated. 
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 Finally, I conducted two additional tests to ensure that Figure 2.3 provides an accurate picture of 
the extent to which the terms Left and Right are used to convey programmatic meaning in each of Latin 
America’s eighteen electoral democracies. Table 2.26 presents correlation coefficients that correspond to 
the pairwise comparison of the standardized R2 values generated for each country-year by each of the 
regression models except Model 2.6 Like the rank orderings reported in Table 2.25, these correlation 
coefficients again demonstrate that the exclusion of variables that measure the respondents’ demographic 
characteristics and their opinions of the United States and foreign leaders has extremely little impact on the 
results generated by these regression models in terms of the cross-country comparisons summarized in 
Figure 2.3. Similarly, Table 2.27, which reports the correlations between each model that employs imputed 
data and the corresponding model that employs list-wise deletion of observations with missing values on 
one or more independent variables, demonstrates that the results presented here are not unduly affected by 
my use of imputed data. 
 In conclusion, I argue that we can be confident that the conclusions I draw from Figure 2.3 are not 
unduly influenced by my selection of independent variables or by my approach to handling missing data. 
This evidence that political preferences best predict left-right self-placement in precisely the same three 
countries (El Salvador, Uruguay, and Chile) where left-right self-placement best predicts voting behavior 
demonstrates that relatively strong programmatic party-voter linkages have indeed developed in El 
Salvador, Uruguay, and Chile. 
 
                                                 
6
  Model 2 is not included in this comparison because it refers to a different sample; 15,128 observations (31.8% of 
the survey respondents in the years 2005-07) were dropped for Model 2 due to missing data on one (ore more) of the 
variables that report respondents’ evaluations of George W. Bush, Fidel Castro, and Hugo Chávez. 
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Table 2.22 – Correlations between Independent Variables and Left-Right Self-Placement 
 
   Predicted Actual Relationship 
 Relationship + – CS SS  
Economic Nationalism 
 INTEGRATION + 7 1 .33 .20  
 FREETRADE1 + 3 1 .11 .63 
 FREETRADE2 + 3 0 .18 .17 
 FREETRADE3 + 4 3 .06 .46 
 
Economic Role of the State 
 PRIVATIZE1 + 12 1 .61 .99 
 PRIVATIZE2 + 11 0 .69 .56 
 T_BUSINESS + 15 0 .83 .97 
 MARKET1 + 16 0 .89 .78 
 MARKET2 + 13 0 .72 .89 
 PRICE + 8 1 .41 .40 
 PRIVATE1 + 5 1 .22 .49 
 PRIVATE2 + 4 0 .24 .57 
 STATE1 - 6 1 .28 .45 
 STATE2 - 1 2 .06 .30 
 STATE3 + 5 1 .24 .42 
 STATE4 - 1 4 .17 .84 
 STATE_96 - 1 4 .18 .84 
 STATE_01 - 2 1 .06 .16 
 STATE_02 - 0 4 .24 .38 
 
Taxation and Public Spending 
 TAX + 4 1 .18 .63 
 PS_HEALTH - 3 3 .00 .50 
 PS_ED - 1 2 .06 .28 
 PS_UNEMPLOY - 2 2 .00 .44 
 PS_SECURITY + 4 1 .19 .61 
 PS_ARMY + 6 0 .38 1.22 
 
Economic Inequality 
 INEQUALITY1 - 2 8 .33 .72 
 INEQUALITY2 - 2 5 .18 .54 
 INEQUALITY3 - 9 2 .41 .96 
 
Labor Unions 
 UNION_MEM - 3 2 .06 .84 
 UNION2 - 0 2 .12 .86 
 T_UNION - 5 3 .11 .63 
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Table 2.22 (Continued) 
 
   Predicted Actual Relationship 
 Relationship + – CS SS  
Support for Democracy 
 DEMPREF1 ? 11 5 .33 1.14 
 MILITARY2 + 7 1 .35 2.05 
 MILITARY3 + 4 3 .06 1.42 
 DEMPREF2 ? 11 2 .50 1.26 
 MILITARY1 + 6 1 .28 1.60 
 AUTHORITY1 + 10 2 .44 1.64 
 AUTHORITY2 + 5 0 .29 .95 
 CONGRESS ? 2 11 .50 .49 
 DEMPREF3 + 5 1 .24 .79 
 CORRUPT ? 2 7 .28 1.83 
 
Rule of Law 
 T_POLICE + 16 0 .89 1.48 
 T_ARMY + 14 1 .76 3.17 
 VIOLENCE + 11 0 .61 .12 
 MIP1 + 5 1 .24 1.01 
 MIP2 - 1 8 .41 … 
 MIP4 - 1 6 .29 … 
 ORDER + 6 0 .33 .59 
 CENSOR + 6 0 .35 .58 
 LEGAL - 3 1 .12 .35 
 ROL + 8 2 .35 1.01 
 
Social and Other Issues 
 ABORTION - 0 8 .44 .82 
 HOMO - 0 14 .78 1.28 
 MACHISMO + 11 0 .61 .68 
 MIGRATION + 6 1 .29 .68 
 ENVIRON - 4 4 .00 .20 
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Table 2.22 (Continued) 
 
   Predicted Actual Relationship 
 Relationship + – CS SS  
Demographic Characteristics 
 FEMALE ? 6 2 .22 .11 
 AGE + 15 0 .83 .78 
 LANGUAGE - 1 4 .17 .22 
 RURAL + 8 1 .39 .27 
 NORELIG - 0 16 .89 1.01 
 EVANG ? 2 3 .06 … 
 T_CHURCH + 17 0 .94 1.43 
 EDUCATION - 2 13 .61 .74 
 SES ? 3 5 .11 .17 
 INDIO - 1 4 .17 .54 
 AFRO ? 1 1 .00 … 
 ATTEND + 8 0 .47 .78 
 PRACTICE + 16 0 .89 .83 
 INCOME ? 6 2 .22 .12 
 
Opinions of the US and Foreign Leaders 
 USA1 + 13 0 .76 1.93 
 USA2 + 17 1 .89 2.68 
 BUSH + 17 0 .94 6.01 
 CHAVEZ - 2 11 .50 3.80 
 FIDEL - 0 13 .72 5.14 
 IRAQ + 9 0 .50 1.57 
 
Note: In the “Predicted Relationship” and “Actual Relationship” columns, (+) indicates that a higher score on the 
variable corresponds (or is expected to correspond) to self-placement on the right, while (-) indicates that a higher score 
on the variable corresponds (or is expected to correspond) to self-placement on the left. 
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Table 2.23 – Description of Independent Variables  
 
INTEGRATION indicates whether the respondent (0) strongly opposes, (1) opposes, (2) favors, or (3) 
strongly favors the economic integration of Latin America. 
 
PRIVATIZE1 indicates whether the respondent (0) strongly disagrees, (1) disagrees, (2) agrees, or (3) 
strongly agrees that privatizations have benefitted his/her country. PRIVATIZE2 indicates whether the 
respondent is (0) much less satisfied, (1) less satisfied, (2) more satisfied, or (3) much more satisfied with 
the privatization of state services. 
 
T_BUSINESS indicates whether the respondent has (0) no confidence, (1) little confidence, (2) some 
confidence, or (3) much confidence in the private sector. 
 
MARKET1 indicates whether the respondent (0) strongly disagrees, (1) disagrees, (2) agrees, or (3) 
strongly agrees that a market economy is best for his/her country. MARKET2 reports whether the 
respondent (0) strongly disagrees, (1) disagrees, (2) agrees, or (3) strongly agrees that a market economy is 
the only system that will allow his/her country to develop economically. 
 
INEQUALITY1 indicates whether the respondent believes that the distribution of income is (0) very just, 
(1) just, (2) unjust, or (3) very unjust. 
 
DEMPREF1 reports which of the following three statements the respondent most agrees with: (0) In some 
circumstances, an authoritarian government could be desirable; (1) For people like me, it does not matter 
whether the government is democratic or authoritarian; (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of 
government. 
 
MILITARY2 indicates whether the respondent (0) strongly disagrees, (1) disagrees, (2) agrees, or (3) 
strongly agrees with the statement: “It would not matter to me if the military came to power if it could 
resolve the country’s economic problems.” MILITARY3 indicates the respondent’s reaction to the closely 
related statement: “It would not matter to me if there was a non-democratic government in power if it could 
resolve the country’s economic problems.” 
 
T_POLICE indicates whether the respondent has (0) no confidence, (1) little confidence, (2) some 
confidence, or (3) much confidence in the police.  
 
T_ARMY indicates whether the respondent has (0) no confidence, (1) little confidence, (2) some 
confidence, or (3) much confidence in the armed forces. 
 
The dummy variable VIOLENCE indicates whether the respondent’s answer to the question “what is your 
country’s most important problem” concerns violent crime. 
 
ABORTION is a 10-point scale indicating whether the respondent believes that abortion (0) is never 
justifiable or (9) is always justifiable. 
 
HOMO is a 10-point scale indicating whether the respondent believes that homosexuality (0) is never 
justifiable or (9) is always justifiable. 
 
MACHISMO indicates whether the respondent (0) strongly disagrees, (1) disagrees, (2) agrees, or (3) 
strongly agrees with the statement that “it is better if the woman stays at home and the man works.” 
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Table 2.24 – Independent Variables by Survey Year 
  Survey Year 
 Variable 96 97 98 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
Economic Policy Preferences 
   INTEGRATION  + +  + +   +   
   PRIVATIZE1 [1]   + + + + +  +  + 
   PRIVATIZE2 [2]        +  +  
   T_BUSINESS +    + + + + + + + 
   MARKET1 [3]   + +  +      
   MARKET2       + + +  + 
   INEQUALITY1  +   + +     + 
Support for Democracy / Law and Order 
   DEMPREF1 + + + + + + + + + + + 
   MILITARY2     +       
   MILITARY3      + + +    
   T_POLICE + + + + + + + + + + + 
   T_ARMY [4] + + + + + + + + + + + 
   VIOLENCE + + + + + + + + + + + 
Social Issues 
   ABORTION      +  +   + 
   HOMO      +  +    
   MACHISMO   +   +       +       
Total Number of IVs 5 7 7 7 9 12 8 11 8 6 9 
 
Notes: 
[1] PRIVATIZE1 was excluded from two surveys – Costa Rica in 2003 and Uruguay in 2007. 
[2] PRIVATIZE2 was also included in the 2003 and 2005 surveys, but is dropped from the regression models in favor 
of PRIVATIZE1. The variable was excluded from all surveys in Costa Rica and Uruguay. It was also excluded from 
the Paraguay survey in 2004, and it is dropped from the regression model corresponding to the Honduras 2004 survey 
due to an extremely high percentage of missing data (85.9%).  
[3] MARKET1 was also included in the 2007 surveys, but it is dropped from the regression models for that year in 
favor of MARKET2. The two variables are highly correlated (Pearson’s R is .634). 
[4] T_ARMY was excluded from the Costa Rican surveys in 1996-97 and 2002-07. The variable is dropped from the 
regression models corresponding to the Costa Rican surveys in 1998-2001 due to a high percentage of missing data 
(48.4%). T_ARMY was also excluded from the surveys in Panama in the years 1996-97, 2002-03, and 2007. 
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Table 2.25 – Comparing Alternate Regression Models 
 Model 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 Chile URU URU Chile Chile Chile URU 
 URU Chile Chile URU URU URU Chile 
 ELS ELS ELS ELS ELS ELS ELS 
 ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG ARG 
 BRA NIC NIC NIC BRA NIC NIC 
 VEN BOL BRA BOL VEN BOL BRA 
 MEX CR BOL BRA HND VEN CR 
 BOL HND CR VEN COL BRA BOL 
 GUAT GUAT MEX MEX GUAT MEX COL 
 DR BRA PAR ECU MEX COL PAR 
 CR PAR COL CR PAR ECU MEX 
 COL MEX GUAT GUAT CR GUAT VEN 
 NIC ECU VEN COL DR HND HND 
 PAN DR ECU PAR PAN CR GUAT 
 HND VEN DR PAN Peru PAR ECU 
 ECU PAN HND HND BOL Peru Peru 
 PAR COL PAN DR NIC PAN DR 
 Peru Peru Peru Peru ECU DR PAN  
 
Mean R2 .060 .149* .096 .069 .041 .052 .078 
IV Pool   16   76   27   18    4    6   13  
 
Policy + + + + + + + 
USA  + + +  + + 
Demographic  + +    + 
 
Notes: Countries in bold type are those with an average standardized R2 value greater than zero, which indicates that, 
according to the model in question, the strength of the relationship between respondents’ preferences and their left-right 
self-placement exceeds the regional average. 
 
* The inclusion of the three variables that report respondents’ evaluations of George W. Bush, Fidel Castro, and Hugo 
Chávez (questions that were only included in the 2005-07 surveys) in Model 2 has a sizeable impact. For the three 
years when these questions were included, the average R2 value is .221; for the eight years when they were not asked, 
the average R2 value is .120. While this finding demonstrates that the affective attachments related to respondents’ 
evaluations of these prominent foreign leaders are an important element of the manner in which the labels Right and 
Left are used in the region, it does not imply that these ideological labels do not also convey programmatic meaning. 
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Table 2.26 – Correlations between Alternate Regression Models 
 Correlation Coefficient (Pearson’s R) 
  Model 1 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Model 1  ---- 
 Model 3 .949  ---- 
 Model 4 .984 .973  ---- 
 Model 5 .959 .899 .938  ---- 
 Model 6 .954 .945 .974 .970  ---- 
 Model 7 .929 .977 .953 .933 .969 ---- 
 
 
Table 2.27 – Comparing Imputed Data and List-wise Deletion 
   Pearson’s R 
 Model 1 .980 
 Model 3 .954 
 Model 4 .974 
 Model 5 .996 
 Model 6 .988 
 Model 7 .975 
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Table 2.28 – R2 Values for Country-Year Regression Models 
 
 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Chile .201 .231 .285 .245 .290 .161 .228 .218 .161 .061 .139 
Uruguay .160 .223 .173 .227 .256 .268 .175 .200 .102 .082 .091 
El Salvador .035 .020 .072 .111 .064 .085 .031 .123 .194 .178 .132 
Argentina .041 .053 .006 .076 .086 .107 .105 .055 .084 .083 .095 
Brazil .034 .030 .056 .047 .064 .096 .072 .038 .052 .021 .060 
Venezuela .013 .034 .041 .022 .029 .016 .023 .056 .014 .085 .124 
Mexico .078 .036 .015 .018 .033 .042 .055 .023 .035 .046 .053 
Bolivia .007 .047 .026 .020 .024 .066 .026 .040 .054 .016 .084 
Guatemala .045 .028 .067 .024 .014 .034 .049 .036 .033 .029 .056 
Dominican Republic        .038 .056 .029 .044 
Costa Rica .022 .081 .049 .055 .053 .073 .024 .014 .056 .016 .013 
Colombia .023 .020 .051 .023 .027 .056 .037 .024 .033 .037 .065 
Nicaragua .018 .094 .033 .047 .046 .053 .034 .044 .038 .011 .012 
Panama .025 .046 .037 .014 .046 .007 .027 .037 .053 .061 .020 
Honduras .025 .026 .030 .036 .030 .029 .037 .045 .027 .021 .063 
Ecuador .010 .013 .011 .031 .003 .048 .028 .025 .025 .061 .076 
Paraguay .064 .030 .017 .020 .041 .039 .034 .037 .021 .030 .035 
Peru .022 .037 .004 .017 .026 .014 .036 .023 .026 .019 .034 
 
Note: Values that are shaded exceed the mean for the corresponding survey year. Values that are shaded and in boldface are those that exceed the mean for the 
corresponding survey year by at least one standard deviation. 
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Table 2.29 – Standardized R2 Values for Country-Year Regression Models 
 
 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Chile 2.85 2.58 3.22 2.61 2.78 1.42 2.91 2.67 2.09 .30 1.86 2.30 
Uruguay 2.09 2.46 1.65 2.36 2.35 3.09 1.98 2.37 .88 .81 .63 1.88 
El Salvador -.26 -.64 .21 .71 -.03 .24 -.50 1.07 2.77 3.18 1.70 .77 
Argentina -.13 -.14 -.73 .21 .24 .58 .77 -.08 .50 .83 .75 .26 
Brazil -.27 -.49 -.02 -.19 -.04 .40 .20 -.37 -.14 -.70 -.15 -.16 
Venezuela -.67 -.43 -.23 -.55 -.46 -.85 -.64 -.07 -.93 .88 1.49 -.22 
Mexico .55 -.39 -.60 -.60 -.42 -.45 -.08 -.62 -.50 -.09 -.35 -.32 
Bolivia -.78 -.22 -.44 -.57 -.53 -.07 -.59 -.33 -.12 -.82 .45 -.37 
Guatemala -.06 -.51 .14 -.52 -.66 -.56 -.20 -.41 -.53 -.49 -.27 -.37 
Dominican Republic        -.36 -.07 -.50 -.59 -.38 
Costa Rica -.48 .29 -.11 -.08 -.16 .05 -.62 -.78 -.06 -.82 -1.38 -.38 
Colombia -.47 -.64 -.09 -.54 -.49 -.22 -.41 -.61 -.54 -.30 -.05 -.39 
Nicaragua -.56 .49 -.34 -.19 -.26 -.27 -.45 -.27 -.43 -.94 -1.39 -.42 
Panama -.44 -.24 -.29 -.67 -.26 -.98 -.57 -.39 -.12 .28 -1.19 -.44 
Honduras -.44 -.54 -.38 -.36 -.46 -.65 -.39 -.26 -.66 -.69 -.10 -.45 
Ecuador -.72 -.75 -.66 -.42 -.79 -.35 -.55 -.58 -.70 .29 .25 -.45 
Paraguay .30 -.47 -.57 -.58 -.31 -.49 -.45 -.38 -.77 -.47 -.82 -.46 
Peru -.50 -.38 -.76 -.62 -.51 -.89 -.42 -.63 -.68 -.73 -.85 -.63 
 
Note: Values that are shaded exceed the mean for the corresponding survey year (0.00). Values that are shaded and in boldface are those that exceed the mean for 
the corresponding survey year by at least one standard deviation. 
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Appendix 2.E 
The Meanings Attached to the Labels “Left” and “Right” in 
Contemporary Latin America 
 
 In the third section of this chapter, I examine cross-country variation in the strength of the 
relationship between survey respondents’ policy preferences and their left-right self-placement in order to 
demonstrate that the evidence I provide in the second section of the chapter does indeed indicate the 
presence of strong programmatic party-voter linkages in El Salvador, Uruguay, and Chile. Although my 
examination of cross-country variation in the degree to which the labels Right and Left convey 
programmatic meaning was designed with the modest goal of demonstrating that the evidence summarized 
in Table 2.7 – evidence which shows that left-right self-identification is a better predictor of voting 
behavior in El Salvador than in any other Latin American democracy – constitutes an important empirical 
puzzle with regards to our understanding of party system development, this examination also generates a 
number of interesting observations regarding the structure of left-right self-placement in contemporary 
Latin America. In this appendix, I highlight some of these findings: 
 
Demographic Characteristics 
 Indicators of each respondent’s gender, age, education, household income, socioeconomic status, 
religious denomination, and the strength of his/her commitment to that religion are included in every wave 
of the Latinobarómetro surveys. Variables that measure two additional demographic characteristics – the 
size of the town where the respondent resides and the respondent’s racial/ethnic identity – are included in 
some survey years. Existing research suggests that many of these demographic characteristics are likely to 
serve as predictors of left-right self-identification. The underspecified regression models demonstrate that, 
generally speaking, demographic characteristics have the expected impact on left-right self-placement, with 
age and religiosity being the two demographic characteristics that best predict left-right self-placement in 
the region. 
 Though thrown into question by research on political ideology in the United States (cf. Glenn and 
Hefner 1972, Glenn 1974, Alwin 1993, Danigelis et al. 2007), conventional wisdom still leads us to expect 
that older respondents will be the most likely to identify themselves with the Right. Also expected to be 
more likely to identify themselves with the Right are residents of small towns and rural areas, evangelical 
Christians (cf. Ammerman 1987, Wald et al. 1988), and people who describe themselves as highly 
religious, regardless of their particular religious affiliation (cf. Broughton and ten Napel 2000, Knutsen 
2004). Respondents with higher levels of education and those who describe themselves as atheists or 
agnostics are expected to be more likely to identify themselves as Leftists. Given the recent emergence in a 
handful of countries (most notably Bolivia, but also Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru) of political parties and 
leaders that have sought to identify themselves simultaneously with the Left and with indigenous 
  300 
populations (Yashar 2005, Madrid 2008-b), I expect that respondents who identify themselves as members 
of an indigenous community and those who report speaking an indigenous language as their mother tongue 
will be more likely to identify themselves with the Left. 
 Predictions regarding the impact that gender, religious denomination, household income, and 
socioeconomic status might have on left-right self-placement are less straightforward. Research on the 
relationship between gender and ideology which shows that this relationship is influenced by the country’s 
level of economic development suggests that we should not expect that the direction of this relationship 
will be the same throughout Latin America, a region where current levels of economic development vary 
considerably from one country to another. The existing literature provides contradictory predictions 
regarding the impact that higher incomes and/or higher levels of wealth might have on ideological self-
identification – if we apply theories of class-based politics, we would predict the affluent to identify 
themselves with the Right and the poor to identify with the Left; however, if we instead focus on the 
important role played by clientelism in Latin American politics, we might expect the poor (whose 
allegiance may be more easily purchased) to be more likely to identify themselves with the Right, since 
political parties on the Right tend to have greater access to the financial resources necessary for 
maintaining patron-client relationships. 
 The underspecified regression models identify age and religiosity as the two demographic 
characteristics that most consistently predict left-right self-placement; as expected, older persons (AGE) as 
well as those who describe themselves as religious (PRACTICE, NORELIG), attend church more 
frequently (ATTEND) and express greater confidence in the Church (T_CHURCH), are more likely to 
identify themselves with the Right. Education (EDUCATION) has the predicted impact on left-right self-
identification (the more educated are more likely to identify themselves as Leftists) in most Latin American 
countries, as does town size (RURAL) – those who live in towns with a population of less than 20,000 are 
more likely to identify themselves with the Right. 
 Race and ethnicity prove to be poor predictors of left-right self-identification across the region as a 
whole, but this general conclusion masks significant relationships at the country level that appear precisely 
in those countries where political leaders have made efforts to link indigenous groups to the Left. In 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, respondents who identify themselves as members of an indigenous group 
(INDIO) and those who speak an Amerindian language as their mother tongue (LANGUAGE) are more 
likely to identify themselves with the Left. 
 The relationship between gender (FEMALE) and left-right self-identification is inconsistent, and 
does not appear to be influenced by the country’s level of socioeconomic development in any coherent 
fashion, as the set of six countries where women identify themselves further to the right than men includes 
countries at the top of regional rankings on the United Nations’ measure of human development (Chile and 
Uruguay), countries near the middle of these rankings (Peru and Ecuador), and also countries near the 
bottom (El Salvador and Bolivia) (UNDP 2013). Belonging to an Evangelical church (EVANG) is an 
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inconsistent predictor of left-right self-placement. Identifying oneself as black or mulatto (AFRO), 
household income (INCOME), and socioeconomic status (SES) are all weak and inconsistent predictors of 
ideological self-identification. 
 
Economic Policy Preferences 
 The composite dataset I used to examine the relationship between political preferences and left-
right self-placement includes thirty-one variables that were drawn from questions that gauge respondents’ 
attitudes towards: (1) free trade, foreign investment, and regional economic integration, (2) the economic 
role of the state and the role of private enterprise, (3) taxation and public spending, (4) economic 
inequality, and (5) labor unions.  
 
1) I initially expected that respondents who are in favor of dismantling barriers to international trade 
(FREETRADE1-2), those who support efforts to attract foreign investment (FREETRADE3), and those 
who support further integration of the region’s economies (INTEGRATION) will be more likely to identify 
themselves with the Right, since leftist parties and politicians throughout much of the region have 
frequently (and, often, quite publicly) criticized and resisted such neoliberal reforms. As shown in Table 
2.22, the four variables included as measures of respondents’ attitudes towards free trade, foreign 
investment, and regional economic integration are all relatively weak predictors of left-right self-
placement. Although the relationships between respondents’ views on these issues and their left-right self-
placement do, when significant, generally conform to my predictions, none of these four variables is a 
statistically significant predictor of left-right self-identification in even half of the region’s countries. 
Moreover, there are only two countries – Uruguay and Guatemala – where more than one of these four 
variables is a statistically significant predictor of left-right self-placement. 
 
2) I predicted that opposition to price controls, support for and satisfaction with privatization, 
confidence in the private sector, disagreement with the notion that the state should be responsible for its 
citizens’ economic well-being, and generalized opposition to state intervention in the economy would all 
increase the likelihood that the respondent self-identifies with the Right. Bivariate correlations conducted 
using the fifteen variables included in this category suggest that attitudes regarding the extent to which the 
state should intervene in the domestic economy do indeed play a role in determining left-right self-
placement. However, it is only when questions regarding the economic role of the state are worded in the 
broadest terms possible that respondents’ answers to these questions consistently predict left-right self-
placement. 
 
3) I expected that agreement with the statement that “taxes should be set as low as possible, even if 
that means a decrease in social spending” (TAX), opposition to increased spending on health care, 
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education, and unemployment insurance (PS_HEALTH, PS_ED, and PS_UNEMPLOY), and support for 
increased spending on security and the armed forces (PS_SECURITY and PS_ARMY) would all predict 
self-identification with the Right. However, just as the more specific questions about the economic role of 
the State fail to provide consistently significant predictions of left-right self-placement, so do questions 
regarding taxation and public spending. Respondents’ preferences regarding the trade-off between lowering 
taxes and cutting social spending and their preferences regarding public spending on health care, education, 
and unemployment insurance are inconsistently related to ideological self-identification. Only in Chile 
(where preferences for increased spending on health care and education predict Leftist self-identification) 
and Uruguay (where preferences for all three forms of social spending predict Leftist self-identification) is 
there evidence that left-right self-placement is strongly related to preferences regarding government social 
spending. 
 Preferences regarding spending on the armed forces are a stronger and more consistent predictor 
of left-right self-identification than any other public spending variable, but even this relationship is 
significant in only six countries (Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela). Moreover, one 
could argue that this variable is more closely related to the “support for democracy” category of political 
preferences than it is to questions regarding State expenditures on health care, education, and 
unemployment insurance. 
 
4) Given the spectacularly high levels of income inequality observed in much of the region, I 
expected that attitudes towards economic redistribution would constitute an important reference point for 
ideological self-identification. The belief that the current distribution of income is unjust, agreement with 
the statement that “it is more important to improve the distribution of wealth than it is to increase economic 
production and productivity,” and a willingness to curtail individual freedoms in order to ensure a more 
egalitarian society were all expected to correspond to self-identification with the Left.  
 Analysis of the three variables that measure respondents’ attitudes concerning economic inequality 
uncovers a complicated relationship between these attitudes and left-right self-placement. Believing that the 
current distribution of income is unjust (INEQUALITY1) and agreeing that the redistribution of wealth is 
more important than economic growth (INEQUALITY2) predict self-identification with the Left in fewer 
than half of the region’s countries. Moreover, there are only three countries (Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay) 
where both of these variables are significant predictors of left-right self-identification. More surprisingly, a 
preference for a society that sacrifices freedom in order to ensure equal compensation for all citizens (as 
opposed to a society that maximizes freedom so that each person can earn as much money as he/she can) 
(INEQUALITY3) predicts self-identification with the Right in nine countries, while the relationship runs in 
the predicted direction in only two countries (Nicaragua and Paraguay). 
 These results suggest that, across the region as a whole, the public at large does not associate the 
distinction between Left and Right with different attitudes towards economic redistribution, even though 
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preferences regarding the tradeoff between freedom and equality serve as a central component of political 
debate regarding the adoption of Washington Consensus policies at the elite level.  
 
5) Lastly, given the close organizational relationships that exist between labor unions and leftist 
parties in many countries (within the region and worldwide), I expected that union members and those who 
report that they would join a union if they had the opportunity to do so (UNION_MEM), respondents who 
agree with the statement that workers need labor unions in order to protect their standard of living 
(UNION2), and those who express confidence in labor unions (T_UNION) would be more likely to self-
identify with the Left. Somewhat surprisingly, none of these variables are consistent predictors of left-right 
self-identification. As was the case with respondents’ preferences regarding public spending, Chile and 
Uruguay again emerge as outliers. In both of these countries, all three of the variables that measure 
attitudes towards labor unions are significantly and negatively related to left-right self-identification. El 
Salvador is the only other country where any of these variables exhibits the predicted relationship with 
ideological self-placement. 
 
 To summarize, the strength of the relationship between economic policy preferences and left-right 
self-placement varies considerably depending upon both (1) the specific policy area and (2) the specificity 
of each survey question. Attitudes towards free trade, foreign investment, and regional economic 
integration, preferences regarding the tradeoff between tax cuts and decreased social spending, preferences 
regarding government expenditures on selected social spending programs (health care, education, and 
unemployment insurance), and attitudes towards trade unions are all weak predictors of left-right self-
identification in most Latin American countries. Surprisingly – given the spectacularly high levels of 
income inequality observed in much of the region, and the fact that preferences regarding the tradeoff 
between freedom and equality have served as a central component of elite-level debates regarding the 
adoption of Washington Consensus policies – Latin Americans do not associate the distinction between 
Left and Right with different attitudes towards economic redistribution, either. However, there is a strong 
relationship between respondents’ attitudes regarding the appropriate level of State intervention in the 
economy and their left-right self-placement; as one would expect, pro-market attitudes are associated with 
the Right, while interventionist attitudes are associated with the Left. 
 There is, however, one important caveat to this finding – for the most part, it is only when 
questions regarding the economic role of the State are worded in the broadest terms possible that 
respondents’ answers to these questions consistently predict left-right self-placement. For instance, whereas 
variables that measure respondents’ evaluations of privatization and their satisfaction with the privatization 
of state services are strongly related to ideological self-placement in the majority of countries, respondents’ 
preferences regarding private sector participation in specific sectors of the economy and their responses to 
questions that explicitly refer to the State’s role in economic production are much less consistent predictors 
  304 
of left-right self-identification. Similarly, whereas the variables that measure respondents’ trust in the 
private sector and their preferences regarding the adoption of a market economy consistently demonstrate a 
positive correlation with left-right self-placement, neither questions that ask whether the State or the market 
should resolve society’s problems, those that ask whether the State or the individual should be responsible 
for personal well-being, nor those that measure respondents’ preferences regarding the State’s role in 
providing specific public services consistently predict left-right self-placement. 
 Even though citizens in most countries exhibit a fairly superficial understanding of the economic 
policy differences that are associated with these two ideological labels, they tend to agree that the Left and 
the Right represent different views regarding the ideal amount of state intervention in the economy. 
Consequently, it appears that economic policy preferences do play some role in providing a common 
structure to the meanings that voters in Latin America attribute to the terms Left and Right. In a small 
subset of countries, this basic agreement does extend to more specific questions regarding economic policy 
issues. 
 The most significant outlier in this regard is Uruguay; attitudes towards free trade, foreign 
investment, regional economic integration, economic inequality, labor unions, State versus private sector 
participation in economic production and in the provision of specific public services, and the State’s role in 
solving society’s problems and ensuring personal well-being, as well as preferences regarding the level of 
State spending on specific social programs all help to distinguish between the Left and the Right in 
Uruguay. Chile also emerges as a significant outlier; attitudes regarding State versus private sector 
participation in specific sectors of the economy, attitudes towards labor unions, and preferences regarding 
the level of State spending on specific social programs help structure the left-right continuum in Chile. Five 
other countries exhibit strong relationships between left-right self-placement and one specific area of 
economic policy issues: Guatemala (free trade), Mexico (State versus private sector participation in specific 
sectors of the economy), Bolivia and Brazil (attitudes towards economic inequality), and El Salvador 
(attitudes towards labor unions). 
 
Support for Democracy and the Rule of Law 
 My analysis of twenty variables that correspond to two categories of political preferences – (1) 
respondents’ support for democracy and for the preservation of institutional checks and balances, and (2) 
their attitudes regarding issues of law and order, the rule of law, and the trade-off between order and liberty 
– finds that both support for democracy and attitudes regarding issues of law and order are strongly related 
to left-right self-placement in contemporary Latin America. Respondents who report high levels of 
confidence in the police and in the armed forces and those who identify some form of violence as their 
country’s most important problem are more likely to identify themselves with the Right in every country 
except Ecuador and Venezuela. Regarding the relationship between support for democracy and left-right 
self-placement, while I find that this relationship is quite strong, my analysis also demonstrates that the 
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directionality of the relationship between support for democracy and left-right self-placement varies across 
the region. This inconsistency does not, however, appear to be random; rather, this finding highlights the 
shortcomings of any approach to measuring the meanings that Latin Americans attribute to the ideological 
labels Left and Right that assumes that the relationship between any given policy preference and left-right 
self-placement will run in the same direction in all eighteen of the region’s electoral democracies (e.g., 
Zechmeister and Corral 2013). 
 
1) Two questions (DEMPREF1 and DEMPREF2) measure respondents’ support for democracy. On 
the one hand, both the fact that persons involved in the military coups of the 1970s and 1980s continue to 
be involved in right-wing political parties in a number of Latin American countries and the fact that a 
number of prominent right-wing parties trace their roots to the official statist parties that were established 
by previous authoritarian regimes might lead one to predict that respondents who do not express a strong 
preference for democracy will be more likely to identify themselves with the Right. Yet, on the other hand, 
the effectiveness of conservative propaganda that seeks to have voters associate the Left with communism 
and the fact that many contemporary Leftist parties are closely associated with guerrilla movements that 
attempted to gain political power through the use of violence might lead one to predict that respondents 
who do not express a strong preference for democracy will be more likely to identify themselves with the 
Left. Therefore, rather than make a general, region-wide prediction regarding the relationship between 
respondents’ answers to these two questions and their left-right self-placement, I expected that this 
relationship might vary in accordance with each country’s recent political history. However, given the 
historic relationship between the armed forces and conservative political forces throughout most of the 
region, I expected that support for (or at least indifference towards) a hypothetical military coup 
(MILITARY1-3), would predict self-identification with the Right. 
 The bivariate correlation analysis of the relationships between these five variables and ideological 
self-placement reveals something of a surprise. In those countries where the three variables that measure 
support for a hypothetical military coup are statistically significant predictors of left-right self-
identification, these relationships run in the same direction in most cases – those who would support a 
military takeover are more likely to identify themselves with the Right. However, respondents who express 
support for democracy as the most preferable form of government for their country are also more likely to 
identify themselves with the Right in more than half of the region’s democracies. Reconciling this apparent 
contradiction – people who identify themselves with the Right are more likely to support both democracy 
and military coups – requires a closer examination of the relationship between these five variables and left-
right self-placement. 
 Table 2.30 uses the regression coefficients from the pooled, single-country underspecified 
regression models to summarize these relationships on a variable-by-variable and country-by-country basis. 
Cells that are shaded grey indicate statistically significant relationships that associate the Left with pro-
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democratic views, cells that are not shaded indicate statistically significant relationships that associate the 
Right with pro-democratic views, and blank cells indicate that there is no statistically significant correlation 
between support for democracy and left-right self-placement for the variable and country in question. This 
analysis demonstrates that the relationship between support for democracy and left-right self-placement 
appears to be contingent upon each country’s recent political history. 
 
Table 2.30 – Support for Democracy and Support for a Military Coup 
 
 ARG BOL BRA COL CR Chile ECU ELS GUAT 
DEMPREF1 -.26  .18 .49 .91 -1.88 -.25 .58 .37 
DEMPREF2   .89 .65 1.47 -2.46  1.63 .95 
MILITARY1 .38 .37    1.95 -.28 .53  
MILITARY2 1.03  .70  1.37 2.61    
MILITARY3 .96  .57   2.82    
          
 HND MEX NIC PAN PAR Peru URU VEN DR 
DEMPREF1 .64 -.31 .55 .22  .29 -.60 .65 .37 
DEMPREF2  .52 1.02 .41 .28 .54 -1.25  1.78 
MILITARY1       1.41 .42  
MILITARY2  .51  -.64 1.04  1.93   
MILITARY3 -.75  -1.09    1.43  -1.26 
 
 In three countries (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay), support for democracy predicts self-
identification with the Left, while support for a military coup predicts self-identification with the Right. 
This pattern is not surprising, given the abuses perpetrated by Right-leaning military dictatorships in these 
Southern Cone countries during the 1970s and 1980s. In eight countries (Colombia, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and the Dominican Republic), support for democracy 
predicts identification with the Right, while support for a hypothetical military coup is not a consistent 
predictor of ideological self-placement. It is interesting to note that five of these eight countries – 
Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru – experienced protracted battles between Right-
wing government forces and armed Leftist insurgent groups during the latter half of the twentieth century. 
In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that the relationship between ideological self-identification and 
support for democracy is somewhat muddled in these countries. In another six countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela), neither support for democracy nor support for a military 
coup are consistent predictors of ideological self-placement. Therefore, what appears to be a puzzling 
contradiction when viewed at the aggregate level is transformed into a relatively clear and coherent picture 
when examined at the country level, as it is only in Brazil where both support for democracy and support 
for a military coup predict identification with the Right. 
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 Like the relationship between support for democracy and left-right self-placement, the relationship 
between respect for authority and left-right self-placement also appears to be contingent upon each 
country’s recent political history. Responses to the question (included only in the 2006 survey) of whether 
citizens should (1) be more active in questioning their leaders or (2) show more respect for authority 
(AUTHORITY1) serve as a statistically significant predictor of self-identification with the Right in ten 
countries – a result that is in line with the prediction that people who hold authoritarian attitudes will be 
more likely to identify themselves with the Right (Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996, 2006, Conover and 
Feldman 1981, Jost et al. 2003). Ordinarily, it might be reasonable to overlook these two outliers and 
conclude that respect for authority is a relatively consistent predictor of self-identification with the Right in 
Latin America. However, the fact that the two countries where this relationship runs counter to my 
prediction are precisely the two countries that, at the time of the 2006 survey (the only year when this 
question was included in the Latinobarómetro surveys), had in Evo Morales and Hugo Chávez the two most 
unapologetically Leftist leaders in the entire region suggests an alternate interpretation of this variable. 
Perhaps we should understand agreement with the statement that citizens should show more respect for 
authority not as an indicator of deeper authoritarian attitudes, but rather as a simple reflection of support for 
the government in office. 
 Unfortunately, the fact that this variable was only included in the 2006 survey makes it difficult to 
test this proposition. Responses to a thematically similar question (AUTHORITY2), which asked 
respondents (in 2002) whether it would be good or bad if people demonstrated more respect for authority, 
do little to help determine whether agreement with the statement that citizens should show more respect for 
authority should be interpreted as an indicator of deeper authoritarian attitudes or as a simple reflection of 
support for the government in office. Although the relationship between this variable and left-right self-
identification does run in the predicted direction in every country where this relationship is statistically 
significant, it is only significant in five countries. 
 Analysis of the degree to which respondents’ (1) support for maintaining institutional checks and 
balances (CONGRESS) and (2) their approval or disapproval of government officials who use their office 
to provide extra benefits to their political supporters or to their own family members (CORRUPT) predict 
left-right self-placement uncovers a pattern similar to that found with the aforementioned variable that 
measures attitudes towards government authority. Only in Chile and Venezuela, two countries where the 
electoral success of parties and politicians who identify themselves as Leftists was considerably greater 
than the regional norm during the time period covered by my dataset, does support for maintaining 
institutional checks and balances predict self-identification with the Left. Chile and Venezuela are also the 
only two countries where people who identify themselves as Leftists are more likely to approve of 
government officials who use their office to provide preferential treatment for their families and their 
political supporters. 
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 Taken together, the patterns described above suggest that respondents’ opinions on these three 
matters might be best understood as a pragmatic reaction to the results of electoral competition, not as 
principled stances which reflect the extent to which each respondent supports democracy as a system of 
governance. In other words, it may be fair to conclude that the typical Latin American citizen agrees that 
people should show more respect for authority, defends the democratic notion of maintaining institutional 
checks and balances within government, and is willing to permit government officials to share the spoils of 
office with family members and political supporters … as long he/she supports the government in power.  
 
2) Three of the questions that are included in every wave of the Latinobarómetro surveys examine 
respondents’ attitudes regarding the rule of law and tradeoffs between order and liberty. As one would 
expect, respondents who report high levels of confidence in the police (T_POLICE) and the armed forces 
(T_ARMY) and those who identify some form of violence as their country’s most important problem 
(VIOLENCE) are more likely to identify themselves with the Right. Additional variables that focus on 
issues related to tradeoffs between order and liberty – including questions that ask if the government should 
be able to decide whether certain ideas can be debated publicly (CENSOR), if it is more important to 
protect the innocent than to punish the guilty (LEGAL), if an ordered society where some liberties are 
limited would be preferable to a society where all rights and liberties are respected, even when there is 
disorder (ORDER), and if it is more important to maintain order than to protect freedom of expression or to 
provide citizens with opportunities to participate in politics (MIP1, MIP2, MIP4) – also follow the 
expectation that respondents with more authoritarian attitudes will be more likely to self-identify with the 
Right.  
 
Social and Other Issues 
 Three variables measure respondents’ attitudes on issues that might be expected to represent 
differences of opinion between social conservatives and social liberals – abortion (ABORTION), 
homosexuality (HOMO), and the appropriate role that women should play in society (MACHISMO). If the 
ideological label Right encompasses social conservatism while Left denotes (at least in part) social 
liberalism, we should expect respondents who believe that neither abortion nor homosexuality are ever 
justifiable and those who agree that a woman’s place is in the home will be more likely to identify 
themselves with the Right. As reported in Table 2.22, all three of these variables meet these expectations; 
indeed, there is no country where the relationship between any one of these three variables and left-right 
self-identification runs in the “wrong” direction. 
 Two additional policy-related questions that do not fit neatly into any one of the categories 
described above were also included in my preliminary list of independent variables. The first of these 
questions (MIGRATION) asks the respondent whether he/she agrees that there should be laws to prevent 
immigrants from entering the country; the second (ENVIRON) asks whether the respondent’s country 
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should place greater emphasis on protecting the environment than on fostering further economic 
development. I predicted that respondents who oppose restrictions on immigration and those who would 
prioritize environmental protection would be more likely to identify themselves as Leftists. However, the 
relationship between both of these variables and left-right self-placement proves to be both weak and 
inconsistent.  
 
Attitudes towards the United States 
 Unsurprisingly, given the long history of US intervention in the domestic politics of many Latin 
American countries, unfavorable opinions of the United States and of US military aggression in Iraq 
(USA1, USA2, and IRAQ), negative evaluations of George W. Bush (BUSH), and positive evaluations of 
Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez (FIDEL, and CHAVEZ) predict self-identification with the Left in every 
Latin American country except one (Panama). Moreover, the average R2 values for the underspecified, 
single-country regression models corresponding to the variables that measure respondents’ evaluations of 
George W. Bush, Fidel Castro, and Hugo Chávez are higher than those for any other variable, while the 
three variables that measure respondents’ opinions of the United States and of US military aggression in 
Iraq rank as the fifth, seventh, and eleventh strongest predictors of left-right self-placement. 
 Based on this evidence, one might argue that the strength of these relationships provides support 
for the suggestion that anti-Americanism may be the central defining factor of what it means to be a Leftist 
in contemporary Latin America (Arnold and Samuels 2011). However, the regression analysis described in 
Appendix 2.D demonstrates that, while there may indeed be a strong symbolic component to the meaning 
that Latin American voters associate with the ideological labels Left and Right, anti-Americanism appears 
to complement rather than overshadow the programmatic meanings that are also associated with these 
labels. Indeed, the examination of alternate regression models described in Appendix 2.D and summarized 
in Table 2.25 demonstrates that the addition of the variables that measure respondents’ opinion of the 
United States to regression models that use policy preferences to predict left-right self-placement increases 
the predictive power of these models by only 15-27% – a substantial but not overwhelming amount. 
 
Summary 
 In this chapter, I argued that, in the Latin American context, the appropriate question regarding the 
relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-placement is not whether citizens associate the 
terms Left and Right solely with substantive, programmatic meanings, but rather, whether policy 
preferences play any role in predicting citizens’ left-right self-placement. The preceding examination of the 
simple bivariate correlations between respondents’ left-right self-identification and their preferences on a 
variety of economic, political, and social issues not only suggests that there is indeed a policy component to 
Latin American citizens’ use of the terms Left and Right, but it also highlights the specific policy 
preferences that are the strongest and most consistent predictors of left-right self-placement in the region.  
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 I find that the relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-placement is not limited 
to the two policy areas (support for democracy and support for private ownership of the means of 
production) examined by Lupu (2009). Throughout the region, citizens associate the Right not only with 
pro-market attitudes, but also with social conservativism (i.e. conservative positions regarding abortion, 
homosexuality, and gender equality) and with support for the State’s security forces (the police and the 
armed forces), while they associate support for State intervention in the economy, distrust of the State’s 
security forces, and progressive social attitudes with the Left. 
 Contrary to the implicit assumption made by Zechmeister and Corral (2013), I also demonstrate 
that the direction of the relationship between support for democracy and left-right self-placement is not 
uniform across the region; rather, the direction of this relationship appears to be contingent on certain 
elements of each country’s recent political history. 
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Appendix 2.F 
On Education, Political Knowledge, and Interest in Politics 
 
 In this chapter, I provide evidence which demonstrates that (1) the relationship between left-right 
self-placement and voting behavior and (2) the relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-
placement are stronger in Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador than in any other country in Latin America. I 
contend that the development of programmatic party-voter linkages in these three countries is the result of 
the unification and organization of the Left and of actions taken by the Concertación, by the Frente Amplio, 
and by the FMLN to promote their ideological distinctiveness. Skeptics of this argument might reasonably 
ask whether there could be a simpler explanation for the findings I report. Perhaps the relationship between 
policy preferences and left-right self-placement is (or appears to be) stronger in Chile, Uruguay, and El 
Salvador than elsewhere in the region because voters (or survey respondents) in these three countries are 
more educated, more knowledgeable about politics, or more interested in politics than their counterparts 
elsewhere? In this appendix, I demonstrate that neither education, political knowledge, nor interest in 
politics can account for the findings I report in this chapter. 
 If we expect educational attainment to be strongly correlated with GDP per capita, then we would 
have to conclude that any argument linking education to programmatic political competition would appear 
to be more plausible in the cases of Chile and Uruguay than in El Salvador. Thankfully, however, we do 
not have to rely on such an indirect measure, since every wave of the Latinobarómetro survey includes a 
question that asks the respondent to report his/her level of educational attainment. Were survey respondents 
from Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador more educated – and therefore more likely to be able to process 
political information – than respondents elsewhere? No, they were not. 
 The Latinobarómetro data on educational attainment can be used to create five categories of nearly 
equal size: (1) no formal education or incomplete basic education (22.75% of the pooled survey sample), 
(2) complete basic education but no secondary education (15.62%), (3) some secondary education 
(19.10%), (4) complete secondary education but no post-secondary education (21.74%), and (5) some post-
secondary education, whether complete or not (20.79%). Assigning each of these five categories a value 
(from one through five) allows for the calculation of a summary measure of the average educational 
attainment for each country’s survey respondents. This measure is reported in Table 2.31; although Chile 
sits near the top of this ranking, neither Uruguay nor El Salvador exhibit a particularly high average level of 
educational attainment. Figure 2.4, which charts the relationship between average educational attainment 
and the degree to which policy preferences predict left-right self-placement, provides further evidence that 
differences in the strength of programmatic political competition cannot be attributed to difference in 
educational attainment; indeed, the two measures are weakly correlated (Pearson’s R is .24). 
 The Latinobarómetro surveys also include questions that measure respondents’ political 
knowledge and their interest in politics. In the 2003-05 surveys, respondents were asked to evaluate their 
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own level of knowledge about political and social events in their country using a five-point scale that 
ranges from (1) “nothing” to (5) “a lot.” A question that asked respondents whether they were (1) not at all, 
(2) a little, (3) fairly, or (4) very interested in politics appeared in the Latinobarómetro surveys every year 
except 2002 and 2006. Respondents’ answers to these two questions are used to determine whether 
Chileans, Uruguayans, and Salvadoran are more knowledgeable of and/or more interested in politics than 
other Latin Americans. 
 As shown in Table 2.32 and Figure 2.5, the average level of political interest is an even poorer 
predictor of the strength of the relationship between policy preferences and left-right self-placement 
(Pearson’s R is .17) than is average educational attainment. Political knowledge (or, perceived political 
knowledge) does serve as a better predictor of the strength of the relationship between policy preferences 
and left-right self-placement, as demonstrated by the position of Uruguay and Chile near the top of Table 
2.33. However, although the correlation between the average level of self-perceived political knowledge 
and the strength of programmatic political competition is relatively strong (Pearson’s R is .47), this variable 
cannot account for the presence of programmatic political competition in El Salvador. Indeed, none of the 
three variables examined in this appendix can account for the unexpected strength of programmatic party-
voter linkages in El Salvador, for Salvadoran survey respondents are thoroughly unremarkable in terms of 
their level of educational attainment, their interest in politics, and their self-perceived knowledge of 
politics. 
 
Table 2.31 – Educational Attainment by Country 
Peru 3.62  Ecuador 3.21  Costa Rica 2.86 
Chile 3.44  Paraguay 3.10  Nicaragua 2.74 
Argentina 3.31  Uruguay 3.07  Guatemala 2.57 
Bolivia 3.27  Mexico 2.98  Honduras 2.50 
Panama 3.27  El Salvador 2.92  Dominican Rep. 2.48 
Colombia 3.23  Venezuela 2.88  Brazil 2.36 
 
 
Table 2.32 – Average Level of Political Interest 
Uruguay 2.32  Argentina 2.01  Guatemala 1.93 
Mexico 2.31  Venezuela 2.00  Costa Rica 1.91 
Dominican Rep. 2.14  Brazil 1.98  Bolivia 1.91 
Panama 2.07  El Salvador 1.97  Ecuador 1.87 
Peru 2.05  Colombia 1.96  Chile 1.87 
Paraguay 2.01  Nicaragua 1.95  Honduras 1.84 
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Table 2.33 – Average Level of (Self-Perceived) Political Knowledge 
Venezuela 3.28  Paraguay 3.11  Peru 2.96 
Argentina 3.28  Dominican Rep. 3.09  El Salvador 2.93 
Uruguay 3.28  Costa Rica 3.09  Brazil 2.93 
Chile 3.23  Bolivia 3.06  Guatemala 2.83 
Mexico 3.13  Nicaragua 3.03  Colombia 2.82 
Panama 3.12  Ecuador 2.98  Honduras 2.77 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – Educational Attainment vs. Programmatic Political Competition 
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Figure 2.5 – Political Interest vs. Programmatic Political Competition  
 
 
Figure 2.6 – Political Knowledge vs. Programmatic Political Competition  
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Appendix 4.A 
GDP per Capita, 1929-2006 
 
Figure 4.2 – GDP per Capita, 1929-2006 
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Note: GDP per Capita is expressed in 1990 International Dollars. 
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Appendix 4.B 
Ideological Clarity in Latin American Party Systems 
 
Figure 4.6 – Ideological Clarity in Latin American Party Systems 
Country Party Acronym 
Mean LR 
Placement SD 
 
Election 
Year Vote % 
El Salvador Alianza Republicana Nacionalista ARENA 18.50 0.85 2006 39.4% 
El Salvador Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional FMLN 2.00 1.05 2006 39.7% 
Dominican Rep. Partido de la Liberación PLD 11.71 1.11 2006 46.4% 
Bolivia Movimiento Al Socialismo MAS 3.44 1.41 2006 50.7% 
Nicaragua Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense ALN 17.67 1.41 2006 26.7% 
Uruguay Frente Amplio FA-EP-NM 5.24 1.48 2009 48.0% 
Mexico Partido Acción Nacional PAN 17.35 1.57 2006 33.4% 
Guatemala Partido Patriota PP 16.86 1.77 2007 15.9% 
Mexico Partido de la Revolución Demócrata PRD 4.55 1.79 2006 29.0% 
Mexico Partido Revolucionario Institucional PRI 11.55 1.82 2006 28.2% 
Chile Renovación Nacional RN 16.33 1.93 2009 17.8% 
Nicaragua Partido Liberal Constitucionalista PLC 18.00 1.94 2006 26.5% 
Chile Unión Demócrata Independiente UDI 18.10 1.97 2009 23.1% 
Chile Partido por la Democracia PPD 7.90 1.97 2009 12.7% 
Colombia Partido Social de Unidad Nacional "de la U" 17.67 2.02 2006 16.7% 
Paraguay Partido Unión de Ciudadanos Éticos PUNACE 17.10 2.02 2008 18.7% 
Uruguay Partido Nacional PN 13.53 2.07 2009 29.1% 
Dominican Rep. Partido Reformista Social Cristiano PRSC 16.29 2.14 2006 10.9% 
Brazil Partido da Frente Liberal PFL 17.33 2.15 2006 10.9% 
Peru Partido Aprista Peruano PAP 10.36 2.16 2006 20.6% 
Colombia Partido Cambio Radical Colombiano PCR 16.87 2.17 2006 10.7% 
Brazil Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro PMDB 11.50 2.18 2006 14.6% 
Bolivia Poder Democrático y Social PODEMOS 16.56 2.19 2006 15.3% 
Guatemala Gran Alianza Nacional GANA 16.50 2.20 2007 16.5% 
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Country Party Acronym 
Mean LR 
Placement SD 
 
Election 
Year Vote % 
Panama Partido Cambio Democrático PCD 17.88 2.23 2009 23.4% 
Colombia Partido Conservador Colombiano PSC 17.13 2.26 2006 15.8% 
El Salvador Partido de Conciliación Nacional PCN 17.10 2.33 2006 11.0% 
Dominican Rep. Partido Revolucionario Dominicano PRD 9.00 2.38 2006 31.1% 
Colombia Partido Liberal Colombiano PL 9.07 2.46 2006 19.0% 
Brazil Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira PSDB 13.46 2.47 2006 13.6% 
Costa Rica Acción Ciudadana PAC 6.64 2.50 2006 25.3% 
Honduras Partido Nacional de Honduras PNH 17.33 2.52 2009 53.4% 
Chile Partido Demócrata Cristiano PDC 10.14 2.54 2009 14.2% 
Venezuela Movimiento Quinta República MVR 3.74 2.56 2010 48.3% 
Brazil Partido dos Trabalhadores PT 6.37 2.60 2006 15.0% 
Peru Unión por el Perú UPP 8.64 2.62 2006 21.2% 
Uruguay Partido Colorado PC 14.47 2.62 2009 17.0% 
Paraguay Asociación Nacional Republicana-Partido Colorado ANR-PC 15.70 2.75 2008 33.0% 
Peru Solidaridad Nacional SN 14.09 2.98 2006 15.3% 
Honduras Partido Liberal de Honduras PLH 15.00 3.00 2009 30.8% 
Panama Partido Panameñista (Partido Arnulfista) PP 16.89 3.22 2009 22.2% 
Panama Partido Revolucionario Democrático PRD 10.63 3.46 2009 35.7% 
Costa Rica Partido Liberación Nacional PLN 12.45 3.75 2006 36.5% 
Venezuela Comité de Organización Política Electoral del Pueblo Independiente COPEI 14.84 3.91 2010 47.2% 
Guatemala Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza UNE 8.38 4.34 2007 22.8% 
Paraguay Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico PLRA 14.30 4.40 2008 28.3% 
Nicaragua Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional FSLN 7.33 5.57 2006 37.6% 
 
Notes: The vote total for Mexico’s PRD refers to the votes received by the "Coalicion por el Bien de Todos," which also included two minor parties: the PT and Convergencia. The 
vote total for Mexico’s PRI refers to the votes received by the “Alianza por Mexico,” which also included the PVEM. The vote total for Venezuela’s MVR refers to the votes 
received by its successor party, the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela. The vote total for Peru’s SN refers to the votes received by the Unidad Nacional alliance formed by the 
SN, the Partido Popular Cristiano, and Renovación Nacional. The vote total for Venezuela’s COPEI refers to the votes received by the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, a coalition 
of 50 anti-Chávez parties. 
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Appendix 5.A 
The Decline of the PCN and the PDC 
 
Figure 5.3 – The Decline of the PCN and the PDC 
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Note: This figure reports the percentage of valid votes received by the PCN and the PDC in every legislative election 
held from the two parties’ formation through the first post-war election in 1994. Data points for the PDC in 1972-78 
report the vote percentage of the National Opposition Union (UNO), an electoral alliance led by the PDC; UNO 
boycotted the elections in 1976 and 1978. 
 
Sources: Nohlen (2005) for the 1964-70 and 1985 elections, data files provided by El Salvador’s Supreme Electoral 
Tribune (TSE) for all other elections. 
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Appendix 5.B 
Results of Legislative and Municipal Elections, 1994-2009 
 
Table 5.1 – March 1994 Election Results 
 ARENA FMLN PDC PCN Others 
Presidential Vote % 49.1% 25.0% 16.3% 5.3% 4.3% 
Presidential Run-off Vote % 68.3% 31.7%    
Legislative Vote % 45.0% 21.4% 17.9% 6.2% 9.5% 
Seats in Legislature 39 21 18 4 2 
Mayorships Won 206   16* 29 10 1 
 
Note: * Includes two mayorships won in coalition with other parties. 
 
Table 5.2 – March 1997 Election Results 
 ARENA FMLN PCN PDC Others 
Legislative Vote % 35.4% 33.0% 8.7% 8.4% 14.5% 
Seats in Legislature 28 27 11 10 8 
   Change, 1994-97 -11 +6 +7 -8  
Mayorships Won 160   54* 18 19+ 11 
 
Notes: * Includes six mayorships won in coalition with other parties. + Includes four mayorships won in coalition with 
other parties. 
 
Table 5.3 – March 2000 Election Results 
 ARENA FMLN PCN PDC Others 
Legislative Vote % 36.0% 35.2% 8.8% 7.2% 12.7% 
Seats in Legislature 29 31 13 6 5 
   Change, 1997-2000 +1 +4 +2 -4  
Mayorships Won 126   80* 34 24+ 7 
 
Notes: * Includes sixteen mayorships won in coalition with other parties. + Includes nine mayorships won in coalition 
with other parties. Total exceeds 262 (the number of municipalities) because the FMLN and PDC formed part of the 
same winning electoral coalition in nine municipalities. 
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Table 5.4 – March 2003 Election Results 
 FMLN ARENA PCN PDC Others 
Legislative Vote % 34.0% 31.9% 13.0% 7.3% 13.9% 
Seats in Legislature 31 27 16 5 5 
   Change, 2000-03 -- -2 +3 -1  
Mayorships Won 74* 111 52 25+ 6 
 
Notes: * Includes twelve mayorships won in coalition with other parties. + Includes ten mayorships won in coalition 
with other parties. Total exceeds 262 (the number of municipalities) because the FMLN and PDC formed part of the 
same winning electoral coalition in six municipalities. 
 
Table 5.5 – March 2006 Election Results 
 FMLN ARENA PCN PDC Others 
Legislative Vote % 39.3% 39.2% 11.4% 6.9% 3.2% 
Seats in Legislature 32 34 10 6 2 
   Change, 2003-06 +1 +7 -6 +1  
Mayorships Won 59* 147 39 15+ 3 
 
Notes: * Includes five mayorships won in coalition with other parties. + Includes one mayorship won in coalition with 
the FMLN. Total exceeds 262 (the number of municipalities) because the FMLN and PDC formed part of the same 
winning electoral coalition in one municipality. 
 
Table 5.6 – January 2009 Election Results 
 FMLN ARENA PCN PDC Others 
Legislative Vote % 42.6% 38.6% 8.8% 6.9% 3.1% 
Seats in Legislature 35 32 11 5 1 
   Change, 2006-09 +3 -2 +1 -1  
Mayorships Won 96* 122+ 33 12# 2 
 
Notes: * Includes twenty-one mayorships won in coalition with other parties. + Includes one mayorship won in a run-off 
election after the initial election resulted in a tie. # Includes three mayorships won in coalition with other parties. Total 
exceeds 262 (the number of municipalities) because the FMLN and PDC formed part of the same winning electoral 
coalition in three municipalities. 
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Appendix 6 
Genealogy of the Guatemalan Right 
 
Figure 6.2 – Genealogy of the Guatemalan Right 
 
 
 
1) The National Advancement Party (PAN) was founded in 1989 by Álvaro Arzú (who won the presidency 
in 1995 but later abandoned the party) and Óscar Berger (who abandoned the party before being elected 
president in 1999).  
2) The Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) was founded in 1990 by Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt, who was 
later (in 2013) convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity for the murders of 1,771 members of the 
Ixil indigenous group that were committed while Ríos Montt ruled the country from March 23, 1982 (when 
he led the coup that ended the presidency of Gen. Romeo Lucas García) until August 8, 1983 (when his 
own government was toppled by a coup led by his Defense Minister, Gen. Óscar Mejía).  
3) Though led by former URNG-DIA presidential candidate Álvaro Colom, the National Unity of Hope 
(UNE) traces its origins to a group of legislators who had abandoned the PAN in 2000.  
4) The Unionist Party (PU) was also formed by politicians (including former president Álvaro Arzú) who 
left the PAN in 2000.  
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5) The Grand National Alliance (GANA) was created in 2003 by ten PAN legislators who supported Óscar 
Berger’s presidential campaign.  
6) The Patriot Party (PP) broke away from GANA after the 2003 election to support the presidential 
aspirations of its leader, Otto Pérez Molina.  
7) The National Change Union (UCN) was formed in 2006 by two-term FRG legislator Mario Estrada, nine 
other legislators who had left the FRG, and three who had abandoned UNE.  
8) Compromise, Renewal, and Order (CREO) was founded in 2010 by Roberto González Díaz-Durán, who 
had served as the Minister of Energy and Mining during the Berger presidency and who, as a member of 
GANA, had finished second in the 2007 Guatemala City mayoral election.  
9) Renewed Democratic Liberty (LIDER) was created in 2010 by Manuel Baldizón, who had been elected 
to the Congress in 2003 as a member of PAN, and again in 2007 as a member of UNE. 
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Appendix 7.A 
Q-Method Research 
 
 What is Q-method? 1 First introduced by William Stephenson in 1935 as an instrument designed to 
study individuals’ subjective beliefs and attitudes, Q-method differs from the more familiar “R-method” 
approach to the analysis of public opinion data in that it aims to discover the universe of perspectives that 
can be found within a population rather than to measure the frequency of occurrence of certain perspectives 
in that population (the goal of the frequentist approach).2 Described by Doody et al. (2009: 1130) as “a 
scientific approach to the study of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity ... [based] on the premise that 
there are a finite number of discourses surrounding any topic,” Q-method has as one of its main strengths 
the ability to provide “an accurate reflection of the broad spectrum of discourses that exist within a larger 
population” from a relatively small sample size.  
 At the heart of Q-method is the Q-sort, a process through which Q-participants rank-order a set of 
Q-statements (expressions of perspectives on the topic of interest to the researcher, drawn from the 
concourse of possible perspectives) into a quasi-normal distribution according to some explicit rule, as 
instructed by the researcher. Compared to the frequentist approach – which defines the survey respondent 
as the subject, the population as the set of possible respondents, and the survey question as the variable – 
Q-method inverts the subjects and the variables. The Q-sort generated by each Q-participant is the variable, 
the Q-statements are the subjects, and the population consists of the concourse of all possible Q-statements 
that contain expressions of the perspectives that exist regarding the topic at hand. Factor analysis is used to 
identify patterns in the placement of the Q-statements in different Q-participants’ Q-sorts; the resultant 
factors, which reflect the deeper organizing principles present within the population, are referred to as 
“social perspectives.” 
 As noted above, one of the advantages of Q-method is the ability to produce statistically 
significant results with a relatively small number of participants. Webler et al. (2009: 9-10) provide two 
useful rules of thumb for determining the appropriate number of Q-participants and Q-statements needed to 
produce a reliable Q-study. Since Q-studies typically uncover 2-5 social perspectives, and since 4-6 
individual Q-participants are generally sufficient to define a perspective, the number of participants can be 
anywhere between eight and thirty. As for the number of Q-statements to include, a Q-statement to Q-
participant ratio of 3:1 is often used; ratios below 2:1 are deemed inappropriate. 
 My decision to use Q-method to examine the extent to which voters’ understanding and usage of 
left-right semantics are (or are not) based on programmatic divides was influenced by Zechmeister’s (2006) 
use of Q-method to examine voters’ understanding of the ideological labels Left and Right in Mexico and 
                                                 
1
  The description of Q-method that follows is informed by the works of Brown (1980, 1993, 1996, n.d.), van Exel 
and de Graaf (2005), Webler et al. (2009), and Doody et al. (2009). 
2
  This frequentist approach to the study of individual beliefs and attitudes is dubbed the “R-method” due to its 
reliance upon statistical tests used to produce Pearson product-moment coefficients (referred to as “r” statistics). 
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Argentina. In her study, Zechmeister used a total of sixty-two Q-statements; thirty-six of these are policy-
related statements, twenty-one are symbolic items (references to certain domestic political actors, political 
parties, and societal groups), and the remaining five are described as valence items. While I followed 
Zechmeister’s example by including policy-based, symbolic, and valence items that might be attached to 
the ideological labels Left and Right in my concourse of Q-statements, I also made some noteworthy 
changes designed to facilitate comparisons between the results of my Q-method research and the results of 
other work that uses elite survey data and/or public opinion survey data to examine the social perspectives 
on ideology that exist in Latin America. 
 In the Q-studies I conducted in El Salvador and Costa Rica,3 I used a total of sixty-seven Q-
statements: thirty-nine statements representing seven categories of policy-based items (economic 
inequality, the economic role of the state, domestic taxation, free trade, support for democracy, law and 
order issues, and social issues), twenty statements that refer to four categories of symbolic referents 
(domestic political parties and politicians, groups in society, international political actors, and personal 
characteristics), six valence items referring to government priorities, and two country-specific statements.4 
Twenty-eight of these statements are either the same as or very similar to the statements used by 
Zechmeister; the main innovation in my concourse of Q-statements is the inclusion of the symbolic 
references to four international political actors (the United States, George W. Bush, Hugo Chávez, and 
Fidel Castro), an inclusion motivated by my finding of a strong relationship between attitudes towards 
these four actors and Left-Right self-placement amongst Latinobarómetro survey respondents. 
 A second difference between my study and Zechmeister’s concerns the instructions given to the 
Q-participants as they conducted their Q-sort. Whereas Zechmeister randomly assigned her Q-participants 
to sort the Q-statements either for the term Left or the term Right, I instructed Q-participants to 
simultaneously sort for both terms. This was done in order to reinforce the idea that these two terms 
constitute the endpoints of a one-dimensional continuum, just as they are used on public opinion surveys 
when respondents are asked to place themselves and/or prominent domestic and international political 
actors on a Left-Rights scale. 
 The third and perhaps most substantial difference between my study and Zechmeister’s concerns 
the recruitment of Q-participants. Ideally, Q-participants are selected not at random, but rather, they are 
“chosen because they have different and well-formed opinions” on the matter at hand (Webler et al. 2009: 
9). The parallel here is with the selection of survey questions in frequentist research; just as the researcher, 
when designing his/her survey instrument, does not choose questions at random, but rather selects 
questions that he/she expects will elicit interesting and meaningful insights, the researcher conducting a Q-
study selects Q-participants because he/she believes that these individuals will reveal interesting and 
                                                 
3
  I went into the field with the intention of conducting this study in Guatemala as well. For reasons that are described 
in Chapter Six, identifying a suitable sample of Q-participants in Guatemala proved to be unworkable. 
4
  The full list of Q-statements, along with English-language translations, is reported below. 
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meaningful perspectives that are expected to represent the entire range of perspectives that could be found 
in the population. Since it seems reasonable to assume that people who are actively involved in partisan 
politics are more likely to have “well-formed opinions” regarding the meanings they attach to ideological 
labels than people who are not politically inclined, and since it is also reasonable to predict that different 
political parties’ supporters might differ in their understandings of these terms, known party sympathizers 
may form the ideal set of Q-participants for a study of the policies and actors that are associated with the 
terms Left and Right. 
 Therefore, whereas Zechmeister recruited her Q-participants at random from the student 
population of elite private universities in Mexico City and Buenos Aires, I recruited most of my Q-
participants (who totaled twenty-two in each country) by visiting national offices (and, in the case of El 
Salvador, departmental and municipal offices as well) of the four main political parties in each country – 
the FMLN, ARENA, PCN, and PDC in El Salvador, and the PLN, PAC, PML, and PUSC in Costa Rica – 
to identify party activists, low-level party officials, and other known party sympathizers who were willing 
to complete the Q-sort process. In both countries, additional Q-participants were recruited to represent the 
population of voters who are not closely affiliated with any political party.5 
 
Q-Sort Statements 
 This list provides the exact text and English translation of each of the sixty-seven Q-statements 
used in the Q-sorts conducted in El Salvador and Costa Rica. Text included in brackets refers to differences 
in wording used in the Q-statements for each country. 
 
Policy Issues: Economic Inequality 
1. Creer que es más importante aumentar la producción económica que reducir las diferencias entre 
los ricos y los pobres. Believe that it is more important to increase economic production than to 
reduce the differences between the rich and the poor. 
2. Creer que con el crecimiento económico la pobreza se reducirá, sin que el Estado introduzca 
programas para reducir las diferencias entre los ricos y los pobres. Believe that economic growth 
will result in poverty reduction, even if the State does not introduce any programs for reducing the 
differences between the rich and the poor. 
3. Creer que cada persona/familia debe ser responsable por su propio bienestar. Believe that each 
person/family should be responsible for its own wellbeing. 
4. Creer que la distribución de ingresos en [El Salvador / Costa Rica] es injusta. Believe that the 
income distribution in [El Salvador / Costa Rica] is unjust. 
                                                 
5
  The distribution of partisan Q-participants in each country was designed to roughly approximate the relative 
electoral strength of the four largest political parties based on their vote percentage in previous election cycles. In El 
Salvador, this translated to seven Q-participants each from ARENA and the FMLN and two each from the PCN and the 
PDC. In Costa Rica, there were eight Q-participants from the PLN, six from the PAC, and two each from the PUSC 
and PML. Non-partisan Q-participants were recruited amongst students from the Universidad de El Salvador, the 
Universidad Don Bosco (Soyapango, El Salvador), the Universidad de Costa Rica, and the Cartago (Costa Rica) 
campus of the Universidad Estatal a Distancia.  
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5. Creer que es responsabilidad del Estado intervenir en la economia para reducir las diferencias 
entre los ricos y los pobres. Believe that the State is responsible for intervening in the economy to 
reduce the differences between the rich and the poor. 
6. Creer que el Estado debe ser responsable por el bienestar de todos los [salvadoreños / 
costarricenses]. Believe that the State should be responsible for the wellbeing of all [Salvadorans / 
Costa Ricans]. 
 
Policy Issues: Role of the State 
7. Creer que las privatizaciones han sido beneficiosas para la economía nacional. Believe that 
privatizations have benefited the national economy. 
8. Creer que la economía de mercado (el capitalismo) es el mejor sistema económico para [ELS / 
CR]. Believe that the market economy (capitalism) is the best economic system for [El Salvador / 
Costa Rica]. 
9. Creer que la producción económica debe dejarse en manos del sector privado, y que el gobierno 
debe intervenir lo menos posible en la economía. Believe that economic production should be left 
in the hands of the private sector, and that the government should intervene as little as possible in 
the economy. 
10. Creer que algunos servicios públicos son demasiados importantes para dejarse en manos del sector 
privado. Believe that some public services are too important to be left in the hands of the private 
sector. 
11. Creer que el Estado debe determinar los precios de los bienes y los servicios para asegurar que la 
gente tenga acceso a los productos alimenticios básicos y los servicios médicos. Believe that the 
State should determine the prices of goods and services to guarantee that people have access to 
basic foodstuffs and to medical services. 
12. Creer que es la responsabilidad del Estado dar empleo a los [salvadoreños / costarricenses]. 
Believe that it is the State’s responsibility to provide jobs for [Salvadorans / Costa Ricans]. 
66-E. Creer que la dolarización trajo más daños que beneficios a la economía nacional y que se debe 
volver a usar el colón como moneda nacional. Believe that dollarization caused more harm than 
good for the national economy, and that the colón should be reinstated as the national currency. 
[Statement only used in El Salvador]. 
 
Policy Issues: Domestic Taxation 
13. Creer que los impuestos deben ser mínimos, aun si eso implica que el Estado gastaría menos en 
servicios públicos. Believe that taxes should be kept to a minimum, even if this means that the 
State will spend less on public services. 
14. Creer que el Estado debe gastar más en la educación, la salúd y otros servicios sociales, aun si 
necesita aumentar los impuestos para cubrir estos gastos. Believe that the State should spend more 
on education, health care, and other social services, even if it needs to increase taxes in order to 
pay for these expenditures. 
 
Policy Issues: Free Trade 
15. Creer que el tratado de libre comercio (TLC) con los Estados Unidos beneficiará a la economía 
nacional. Believe that the free trade agreement with the United States will benefit the national 
economy. 
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16. Favorecer la eliminación de los impuestos sobre las importaciones y las exportaciones para así 
fomentar el comercio internacional. Favor eliminating taxes on imports and exports in order to 
encourage international trade. 
17. Creer que [El Salvador / Costa Rica] debe tratar de atraer más inversión internacional para así 
fomentar el desarrollo económico. Believe that [El Salvador / Costa Rica] should try to attract 
more international investment in order to encourage economic development. 
18. Creer que los problemas económicos que tiene [El Salvador / Costa Rica] son consecuencia de 
tener una economía que depende demasiado de los mercados internacionales. Believe that [El 
Salvador’s / Costa Rica’s] economic problems are a consequence of having an economy that is 
too reliant on international markets. 
19. Creer que la integración económica a nivel latinoamericano reducirá los problemas económicos de 
[El Salvador / Costa Rica]. Believe that economic integration in Latin America will reduce [El 
Salvador’s / Costa Rica’s] economic problems. 
 
Policy Issues: Support for Democracy 
20. Creer que la democracia siempre es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. Believe that 
democracy is always preferable to any other form of government. 
21. Creer que es normal y aceptable que un gobernante favorece a las personas que votaron por él. 
Believe that it is normal and acceptable that an elected official favor the people who voted for 
him. 
22. Creer que los [salvadoreños / costarricenses] deben demostrar más respeto a las autoridades. 
Believe that [Salvadorans / Costa Ricans] should show more respect for government authorities. 
23. Creer que los [salvadoreños / costarricenses] deben cuestionar más a las autoridades públicas. 
Believe that [Salvadorans / Costa Ricans] should question government authorities more 
frequently. 
24. Creer que los funcionarios públicos deben ser sancionados si solamente dan empleo a sus 
familiares y a las personas que pertenecen al mismo partido político. Believe that public officials 
should be punished if they only employ family members and people who belong to the same 
political party as they do. 
25. Creer que, en algunas circunstancias, puede ser mejor tener un gobierno no democrático (un 
gobierno militar o una dictadura personal) que tener un gobierno democrático. Believe that, in 
certain circumstances, it may be better to have a non-democratic government (a military 
government or a personal dictatorship) than to have a democratic government. 
 
Policy Issues: Law and Order 
26. Creer que la manera más eficaz de combatir la inseguridad pública es dar más recursos a la policia 
[y a las fuerzas armadas] y aplicar penas más severas a los delincuentes. Believe that the best way 
to combat public insecurity is to provide more resources to the police [and the armed forces] and 
to apply more severe penalties for delinquency. 
27. Creer que el Estado debe gastar más en [las fuerzas armadas y] la seguridad pública. Believe that 
the State should spend more on [the armed forces and] public security. 
28. Creer que [El Salvador / Costa Rica] debe implementar la pena de muerte para reducir la 
delincuencia. Believe that [El Salvador / Costa Rica] should implement the death penalty in order 
to reduce delinquency. 
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29. Creer que el problema de la [inseguridad (la violencia, la delincuencia y el crimen) / la inseguridad 
pública] es el problema más importante que enfrenta [El Salvador / Costa Rica]. Believe that 
[insecurity (violence, delinquency, and crime) / public insecurity] is the most important problem 
facing [El Salvador / Costa Rica]. 
30. Creer que es mejor vivir en una sociedad donde el orden se mantiene, aun si los derechos y las 
libertades de los ciudadanos son limitados, que vivir en una sociedad que respeta todos los 
derechos y libertades de los ciudadanos pero donde a veces hay desordenes. Believe that it is 
better to live in a society where order is maintained, even if citizens’ rights and liberties are 
limited, than it is to live in a society that respects all of its citizens’ rights and liberties, but where 
disorder sometimes occurs. 
31. Creer que la mejor manera de combatir la inseguridad pública es crear más empleos y más 
oportunidades para la gente joven. Believe that the best way to combat public insecurity is to 
create more jobs and more opportunities for young people. 
32. Creer que es más importante para el sistema judicial proteger a los inocentes que castigar a los 
culpables. Believe that it is more important for the judicial system to protect innocent persons than 
to punish the guilty. 
33. Creer que proteger los derechos humanos de los [salvadoreños / costarricenses] es más importante 
que combatir la inseguridad. Believe that protecting [Salvadorans’ / Costa Ricans’] human rights 
is more important than combating public insecurity. 
34. Creer que el gobierno no debe poder censurar a los medios de comunicación. Believe that the 
government should not be allowed to censor the media. 
35. Creer que el gobierno siempre debe obedecer las leyes, aun cuando esto implica dejar en libertad a 
un presunto delincuente por falta de evidencias. Believe that the government should always obey 
the law, even when this implies allowing a presumed delinquent to retain his/her freedom if there 
is not enough evidence to prove his/her guilt. 
 
Policy Issues: Social Issues 
36. Ser una persona muy religiosa y practicante. Be a very religious person who is active in his/her 
church. 
37. Creer que los líderes religiosos deben tener más autoridad de lo que tienen. Believe that religious 
leaders should have more authority than they do. 
38. Favorecer la legalización del aborto. Support the legalization of abortion. 
39. Estar a favor de los derechos de los homosexuales. Support gay/lesbian rights. 
66-C. Creer que Costa Rica debe tomar medidas más estrictas para frenar la inmigración ilegal de 
personas de Nicaragua y de otros paises vecinos. Believe that Costa Rica should take stricter 
actions in order to reduce illegal immigration from Nicaragua and other neighboring countries. 
[Statement only used in Costa Rica]. 
67-C. Creer que la inmigración de personas de Nicaragua y de otros paises vecinos representa una 
amenaza para la sociedad costarricense. Believe that immigrants from Nicaragua and other 
neighboring countries represent a threat to Costa Rican society. [Statement only used in Costa 
Rica]. 
 
Valence Items: Government Priorities 
40. Creer que el crecimiento económico debe ser una de las prioridades más altas del gobierno. 
Believe that economic growth should be one of the government’s top priorities. 
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41. Creer que la seguridad pública debe ser una de las prioridades más altas del gobierno. Believe that 
public security should be one of the government’s top priorities. 
42. Creer que proteger los derechos humanos debe ser una de las prioridades más altas del gobierno. 
Believe that protecting human rights should be one of the government’s top priorities. 
43. Creer que proteger el medio ambiente debe ser una de las prioridades más altas del gobierno. 
Believe that environmental protection should be one of the government’s top priorities. 
44. Creer que combatir a la corrupción debe ser una de las prioridades más altas del gobierno. Believe 
that combating corruption should be one of the government’s top priorities. 
45. Creer que combatir la pobreza y la desigualdad debe ser una de las prioridades más altas del 
gobierno. Believe that combating poverty and inequality should be one of the government’s top 
priorities. 
 
Symbolic Referents: Identification with Groups in Society 
46. Identificarse con los ricos. Identify oneself with the rich. 
47. Identificarse con los empresarios. Identify oneself with businessmen. 
48. Identificarse con los pobres. Identify oneself with the poor. 
49. Identificarse con los comunistas. Identify oneself with the communists. 
50. Identificarse con los trabajadores. Identify oneself with workers. 
51. Identificarse con el pueblo [salvadoreño / costarricense]. Identify oneself with the [Salvadoran / 
Costa Rican] people. 
 
Symbolic Referents: Identification with International Political Actors 
52. Identificarse con George W. Bush. Identify oneself with George W. Bush. 
53. Identificarse con los Estados Unidos. Identify oneself with the United States. 
54. Identificarse con Hugo Chávez. Identify oneself with Hugo Chávez. 
55. Identificarse con Fidel Castro. Identify oneself with Fidel Castro. 
 
Symbolic Referents: Identification with Domestic Political Actors, El Salvador 
56. Identificarse con Roberto d’Aubuisson. Identify oneself with Roberto d’Aubuisson, the former 
death squad organizer who co-founded ARENA, was the party’s candidate in the 1984 
presidential election, and served as one of the party’s top leaders until his death in 1992. 
57. Identificarse con ARENA. Identify oneself with National Republican Alliance, the right-wing 
political party formed in 1982 that governed El Salvador from 1989-2009. 
58. Identificarse con Alfredo Cristiani. Identify oneself with Alfredo Cristiani; ARENA’s first 
president, Cristiani introduced privatizations and other neoliberal reforms during his presidency, 
1989-94, and he; returned as the party’s president in 2009. 
59. Identificarse con el FMLN. Identify oneself with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, 
which was formed in 1980 through the union of five guerrilla forces and their affiliated civilian 
organization, and which was reorganized as a political party in 1992. 
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60. Identificarse con Schafik Hándal. Identify oneself with Schafik Hándal, longtime leader of the 
Salvadoran Communist Party and later the FMLN who was the unsuccessful FMLN candidate in 
the 2004 presidential election. 
61. Identificarse con Mauricio Funes. Identify oneself with Mauricio Funes, a former journalist who 
became the FMLN’s first president upon his election in 2009. 
67-E. Identificarse con las fuerzas armadas. Identify oneself with the armed forces. [Statement only used 
in El Salvador]. 
 
Symbolic Referents: Identification with Domestic Political Actors, Costa Rica 
56. Identificarse con el Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC). Identify oneself with the Citizen’s Action 
Party, a center-left party founded by ex-PLN legislator Ottón Solís in 2000 that has traditionally 
campaigned on an anti-corruption platform.  
57. Identificarse con el Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN). Identify oneself with the National 
Liberation Party, Costa Rica’s most successful political party since its formation in 1951; the PLN 
has occupied Costa Rica’s presidency for 37 of the past 61 years. 
58. Identificarse con el Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC). Identify oneself with the Social 
Christian Unity Party, which was founded in 1983 by the union of four political parties who had 
formed an electoral coalition to oppose the PLC in the 1978 presidential election, held Costa 
Rica’s presidency from 1990-94 and from 1998-2006, and was one of Costa Rica’s two dominant 
parties until 2006, when the party lost much of its support following a series of highly-publicized 
corruption scandals involving two ex-presidents. 
59. Identificarse con el Movimiento Libertario. Identify oneself with the Libertarian Movement Party, 
the classical liberal party founded in 1994 that achieved its best electoral performance in 2010, 
when presidential candidate Otto Guevara finished in third place with 20.8% of the vote and the 
party won 9 seats in the Costa Rican legislature. 
60. Identificarse con José Figueres Ferrer (Don Pepe). Identify oneself with José Figueres Ferrer, the 
leader of the victorious National Liberation Army in Costa Rica’s 1948 civil war who abolished 
the country’s armed forces, founded the PLN in 1951, and thrice served as the country’s president 
(1948-49, 1953-58, and 1970-74). 
61. Identificarse con Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia. Identify oneself with Rafael Ángel Calderón 
Guardia, who served as president of Costa Rica from 1940-44; though elected with the support of 
the country’s coffee oligarchy, Calderón enacted a variety of progressive reforms, including the 
introduction of the minimum wage, the creation of Costa Rica’s social security system, and land 
reform. His son, PUSC politician Rafael Ángel Calderón Fournier, served as Costa Rica’s 
president from 1990-94 and was later sentenced to a five-year prison term for taking bribes in 
exchange for awarding a Finnish company contracts with Costa Rica’s social security agency. 
 
Symbolic Referents: Personal Characteristics 
62. Ser corrupto. Be corrupt. 
63. Ser patriótico. Be patriotic. 
64. Ser trabajador. Be hard-working. 
65. Ser honesto. Be honest. 
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Description of the Q-Sort Process 
 With each Q-participant, I began the data collection process by reading the following statement, 
which includes a brief explanation of the purpose of my research project and the instructions for the first 
part of the Q-sort process: 
 
Cuando los analistas hablan de la política, muchas veces dicen que algunas personas, 
algunos partidos políticos y algunas ideas son “de la izquierda,” mientras otras 
personas, otros partidos políticos y otras ideas son “de la derecha.” La investigación 
que yo estoy realizando busca entender mejor lo que significan estos términos en al 
ámbito centroamericano. 
 
Para comenzar, quiero que Ud. lea las frases que están escritas en cada una de estas 67 
tarjetas. Si la frase está de acuerdo con el concepto que Ud. tiene de lo que significa el 
término Izquierda, póngala en frente de la tarjeta que dice “IZQUIERDA.” Si la frase 
está de acuerdo con el concepto que Ud. tiene de lo que significa el término Derecha, 
póngala en frente de la tarjeta que dice “DERECHA.” Y si la frase no está relacionada 
con el concepto que Ud. tiene de lo que significan los términos Derecha e Izquierda, 
póngala en frente de la tarjeta que dice “NO RELACIONADA.” 
 
When analysts talk about politics, they often say that some people, some political parties, 
and some ideas are “Leftist,” while other people, other political parties, and other ideas 
are “Rightist.” My research seeks a better understanding of what these terms mean in the 
Central American context. 
 
To begin, I want you to read the sentences that are written of each of these 67 notecards. 
If the sentence corresponds to your conception of what the term Left means, place it in 
front of the notecard that says “Left.” If the sentence corresponds to your conception of 
what the term Right means, place it in front of the notecard that says “Right.” And if the 
sentence is not related to your conception of the meaning of the terms Right or Left, place 
it in front of the notecard that says “Not Related.” 
 
 Once the Q-participant had concluded this initial sort, I recorded the placement of each Q-
statement. Then, beginning either with the stack of cards initially identified with the Right or with the stack 
of cards initially identified with the Left, I instructed the Q-participant to select the three statements that are 
most closely associated with his/her understanding of the term Right (Left). Once this step was complete, I 
instructed the Q-participant to do the same with the cards that he/she had initially placed in the opposite 
stack. This process of alternating between stacks and choosing the appropriate number of statements that 
are most closely associated with the term Right (Left) amongst those statements that remained in the stack 
continued until the Left and Rights stacks were both depleted. Then, I instructed the Q-participant to 
reconsider the cards initially placed in the “Not Related” stack and classify the appropriate number as either 
slightly associated with the Left or slightly associated with the Right until only the eleven cards that would 
form the neutral column of the quasi-normal distribution (shown below) remained.  
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Figure 7.2 – Q-Sort Distribution 
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 Throughout this process, I encouraged Q-participants to explain the rationale for their sorting 
decisions; the comments that Q-participants provided during and after the completion of the Q-sort often 
provided valuable information. After they had completed their Q-sort, I also interviewed each Q-
participant, asking them a series of questions about their participation in partisan politics, their interest in 
politics, and the strength of their partisan attachments. During these interviews, I also asked each Q-
participant to place his/her own political preferences and the country’s main political parties and its recent 
presidents on an 11-point Left-Right scale. 
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Table 7.1 – Q-Statements Associated with the Right, Costa Rica, Factor 1. 
No. Statement Z-Score 
9 Economic production should be left in the hands of the private sector. 1.884 
8 Capitalism is the best economic system for this country. 1.836 
2 Economic growth will result in poverty reduction. 1.777 
16 Favor eliminating taxes ... in order to encourage international trade. 1.676 
1 It is more important to increase economic production than to reduce inequality. 1.592 
40 Economic growth should be one of the government’s top priorities. 1.550 
13 Taxes should be kept to a minimum ... 1.450 
7 Privatizations have benefited the national economy. 1.377 
3 Each person/family should be responsible for its own wellbeing. 1.291 
26 The best way to combat insecurity is to provide more resources to the police ... 1.266 
47 Identify oneself with businessmen. 1.167 
15 The free trade agreement with the US will benefit the national economy. 1.121 
17 This country should try to attract more international investment ... 1.088 
 
Table 7.2 – Q-Statements Associated with the Left, Costa Rica, Factor 1. 
No. Statement Z-Score 
5 State is responsible for reducing the differences between rich and poor. -1.976 
10 Some public services are too important to be left to the private sector. -1.771 
14 The State should spend more on education, health care .... -1.689 
4 The income distribution in this country is unjust. -1.557 
45 Combating poverty/inequality should be one of the government’s top priorities. -1.554 
6 The State should be responsible for the wellbeing of all citizens. -1.461 
50 Identify oneself with workers. -1.399 
11 The State should ... guarantee that people have access to basic foodstuffs ... -1.393 
49 Identify oneself with the communists. -1.224 
18 This country's economic problems are a consequence of ... international markets. -1.220 
43 Environmental protection should be one of the government’s top priorities. -1.178 
42 Protecting human rights should be one of the government’s top priorities. -1.071 
12 It is the State’s responsibility to provide jobs. -1.060 
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Table 7.3 – Q-Statements Associated with the Right, El Salvador, Factor 1. 
No. Statement Z-Score 
7 Privatizations have benefited the national economy. 1.858 
46 Identify oneself with the rich. 1.801 
56 Identify oneself with Roberto d’Aubuisson. 1.656 
8 Capitalism is the best economic system for this country. 1.516 
57 Identify oneself with ARENA. 1.503 
9 Economic production should be left in the hands of the private sector. 1.494 
58 Identify oneself with Alfredo Cristiani. 1.461 
47 Identify oneself with businessmen. 1.286 
15 The free trade agreement with the US will benefit the national economy. 1.270 
1 It is more important to increase economic production than to reduce inequality. 1.233 
2 Economic growth will result in poverty reduction. 1.019 
 
Table 7.4 – Q-Statements Associated with the Left, El Salvador, Factor 1. 
No. Statement Z-Score 
45 Combating poverty/inequality should be one of the government’s top priorities. -1.829 
59 Identify oneself with the FMLN. -1.693 
10 Some public services are too important to be left to the private sector. -1.467 
48 Identify oneself with the poor. -1.418 
60 Identify oneself with Schafik Hándal. -1.411 
4 The income distribution in this country is unjust. -1.400 
66E Believe that ... the colón should be reinstated as the national currency. -1.353 
49 Identify oneself with the communists. -1.343 
54 Identify oneself with Hugo Chávez. -1.312 
11 The State should ... guarantee that people have access to basic foodstuffs ... -1.246 
55 Identify oneself with Fidel Castro. -1.228 
14 The State should spend more on education, health care .... -1.199 
51 Identify oneself with this country's people. -1.190 
5 State is responsible for reducing the differences between rich and poor. -1.156 
50 Identify oneself with workers. -1.041 
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Table 7.5 – Q-Statements Associated with the Right, Costa Rica, Factor 2. 
No. Statement Z-Score 
20 Democracy is always preferable to any other form of government. 2.388 
45 Combating poverty/inequality should be one of the government’s top priorities. 2.024 
42 Protecting human rights should be one of the government’s top priorities. 1.696 
44 Combating corruption should be one of the government’s top priorities. 1.538 
31 The best way to combat public insecurity is to create more jobs ... 1.517 
41 Public security should be one of the government’s top priorities. 1.153 
6 The State should be responsible for the wellbeing of all citizens. 1.151 
48 Identify oneself with the poor. 1.097 
51 Identify oneself with this country's people. 1.021 
 
Table 7.6 – Q-Statements Associated with the Left, Costa Rica, Factor 2. 
No. Statement Z-Score 
49 Identify oneself with the communists. -2.444 
55 Identify oneself with Fidel Castro. -2.397 
25 In certain circumstances, it may be better to have a non-democratic ... -2.265 
54 Identify oneself with Hugo Chávez. -2.166 
30 It is better to live in a society where order is maintained ... -1.972 
62 Be corrupt. -1.219 
38 Support the legalization of abortion. -1.204 
34 Government should not be allowed to censor the media. -1.125 
9 Economic production should be left in the hands of the private sector. -1.058 
 
Table 7.7 – Q-Statements Associated with the Right, El Salvador, Factor 2. 
No. Statement Z-Score 
51 Identify oneself with this country's people. 1.675 
20 Democracy is always preferable to any other form of government. 1.612 
57 Identify oneself with ARENA. 1.577 
6 The State should be responsible for the wellbeing of all citizens. 1.489 
50 Identify oneself with workers. 1.487 
41 Public security should be one of the government’s top priorities. 1.431 
43 Environmental protection should be one of the government’s top priorities. 1.421 
63 Be patriotic. 1.336 
65 Be honest. 1.334 
31 The best way to combat public insecurity is to create more jobs ... 1.257 
44 Combating corruption should be one of the government’s top priorities. 1.167 
42 Protecting human rights should be one of the government’s top priorities. 1.020 
17 This country should try to attract more international investment ... 1.008 
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Table 7.8 – Q-Statements Associated with the Left, El Salvador, Factor 2. 
No. Statement Z-Score 
59 Identify oneself with the FMLN. -2.294 
49 Identify oneself with the communists. -2.206 
54 Identify oneself with Hugo Chávez. -1.840 
55 Identify oneself with Fidel Castro. -1.729 
60 Identify oneself with Schafik Hándal. -1.662 
67E Believe that ... the colón should be reinstated as the national currency. -1.447 
61 Identify oneself with Mauricio Funes. -1.398 
62 Be corrupt. -1.396 
35 The government should always obey the law ... -1.106 
38 Support the legalization of abortion. -1.010 
 
Table 7.9 – Factor Scores 
 Social Perspective 
 CR 1 CR 2   ELS 1 ELS 2 
Eigenvalue 10.64 2.78  7.74 3.78 
Explained Variance 48% 13%  35% 17% 
Defining Sorts 14 6  14 6 
 
Table 7.10 – Defining Sorts by Party Affiliation, Costa Rica 
Party Affiliation Factor 1 Factor 2 None 
PAC  6  0 0 
PLN  7  0 1 
PUSC  0  2 0 
PML  0  2 0 
No party affiliation  1  2 1* 
 
* The Q-sort of one nonpartisan Q-participant is identified as a defining sort on factor 1, but with a negative factor 
loading. 
 
Table 7.11 – Defining Sorts by Party Affiliation, El Salvador 
Party Affiliation Factor 1 Factor 2 None 
FMLN  7  0 0  
CD  1  0 0 
PDC  1  1 0 
PCN  1  0 1 
ARENA  1  5 1 
No party affiliation  3  0 0 
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Appendix 7.B 
Costa Rica Political Timeline, 1931-Present 
 
From Global Depression to Civil War, 1929-1948 
1931 Foundation of Costa Rican Communist Party (PCCR) (June 16). 
1932 PCCR renamed Workers and Peasants Bloc (BOC). 
1934 Legislative Election (February 11): First electoral participation of Workers and Peasants Bloc 
(BOC), which finished fifth with 5.0% of the vote. 
1936 General Election (February 9): León Cortés Castro (National Republic Party, PRN) won 
presidency with 60.2% of the vote. Legislative vote totals: PRN 59.4%, National Party 34.5%, 
BOC 6.1%. 
1938 Legislative Election (April 13): PRN 62.1%, BOC 11.6%, others 26.3% 
1940 General Election (February 11): Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia (PRN) elected president with 
84.5% of the vote. Legislative vote totals not available. 
1940 Foundation of Center for the Study of National Problems (CEPN). 
1941 Creation of Costa Rican Department of Social Security (CCSS) (November 1). 
1941 Costa Rica declared war on Japan (December 8). 
1941 BOC published national unity platform (December). 
1942 Legislative Election (February 8): PRN 63.3%, BOC 16.3%, Democratic Party (PD) 9.2%, 
Cortesista Party 8.1%, others 3.1%. 
1942 Formation of Anti-totalitarian Unification Committee, beginning of cooperation between Calderón 
and the Communists (April). 
1942 Calderón announced program of reforms (May 1). 
1942 San Pablo sunk in Limón harbor by a German submarine (July 3). 
1942 Figueres made radio address criticizing Picado government; arrested and sent into exile (July 8). 
1943 Establishment of Democratic Action as faction within PD (June 2). 
1943 Dissolution of BOC and creation of Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) (June 13). 
1943 Formation of Bloque de la Victoria between PRN and PVP (September 22). 
1943 Introduction of new Labor Code (September 15). 
1944 General Election (February 13): Teodoro Picado Michalski (PRN-PVP) won presidency with 
75.1% of the vote. Legislative vote totals not available. 
1944 Democratic Action separated from PD. 
1944 Figueres returned from exile in Mexico (May 4). 
1945 Foundation of Social Democratic Party (PSD) via merger of Center for the Study of National 
Problems (CEPN) and Democratic Action (March 11). 
1945 Figueres resigned post as head of PSD Finance Department, returned to PD (April 14). 
1945 PVP organized protests against Picado government for delaying reform (July 18). 
1945 Creation of Democratic Union Party (PUD) by PD, National Union Party (PUN), and PSD. 
1946 Legislative Election (February 10): PRN 50.5%, PD 41.6%, PVP 5.4%, others 2.3%. 
1946 Foundation of Authentic Cortesista Party. 
1946 Figueres publicly asserted that an armed revolt was necessary to overthrow the Calderón-Picado 
regime (August 22). 
1947 PUD and Authentic Cortesista Party hold joint national convention, name Otilio Ulate Blanco 
candidate for 1948 presidential election (February 13). 
1948 General Election (February 8). Election commission declared Ulate provisional winner of 
presidential election with 55.3% of the vote (February 28). Legislative vote totals not available. 
1948 Legislative Assembly voted 27-19 to annul the results of the presidential election (March 1). 
1948 Police ordered to arrest Ulate (March 8). 
1948 Costa Rican Civil War began when forces led by José Figueres Ferrer captured the town of San 
Isidro de El General (March 12). 
1948 Government forces surrendered the city of Cartago to Figueres-led rebels (April 12). 
1948 Figueres recaptured San Isidro de El General in the last battle of the civil war (April 19). 
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1948 Pact of Ochomogo signed by Figueres and PVP leader Manuel Mora Valverde (April 19). 
1948 Picado handed power to interim president Santos León Herrera (April 20). 
1948 Pact of the Mexican Embassy ended hostilities, established Junta Fundadora de la Segunda 
República (April 22). 
 
 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 1948-66 
1948 Junta assumed power from León Herrera (May 8) 
1948 Decree 105 prohibited the PVP for being “antidemocratic” (July 17) 
1948 Constitutional Assembly Election (December 8): PUN 74.2%, Constitutional Party 12.9%, PSD 
7.6%, others 5.3%. 
1948 Calderón supporters launched armed invasion from Nicaragua (December). 
1949 Security Minister Edgar Cardona Quirós led failed coup attempt (April 3). 
1949 Legislative Election (October 4): PUN 71.7%, Constitutional Party 15.7%, PSD 6.6%, others 
6.0%. 
1949 New Constitution approved by Constitutional Assembly (November 7) 
1949 Ulate assumed presidency (November 8). 
1951 Foundation of National Liberation Party (PLN) (October 12). 
1953 General Election (July 26): Figueres (PLN) won presidency with 64.7% of the vote. Legislative 
seats: PLN 30, PD 11, others 4. 
1955 Calderón supporters launched armed invasion from Nicaragua (December). 
1958 General Election (February 2): Mario Echandi Jiménez (PUN) elected president with 46.4% of the 
vote. Legislative seats: PLN 20, Republican Party 11, PUN 10, others 4. 
1962 General Election (February 4): Francisco Orlich (PLN) won presidency with 50.3% of the vote. 
Legislative seats: PLN 29, Republican Party 18, PUN 8, others 2. 
 
 
Ideological Conflict Gives Way to Bipartisan Cooperation, 1966-82 
1966 Foundation of National Unification Party (UfN) as coalition of Republican Party and PUN. 
1966 General Election (February 6): José Joaquín Trejos Fernández (UfN) elected president with 50.5% 
of the vote. Legislative seats: PLN 29, PUN 26, others 2. 
1967 PUN left UfN coaltion. 
1967 Foundation of Christian Democratic Party (PDC) (October 27). 
1968 Figueres threatened to leave PLN and resurrect PSD if not named presidential candidate. 
1970 General Election (February 1): Figueres (PLN) won presidency with 54.8% of the vote. 
Legislative seats: PLN 32, UfN 22, others 3. 
1972 Foundation of Democratic Renovation Party (PRD) by dissidents from the progressive wing of the 
PLN (March 6). 
1972 Foundation of Popular Union Party (PUP) by ex-presidents Echandi and Trejos (March 6). 
1974 General Election (February 3): Daniel Oduber Quirós (PLN) elected president with 43.4% of the 
vote. Legislative seats: PLN 27, UfN 16, National Independent Party 6, others 8. 
1975 Article 98 of the 1949 Constutition (the prohibition of Communist parties) lifted. 
1976 Foundation of Calderonista Republican Party (PRC) (July 27). 
1976 Foundation of Unity Coalition by PRD, PUP, PRC, and PDC (August 13). 
1978 Foundation of People United Coalition (CPU) by PVP, Costa Rican Socialist Party (PSC), and 
People’s Revolutionary Movement (MRP). 
1978 General Election (February 5): Rodrigo Carazo Odio (Unity Coalition) won the presidency with 
50.5% of the vote. Legislative seats: Unity Coalition 27, PLN 25, others 5. 
1979 National Export Plan adopted by President Carazo in response to economic crisis. 
1982 General Election (February 7): Luis Alberto Monge (PLN) elected president with 58.8% of the 
vote. Legislative seats: PLN 33, Unity Coalition 18, others 6. 
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Ideological Convergence, 1982-2002 
1982 Pact negotiated by Monge and Calderón Fournier: PUSC allowed to retain public financing in 
exchange for agreement to support PLN economic reforms. 
1983 Foundation of Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) by members of the Unity Coalition (December 
17). 
1984 PVP separated from CPU. Foundation of Costa Rican People’s Party (PPC). 
1985 Costa Rica received $80 million Structural Adjustment loan from the World Bank. 
1986 General Election (February 2): Óscar Arias (PLN) won the presidency with 52.3% of the vote. 
Legislative seats: PLN 29, PUSC 25, others 3. 
1989 Costa Rica received $200 million Structural Adjustment loan from the World Bank. 
1990 General Election (February 4): Rafael Ángel Calderón Fournier (PUSC) elected president with 
51.5% of the vote. Legislative seats: PUSC 29, PLN 25, others 3. 
1994 General Election (February 2): José María Figueres Olsen (PLN) won the presidency with 49.6% 
of the vote. Legislative seats: PLN 28, PUSC 25, others 4. 
1994 Costa Rica received $180 million Structural Adjustment loan from the World Bank. 
1994 Foundation of Libertarian Movement (ML) (May). 
1995 Figueres-Calderón Pact (April 28). 
1998 General Election (February 4): Miguel Ángel Rodríguez (PUSC) elected president with 47.0% of 
the vote. Legislative seats: PUSC 27, PLN 23, others 7. Absenteeism: 30.0%. 
1999 First legislative debate regarding Combo ICE (December). 
2000 Legislative Assembly approved Combo ICE by 47-10 vote (March 20). 
2000 Anti-Combo ICE protest march drew tens of thousands of participants (March 23). 
2000 Government initiated dialogue with opponents of Combo ICE (April 4). 
2000 Combo ICE declared unconstitutional (April). 
2000 Foundation of Citizen’s Action Party (PAC) (December). 
 
 
The End of Two-Party Politics, 2002-Present 
2002 General Election (February 3): Abel Pacheco (PUSC) and Rolando Araya Monge (PLN) advance 
to presidential run-off election. Legislative seats: PUSC 19, PLN 17, PAC 14, ML 6, others 1. 
2002 Presidential Run-Off Election (April 7): Pacheco won with 58.0% of the vote. 
2004 CCSS-Fischel corruption scandal uncovered (April). 
2004 President Pacheco signed Central American Free Trade Agreement (May). 
2004 ICE-Alcatel corruption scandal uncovered (September). 
2004 Foundation of Broad Front (FA) (October). 
2005 National Christian Alliance, National Agrarian Party, and General Union Party integrated into 
ML. 
2006 General Election (February 5): Óscar Arias (PLN) elected president with 40.9% of the vote. 
Legislative seats: PLN 25, PAC 17, ML 6, PUSC 5, others 4. 
2007 Referendum held to decide ratification of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (TLC) 
(October 7). 
2009 Calderón Fournier sentenced to five years in prison for role in CCSS-Fischel case (October). 
2010 General Election (February 7): Laura Chinchilla (PLN) won the presidency with 46.8% of the 
vote. Legislative seats: PLN 24, PAC 11, ML 9, PUSC 6, others 7. 
2011 Rodríguez sentenced to five years in prison for role in ICE-Alcatel case (April). 
2012 Conviction of Rodríguez overturned (December). 
2014 General Election (February 5): Luis Guillermo Solís (PAC) and Johnny Araya (PLN) advance to 
presidential run-off election. Legislative seats: PLN 18, PAC 13, FA 9, PUSC 8, ML 4, others 5. 
2014 Araya abandoned presidential campaign (March 6). 
2014 Presidential Run-Off Election (April 6): Solís won with 77.8% of the vote. 
 
  340  
Appendix 9 
List of Interviews 
 
In compliance with the University of Minnesota’s regulations for research exempt from IRB Committee 
Review, I only recorded data that could be used to identify the interview subjects and Q-participants that 
participated in my investigation if they are public figures who explicitly provided consent to have their 
identities revealed. Consequently, except in the case of elected officials, candidates for elected office, 
prominent party officials, and academics, the following list of interview subjects and Q-participants 
includes only the interview date, a general description of the interview subject’s connection to party 
politics, and (for El Salvador) the name of the city or department where the interview was conducted. All 
interviews in Costa Rica were conducted in the province of San José; all interviews in Guatemala were 
conducted in Guatemala City.  
 
El Salvador (2011) 
1. October 13 Non-partisan professional staff member in an ARENA-controlled city hall 
(Chalatenango) 
2. October 28 Orlando Cocar Romano, Manager of ARENA’s “Instituto de Formación 
Política Mayor Roberto d’Aubuisson” (San Salvador) 
3. November 3 Non-partisan national government official (San Salvador) 
4. November 9 Guillermo José Portillo, president of GANA’s National Youth Committe 
and alternate candidate in the 2012 legislative election (San Salvador) 
5. November 10 ARENA party activist (Chalatenango) 
6. November 10 ARENA party activist (Chalatenango) 
7. November 10 ARENA party activist (Chalatenango) 
8. November 16 Evelín Patricia Gutiérrez Castro, political scientist at the Universidad 
Pedagógica (San Salvador) 
9. November 17 CD party activist (San Salvador) 
10. November 20 Dr. Rigoberto Mejía, ARENA mayor of Chalatenango (Chalatenango) 
11. November 21 ARENA party activist and municipal director (Chalatenango) 
12. November 25 FMLN party activist (Cuscatlán) 
13. November 25 FMLN party activist (Cuscatlán) 
14. November 25 FMLN party activist and ex-combatant (Cuscatlán) 
15. November 28 ARENA party activist and manager of party office (La Libertad) 
16. November 28 ARENA party activist (La Libertad) 
17. November 28 Col. José Monico, ARENA mayoral candidate in the 2012 election (La 
Libertad) 
18. November 30 ARENA party activist (Chalatenango) 
19. December 3 FMLN party activist (Chalatenango) 
20. December 8 PDC party activist and national office staff member (San Salvador) 
21. December 8 PDC party activist and national office staff member (San Salvador) 
22. December 8 non-partisan university student (San Salvador) 
23. December 8 non-partisan university student (San Salvador) 
24. December 12 ARENA party activist from Sonsonate (San Salvador) 
25. December 12 FMLN party activist (San Salvador) 
26. December 12 FMLN party activist (San Salvador) 
27. December 14 PCN party activist and manager of party office (La Paz) 
28. December 14 PCN party activist (La Paz) 
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Costa Rica (2012) 
1. January 18 PUSC activist and national office staff member 
2. January 20 PUSC activist and national office staff member 
3. January 24 Member of PAC’s National Executive Youth Committee from Limón 
4. January 24 Member of PAC’s Political Commission 
5. January 24 Member of PAC’s Election Commission 
6. January 24 Member of PAC’s Citizen Training Commission 
7. January 24 PAC activist 
8. January 28 non-partisan university student 
9. January 28 non-partisan university student from Cartago 
10. January 28 delegate at PAC Citizen Congress 
11. January 28 delegate at PAC Citizen Congress from Alajuela 
12. January 29 PAC municipal council member in Cartago 
13. January 29 Alberto Salom, former PAC legislator and political scientist at the 
Universidad Nacional 
14. February 1 Ottón Solís, PAC founder and three-time presidential candidate 
15. February 1 PAC activist from Cartago 
16. February 1 PAC activist and national office staff member 
17. February 2 Ronald Alfaro Redondo, political scientist at the Universidad de Costa Rica 
18. February 3 ML activist and national office staff member 
19. February 3 ML activist and member of national campaign staff 
20. February 6 Rotsay Rosales, political scientist at the Universidad de Costa Rica 
21. February 7 Member of PLN’s Internal Elections Commission 
22. February 15 Ciska Raventós Vorst, sociologist at the Universidad de Costa Rica 
23. February 15 FA activist 
24. February 18 Member of PLN’s Fuerza Verde youth organization 
25. February 18 Member of PLN’s Fuerza Verde youth organization 
26. February 18 Member of PLN’s Fuerza Verde youth organization from Heredia 
27. February 18 Member of PLN’s Fuerza Verde youth organization 
28. February 18 Member of PLN’s Fuerza Verde youth organization 
29. February 18 Member of PLN’s Fuerza Verde youth organization 
30. February 18 Member of PLN’s Fuerza Verde youth organization 
31. February 18 Member of PLN’s Fuerza Verde youth organization 
32. February 23 non-partisan university student from Cartago 
33. February 23 non-partisan university student from Cartago 
 
 
Guatemala (2012) 
1. March 15 Byron Navas, director of LIDER campaign staff 
2. March 19 LIDER party activist and national office staff member 
3. March 19 UNE party activist 
4. March 19 LIDER party activist from El Progreso 
5. March 19 LIDER party activist and national office staff member 
6. March 23 Manuel Barquín, UNE-GANA legislator (2012-16) 
7. March 23 Edgar Dedet, GANA legislator (2008-12) and member of Central American 
Parliament (2012-16) 
8. March 28 GANA party activist and national office staff member 
9. March 28 GANA party activist and member of GANA Women’s Secretariat 
10. March 28 GANA party activist and candidate in 2012 legislative election 
11. March 29 Member of PP legislative staff 
12. March 29 Member of PP legislative staff 
 
